UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Act 174 of 1962
440.9501 Filing office.
Sec. 9501.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), the office in which to file a financing statement to perfect the security interest or agricultural lien is 1 of the following:
(a) The office designated for the filing or recording of a record of a mortgage on the related real property, if the collateral is as-extracted collateral or timber to be cut, or the financing statement is filed as a fixture filing and the collateral is goods that are or are to become fixtures.
(b) The office of secretary of state in all other cases, including a case in which the collateral is goods that are or are to become fixtures and the financing statement is not filed as a fixture filing.
(2) The office in which to file a financing statement to perfect a security interest in collateral, including fixtures, of a transmitting utility is the office of the secretary of state. The financing statement also constitutes a fixture filing as to the collateral indicated in the financing statement which is or is to become fixtures.
(3) Any financing statement filed under subsection (1)(a) with a register of deeds and any continuation statement, termination statement, amendment, or assignment relating to the financing statement and meeting the formal requisites of this part shall be recorded by the register of deeds, notwithstanding the provisions for witnessing and acknowledging instruments to be recorded in the real property records contained in section 47 of 1846 RS 65, MCL 565.47.
(4) If the office of secretary of state receives a financing statement under subsection (1)(b) or (2) for filing, and any debtor identified on the financing statement is an individual, the secretary of state shall provide written notice of the filing of the financing statement to that debtor. The secretary of state shall determine the form of the written notice and the written notice shall contain at least all of the following information:
(a) The debtor's name and address as shown on the financing statement.
(b) The secured party's name and address as shown on the financing statement.
(c) The remedies available to the debtor under this act if he or she believes that the financing statement is erroneously or fraudulently filed.
(5) In addition to the written notice described in subsection (4), the secretary of state shall provide at no charge to a debtor described in that subsection a copy or image of the filed financing statement and any attachments. If the debtor requests additional copies or searches, the fees provided in section 9525 apply to that request.
(6) A person shall not knowingly or intentionally file a false or fraudulent financing statement with the office of the secretary of state under subsection (1)(b) or (2). In addition to any other penalty provided by law, a violation of this subsection is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $2,500.00, or both. If the person is convicted of the violation, the court may find that the financing statement is ineffective and may order the office of the secretary of state to terminate the financing statement and may order restitution.
(7) If a person files a false or fraudulent financing statement with the office of the secretary of state under subsection (1)(b) or (2), a debtor named in that financing statement may file an action against the person that filed the financing statement seeking appropriate equitable relief or damages, including, but not limited to, an order declaring the financing statement ineffective and ordering the office of the secretary of state to terminate the financing statement, and reasonable attorney fees.
History: 1962, Act 174, Eff. Jan. 1, 1964 ;-- Am. 1978, Act 369, Eff. Jan. 1, 1979 ;-- Am. 2000, Act 348, Eff. July 1, 2001 ;-- Am. 2004, Act 212, Eff. Jan. 1, 2005
Notes of Decisions
Fodale v. Waste Mgmt. of Michigan, Inc, 718 N.W.2d 827 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 13× “Before July 2001, defaults were governed by part five of Article 9, 1978 PA 369 ; MCL 440.9501 et seq. [4] Those sections were in effect in 1987, when the parties' contract was executed, and in 1998, when the contested transaction took place.”
Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2009).
· cites it 7× “See Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.9501 (6) (2004). [2] 2.”
Atlas Tech., LLC v. Levine, 268 F. Supp. 3d 950 (E.D. Mich. 2017).
· cites it 7× “Lastly, the defendants ’ argue that the damages alleged in Count X (Breach of Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.9501 ) and Count XI (Tortious Interference) are speculative because they are based on business contingency, and therefore the plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim in…”
Productivity Tech. Corp. v. Levine, 268 F. Supp. 3d 940 (E.D. Mich. 2017).
· cites it 11× “The defendants also argue that the damages alleged in Count V (breach of Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.9501 ) are speculative because they are based on business contingency.”
Earl Dubey & Sons, Inc. v. MacOmb Contracting Corp., 296 N.W.2d 582 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
“It is correctly argued that until default is a reality the secured party cannot claim possession or otherwise assert rights in the collateral securing the loan, MCL 440.9501; MSA 19.9501; however, another creditor who subsequently perfects an interest in the same collateral…”
United States v. Michael Modena, 430 F. App'x 444 (6th Cir. 2011).
“See Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.9501 (6). In accordance with a state search warrant, officers searched Modena’s residence and discovered a nine-millimeter pistol, a bolt-action rifle and ammunition.”
Gorham v. Denha, 258 N.W.2d 196 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
“MCLA 440.9501(1); MSA 19.9501(1). In addition, "[u]nless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to *270 take possession of the collateral”.”
Shurlow v. Bonthuis, 553 N.W.2d 366 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
“9105(l)(d), MCL 440.9501(2); MSA 19.9501(2) allows Bonthuis to claim protection under § 9-207.”
McBride v. Arends, 263 N.W.2d 5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
· cites it 2× “Such a provision is clearly authorized by MCLA 440.9501; MSA 19.9501. 2 This statute has been construed by this Court in Michigan National Bank v Marston, 29 Mich App 99 ; 185 NW2d 47 (1970), where it was held that the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in the state, was…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.9501(1) — 3 cases
Fodale v. Waste Mgmt. of Michigan, Inc, 718 N.W.2d 827 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).
“Before July 2001, defaults were governed by part five of Article 9, 1978 PA 369 ; MCL 440.9501 et seq. [4] Those sections were in effect in 1987, when the parties' contract was executed, and in 1998, when the contested transaction took place.”
Gorham v. Denha, 258 N.W.2d 196 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
“MCLA 440.9501(1); MSA 19.9501(1). In addition, "[u]nless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to *270 take possession of the collateral”.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.9501(2) — 1 case
Shurlow v. Bonthuis, 553 N.W.2d 366 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
“9105(l)(d), MCL 440.9501(2); MSA 19.9501(2) allows Bonthuis to claim protection under § 9-207.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.9501(3) — 1 case
Fodale v. Waste Mgmt. of Michigan, Inc, 718 N.W.2d 827 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).
“Before July 2001, defaults were governed by part five of Article 9, 1978 PA 369 ; MCL 440.9501 et seq. [4] Those sections were in effect in 1987, when the parties' contract was executed, and in 1998, when the contested transaction took place.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.9501(3)(b) — 1 case
Fodale v. Waste Mgmt. of Michigan, Inc, 718 N.W.2d 827 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).
“Before July 2001, defaults were governed by part five of Article 9, 1978 PA 369 ; MCL 440.9501 et seq. [4] Those sections were in effect in 1987, when the parties' contract was executed, and in 1998, when the contested transaction took place.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.9501(7) — 2 cases
Atlas Tech., LLC v. Levine, 268 F. Supp. 3d 950 (E.D. Mich. 2017).
“Lastly, the defendants ’ argue that the damages alleged in Count X (Breach of Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.9501 ) and Count XI (Tortious Interference) are speculative because they are based on business contingency, and therefore the plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim in…”
Productivity Tech. Corp. v. Levine, 268 F. Supp. 3d 940 (E.D. Mich. 2017).
“The defendants also argue that the damages alleged in Count V (breach of Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.9501 ) are speculative because they are based on business contingency.”
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