Mont. Code Ann. » TITLE 40. FAMILY LAW · CHAPTER 15. PARTNER AND FAMILY MEMBER ASSAULT, SEXUAL ASSAULT, AND STALKING -- VICTIM PROTECTION · Part 2. Order of Protection
Montana Code Annotated

Mont. Code Ann. § 40-15-201 (2026)

Temporary Order Of Protection

✓ current as of May 2026
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  1. MCA Contents
  2. TITLE 40
  3. CHAPTER 15
  4. Part 2
  5. 40-15-201 Temporary order of protection

TITLE 40. FAMILY LAW

CHAPTER 15. PARTNER AND FAMILY MEMBER ASSAULT, SEXUAL ASSAULT, AND STALKING -- VICTIM PROTECTION

Part 2. Order of Protection

Temporary Order Of Protection

40-15-201. Temporary order of protection. (1) A petitioner may seek a temporary order of protection from a court listed in 40-15-301. The petitioner shall file a sworn petition that states that the petitioner is in reasonable apprehension of bodily injury or is a victim of one of the offenses listed in 40-15-102, has a relationship to the respondent if required by 40-15-102, and is in danger of harm if the court does not issue a temporary order of protection immediately.

(2) Upon a review of the petition and a finding that the petitioner is in danger of harm if the court does not act immediately, the court shall issue a temporary order of protection that grants the petitioner appropriate relief. The temporary order of protection may include any or all of the following orders:

(a) prohibiting the respondent from threatening to commit or committing acts of violence against the petitioner and any designated family member;

(b) prohibiting the respondent from harassing, annoying, disturbing the peace of, telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating, directly or indirectly, with the petitioner, any named family member, any other victim of this offense, or a witness to the offense;

(c) prohibiting the respondent from removing a child from the jurisdiction of the court;

(d) directing the respondent to stay 1,500 feet or other appropriate distance away from the petitioner, the petitioner's residence, the school or place of employment of the petitioner, or any specified place frequented by the petitioner and by any other designated family or household member;

(e) removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence;

(f) prohibiting the respondent from possessing or using the firearm used in the assault;

(g) prohibiting the respondent from transferring, encumbering, concealing, or otherwise disposing of any property except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life and, if so restrained, requiring the respondent to notify the petitioner, through the court, of any proposed extraordinary expenditures made after the order is issued;

(h) directing the transfer of possession and use of the residence, an automobile, and other essential personal property, regardless of ownership of the residence, automobile, or essential personal property, and directing an appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence to ensure that the petitioner safely obtains possession of the residence, automobile, or other essential personal property or to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's removal of essential personal property;

(i) directing the respondent to complete violence counseling, which may include alcohol or chemical dependency counseling or treatment, if appropriate;

(j) directing other relief considered necessary to provide for the safety and welfare of the petitioner or other designated family member.

(3) If the petitioner has fled the parties' residence, notice of the petitioner's new residence must be withheld, except by order of the court for good cause shown.

(4) The court may, without requiring prior notice to the respondent, issue an immediate temporary order of protection for up to 20 days if the court finds, on the basis of the petitioner's sworn petition or other evidence, that harm may result to the petitioner if an order is not issued before the 20-day period for responding has elapsed.

(5) A temporary order of protection issued pursuant to this section must conspicuously bear the following: "Violation of this order is a criminal offense under 45-5-626 and may also be a criminal offense under 45-5-220."

