Michigan Compiled Laws

Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161 (2026)

“Employee” defined; exclusion from coverage of partner or spouse, child, or parent in employer's family; election by employee to be excluded; notice of election; duration of elected exclusion.

✓ current as of July 2026
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WORKER'S DISABILITY COMPENSATION ACT OF 1969


Act 317 of 1969


418.161 “Employee” defined; exclusion from coverage of partner or spouse, child, or parent in employer's family; election by employee to be excluded; notice of election; duration of elected exclusion.

Sec. 161.

    (1) As used in this act, "employee" means:

    (a) A person in the service of the state, a county, city, township, village, or school district, under any appointment, or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written. A person employed by a contractor who has contracted with a county, city, township, village, school district, or the state, through its representatives, shall not be considered an employee of the state, county, city, township, village, or school district that made the contract, if the contractor is subject to this act.

    (b) Nationals of foreign countries employed pursuant to section 102(a)(1) of the mutual educational and cultural exchange act of 1961, Public Law 87-256, 22 USC 2452, shall not be considered employees under this act.

    (c) Police officers, fire fighters, or employees of the police or fire departments, or their dependents, in municipalities or villages of this state providing like benefits, may waive the provisions of this act and accept like benefits that are provided by the municipality or village but are not entitled to like benefits from both the municipality or village and this act. However, this waiver does not prohibit those employees or their dependents from being reimbursed under section 315 for the medical expenses or portion of medical expenses that are not otherwise provided for by the municipality or village. This act shall not be construed as limiting, changing, or repealing any of the provisions of a charter of a municipality or village of this state relating to benefits, compensation, pensions, or retirement independent of this act, provided for employees.

    (d) On-call members of a fire department of a county, city, village, or township shall be considered to be employees of the county, city, village, or township, and entitled to all the benefits of this act if personally injured in the performance of duties as on-call members of the fire department whether the on-call member of the fire department is paid or unpaid. On-call members of a fire department of a county, city, village, or township shall be considered to be receiving the state average weekly wage at the time of injury, as last determined under section 355, from the county, village, city, or township for the purpose of calculating the weekly rate of compensation provided under this act except that if the member's average weekly wage was greater than the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury, the member's weekly rate of compensation shall be determined based on the member's average weekly wage.

    (e) On-call members of a fire department or an on-call member of a volunteer underwater diving team that contracts with or receives reimbursement from 1 or more counties, cities, villages, or townships is entitled to all the benefits of this act if personally injured in the performance of their duties as on-call members of a fire department or as an on-call member of a volunteer underwater diving team whether the on-call member of the fire department or the on-call member of the volunteer underwater diving team is paid or unpaid. On-call members of a fire department shall be considered to be receiving the state average weekly wage at the time of injury, as last determined under section 355, from the fire department for the purpose of calculating the weekly rate of compensation provided under this act except that if the member's average weekly wage was greater than the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury, the member's weekly rate of compensation shall be determined based on the member's average weekly wage. On-call members of a volunteer underwater diving team shall be considered to be receiving the state average weekly wage at the time of injury, as last determined under section 355, from the fire department for the purpose of calculating the weekly rate of compensation provided under this act except that if the member's average weekly wage was greater than the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury, the member's weekly rate of compensation shall be determined based on the member's average weekly wage.

    (f) The benefits of this act are available to a safety patrol officer who is engaged in traffic regulation and management for and by authority of a county, city, village, or township, whether the officer is paid or unpaid, in the same manner as benefits are available to on-call members of a fire department under subdivision (d), upon the adoption by the legislative body of the county, city, village, or township of a resolution to that effect. A safety patrol officer or safety patrol force when used in this act includes all persons who volunteer and are registered with a school and assigned to patrol a public thoroughfare used by students of a school.

    (g) A volunteer civil defense worker who is a member of the civil defense forces as provided by law and is registered on the permanent roster of the civil defense organization of the state or a political subdivision of the state shall be considered to be an employee of the state or the political subdivision on whose permanent roster the employee is enrolled if engaged in the performance of duty and shall be considered to be receiving the state average weekly wage at the time of injury, as last determined under section 355, from the state or political subdivision for purposes of calculating the weekly rate of compensation provided under this act.

