Minnesota Statutes

Minn. Stat. § 15.0425 (2026)

[Repealed]

✓ current as of May 2026
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[Renumbered 14.69]

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 37 cases, 1969–2018 · leading case: Minneapolis Van & Warehouse Co. v. St. Paul Terminal Warehouse Co., 180 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1970).
Minneapolis Van & Warehouse Co. v. St. Paul Terminal Warehouse Co., 180 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1970). · cites it 9× “(2d) 630 , and not by § 15.0425 of the Administrative Procedure Act, and further stated that “[ajppellant has not ‘swept away by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary’ the prima facie foundation of the Commission’s findings.”
St. Paul Area Chamber of Com. v. Minnesota Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 251 N.W.2d 350 (Minn. 1977). · cites it 4× “In Minneapolis Van we held that the Administrative Procedure Act, specifically § 15.0425, made the substantial evidence test applicable to factual findings by the commission: “The statutory rule also settles any doubt of our conformity with the majority of courts, both state and…”
Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights, 295 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1980). · cites it 8× “The prevailing interpretation of the "substantial evidence" rule is far more restrictive than Minn.Stat. § 15.0425 (1978) requires. A better interpretation of this rule in a review of a judicial or quasi-judicial agency's factual findings would focus on the words of the statute…”
Webster v. Hennepin Cnty., 910 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 2018). · cites it 4× “69 (formerly Minn. Stat. § 15.0425 (1980) ). See Reserve Mining Co.”
Quinn Distrib. Co. v. Quast Transfer, Inc., 181 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 1970). · cites it 6× “On appeal, the district court affirmed, holding specifically that the scope of review was controlled by the “any-evidence” interpretation of Dahlen, and not by § 15.0425 of the Administrative Procedure Act.”
Fisher Nut Co. v. Lewis Ex Rel. Garcia, 320 N.W.2d 731 (Minn. 1982). · cites it 4× “We hold that Chapter 866, although its wording is imprecise, should be interpreted to provide that unless the district court expressly orders a trial de novo, the standard of review by the district court is that provided by Minn.Stat. § 15.0425 (1980). In other words, the…”
State v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 246 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1976). · cites it 5× “) The issue presented is whether § 15.0425 applies to judicial review of telephone rate proceedings so that the powers conferred in § 237.”
Soo Line R.R. v. Minnesota Dep't of Transp., 304 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. 1981). · cites it 6× “Reduced traffic would decrease the likelihood of a train colliding with an automobile, thereby diminishing the railroad’s exposure to risks of tort liability.”
Sunstar Foods, Inc. v. Uhlendorf, 310 N.W.2d 80 (Minn. 1981). · cites it 2× “The standard to be used by the reviewing court is whether the findings of the department are supported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record submitted, are affected by an error of law, or are arbitrary or capricious.”
Signal Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Brynwood Transfer Co., 288 N.W.2d 707 (Minn. 1980). · cites it 2× “After the argument by the parties, the district court issued a subsequent order on December 5, 1978, again reversing the Commission’s decision.”
Bryan v. Cmty. State Bank of Bloomington, 172 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1969). · cites it 3× “Section 15.0425 of the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes a reviewing court to remand the case for further proceedings.”
Taylor v. Beltrami Elec. Coop., Inc., 319 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 1982). · cites it 2× “” Minn.Stat. § 15.0425(e) (1980). In Reserve Mining Co.”
— Minn. Stat. § 15.0425(b) — 1 case
Soo Line R.R. v. Minnesota Dep't of Transp., 304 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. 1981). “Reduced traffic would decrease the likelihood of a train colliding with an automobile, thereby diminishing the railroad’s exposure to risks of tort liability.”
— Minn. Stat. § 15.0425(e) — 8 cases
Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights, 295 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1980). “The prevailing interpretation of the "substantial evidence" rule is far more restrictive than Minn.Stat. § 15.0425 (1978) requires. A better interpretation of this rule in a review of a judicial or quasi-judicial agency's factual findings would focus on the words of the statute…”
Taylor v. Beltrami Elec. Coop., Inc., 319 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 1982). “” Minn.Stat. § 15.0425(e) (1980). In Reserve Mining Co.”
Minneapolis Van & Warehouse Co. v. St. Paul Terminal Warehouse Co., 180 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1970). “(2d) 630 , and not by § 15.0425 of the Administrative Procedure Act, and further stated that “[ajppellant has not ‘swept away by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary’ the prima facie foundation of the Commission’s findings.”
St. Paul Area Chamber of Com. v. Minnesota Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 251 N.W.2d 350 (Minn. 1977). “In Minneapolis Van we held that the Administrative Procedure Act, specifically § 15.0425, made the substantial evidence test applicable to factual findings by the commission: “The statutory rule also settles any doubt of our conformity with the majority of courts, both state and…”
— Minn. Stat. § 15.0425(f) — 1 case
Soo Line R.R. v. Minnesota Dep't of Transp., 304 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. 1981). “Reduced traffic would decrease the likelihood of a train colliding with an automobile, thereby diminishing the railroad’s exposure to risks of tort liability.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.