Minn. Stat. » CHAPTER 645. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES AND RULES
Minnesota Statutes

Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2026)

Canons Of Construction

✓ current as of May 2026
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In construing the statutes of this state, the following canons of interpretation are to govern, unless their observance would involve a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature, or repugnant to the context of the statute:

(1) words and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage; but technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a special meaning, or are defined in this chapter, are construed according to such special meaning or their definition;

(2) the singular includes the plural; and the plural, the singular; words of one gender include the other genders; words used in the past or present tense include the future;

(3) general words are construed to be restricted in their meaning by preceding particular words;

(4) words in a law conferring a joint authority upon three or more public officers or other persons are construed to confer authority upon a majority of such officers or persons; and

(5) a majority of the qualified members of any board or commission constitutes a quorum.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 605 cases (56 in the last 5 years), 1942–2026 · leading case: Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. 2009).
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Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. 2009). · cites it 92× “" Minn.Stat. § 645.08 (emphasis added). The referenced "canons of interpretation" include that "words and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage," and that "the singular includes the plural; and the plural, the…”
State v. Nelson, 842 N.W.2d 433 (Minn. 2014). · cites it 16× “2010) (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2012)). If a statute has more than one reasonable interpretation, then it is ambiguous and we may resort to the canons of statutory construction to determine its meaning.”
Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 2016). · cites it 11× “; Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (1) (2014). Further, we interpret the statute as a whole, considering the provision at issue “in light of the surrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations.”
Sprint Spectrum LP v. Comm'r of Revenue, 676 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 2004). · cites it 20× “The key phrase of contention in the present matter is "tangible personal property," because to qualify for the capital equipment exemption, the equipment for which the exemption is sought must manufacture tangible personal property for sale at retail. Minn.”
Ali M. Shire v. Rosemount, Inc., Self-Insured/Berkley Risk Administrators Co., LLC, Relators, & Twin Cities Orthopedics, P.A., Crosstown Surgery Ctr., & Minnesota Dep't of Human Servs./BRS, Intervenors., 875 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 2016). · cites it 7× “2d at 876 (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (1) (2014)). In subdivision 9, the word “voluntary” is an adjective that modifies the noun “program.”
State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2019). · cites it 6× “2d at 682 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (1) (2018) ). The statutory language in dispute is not examined in isolation; rather, all provisions in the statute must be read and interpreted as whole.”
State of Minnesota v. Thomas Raymond Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d 280 (Minn. 2015). · cites it 8× “2010) (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2012))). “If the Legislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s plain and unambiguous language, then we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to the canons of statutory construction.”
City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Investments P'ship, 827 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 2013). · cites it 8× “” Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (1). The common definition of the word “owner” is “[o]ne who has the right to possess, use, and convey something.”
State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. 2013). · cites it 6× “2011) (citing Minn.Stat. § 645.08). The ordinary definition of the noun “transfer” is “[t]he conveyance or removal of something from one place, person, or thing to another.”
Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enter., Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 1998). · cites it 8× “Ejusdem generis, as codified in Minn.Stat. § 645.08, subd. 3 (1996), requires that "[g]eneral words are construed to be restricted in their meaning by preceding particular words.”
Swanson v. Brewster, 784 N.W.2d 264 (Minn. 2010). · cites it 8× “at 277 ; accord Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2008) ("[W]ords and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.”
Odunlade v. City of Minneapolis, 823 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 2012). · cites it 15× “But the plain language in Minn. Stat. § 645.08 directs us to apply this canon unless its application is “inconsistent with the manifest intent of the [Legislature.”
Show all 605 citing cases →
— Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) — 289 cases
Sprint Spectrum LP v. Comm'r of Revenue, 676 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 2004). “The key phrase of contention in the present matter is "tangible personal property," because to qualify for the capital equipment exemption, the equipment for which the exemption is sought must manufacture tangible personal property for sale at retail. Minn.”
City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Investments P'ship, 827 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 2013). “” Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (1). The common definition of the word “owner” is “[o]ne who has the right to possess, use, and convey something.”
Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 2012).
State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. 2013). “2011) (citing Minn.Stat. § 645.08). The ordinary definition of the noun “transfer” is “[t]he conveyance or removal of something from one place, person, or thing to another.”
Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 2016). “; Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (1) (2014). Further, we interpret the statute as a whole, considering the provision at issue “in light of the surrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations.”
— Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1)(1984) — 1 case
State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985).
— Minn. Stat. § 645.08(2) — 24 cases
Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. 2009). “" Minn.Stat. § 645.08 (emphasis added). The referenced "canons of interpretation" include that "words and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage," and that "the singular includes the plural; and the plural, the…”
Hoang Minh Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2000).
Broton v. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 428 N.W.2d 85 (Minn. 1988).
Odunlade v. City of Minneapolis, 823 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 2012). “But the plain language in Minn. Stat. § 645.08 directs us to apply this canon unless its application is “inconsistent with the manifest intent of the [Legislature.”
State v. Thao, 649 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 2002).
— Minn. Stat. § 645.08(2006) — 1 case
Greene v. Comm'r of the Minnesota Dep't of Human Servs., 755 N.W.2d 713 (Minn. 2008).
— Minn. Stat. § 645.08(3) — 27 cases
Sipe v. STS Mfg., Inc., 834 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 2013).
Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enter., Inc., 567 N.W.2d 746 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
Cloverdale Foods of Minnesota, Inc. v. Snacks, 580 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
Kaiser v. Mem'l Blood Ctr. of Minneapolis, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1992).
Correll v. Distinctive Dental Servs., P.A., 607 N.W.2d 440 (Minn. 2000).
— Minn. Stat. § 645.08(4) — 1 case
In re the Appeal from the Final Order of the Bd. of Managers of the Bois De Sioux Watershed Dist., 818 N.W.2d 583 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).
— Minn. Stat. § 645.08(8) — 1 case
State v. Lewis, 394 N.W.2d 212 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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