(a) Whoever does any of the following is guilty of murder in the first degree and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life:
(1) causes the death of a human being with premeditation and with intent to effect the death of the person or of another;
(2) causes the death of a human being while committing or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence, either upon or affecting the person or another;
(3) causes the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of the person or another, while committing or attempting to commit burglary, aggravated robbery, carjacking in the first or second degree, kidnapping, arson in the first or second degree, a drive-by shooting, tampering with a witness in the first degree, escape from custody, or any felony violation of chapter 152 involving the unlawful sale of a controlled substance;
(4) causes the death of a peace officer, prosecuting attorney, judge, or a guard employed at a Minnesota state or local correctional facility, with intent to effect the death of that person or another, while the person is engaged in the performance of official duties;
(5) causes the death of a minor while committing child abuse, when the perpetrator has engaged in a past pattern of child abuse upon a child and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life;
(6) causes the death of a human being while committing domestic abuse, when the perpetrator has engaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse upon the victim or upon another family or household member and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life; or
(7) causes the death of a human being while committing, conspiring to commit, or attempting to commit a felony crime to further terrorism and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.
(b) For the purposes of paragraph (a), clause (4), "prosecuting attorney" has the meaning given in section 609.221, subdivision 6, clause (4).
(c) For the purposes of paragraph (a), clause (4), "judge" has the meaning given in section 609.221, subdivision 6, clause (5).
(d) For purposes of paragraph (a), clause (5), "child abuse" means an act committed against a minor victim that constitutes a violation of the following laws of this state or any similar laws of the United States or any other state: section 609.221; 609.222; 609.223; 609.224; 609.2242; 609.342; 609.343; 609.344; 609.345; 609.377; 609.378; or 609.713.
(e) For purposes of paragraph (a), clause (6), "domestic abuse" means an act that:
(1) constitutes a violation of section 609.221, 609.222, 609.223, 609.224, 609.2242, 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, 609.713, or any similar laws of the United States or any other state; and
(2) is committed against the victim who is a family or household member as defined in section 518B.01, subdivision 2, paragraph (b).
(f) For purposes of paragraph (a), clause (7), "further terrorism" has the meaning given in section 609.714, subdivision 1.
Notes of Decisions
State of Minnesota v. David Muniz Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 2015).
· cites it 57× “A jury found David Muniz Bustos guilty of first-degree murder while committing domestic abuse, Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(6) (2014), second-degree intentional murder, Minn.”
State v. Goelz, 743 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 2007).
· cites it 36× “In this direct appeal we are asked to determine the admissibility of certain evidence to prove the existence of a "past pattern of domestic abuse" under Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(6) (2006). Goelz argues that: (1) the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of…”
State of Minnesota v. Diamond Lee Jamal Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257 (Minn. 2016).
· cites it 21× “Following a jury trial, appellant Diamond Lee Jamal Griffin was convicted of first- degree felony murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(3) (2014), in connection with the shooting death of Francisco Benitez-Hernandez.”
State v. Kelbel, 648 N.W.2d 690 (Minn. 2002).
· cites it 48× “As a result, this court rejects the argument that Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (5) is analogous to the federal Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) Statute found at 21 U.”
State of Minnesota v. Amanda Lea Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. 2016).
· cites it 20× “However, the jury’s determination that Pel-tier engaged in malicious punishment of a child on this one occasion is insufficient to find a past pattern of child abuse under Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(5).”
State of Minnesota v. Mahdi Hassan Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235 (Minn. 2014).
· cites it 23× “1(1) (2012) and a count of first-degree felony murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(3) (2012), but he was not sentenced on these counts pursuant to Minn.”
State v. Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1995).
· cites it 35× “Auchampach argued that Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (6), the domestic abuse homicide statute, is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define the term "pattern" in the phrase "past pattern of domestic abuse.”
State v. Gutierrez, 667 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 2003).
· cites it 24× “Since 1989, this crime has been classified as a "heinous crime," which is punishable by the imposition of a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of release. See Minn.Stat. § 609.184 (1989), recodified at Minn.”
State of Minnesota v. Anthony James Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 2016).
· cites it 21× “In December 2013, a Scott County grand jury indicted Cox on one count of first-degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.185 , subd. (a)(1) (2014); two counts of first-degree intentional murder while committing or attempting to commit a felony, Minn.”
State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 2008).
· cites it 15× “Following his arrest, a grand jury indicted Tscheu for first-degree murder while committing first-degree criminal sexual conduct placing the victim in fear of great bodily harm in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(2) (2006) (Count I), and first-degree murder while committing…”
State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 2010).
· cites it 16× “1(1) (2008), and indicted for first-degree premeditated murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(1) (2008), and first-degree domestic-abuse murder, in violation of MinmStat.”
State v. Manley, 664 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 2003).
