Mississippi Code
Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36 (2026)
Limitations applicable to malpractice action arising from medical, surgical or other professional services
✓ current as of July 2026
- (1) For any claim accruing on or before June 30, 1998, and except as otherwise provided in this section, no claim in tort may be brought against a licensed physician, osteopath, dentist, hospital, institution for the aged or infirm, nurse, pharmacist, podiatrist, optometrist or chiropractor for injuries or wrongful death arising out of the course of medical, surgical or other professional services unless it is filed within two (2) years from the date the alleged act, omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered.
- (2) For any claim accruing on or after July 1, 1998, and except as otherwise provided in this section, no claim in tort may be brought against a licensed physician, osteopath, dentist, hospital, institution for the aged or infirm, nurse, pharmacist, podiatrist, optometrist or chiropractor for injuries or wrongful death arising out of the course of medical, surgical or other professional services unless it is filed within two (2) years from the date the alleged act, omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered, and, except as described in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection, in no event more than seven (7) years after the alleged act, omission or neglect occurred:
- (a) In the event a foreign object introduced during a surgical or medical procedure has been left in a patient's body, the cause of action shall be deemed to have first accrued at, and not before, the time at which the foreign object is, or with reasonable diligence should have been, first known or discovered to be in the patient's body.
- (b) In the event the cause of action shall have been fraudulently concealed from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the cause of action shall be deemed to have first accrued at, and not before, the time at which such fraud shall be, or with reasonable diligence should have been, first known or discovered.
- (3) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (4) of this section, if at the time at which the cause of action shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered, the person to whom such claim has accrued shall be six (6) years of age or younger, then such minor or the person claiming through such minor may, notwithstanding that the period of time limited pursuant to subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall have expired, commence action on such claim at any time within two (2) years next after the time at which the minor shall have reached his sixth birthday, or shall have died, whichever shall have first occurred.
- (4) If at the time at which the cause of action shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered, the person to whom such claim has accrued shall be a minor without a parent or legal guardian, then such minor or the person claiming through such minor may, notwithstanding that the period of time limited pursuant to subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall have expired, commence action on such claim at any time within two (2) years next after the time at which the minor shall have a parent or legal guardian or shall have died, whichever shall have first occurred; provided, however, that in no event shall the period of limitation begin to run prior to such minor's sixth birthday unless such minor shall have died.
- (5) If at the time at which the cause of action shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered, the person to whom such claim has accrued shall be under the disability of unsoundness of mind, then such person or the person claiming through him may, notwithstanding that the period of time hereinbefore limited shall have expired, commence action on such claim at any time within two (2) years next after the time at which the person to whom the right shall have first accrued shall have ceased to be under the disability, or shall have died, whichever shall have first occurred.
- (6) When any person who shall be under the disabilities mentioned in subsections (3), (4) and (5) of this section at the time at which his right shall have first accrued, shall depart this life without having ceased to be under such disability, no time shall be allowed by reason of the disability of such person to commence action on the claim of such person beyond the period prescribed under Section 15-1-55, Mississippi Code of 1972.
- (7) For the purposes of subsection (3) of this section, and only for the purposes of such subsection, the disability of infancy or minority shall be removed from and after a person has reached his sixth birthday.
- (8) For the purposes of subsection (4) of this section, and only for the purposes of such subsection, the disability of infancy or minority shall be removed from and after a person has reached his sixth birthday or from and after such person shall have a parent or legal guardian, whichever occurs later, unless such disability is otherwise removed by law.
- (9) The limitation established by this section as to a licensed physician, osteopath, dentist, hospital or nurse shall apply only to actions the cause of which accrued on or after July 1, 1976.
- (10) The limitation established by this section as to pharmacists shall apply only to actions the cause of which accrued on or after July 1, 1978.
- (11) The limitation established by this section as to podiatrists shall apply only to actions the cause of which accrued on or after July 1, 1979.
