Minnesota Statutes

Minn. Stat. § 513.33 (2026)

Credit Agreements

✓ current as of May 2026
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Subdivision 1.Definitions.

For the purposes of this section, the following terms have the meanings given them:

(1) "credit agreement" means an agreement to lend or forbear repayment of money, goods, or things in action, to otherwise extend credit, or to make any other financial accommodation;

(2) "creditor" means a person who extends credit under a credit agreement with a debtor;

(3) "debtor" means a person who obtains credit or seeks a credit agreement with a creditor or who owes money to a creditor; and

(4) "signed" has the meaning specified in section 336.1-201(b)(37).

Subd. 2.Credit agreements to be in writing.

A debtor may not maintain an action on a credit agreement unless the agreement is in writing, expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant terms and conditions, and is signed by the creditor and the debtor.

Subd. 3.Actions not considered agreements.

(a) The following actions do not give rise to a claim that a new credit agreement is created, unless the agreement satisfies the requirements of subdivision 2:

(1) the rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a debtor;

(2) the consultation by a creditor with a debtor; or

(3) the agreement by a creditor to take certain actions, such as entering into a new credit agreement, forbearing from exercising remedies under prior credit agreements, or extending installments due under prior credit agreements.

(b) A credit agreement may not be implied from the relationship, fiduciary or otherwise, of the creditor and the debtor.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 48 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1988–2025 · leading case: Patrick M. Figgins v. Noah Wilcox, 879 N.W.2d 653 (Minn. 2016).
Patrick M. Figgins v. Noah Wilcox, 879 N.W.2d 653 (Minn. 2016). · cites it 78× “The respondents moved to dismiss on the ground that Minn.Stat. § 513.33 (2014) does not permit these claims.”
Rural Am. Bank of Greenwald v. Herickhoff, 485 N.W.2d 702 (Minn. 1992). · cites it 76× “This case involves the interpretation of Minnesota's credit agreement statute, Minn.Stat. § 513.33 (1990 & Supp.1991), [1] and its application to agriculture operational loans made to a retired farmer and his son and daughter-in-law.”
Bankcherokee v. Insignia Dev., LLC, 779 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 32× “Appellant first argues that the district court erred in rejecting his defenses of unilateral and mutual mistake, no meeting of the minds, and contract modification on the ground that the defenses were barred by Minn.Stat. § 513.33. Statutory interpretation presents a question of…”
Carlson v. Estes, 458 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 36× “The trial court granted the motion, finding appellants’ claims were based on oral credit agreements and were barred by Minn.Stat. § 513.33 (1988). The Esteses appeal.”
Greuling v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 690 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 15× “Does Minn.Stat. § 513.33, subd. 3(a) (2002), prevent a claim of promissory estoppel to enforce an oral promise to refinance a mortgage loan? III.”
Labrant v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 671 (D. Minnesota 2012). · cites it 43× “1 Defendant CitiMortgage argues that Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law because Minn.Stat. § 513.33 requires all credit agreements to be in writing.”
Rural Am. Bank of Greenwald v. Herickhoff, 473 N.W.2d 361 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 56× “The trial court concluded that Minn.Stat. § 513.33 (1988), the statute requiring credit agreements to be in writing, barred a breach of contract defense based on respondent's breach of an agreement to first apply proceeds from farm operations to appellant Ben Herickhoff's loan…”
Myrlie v. Countrywide Bank, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (D. Minnesota 2011). · cites it 18× “Defendants contends that their Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted as to Plaintiffs promissory estoppel claim because his promissory estoppel claim is barred by (1) Plaintiffs failure to present evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to his promissory…”
Pako Corp. v. Citytrust, 109 B.R. 368 (D. Minnesota 1989). · cites it 12× “Credit Agreement Statute of Frauds Citytrust argues that Pako’s claims are barred by the Minnesota credit agreement statute of frauds, Minn.Stat. § 513.33 which provides: A debtor may not maintain an action on a credit agreement unless the agreement is in writing, expresses…”
Becker v. First Am. State Bank of Redwood Falls, 420 N.W.2d 239 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 14× “The trial court determined the action was barred by Minn. Stat. § 513.33 (1986), which provides a credit agreement must be in writing to be actionable.”
NJK Holding Corp. v. The Araz Grp., Inc., 878 N.W.2d 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 35× “Appellant challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to respondent, arguing that a promise to forgive debt is not a credit agreement under Minn. Stat. § 513.33 and does not require a -writing to be enforceable.”
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Flanagan, 821 F. Supp. 572 (D. Minnesota 1993). · cites it 16× “Minn.Stat. § 513.33 provides that: A debtor may not maintain an action on a credit agreement unless the agreement is in writing, expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant terms and conditions, and is signed by the creditor and the debt- or.”
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