    (h) A volunteer licensed under section 20950 or 20952 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.20950 and 333.20952, who is an on-call member of a life support agency as defined under section 20906 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.20906, shall be considered to be an employee of the county, city, village, or township and entitled to the benefits of this act if personally injured in the performance of duties as an on-call member of a life support agency whether the on-call member of the life support agency is paid or unpaid. An on-call member of a life support agency shall be considered to be receiving the state average weekly wage at the time of injury, as last determined under section 355, from the county, city, village, or township for purposes of calculating the weekly rate of compensation provided under this act except that if the member's average weekly wage was greater than the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury, the member's weekly rate of compensation shall be determined based on the member's average weekly wage.

    (i) A volunteer licensed under section 20950 or 20952 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.20950 and 333.20952, who is an on-call member of a life support agency as defined under section 20906 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.20906, that contracts with or receives reimbursement from 1 or more counties, cities, villages, or townships is entitled to all the benefits of this act if personally injured in the performance of his or her duties as an on-call member of a life support agency whether the on-call member of the life support agency is paid or unpaid. An on-call member of a life support agency shall be considered to be receiving the state average weekly wage at the time of injury, as last determined under section 355, from the life support agency for the purpose of calculating the weekly rate of compensation provided under this act except that if the member's average weekly wage was greater than the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury, the member's weekly rate of compensation shall be determined based on the member's average weekly wage.

    (j) If a member of an organization recognized by 1 or more counties, cities, villages, or townships within this state as an emergency rescue team is employed by a state, county, city, village, or township within this state as a police officer, fire fighter, emergency medical technician, or ambulance driver and is injured in the normal scope of duties including training, but excluding activation, as a member of the emergency rescue team, he or she shall be considered to be engaged in the performance of his or her normal duties for the state, county, city, village, or township. If the member of the emergency rescue team is not employed by a state, county, city, village, or township within this state as a police officer, fire fighter, emergency medical technician, or ambulance driver, and is injured in the normal scope of duties, including training, as a member of the emergency rescue team, he or she shall be considered to be an employee of the team. For the purpose of securing the payment of compensation under this act, on activation, each member of the team shall be considered to be covered by a policy obtained by the team unless the employer of a member of the team agrees in writing to provide coverage for that member under its policy. Members of an emergency rescue team shall be considered to be receiving the state average weekly wage at the time of injury, as last determined under section 355, from the team for the purpose of calculating the weekly rate of compensation provided under this act except that if the member's average weekly wage was greater than the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury, the member's weekly rate of compensation shall be determined based on the member's average weekly wage. As used in this subdivision, "activation" means a request by the emergency management coordinator appointed pursuant to section 8 or 9 of the emergency management act, 1976 PA 390, MCL 30.408 and 30.409, made of and accepted by an emergency rescue team.

    (k) A political subdivision of this state is not required to provide compensation insurance for a peace officer of the political subdivision with respect to the protection and compensation provided by 1937 PA 329, MCL 419.101 to 419.104.

    (l) Every person in the service of another, under any contract of hire, express or implied, including aliens; a person regularly employed on a full-time basis by his or her spouse having specified hours of employment at a specified rate of pay; working members of partnerships receiving wages from the partnership irrespective of profits; a person insured for whom and to the extent premiums are paid based on wages, earnings, or profits; and minors, who shall be considered the same as and have the same power to contract as adult employees. Any minor under 18 years of age whose employment at the time of injury is shown to be illegal, in the absence of fraudulent use of permits or certificates of age in which case only single compensation shall be paid, shall receive compensation double that provided in this act.

    (m) Every person engaged in a federally funded training program or work experience program that mandates the provision of appropriate worker's compensation for participants and that is sponsored by the state, a county, city, township, village, or school district, or an incorporated public board or public commission in the state authorized by law to hold property and to sue or be sued generally, or any consortium thereof, shall be considered, for the purposes of this act, to be an employee of the sponsor and entitled to the benefits of this act. The sponsor is responsible for the provision of worker's compensation and shall secure the payment of compensation by a method permitted under section 611. If a sponsor contracts with a public or private organization to operate a program, the sponsor may require the organization to secure the payment of compensation by a method permitted under section 611.

