Missouri Revised Statutes

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 191.677 (2026)

Serious infectious or communicable diseases, prohibited acts, criminal penalties

✓ current as of May 2026
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  191.677.  Serious infectious or communicable diseases, prohibited acts, criminal penalties — affirmative defense — use of pseudonym, when. — 1.  For purposes of this section, the term "serious infectious or communicable disease" means a nonairborne disease spread from person to person that is fatal or causes disabling long-term consequences in the absence of lifelong treatment and management.

  2.  It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly infected with a serious infectious or communicable disease to:

  (1)  Be or attempt to be a blood, blood products, organ, sperm, or tissue donor except as deemed necessary for medical research or as deemed medically appropriate by a licensed physician;

  (2)  Knowingly expose another person to such serious infectious or communicable disease through an activity that creates a substantial risk of disease transmission as determined by competent medical or epidemiological evidence; or

  (3)  Act in a reckless manner by exposing another person to such serious infectious or communicable disease through an activity that creates a substantial risk of disease transmission as determined by competent medical or epidemiological evidence.

  3.  (1)  Violation of the provisions of subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection 2 of this section is a class D felony unless the victim contracts the serious infectious or communicable disease from the contact, in which case it is a class C felony.

  (2)  Violation of the provisions of subdivision (3) of subsection 2 of this section is a class A misdemeanor.

  4.  It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section if the person exposed to the serious infectious or communicable disease knew that the infected person was infected with the serious infectious or communicable disease at the time of the exposure and consented to the exposure with such knowledge.

  5.  (1)  For purposes of this subsection, the term "identifying characteristics" includes, but is not limited to, the name or any part of the name, address or any part of the address, city or unincorporated area of residence, age, marital status, place of employment, or racial or ethnic background of the defendant or the person exposed, or the relationship between the defendant and the person exposed.

  (2)  When alleging a violation of this section, the prosecuting attorney or the grand jury shall substitute a pseudonym for the actual name of the person exposed to a serious infectious or communicable disease.  The actual name and other identifying characteristics of the person exposed shall be revealed to the court only in camera unless the person exposed requests otherwise, and the court shall seal the information from further disclosure, except by counsel as part of discovery.

  (3)  Unless the person exposed requests otherwise, all court decisions, orders, pleadings, and other documents, including motions and papers filed by the parties, shall be worded so as to protect from public disclosure the name and other identifying characteristics of the person exposed.

  (4)  Unless the person exposed requests otherwise, a court in which a violation of this section is filed shall issue an order that prohibits counsel and their agents, law enforcement personnel, and court staff from making a public disclosure of the name or any other identifying characteristics of the person exposed.

  (5)  Unless the defendant requests otherwise, a court in which a violation of this section is filed shall issue an order that prohibits counsel and their agents, law enforcement personnel, and court staff, before a finding of guilt, from making a public disclosure of the name or other identifying characteristics of the defendant.  In any public disclosure before a finding of guilt, a pseudonym shall be substituted for the actual name of the defendant.

  (6)  Before sentencing, a defendant shall be assessed for placement in one or more community-based programs that provide counseling, supervision, and education and that offer reasonable opportunity for the defendant to provide redress to the person exposed.

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(L. 1988 H.B. 1151 & 1044 § 10, A.L. 1997 S.B. 347, A.L. 2002 H.B. 1756, A.L. 2021 S.B. 53 & 60)

(2016) Section's burden on speech is incidental to the conduct sought to be prohibited and does not violate constitutional provisions protecting freedom of speech.  State v. S.F., 483 S.W.3d 385 (Mo.).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 18 cases, 1998–2017 · leading case: State of Missouri v. S.F., 483 S.W.3d 385 (Mo. 2016).
State of Missouri v. S.F., 483 S.W.3d 385 (Mo. 2016). · cites it 42× “(Defendant) appeals her conviction for recklessly exposing another person to HIV without that person’s knowledge and consent to the exposure pursuant to section 191.677. 1 She argues that the statute infringes on her constitutional rights to free speech and privacy by compelling…”
State v. White, 247 S.W.3d 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 18× “Factual and Procedural Background Defendant was convicted in a jury trial of one count of knowingly exposing another to HIV under Section 191.677. 2 Defendant met Isia Douglas (“Douglas”) in June 2002, after his release from prison.”
State v. Mahan, 971 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1998). · cites it 27× “Section 191.677, RSMo 1994, creates the class D felony of creating a grave and unjustifiable risk of infecting another with HIV.”
State v. Newlon, 216 S.W.3d 180 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 7× “Louis, following a jury trial, finding him guilty of *183 two counts of exposing other persons to HIV without their knowledge and consent, section 191.677, RSMo 2000 (Supp.2002). 1 Defendant was sentenced as a persistent sexual offender to ten years of imprisonment for each…”
State v. Bowens, 964 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 6× “Defendant argues Section 191.677 3 is overbroad because it makes no exception for knowing and consenting partners, which is constitutionally protected conduct.”
State v. Richardson, 209 P.3d 696 (Kan. 2009). · cites it 2× “For example, Missouri’s statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 191.677 (4) (2008 Supp.), specifically states that “[t]he use of condoms is not *129 a defense” to a violation of that statute.”
State v. Wilson, 256 S.W.3d 58 (Mo. 2008). · cites it 4× “Section 191.677 makes it unlawful for any individual knowingly infected with HIV to recklessly expose another person to the virus through sexual intercourse without his or her knowledge and consent.”
State v. Hadley, 357 S.W.3d 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 4× “In relevant part Mo.Rev.Stat. § 191.677 (2006) provides: 1.”
Grace v. State, 313 S.W.3d 230 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “067 (Count III); and exposing another person to HIV infection without knowledge or consent, pursuant to Section 191.677 (Count IV). The State entered a nolle pro-sequi on Count III.”
State of Missouri v. Andrew Canaday, 476 S.W.3d 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 2× “067 and one count of intentionally exposing another to the HIV virus 2 in violation of section 191.677. The trial court sentenced Canaday to life in prison on the first count and to- fifteen-years on each of the remaining counts, to run concurrently with the life sentence.”
Sykes v. State, 372 S.W.3d 33 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 2× “Sykes was charged with one count of recklessly exposing another to HIV, in violation of section 191.677. At trial, Sykes stipulated that he was at all times aware of his HIV status and of his duty to warn partners of it.”
State v. Yonts, 84 S.W.3d 516 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 4× “David Yonts (“Appellant”) appeals from his conviction of recklessly exposing another to HIV in violation of § 191.677. 1 On November 6, 2001, the trial court sentenced Appellant to one year of imprisonment in the Missouri Department of Corrections.”
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 191.677(2) — 1 case
State v. Bowens, 964 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). “Defendant argues Section 191.677 3 is overbroad because it makes no exception for knowing and consenting partners, which is constitutionally protected conduct.”
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