Montana Code Annotated

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201 (2026)

Sentences That May Be Imposed

✓ current as of May 2026
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TITLE 46. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 18. SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT

Part 2. Form of Sentence

Sentences That May Be Imposed

46-18-201. Sentences that may be imposed. (1) (a) Whenever a person has been found guilty of an offense upon a verdict of guilty or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a sentencing judge may defer imposition of sentence, except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, for a period:

(i) not exceeding 1 year for a misdemeanor or for a period not exceeding 3 years for a felony; or

(ii) not exceeding 2 years for a misdemeanor or for a period not exceeding 6 years for a felony if a financial obligation is imposed as a condition of sentence for either the misdemeanor or the felony, regardless of whether any other conditions are imposed.

(b) Except as provided in 46-18-222, imposition of sentence in a felony case may not be deferred in the case of an offender who has been convicted of a felony on a prior occasion, whether or not the sentence was imposed, imposition of the sentence was deferred, or execution of the sentence was suspended.

(2) (a) Whenever a person has been found guilty of an offense upon a verdict of guilty or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a sentencing judge may suspend execution of sentence, except as provided in subsection (2)(b) or as otherwise specifically provided by statute, for a period up to the maximum sentence allowed or for a period of 6 months, whichever is greater, for each particular offense.

(b) (i) Except as provided in subsections (2)(b)(ii) and (2)(b)(iii), a sentencing judge may not suspend execution of sentence, including when imposing a sentence under subsection (3)(a)(vii), in a manner that would result in an offender being supervised in the community as a probationer by the department of corrections for a period of time longer than:

(A) 20 years for a sexual offender, as defined in 46-23-502;

(B) 20 years for an offender convicted of deliberate homicide, as defined in 45-5-102, or mitigated homicide, as defined in 45-5-103;

(C) 15 years for a violent offender, as defined in 46-23-502, an offender convicted of negligent homicide, as defined in 45-5-104, vehicular homicide while under the influence, as defined in 45-5-106, aggravated vehicular homicide under the influence, as provided in 45-5-107, or criminal distribution of dangerous drugs that results in the death of an individual from use of the dangerous drug, as provided in 45-9-101(5);

(D) 10 years for an offender convicted of 45-9-101, 45-9-103, 45-9-107, 45-9-109, 45-9-110, 45-9-125, 45-9-127, or 45-9-132; or

(E) 5 years for all other felony offenses.

(ii) The provisions of subsections (2)(b)(i)(A) and (2)(b)(i)(B) do not apply if the sentencing judge finds that a longer term of supervision is needed for the protection of society or the victim. The sentencing judge shall state as part of the sentence and the judgment the reasons a longer suspended sentence is needed to protect society or the victim.

(iii) The provisions of subsections (2)(b)(i)(A) and (2)(b)(i)(B) do not apply to violations of 45-6-301 if the amount of restitution ordered exceeds $50,000.

(3) (a) Whenever a person has been found guilty of an offense upon a verdict of guilty or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a sentencing judge may impose a sentence that may include:

(i) a fine as provided by law for the offense;

(ii) payment of costs, as provided in 46-18-232, or payment of costs of assigned counsel as provided in 46-8-113;

(iii) a term of incarceration, as provided in Title 45 for the offense, at a county detention center or at a state prison to be designated by the department of corrections;

(iv) commitment of:

(A) an offender not referred to in subsection (3)(a)(iv)(B) to the department of corrections with a recommendation for placement in an appropriate correctional facility or program; however, all but the first 5 years of the commitment to the department of corrections must be suspended, except as provided in 45-5-503(4), 45-5-507(5), 45-5-601(3), 45-5-625(4), and 45-5-711; or

(B) a youth transferred to district court under 41-5-206 and found guilty in the district court of an offense enumerated in 41-5-206 to the department of corrections for a period determined by the court for placement in an appropriate correctional facility or program;

(v) chemical treatment of sexual offenders, as provided in 45-5-512, if applicable, that is paid for by and for a period of time determined by the department of corrections, but not exceeding the period of state supervision of the person;

(vi) commitment of an offender to the department of corrections with the requirement that immediately subsequent to sentencing or disposition the offender is released to community supervision and that any subsequent violation must be addressed as provided in 46-23-1011 through 46-23-1015; or

(vii) any combination of subsection (2) and this subsection (3)(a).