    (n) Every person performing service in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of an employer at the time of the injury, if the person in relation to this service does not maintain a separate business, does not hold himself or herself out to and render service to the public, and is not an employer subject to this act. On and after January 1, 2013, services are employment if the services are performed by an individual whom the Michigan administrative hearing system determines to be in an employer-employee relationship using the 20-factor test announced by the internal revenue service of the United States department of treasury in revenue ruling 87-41, 1 C.B. 296. An individual for whom an employer is required to withhold federal income tax is prima facie considered to perform service in employment under this act. If a business entity requests the Michigan administrative hearing system to determine whether 1 or more individuals performing service for the entity in this state are in covered employment, the Michigan administrative hearing system shall issue a determination of coverage of service performed by those individuals and any other individuals performing similar services under similar circumstances.

    (o) An individual registered with the state of Michigan verification system described in 42 USC 247d-7b shall be considered an employee of the state of Michigan when engaged in the performance of duties or services as a registrant, or when training to provide those duties or services, except if another employer provides coverage for that individual specifically for duties and services arising from registration with this state. That individual shall be considered to be receiving the state average weekly wage at the time of injury or death, as last determined under section 355, from the state of Michigan for purposes of calculating the weekly rate of compensation provided under this act, except that if the individual's average weekly wage was greater than the state average weekly wage at the time of injury or death the individual's weekly rate of compensation shall be determined based upon the individual's weekly average wage. The state of Michigan shall exercise all the rights and obligations of an employer and carrier as provided for under this act.

    (2) A policy or contract of worker's compensation insurance, by endorsement, may exclude coverage as to any 1 or more named partners or the spouse, child, or parent in the employer's family. A person excluded pursuant to this subsection is not subject to this act and shall not be considered an employee for the purposes of section 115.

    (3) An employee who is subject to this act, including an employee covered pursuant to section 121, who is an employee of a limited liability company of not more than 10 members and who is also a manager and member, as defined in section 102 of the Michigan limited liability company act, 1993 PA 23, MCL 450.4102, and who owns at least a 10% interest in that limited liability company, with the consent of the limited liability company as approved by a majority vote of the members, or if the limited liability company has more than 1 manager, all of the managers who are also members, except as otherwise provided in an operating agreement, may elect to be individually excluded from this act by giving a notice of the election in writing to the carrier with the consent of the limited liability company endorsed on the notice. The exclusion remains in effect until revoked by the employee by giving notice in writing to the carrier. While the exclusion is in effect, section 141 does not apply to any action brought by the employee against the limited liability company.

    (4) An employee who is subject to this act, including an employee covered pursuant to section 121, who is an employee of a corporation that has not more than 10 stockholders and who is also an officer and stockholder who owns at least 10% of the stock of that corporation, with the consent of the corporation as approved by its board of directors, may elect to be individually excluded from this act by giving a notice of the election in writing to the carrier with the consent of the corporation endorsed on the notice. The exclusion remains in effect until revoked by the employee by giving a notice in writing to the carrier. While the exclusion is in effect, section 141 does not apply to any action brought by the employee against the corporation.

    (5) If the persons to be excluded from coverage under this act pursuant to subsections (2) to (4) comprise all of the employees of the employer, those persons may elect to be excluded from being considered employees under this act by submitting written notice of that election to the director upon a form prescribed by the director. The exclusion shall remain in effect until revoked by giving written notice to the director.

History: 1969, Act 317, Eff. Dec. 31, 1969 ;-- Am. 1975, Act 268, Imd. Eff. Nov. 10, 1975 ;-- Am. 1976, Act 21, Imd. Eff. Feb. 26, 1976 ;-- Am. 1980, Act 357, Eff. Jan. 1, 1982 ;-- Am. 1982, Act 32, Imd. Eff. Mar. 10, 1982 ;-- Am. 1982, Act 282, Imd. Eff. Oct. 7, 1982 ;-- Am. 1983, Act 162, Imd. Eff. July 24, 1983 ;-- Am. 1985, Act 103, Imd. Eff. July 30, 1985 ;-- Am. 1994, Act 97, Imd. Eff. Apr. 13, 1994 ;-- Am. 1994, Act 271, Imd. Eff. July 11, 1994 ;-- Am. 1995, Act 206, Imd. Eff. Nov. 29, 1995 ;-- Am. 1996, Act 460, Imd. Eff. Dec. 26, 1996 ;-- Am. 2002, Act 427, Imd. Eff. June 5, 2002 ;-- Am. 2011, Act 266, Imd. Eff. Dec. 19, 2011 ;-- Am. 2012, Act 83, Imd. Eff. Apr. 11, 2012

Compiler's Notes:

    For legislative intent as to severability, see Compiler's note to MCL 418.213.