- (12) The limitation established by this section as to optometrists and chiropractors shall apply only to actions the cause of which accrued on or after July 1, 1983.
- (13) The limitation established by this section as to actions commenced on behalf of minors shall apply only to actions the cause of which accrued on or after July 1, 1989.
- (14) The limitation established by this section as to institutions for the aged or infirm shall apply only to actions the cause of which occurred on or after January 1, 2003.
- (15) No action based upon the health care provider's professional negligence may be begun unless the defendant has been given at least sixty (60) days' prior written notice of the intention to begin the action. No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered. If the notice is served within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the time for the commencement of the action shall be extended sixty (60) days from the service of the notice for said health care providers and others. This subsection shall not be applicable with respect to any defendant whose name is unknown to the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint and who is identified therein by a fictitious name.
Laws, 1976, ch. 473; Laws, 1978, ch. 464, § 1; Laws, 1979, ch. 347; Laws, 1983, ch. 482, § 1; Laws, 1989, ch. 311, § 2; Laws, 1998, ch. 573, § 1; Laws, 2002, 3rd Ex Sess, ch. 2, § 5, eff. 1/1/2003.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 261
cases (22 in the last 5 years), 1978–2026 · leading case: Price v. Clark, 21 So. 3d 509 (Miss. 2009).
Price v. Clark, 21 So. 3d 509 (Miss. 2009). “Steven Clark, Cleveland Medical Clinic, and Alliance filed their Answers, First Defenses, and Motions to Dismiss, raising the defenses of failure to timely file notice of claim pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 15-1-36; the failure of plaintiff to attach to the second amended…”
Arceo v. Tolliver, 19 So. 3d 67 (Miss. 2009). “" Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36 (15) (Rev.2003).”
Arceo v. Tolliver, 949 So. 2d 691 (Miss. 2006). “We also acknowledge that at the time the trial judge was confronted with this issue, there was a dearth of pronouncements from this Court on the recently revised Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36; therefore, we find no fault with the trial judge's effort to fashion a remedy consistent…”
Brittany Spann, LPN v. Patsy Wood, 269 So. 3d 10 (Miss. 2018). “Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36 (15). “The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is the plain meaning rule, which provides that if a statute is not ambiguous, then this Court must apply the statute according to its terms.”
Williams v. Skelton, 6 So. 3d 428 (Miss. 2009). “We agree with the Court of Appeals that this Court "has required strict compliance with the mandates of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-36 such that failure to satisfy the pre-suit notice requirement mandates dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.”
Scaggs v. Gpch-gp, Inc., 931 So. 2d 1274 (Miss. 2006). “The relevant provisions of Miss Code Ann. 15-1-36 are as follows: (2) For any claim occurring on or after July 1, 1998, and except as otherwise provided in this section, no claim in tort may be brought against a .”
Thomas v. Warden, 999 So. 2d 842 (Miss. 2008). “The second argument presented in Thomas' first issue on appeal, and the arguments presented in his remaining issues on appeal, pertain to the constitutionality of Section 15-1-36, and whether this Court should require strict compliance with that statute's notice requirement.”
Pope v. Brock, 912 So. 2d 935 (Miss. 2005). “Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36(15) ¶ 4. The parties agree that this case is controlled by Miss.”
Huss v. Gayden, 991 So. 2d 162 (Miss. 2008). “]" Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36 (Rev.2003). See also Parham, 552 So.”
Proli v. Hathorn, 928 So. 2d 169 (Miss. 2006). “Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36. The statute provides, in part, for a two-year statute of limitations from the date the alleged act, omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered.”
Christopher Pollan v. Andrew Wartak, 240 So. 3d 1185 (Miss. 2017). “Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36 (2) (Rev. 2012).”
Pitalo v. Gpch-gp, Inc., 933 So. 2d 927 (Miss. 2006). “Sections 15-1-36 (Rev.2003) and 11-1-58 (Rev.”
— Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(1) — 41 cases
Caves v. Yarbrough, 991 So. 2d 142 (Miss. 2008).
