WORKER'S DISABILITY COMPENSATION ACT OF 1969
Act 317 of 1969
418.131 Exclusive remedy; exception; “employee” and “employer” defined.
Sec. 131.
(1) The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer for a personal injury or occupational disease. The only exception to this exclusive remedy is an intentional tort. An intentional tort shall exist only when an employee is injured as a result of a deliberate act of the employer and the employer specifically intended an injury. An employer shall be deemed to have intended to injure if the employer had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge. The issue of whether an act was an intentional tort shall be a question of law for the court. This subsection shall not enlarge or reduce rights under law.
(2) As used in this section and section 827, "employee" includes the person injured, his or her personal representatives, and any other person to whom a claim accrues by reason of the injury to, or death of, the employee, and "employer" includes the employer's insurer and a service agent to a self-insured employer insofar as they furnish, or fail to furnish, safety inspections or safety advisory services incident to providing worker's compensation insurance or incident to a self-insured employer's liability servicing contract.
History: 1969, Act 317, Eff. Dec. 31, 1969 ;-- Am. 1972, Act 285, Imd. Eff. Oct. 30, 1972 ;-- Am. 1987, Act 28, Imd. Eff. May 14, 1987 ;-- Am. 1993, Act 198, Eff. Dec. 28, 1994
Compiler's Notes:
Section 3 of Act 198 of 1993 provides as follows:
“Section 3. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), this amendatory act shall not take effect unless the state administrative board certifies in writing to the secretary of state by December 31, 1994 that an agreement for the transfer of all or substantially all of the assets and the assumption of all or substantially all of the liabilities of the state accident fund has been consummated with a permitted transferee pursuant to the requirements of section 701a of the worker's disability compensation act of 1969, Act No. 317 of the Public Acts of 1969, being section 418.701a of the Michigan Compiled Laws, as added by this amendatory act.
“(2) Sections 700 and 701a as added by this amendatory act shall take effect upon the date of enactment of this amendatory act.”
PopularName Notes:
Act 317
Notes of Decisions
David J McQueer v. Perfect Fence Co., 917 N.W.2d 584 (Mich. 2018).
· cites it 14× “171 reads, in pertinent part: (1) If any employer subject to the provisions of this act, in this section referred to as the principal, contracts with any other person, in this section referred to as the contractor, who is not subject to this act . . . and who does not become…”
Hesse v. Ashland Oil, Inc, 642 N.W.2d 330 (Mich. 2002).
· cites it 39× “MCL 418.131 restricts recovery to the disabled employee and "any other person to whom a claim accrues by reason of the injury to, or death of, the employee.”
Travis v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 551 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. 1996).
· cites it 16× “§ 418.131(1); M.S.A. § 17.237(131)(1). The precise issues framed by the parties are (1) whether the facts alleged by the plaintiffs are sufficient as a matter of law to state a question for the jury regarding liability within the intentional tort exception of the WDCA, (2)…”
Adams v. Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 508 N.W.2d 464 (Mich. 1993).
· cites it 24× “Any plaintiff that proves facts necessary to sustain a jury's determination of corporate liability will also prove facts necessary to escape the confines of the Workers' Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.”
Reed v. Yackell, 703 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 2005).
· cites it 10× “[12] This principle is expressed in MCL 418.131(1), which provides, "The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer for a personal injury or occupational disease.”
Wells v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 364 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. 1985).
· cites it 10× “Defendant Firestone moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff was barred from bringing the action against Firestone by the exclusive remedy provision of the Michigan Worker's Disability Compensation Act of 1969, MCL 418.”
Gray v. Morley, 596 N.W.2d 922 (Mich. 1999).
· cites it 14× “We find that plaintiff has not presented the requisite proof that defendant specifically intended to injure plaintiff, and affirm the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant.”
Johnson v. Detroit Edison Co., 795 N.W.2d 161 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 9× “This action requires us to determine whether plaintiffs, Sandra Johnson and Hiram Jones, proffered sufficient circumstantial evidence that defendant, Detroit Edison Company, committed an intentional tort under the exception to the exclusive remedy of the Worker’s Disability…”
Clifton Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., 731 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2013).
· cites it 5× “” Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.131 . If this were not the case, injured employees could circumvent the restrictions the WDCA places on the benefits an injured employee is entitled to receive.”
Harris v. Vernier, 617 N.W.2d 764 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 8× “§ 418.131; MSA 17.237(131). Plaintiff argued, in response, that defendant had failed to assert the affirmative defense of "immunity granted by law" under MCR 2.”
Mathis v. Interstate Motor Freight Sys., 289 N.W.2d 708 (Mich. 1980).
· cites it 6× “Corollary issues are: (1) Whether such employee is precluded by § 131 of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.131, MSA 17.237(131) from collecting no-fault insurance benefits when the employer is self-insured under the no-fault act.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.131(1) — 136 cases
David J McQueer v. Perfect Fence Co., 917 N.W.2d 584 (Mich. 2018).
“171 reads, in pertinent part: (1) If any employer subject to the provisions of this act, in this section referred to as the principal, contracts with any other person, in this section referred to as the contractor, who is not subject to this act . . . and who does not become…”
Travis v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 551 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. 1996).
“§ 418.131(1); M.S.A. § 17.237(131)(1). The precise issues framed by the parties are (1) whether the facts alleged by the plaintiffs are sufficient as a matter of law to state a question for the jury regarding liability within the intentional tort exception of the WDCA, (2)…”
Reed v. Yackell, 703 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 2005).
“[12] This principle is expressed in MCL 418.131(1), which provides, "The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer for a personal injury or occupational disease.”
Adams v. Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 508 N.W.2d 464 (Mich. 1993).
“Any plaintiff that proves facts necessary to sustain a jury's determination of corporate liability will also prove facts necessary to escape the confines of the Workers' Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.”
Gray v. Morley, 596 N.W.2d 922 (Mich. 1999).
“We find that plaintiff has not presented the requisite proof that defendant specifically intended to injure plaintiff, and affirm the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.131(2) — 5 cases
Hesse v. Ashland Oil, Inc, 642 N.W.2d 330 (Mich. 2002).
“MCL 418.131 restricts recovery to the disabled employee and "any other person to whom a claim accrues by reason of the injury to, or death of, the employee.”
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