    Enacting section 2 of Act 266 of 2011 provides:

    "Enacting section 2. This amendatory act applies to injuries incurred on or after its effective date."

PopularName Notes:

Act 317
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 94 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1970–2023 · leading case: Reed v. Yackell, 703 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 2005).
Reed v. Yackell, 703 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 2005). · cites it 51× “] Accordingly, the threshold question in this case is whether Reed is an "employee" under any of the definitions in MCL 418.161 of the WDCA and, therefore, has traded his right to bring a tort action for the assured payment of benefits without regard to fault.”
Smitter v. Thornapple Twp., 833 N.W.2d 875 (Mich. 2013). · cites it 51× “161(1)(a) that the Legislature failed to revise when it altered the language in MCL 418.161. 10 Possibly bolstering this conclusion is the fact that MCL 418.”
David J McQueer v. Perfect Fence Co., 917 N.W.2d 584 (Mich. 2018). · cites it 5× “171 applies to a principal and contractor only if the contractor engages persons to work other than persons who would not be considered employees under MCL 418.161(1)(d). MCL 418.171(4) provides that principals willfully acting to circumvent the provisions of MCL 418.”
Hoste v. Shanty Creek Mgmt., Inc, 592 N.W.2d 360 (Mich. 1999). · cites it 10× “[MCL 418.161; MSA 17.237(161).] [3] MCL 418.”
Auto-Owners Ins. v. All Star Lawn Specialists Plus, Inc., 857 N.W.2d 520 (Mich. 2014). · cites it 16× “In this case, we are called upon to interpret the definition of “employee” as found in MCL 418.161(l)(n), prior to being amended in 2011, which is a provision in the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.”
Crowe v. City of Detroit, 631 N.W.2d 293 (Mich. 2001). · cites it 12× “§ 418.161. Section 161(1)(c) authorizes municipalities and villages to offer injured police officers and fire fighters a form of compensation that, while like that provided through Michigan's statutory worker's compensation system, M.”
Bannan v. City of Saginaw, 420 Mich. 376 (Mich. 1985). · cites it 16× “The second issue presented for review is whether § 161 of the Michigan Worker's Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.161; MSA 17.237(161), which allowed police or fire fighters to waive the provision of the WDCA in lieu of "like benefits" prescribed in a municipality's charter,…”
Adair v. State, 836 N.W.2d 742 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 11× “116(C)(10), arguing that, as a matter of law, Derry was an “employee” of All Star at the time of his injuries as defined under § 161(1) of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.161(1), and thus, the Auto-Owners workers’ compensation insurance policy was the…”
Max Trucking, LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Corp., 802 F.3d 793 (6th Cir. 2015). · cites it 7× “Under the definition of employee set forth in Mich. Comp. Laws 418.161(1 ){l) and (n), as amended by 2011 P.”
Betts v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schs., 271 N.W.2d 498 (Mich. 1978). · cites it 14× “I respectfully dissent from the judgment of my colleagues in the majority and from what I perceive to be the strained construction they have given MCLA 418.161; MSA 17.237(161). [1] The conclusion is inescapable that the majority has inappropriately broadened the plain meaning…”
Auto-Owners Ins. v. All Star Lawn Specialists Plus, Inc., 845 N.W.2d 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 18× “We agree with the analysis of the prior opinion in this case and now overrule Amerisure, which held that if any one of the three statutory criteria in MCL 418.161(l)(n) are met, the person is an “independent contractor” and not an “employee.”
Higgins v. Monroe Evening News, 272 N.W.2d 537 (Mich. 1978). · cites it 8× “Consequently, we hold, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was not employed by either the defendant or the substitute newsboy within the meaning of MCL 418.161(1)(b); MSA 17.237(161)(1)(b).”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(1) — 13 cases
Reed v. Yackell, 703 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 2005). “] Accordingly, the threshold question in this case is whether Reed is an "employee" under any of the definitions in MCL 418.161 of the WDCA and, therefore, has traded his right to bring a tort action for the assured payment of benefits without regard to fault.”