· cites it 20× “Manley’s indictment did not properly inform him of the penalties under Minn.Stat. § 609.185. 12. The trial court erred by failing to determine whether Manley’s statement was voluntary before submitting it to the jury- 13.”
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(1) — 142 cases
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(2) — 45 cases
State v. Gutierrez, 667 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 2003).
“Since 1989, this crime has been classified as a "heinous crime," which is punishable by the imposition of a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of release. See Minn.Stat. § 609.184 (1989), recodified at Minn.”
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(3) — 85 cases
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(4) — 16 cases
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(5) — 7 cases
State v. Kelbel, 648 N.W.2d 690 (Minn. 2002).
“As a result, this court rejects the argument that Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (5) is analogous to the federal Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) Statute found at 21 U.”
State v. Manley, 664 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 2003).
“Manley’s indictment did not properly inform him of the penalties under Minn.Stat. § 609.185. 12. The trial court erred by failing to determine whether Manley’s statement was voluntary before submitting it to the jury- 13.”
State v. Gutierrez, 667 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 2003).
“Since 1989, this crime has been classified as a "heinous crime," which is punishable by the imposition of a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of release. See Minn.Stat. § 609.184 (1989), recodified at Minn.”
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(6) — 17 cases
State v. Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1995).
“Auchampach argued that Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (6), the domestic abuse homicide statute, is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define the term "pattern" in the phrase "past pattern of domestic abuse.”
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(8) — 4 cases
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a) — 13 cases
State of Minnesota v. Mahdi Hassan Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235 (Minn. 2014).
“1(1) (2012) and a count of first-degree felony murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(3) (2012), but he was not sentenced on these counts pursuant to Minn.”
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) — 155 cases
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(2) — 13 cases
State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 2008).
“Following his arrest, a grand jury indicted Tscheu for first-degree murder while committing first-degree criminal sexual conduct placing the victim in fear of great bodily harm in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(2) (2006) (Count I), and first-degree murder while committing…”
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) — 91 cases
State of Minnesota v. Diamond Lee Jamal Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257 (Minn. 2016).
“Following a jury trial, appellant Diamond Lee Jamal Griffin was convicted of first- degree felony murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(3) (2014), in connection with the shooting death of Francisco Benitez-Hernandez.”
State of Minnesota v. Mahdi Hassan Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235 (Minn. 2014).
“1(1) (2012) and a count of first-degree felony murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(3) (2012), but he was not sentenced on these counts pursuant to Minn.”
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3)(2002) — 1 case
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3)(2006) — 1 case
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3)(2008) — 1 case
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(4) — 11 cases
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(5) — 6 cases
State of Minnesota v. Amanda Lea Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. 2016).
“However, the jury’s determination that Pel-tier engaged in malicious punishment of a child on this one occasion is insufficient to find a past pattern of child abuse under Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(5).”
State v. Manley, 664 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 2003).
“Manley’s indictment did not properly inform him of the penalties under Minn.Stat. § 609.185. 12. The trial court erred by failing to determine whether Manley’s statement was voluntary before submitting it to the jury- 13.”
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(6) — 26 cases
State v. Goelz, 743 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 2007).
“In this direct appeal we are asked to determine the admissibility of certain evidence to prove the existence of a "past pattern of domestic abuse" under Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(6) (2006). Goelz argues that: (1) the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of…”
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(6)(c) — 1 case
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(8) — 2 cases
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(l) — 1 case
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(l)(2006) — 1 case
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(b) — 1 case
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(c) — 8 cases
State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 2010).
“1(1) (2008), and indicted for first-degree premeditated murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(1) (2008), and first-degree domestic-abuse murder, in violation of MinmStat.”
State of Minnesota v. David Muniz Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 2015).
“A jury found David Muniz Bustos guilty of first-degree murder while committing domestic abuse, Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(6) (2014), second-degree intentional murder, Minn.”
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(c)(1) — 4 cases
State v. Goelz, 743 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 2007).
“In this direct appeal we are asked to determine the admissibility of certain evidence to prove the existence of a "past pattern of domestic abuse" under Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(6) (2006). Goelz argues that: (1) the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of…”
State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 2010).
“1(1) (2008), and indicted for first-degree premeditated murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(1) (2008), and first-degree domestic-abuse murder, in violation of MinmStat.”
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(c)(2) — 3 cases
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(d) — 1 case
State of Minnesota v. Amanda Lea Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. 2016).
“However, the jury’s determination that Pel-tier engaged in malicious punishment of a child on this one occasion is insufficient to find a past pattern of child abuse under Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(5).”
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(e) — 1 case
State of Minnesota v. David Muniz Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 2015).
“A jury found David Muniz Bustos guilty of first-degree murder while committing domestic abuse, Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a)(6) (2014), second-degree intentional murder, Minn.”
— Minn. Stat. § 609.185(g) — 1 case
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