Barnes v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 733 So. 2d 199 (Miss. 1999).
Huss v. Gayden, 991 So. 2d 162 (Miss. 2008). “]" Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36 (Rev.2003). See also Parham, 552 So.”
Jackson Clinic for Women, PA v. Henley, 965 So. 2d 643 (Miss. 2007).
Robinson v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 732 So. 2d 204 (Miss. 1999).
— Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(1)(1995) — 2 cases
Sarris v. Smith, 782 So. 2d 721 (Miss. 2001).
Shirley C. Johnson Sarris v. McKamy Smith (Miss. 1999).
— Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(15) — 87 cases
Arceo v. Tolliver, 19 So. 3d 67 (Miss. 2009). “" Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36 (15) (Rev.2003).”
Price v. Clark, 21 So. 3d 509 (Miss. 2009). “Steven Clark, Cleveland Medical Clinic, and Alliance filed their Answers, First Defenses, and Motions to Dismiss, raising the defenses of failure to timely file notice of claim pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 15-1-36; the failure of plaintiff to attach to the second amended…”
Arceo v. Tolliver, 949 So. 2d 691 (Miss. 2006). “We also acknowledge that at the time the trial judge was confronted with this issue, there was a dearth of pronouncements from this Court on the recently revised Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36; therefore, we find no fault with the trial judge's effort to fashion a remedy consistent…”
Brittany Spann, LPN v. Patsy Wood, 269 So. 3d 10 (Miss. 2018). “Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36 (15). “The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is the plain meaning rule, which provides that if a statute is not ambiguous, then this Court must apply the statute according to its terms.”
Williams v. Skelton, 6 So. 3d 428 (Miss. 2009). “We agree with the Court of Appeals that this Court "has required strict compliance with the mandates of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-36 such that failure to satisfy the pre-suit notice requirement mandates dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.”
— Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(2) — 54 cases
Christopher Pollan v. Andrew Wartak, 240 So. 3d 1185 (Miss. 2017). “Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36 (2) (Rev. 2012).”
Pope v. Brock, 912 So. 2d 935 (Miss. 2005). “Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36(15) ¶ 4. The parties agree that this case is controlled by Miss.”
Chitty v. Terracina, 16 So. 3d 774 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Sutherland v. Est. of Ritter, 959 So. 2d 1004 (Miss. 2007).
Jackson Clinic for Women, PA v. Henley, 965 So. 2d 643 (Miss. 2007).
— Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(2)(b) — 1 case
Russell v. Williford, 907 So. 2d 362 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
— Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(3) — 5 cases
Kilgore v. Barnes, 508 So. 2d 1042 (Miss. 1987).
Williams v. Kilgore, 618 So. 2d 51 (Miss. 1992).
Nelson v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp.-North Mississippi, Inc., 70 So. 3d 212 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Tanks v. Neas, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 2d 645 (S.D. Miss. 2007).
Brenda Span, as Guardian & Next Friend of Antheijah Span, a Minor v. Dr. Brantley P. Nichols (Miss. Ct. App. 2020).
— Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(5) — 3 cases
Est. of Johnson v. Graceland Care Ctr. of Oxford, LLC, 41 So. 3d 692 (Miss. 2010).
Nelson v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp.-North Mississippi, Inc., 70 So. 3d 212 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Ardelua Johnson v. Graceland Care Ctr. of Oxford, LLC (Miss. 2008).
— Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(6) — 3 cases
Est. of Johnson v. Graceland Care Ctr. of Oxford, LLC, 41 So. 3d 692 (Miss. 2010).
Nelson v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp.-North Mississippi, Inc., 70 So. 3d 212 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Ardelua Johnson v. Graceland Care Ctr. of Oxford, LLC (Miss. 2008).
— Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(8) — 1 case
Nelson v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp.-North Mississippi, Inc., 70 So. 3d 212 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
— Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(l) — 1 case
Janice Y. Davis v. Darrell N. Blaylock, MD, 212 So. 3d 755 (Miss. 2017).
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