Smitter v. Thornapple Twp., 833 N.W.2d 875 (Mich. 2013). “161(1)(a) that the Legislature failed to revise when it altered the language in MCL 418.161. 10 Possibly bolstering this conclusion is the fact that MCL 418.”
Adair v. State, 836 N.W.2d 742 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). “116(C)(10), arguing that, as a matter of law, Derry was an “employee” of All Star at the time of his injuries as defined under § 161(1) of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.161(1), and thus, the Auto-Owners workers’ compensation insurance policy was the…”
Hoste v. Shanty Creek Mgmt., Inc, 592 N.W.2d 360 (Mich. 1999). “[MCL 418.161; MSA 17.237(161).] [3] MCL 418.”
Auto-Owners Ins. v. All Star Lawn Specialists Plus, Inc., 845 N.W.2d 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). “We agree with the analysis of the prior opinion in this case and now overrule Amerisure, which held that if any one of the three statutory criteria in MCL 418.161(l)(n) are met, the person is an “independent contractor” and not an “employee.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(1)(1) — 2 cases
Reed v. Yackell, 691 N.W.2d 454 (Mich. 2005).
Demogola v. Shellhouse Sawmill, 574 N.W.2d 688 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(1)(B) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(1)(Z) — 3 cases
Reed v. Yackell, 703 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 2005). “] Accordingly, the threshold question in this case is whether Reed is an "employee" under any of the definitions in MCL 418.161 of the WDCA and, therefore, has traded his right to bring a tort action for the assured payment of benefits without regard to fault.”
Auto-Owners Ins. v. All Star Lawn Specialists Plus, Inc., 845 N.W.2d 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). “We agree with the analysis of the prior opinion in this case and now overrule Amerisure, which held that if any one of the three statutory criteria in MCL 418.161(l)(n) are met, the person is an “independent contractor” and not an “employee.”
Romero v. Burt Moeke Hardwoods, Inc, 760 N.W.2d 586 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(1)(a) — 8 cases
Smitter v. Thornapple Twp., 833 N.W.2d 875 (Mich. 2013). “161(1)(a) that the Legislature failed to revise when it altered the language in MCL 418.161. 10 Possibly bolstering this conclusion is the fact that MCL 418.”
Betts v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schs., 271 N.W.2d 498 (Mich. 1978). “I respectfully dissent from the judgment of my colleagues in the majority and from what I perceive to be the strained construction they have given MCLA 418.161; MSA 17.237(161). [1] The conclusion is inescapable that the majority has inappropriately broadened the plain meaning…”
Bannan v. City of Saginaw, 420 Mich. 376 (Mich. 1985). “The second issue presented for review is whether § 161 of the Michigan Worker's Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.161; MSA 17.237(161), which allowed police or fire fighters to waive the provision of the WDCA in lieu of "like benefits" prescribed in a municipality's charter,…”
Hoste v. Shanty Creek Mgmt., Inc, 592 N.W.2d 360 (Mich. 1999). “[MCL 418.161; MSA 17.237(161).] [3] MCL 418.”
Oxley v. Dep't of Military Affairs, 597 N.W.2d 89 (Mich. 1999).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(1)(b) — 7 cases
Higgins v. Monroe Evening News, 245 N.W.2d 769 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
Betts v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schs., 271 N.W.2d 498 (Mich. 1978). “I respectfully dissent from the judgment of my colleagues in the majority and from what I perceive to be the strained construction they have given MCLA 418.161; MSA 17.237(161). [1] The conclusion is inescapable that the majority has inappropriately broadened the plain meaning…”
Higgins v. Monroe Evening News, 272 N.W.2d 537 (Mich. 1978). “Consequently, we hold, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was not employed by either the defendant or the substitute newsboy within the meaning of MCL 418.161(1)(b); MSA 17.237(161)(1)(b).”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(1)(c) — 4 cases
Crowe v. City of Detroit, 631 N.W.2d 293 (Mich. 2001). “§ 418.161. Section 161(1)(c) authorizes municipalities and villages to offer injured police officers and fire fighters a form of compensation that, while like that provided through Michigan's statutory worker's compensation system, M.”