History: En. Sec. 23, Ch. 350, L. 1995; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 37, L. 2011.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 28 cases (9 in the last 5 years), 2000–2025 · leading case: Boushie v. Windsor, 2014 MT 153 (Mont. 2014).
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Boushie v. Windsor, 2014 MT 153 (Mont. 2014). · cites it 16× “Section 40-15-201, MCA, provides a process by which victims of offenses, including stalking, may obtain relief from the perpetrators.”
Marriage of Lockhead, 2013 MT 368 (Mont. 2013). · cites it 6× “We therefore determine he has failed to preserve these alleged errors for appeal and consequently we decline to review the constitutionality of § 40-15-201, MCA. As such, the only remaining issue is whether the District Court’s denial of Brian’s Motion to Vacate constituted an…”
In Re the Marriage of Coogler, 2004 MT 122 (Mont. 2004). · cites it 10× “4 ¶18 Section 40-15-201(1), MCA, states that “[a] petitioner may seek a temporary order of protection.”
Lear v. Jamrogowicz, 2013 MT 147 (Mont. 2013). · cites it 3× “” Section 40-15-201(1), MCA, allows a petitioner to seek a TOP if the petitioner is fin reasonable apprehension of bodily injury”; is a victim of stalking; and is in “danger of harm if the court does not issue a temporary order of protection immediately.”
M. Cook v. K. Bodine, 2024 MT 189 (Mont. 2024). · cites it 10× “FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 On April 28, 2023, Cook petitioned for a temporary order of protection pursuant to § 40-15-201, MCA, based on assertions that Bodine, his former girlfriend, despite his demand that she never contact him again, had driven by and parked near…”
Commonwealth v. Telcinord, 113 N.E.3d 382 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018). “See Idaho Code § 39-6306 (1)(i) (2018) ; Mont. Code Ann. § 40-15-201 (2)(d) (2017).”
E. Weilacher v. S. Weilacher, 2024 MT 195N (Mont. 2024). · cites it 14× “¶3 On January 18, 2023, Erika Dawn Petersen-Weilacher (Erika) petitioned the District Court pursuant to § 40-15-201, MCA, for a temporary order of protection based on assertions that during a December 28, 2022, incident at the Columbia Falls residence where she and Scott lived,1…”
Groenke v. Gabriel, 2025 MT 104N (Mont. 2025). · cites it 13× “By contrast, this case involves a civil protective order, governed by an objective standard—whether a reasonable person would experience apprehension of bodily injury—under §§ 40-15-201 and -202, MCA. Thus, Counterman is distinguishable and does not alter our analysis.”
K.d.r.-m v. R.E.M., 2004 MT 292 (Mont. 2004). · cites it 2× “¶31 The mother commenced both of these actions specifically alleging she was entitled to a temporary protective order under § 40-15-201, MCA, as well as under § 40-4-121, MCA.”
Boland v. Boland, 430 P.3d 1014 (Mont. 2018). · cites it 6× “Section 40-15-201, MCA ; see also § 40-15-102, MCA (setting out eligibility for an order of protection); In re Marriage of Coogler , ¶ 18 .”
State v. Thorpe, 2015 MT 14 (Mont. 2015). “Because, under §§ 40-15-201 through -202, MCA, the issuance of an order of protection turns merely upon good cause and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, see Lear v.”
Hennon v. Weber, 2025 MT 260 (Mont. 2025). · cites it 2× “by affirming the Justice Court’s order of protection without providing an opportunity to be heard? FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶3 On February 24, 2025, Skye Angel Anne Hennon (Hennon) filed with the Judith Basin Justice Court of record (Justice Court),1 a sworn petition…”
Show all 28 citing cases →
— Mont. Code Ann. § 40-15-201(1) — 9 cases
In Re the Marriage of Coogler, 2004 MT 122 (Mont. 2004). “4 ¶18 Section 40-15-201(1), MCA, states that “[a] petitioner may seek a temporary order of protection.”
Lear v. Jamrogowicz, 2013 MT 147 (Mont. 2013). “” Section 40-15-201(1), MCA, allows a petitioner to seek a TOP if the petitioner is fin reasonable apprehension of bodily injury”; is a victim of stalking; and is in “danger of harm if the court does not issue a temporary order of protection immediately.”
M. Cook v. K. Bodine, 2024 MT 189 (Mont. 2024). “FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 On April 28, 2023, Cook petitioned for a temporary order of protection pursuant to § 40-15-201, MCA, based on assertions that Bodine, his former girlfriend, despite his demand that she never contact him again, had driven by and parked near…”
E. Weilacher v. S. Weilacher, 2024 MT 195N (Mont. 2024). “¶3 On January 18, 2023, Erika Dawn Petersen-Weilacher (Erika) petitioned the District Court pursuant to § 40-15-201, MCA, for a temporary order of protection based on assertions that during a December 28, 2022, incident at the Columbia Falls residence where she and Scott lived,1…”
Groenke v. Gabriel, 2025 MT 104N (Mont. 2025). “By contrast, this case involves a civil protective order, governed by an objective standard—whether a reasonable person would experience apprehension of bodily injury—under §§ 40-15-201 and -202, MCA. Thus, Counterman is distinguishable and does not alter our analysis.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 40-15-201(2) — 8 cases
Boushie v. Windsor, 2014 MT 153 (Mont. 2014). “Section 40-15-201, MCA, provides a process by which victims of offenses, including stalking, may obtain relief from the perpetrators.”
In Re the Marriage of Coogler, 2004 MT 122 (Mont. 2004). “4 ¶18 Section 40-15-201(1), MCA, states that “[a] petitioner may seek a temporary order of protection.”
Groenke v. Gabriel, 2025 MT 104N (Mont. 2025). “By contrast, this case involves a civil protective order, governed by an objective standard—whether a reasonable person would experience apprehension of bodily injury—under §§ 40-15-201 and -202, MCA. Thus, Counterman is distinguishable and does not alter our analysis.”
Wooldridge v. Spreadbury, 2025 MT 235N (Mont. 2025).
Richards v. Short, 2014 MT 298N (Mont. 2014).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 40-15-201(2)(a) — 1 case
Boushie v. Windsor, 2014 MT 153 (Mont. 2014). “Section 40-15-201, MCA, provides a process by which victims of offenses, including stalking, may obtain relief from the perpetrators.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 40-15-201(2)(d) — 1 case
Boushie v. Windsor, 2014 MT 153 (Mont. 2014). “Section 40-15-201, MCA, provides a process by which victims of offenses, including stalking, may obtain relief from the perpetrators.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 40-15-201(2)(j) — 1 case
Boushie v. Windsor, 2014 MT 153 (Mont. 2014). “Section 40-15-201, MCA, provides a process by which victims of offenses, including stalking, may obtain relief from the perpetrators.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 40-15-201(4) — 5 cases
Marriage of Lockhead, 2013 MT 368 (Mont. 2013). “We therefore determine he has failed to preserve these alleged errors for appeal and consequently we decline to review the constitutionality of § 40-15-201, MCA. As such, the only remaining issue is whether the District Court’s denial of Brian’s Motion to Vacate constituted an…”
M. Cook v. K. Bodine, 2024 MT 189 (Mont. 2024). “FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 On April 28, 2023, Cook petitioned for a temporary order of protection pursuant to § 40-15-201, MCA, based on assertions that Bodine, his former girlfriend, despite his demand that she never contact him again, had driven by and parked near…”
Carter v. Carter, 2008 MT 406 (Mont. 2008).
E. Weilacher v. S. Weilacher, 2024 MT 195N (Mont. 2024). “¶3 On January 18, 2023, Erika Dawn Petersen-Weilacher (Erika) petitioned the District Court pursuant to § 40-15-201, MCA, for a temporary order of protection based on assertions that during a December 28, 2022, incident at the Columbia Falls residence where she and Scott lived,1…”
Cuomo v. Derr, 2025 MT 48N (Mont. 2025).
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