REVISED JUDICATURE ACT OF 1961
Act 236 of 1961
600.2166 Admissibility of evidence in action by or against person incapable of testifying.
Sec. 2166.
(1) In an action by or against a person incapable of testifying, a party's own testimony shall not be admissible as to any matter which, if true, must have been equally within the knowledge of the person incapable of testifying, unless some material portion of his testimony is supported by some other material evidence tending to corroborate his claim.
(2) A "person incapable of testifying" includes an individual who is incapable of testifying by reason of death or incompetency and his heirs, legal representatives, or assigns; and includes an individual, corporation, or other entity, or the successors thereof, whose agent, having material knowledge of the matter, is incapable of testifying by reason of death or incompetency. A "party's own testimony" includes the testimony of his agents, successors, assigns, predecessors, or assignors.
(3) In any such actions, all entries, memoranda, and declarations by the individual so incapable of testifying, relevant to the matter, as well as evidence of his acts and habits of dealing tending to disprove or show the improbability of the claims of the adverse party, may be received in evidence.
(4) When the deposition, affidavit, or testimony of a person incapable of testifying is taken in his lifetime or when he is mentally sound, and is read in evidence in the action, the affidavit or testimony of the other party shall be admitted in his own behalf on all matters mentioned or covered in the deposition, affidavit, or testimony. When the testimony or deposition of a witness has once been taken and used, or has heretofore been taken and used, upon the trial of any cause, and the same was, when so taken and used, competent and admissible under this section, the subsequent death or incompetency of the witness or of any other person shall not render the testimony incompetent under this section, but the testimony shall be received upon any subsequent trial of such cause.
History: Add. 1967, Act 263, Eff. Nov. 2, 1967 ;-- Am. 1969, Act 63, Imd. Eff. July 21, 1969 ;-- Am. 1974, Act 305, Imd. Eff. Dec. 9, 1974
Compiler's Notes:
Section 2 of Act 305 of 1974 provides: “This 1974 amendatory act shall apply to actions pending on its effective date and to actions commenced thereafter, regardless of whether the cause of action arose prior to the effective date of this act or arose thereafter.”
Notes of Decisions
Elec. Planroom, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
· cites it 10× “In addition to the hearsay concerns identified by the parties, these affidavits also implicate Michigan’s so-called “dead man’s” statute, Mich.Comp.Laws § 600.2166, as well as the often elusive distinction between “procedural” and “substantive” law.”
Turbyfill v. Int'l Harvester Co., 486 F. Supp. 232 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
· cites it 5× “§ 600.2166, discussed below. This suit, as originally commenced, was filed against defendant and one “John Doe.”
Dahn v. Sheets, 305 N.W.2d 547 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
· cites it 2× “Plaintiffs first contend that the dead man’s statute, MCL 600.2166; MSA 27A.2166, precluded the testimony of Robert Sheets, Charles Roberts, and Sharon Kowaleski as the court had ruled Nerio incompetent to testify.”
Pressley v. Wayne Cnty. Sheriff, 186 N.W.2d 412 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
· cites it 4× “382 Mich xxxii , modifying PA 1967, No 263, MCLA § 600.2166 (Stat Ann 1970 Cum Supp § 27A.”
Maple Hill Apt. Co. v. Stine, 346 N.W.2d 555 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 2× “Legal commentary on this Court's opinion in James v Dixon, 95 Mich App 527 ; 291 NW2d *382 106 (1980), in which it was held that the Michigan Supreme Court's adoption of MRE 601 impliedly abrogated the dead man's statute, MCL 600.2166; MSA 27A.2166, illustrates the difficulties…”
Braidwood v. Harmon, 187 N.W.2d 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
· cites it 4× “1 MCLA § 600.2166 (Stat Ann 1970 Cum Supp § 27A.”
Mason v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 312 N.W.2d 167 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
· cites it 2× “Defendant also argues that the record was admissible under the deadman's statute, MCL 600.2166(3); MSA 27A.2166(3). However, this Court has found that MRE 601 has abrogated the deadman's statute.”
Serkaian v. Ozar, 211 N.W.2d 237 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).
· cites it 2× “The dead man’s act, MCLA 600.2166; MSA 27A.2166 was used as a ground for objecting to the testimony of Horace Arthur, Margaret Antczak, and defendant Janet Shay.”
Bryson v. Stone, 190 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
· cites it 2× “MCLA § 600.2166 (Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 27A.”
James v. Dixon, 291 N.W.2d 106 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
· cites it 3× “We are convinced that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a consolidation of the wrongful death and dramshop actions for trial.”
In Re Backofen Est., 404 N.W.2d 675 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
“The dead man's statute, MCL 600.2166; MSA 27A.2166, does not bar the bank's agent's testimony.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2166(1) — 3 cases
Serkaian v. Ozar, 211 N.W.2d 237 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).
“The dead man’s act, MCLA 600.2166; MSA 27A.2166 was used as a ground for objecting to the testimony of Horace Arthur, Margaret Antczak, and defendant Janet Shay.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2166(2) — 2 cases
Elec. Planroom, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
“In addition to the hearsay concerns identified by the parties, these affidavits also implicate Michigan’s so-called “dead man’s” statute, Mich.Comp.Laws § 600.2166, as well as the often elusive distinction between “procedural” and “substantive” law.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2166(3) — 3 cases
Elec. Planroom, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
“In addition to the hearsay concerns identified by the parties, these affidavits also implicate Michigan’s so-called “dead man’s” statute, Mich.Comp.Laws § 600.2166, as well as the often elusive distinction between “procedural” and “substantive” law.”
Mason v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 312 N.W.2d 167 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
“Defendant also argues that the record was admissible under the deadman's statute, MCL 600.2166(3); MSA 27A.2166(3). However, this Court has found that MRE 601 has abrogated the deadman's statute.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2166(4) — 1 case
Elec. Planroom, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
“In addition to the hearsay concerns identified by the parties, these affidavits also implicate Michigan’s so-called “dead man’s” statute, Mich.Comp.Laws § 600.2166, as well as the often elusive distinction between “procedural” and “substantive” law.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.