Paige v. City of Sterling Heights, 720 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. 2006).
Crowe v. City of Detroit, 603 N.W.2d 107 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(1)(d) — 7 cases
David J McQueer v. Perfect Fence Co., 917 N.W.2d 584 (Mich. 2018). “171 applies to a principal and contractor only if the contractor engages persons to work other than persons who would not be considered employees under MCL 418.161(1)(d). MCL 418.171(4) provides that principals willfully acting to circumvent the provisions of MCL 418.”
Smitter v. Thornapple Twp., 833 N.W.2d 875 (Mich. 2013). “161(1)(a) that the Legislature failed to revise when it altered the language in MCL 418.161. 10 Possibly bolstering this conclusion is the fact that MCL 418.”
Hoste v. Shanty Creek Mgmt., Inc, 592 N.W.2d 360 (Mich. 1999). “[MCL 418.161; MSA 17.237(161).] [3] MCL 418.”
Boyd v. W G Wade Shows, 505 N.W.2d 544 (Mich. 1993).
Amerisure Ins. Companies v. Time Auto Transp., Inc, 493 N.W.2d 482 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(1)(l) — 4 cases
Kevin James v. Facility Matrix Grp. (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
Jennifer Drob v. Sek 15 Inc (Mich. Ct. App. 2020).
Robert G Florian v. Gary Grimm (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(1)(n) — 12 cases
Reed v. Yackell, 703 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 2005). “] Accordingly, the threshold question in this case is whether Reed is an "employee" under any of the definitions in MCL 418.161 of the WDCA and, therefore, has traded his right to bring a tort action for the assured payment of benefits without regard to fault.”
David J McQueer v. Perfect Fence Co., 917 N.W.2d 584 (Mich. 2018). “171 applies to a principal and contractor only if the contractor engages persons to work other than persons who would not be considered employees under MCL 418.161(1)(d). MCL 418.171(4) provides that principals willfully acting to circumvent the provisions of MCL 418.”
Hoste v. Shanty Creek Mgmt., Inc, 592 N.W.2d 360 (Mich. 1999). “[MCL 418.161; MSA 17.237(161).] [3] MCL 418.”
Loos v. JB Installed Sales, Inc., 775 N.W.2d 139 (Mich. 2009).
Kevin James v. Facility Matrix Grp. (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(4) — 1 case
Blanzy v. Brigadier Gen. Contractors, Inc., 613 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(a) — 2 cases
Simm v. City of Dearborn, 220 N.W.2d 768 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
Saylor v. Kingsley Area Emergency Ambulance Serv., 607 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(b) — 3 cases
Stover v. Midwest Tank & Fabrication Co., 275 N.W.2d 15 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
Hamilton v. Superior Mushroom Co., 282 N.W.2d 831 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
Lee v. J. H. Lee & Son, 249 N.W.2d 380 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(c) — 2 cases
Smitter v. Thornapple Twp., 833 N.W.2d 875 (Mich. 2013). “161(1)(a) that the Legislature failed to revise when it altered the language in MCL 418.161. 10 Possibly bolstering this conclusion is the fact that MCL 418.”
Joseph S Bell v. City of Saginaw (Mich. Ct. App. 2019).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(d) — 1 case
Auto-Owners Ins. v. All Star Lawn Specialists Plus, Inc., 845 N.W.2d 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). “We agree with the analysis of the prior opinion in this case and now overrule Amerisure, which held that if any one of the three statutory criteria in MCL 418.161(l)(n) are met, the person is an “independent contractor” and not an “employee.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(i) — 1 case
Saylor v. Kingsley Area Emergency Ambulance Serv., 607 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(k) — 1 case
Celina Mut. Ins. v. Lake States Ins., 549 N.W.2d 834 (Mich. 1996).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(l)(a) — 12 cases
Holody v. City of Detroit, 323 N.W.2d 599 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
Betts v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schs., 271 N.W.2d 498 (Mich. 1978). “I respectfully dissent from the judgment of my colleagues in the majority and from what I perceive to be the strained construction they have given MCLA 418.161; MSA 17.237(161). [1] The conclusion is inescapable that the majority has inappropriately broadened the plain meaning…”
Hoste v. Shanty Creek Mgmt., Inc, 592 N.W.2d 360 (Mich. 1999). “[MCL 418.161; MSA 17.237(161).] [3] MCL 418.”
Oxley v. Dep't of Military Affairs, 597 N.W.2d 89 (Mich. 1999).
Bannan v. City of Saginaw, 420 Mich. 376 (Mich. 1985). “The second issue presented for review is whether § 161 of the Michigan Worker's Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.161; MSA 17.237(161), which allowed police or fire fighters to waive the provision of the WDCA in lieu of "like benefits" prescribed in a municipality's charter,…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(l)(b) — 11 cases
Higgins v. Monroe Evening News, 272 N.W.2d 537 (Mich. 1978). “Consequently, we hold, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was not employed by either the defendant or the substitute newsboy within the meaning of MCL 418.161(1)(b); MSA 17.237(161)(1)(b).”
Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy, Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
Higgins v. Monroe Evening News, 245 N.W.2d 769 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
Hyslop v. Klein, 270 N.W.2d 540 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
Hudson v. Jackson Plating Co., 307 N.W.2d 96 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(l)(c) — 4 cases
Crowe v. City of Detroit, 631 N.W.2d 293 (Mich. 2001). “§ 418.161. Section 161(1)(c) authorizes municipalities and villages to offer injured police officers and fire fighters a form of compensation that, while like that provided through Michigan's statutory worker's compensation system, M.”
Paige v. City of Sterling Heights, 720 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. 2006).
Crowe v. City of Detroit, 603 N.W.2d 107 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
Haselhuhn v. Huron-Clinton Metro. Auth., 308 N.W.2d 190 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(l)(d) — 7 cases
Hoste v. Shanty Creek Mgmt., Inc, 592 N.W.2d 360 (Mich. 1999). “[MCL 418.161; MSA 17.237(161).] [3] MCL 418.”
Smitter v. Thornapple Twp., 833 N.W.2d 875 (Mich. 2013). “161(1)(a) that the Legislature failed to revise when it altered the language in MCL 418.161. 10 Possibly bolstering this conclusion is the fact that MCL 418.”
Boyd v. W G Wade Shows, 505 N.W.2d 544 (Mich. 1993).
Mccaul v. Modern Tile & Carpet, Inc, 640 N.W.2d 589 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
Blanzy v. Brigadier Gen. Contractors, Inc., 613 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(l)(n) — 7 cases
Auto-Owners Ins. v. All Star Lawn Specialists Plus, Inc., 857 N.W.2d 520 (Mich. 2014). “In this case, we are called upon to interpret the definition of “employee” as found in MCL 418.161(l)(n), prior to being amended in 2011, which is a provision in the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.”
Reed v. Yackell, 703 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 2005). “] Accordingly, the threshold question in this case is whether Reed is an "employee" under any of the definitions in MCL 418.161 of the WDCA and, therefore, has traded his right to bring a tort action for the assured payment of benefits without regard to fault.”
Adair v. State, 836 N.W.2d 742 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). “116(C)(10), arguing that, as a matter of law, Derry was an “employee” of All Star at the time of his injuries as defined under § 161(1) of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.161(1), and thus, the Auto-Owners workers’ compensation insurance policy was the…”
Max Trucking, LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Corp., 802 F.3d 793 (6th Cir. 2015). “Under the definition of employee set forth in Mich. Comp. Laws 418.161(1 ){l) and (n), as amended by 2011 P.”
Auto-Owners Ins. v. All Star Lawn Specialists Plus, Inc., 845 N.W.2d 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). “We agree with the analysis of the prior opinion in this case and now overrule Amerisure, which held that if any one of the three statutory criteria in MCL 418.161(l)(n) are met, the person is an “independent contractor” and not an “employee.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(lXa) — 1 case
Johnson v. City of Muskegon, 232 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.161(n) — 1 case
20230202_C358037_51_358037.Opn.Pdf (Mich. Ct. App. 2023).
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