(b) A court may permit a part or all of a fine to be satisfied by a donation of food to a food bank program.

(4) When deferring imposition of sentence or suspending all or a portion of execution of sentence, the sentencing judge may impose on the offender any reasonable restrictions or conditions during the period of the deferred imposition or suspension of sentence. Reasonable restrictions or conditions imposed under subsection (1)(a) or (2) may include but are not limited to:

(a) limited release during employment hours as provided in 46-18-701;

(b) incarceration in a detention center not exceeding 180 days;

(c) conditions for probation;

(d) payment of the costs of confinement;

(e) payment of a fine and accrued interest as provided in 46-18-231;

(f) payment of costs as provided in 46-18-232 and 46-18-233;

(g) payment of costs of assigned counsel as provided in 46-8-113;

(h) with the approval of the facility or program, an order that the offender be placed in a community corrections facility or program as provided in 53-30-321;

(i) with the approval of the prerelease center or prerelease program and confirmation by the department of corrections that space is available and that the offender is a suitable candidate, an order that the offender be placed in a chemical dependency treatment program, prerelease center, or prerelease program for a period not to exceed 1 year;

(j) community service;

(k) home arrest as provided in Title 46, chapter 18, part 10;

(l) payment of expenses for use of a judge pro tempore or special master as provided in 3-5-116;

(m) participation in a day reporting program provided for in 53-1-203;

(n) participation in the 24/7 sobriety and drug monitoring program provided for in Title 44, chapter 4, part 12, for a violation of aggravated driving under the influence as defined in 61-8-1001, a violation of 61-8-1002, or a second or subsequent violation of any other statute that imposes a jail penalty of 6 months or more if the abuse of alcohol or dangerous drugs was a contributing factor in the commission of the crime or for a violation of any statute involving domestic abuse or the abuse or neglect of a minor if the abuse of alcohol or dangerous drugs was a contributing factor in the commission of the crime regardless of whether the charge or conviction was for a first, second, or subsequent violation of the statute;

(o) participation in a restorative justice program approved by court order and payment of a participation fee of up to $150 for program expenses if the program agrees to accept the offender;

(p) any other reasonable restrictions or conditions considered necessary for rehabilitation or for the protection of the victim or society;

(q) with approval of the program and confirmation by the department of corrections that space is available, an order that the offender be placed in a residential treatment program; or

(r) any combination of the restrictions or conditions listed in this subsection (4).

(5) In addition to any other penalties imposed, if a person has been found guilty of an offense upon a verdict of guilty or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and the sentencing judge finds that a victim, as defined in 46-18-243, has sustained a pecuniary loss or the provisions of 46-18-240 apply, the sentencing judge shall, as part of the sentence, require payment of full restitution and interest to the victim, as provided in 46-18-241 through 46-18-249, whether or not any part of the sentence is deferred or suspended.

(6) (a) Except as provided in subsection (6)(b), in addition to any of the penalties, restrictions, or conditions imposed pursuant to subsections (1) through (5), the sentencing judge may include the suspension of the license or driving privilege of the person to be imposed upon the failure to comply with any penalty, restriction, or condition of the sentence. A suspension of the license or driving privilege of the person must be accomplished as provided in 61-5-214 through 61-5-217.

(b) A person's license or driving privilege may not be suspended due to nonpayment of fines, costs, or restitution.

(7) In imposing a sentence on an offender convicted of a sexual or violent offense, as defined in 46-23-502, the sentencing judge may not waive the registration requirement provided in Title 46, chapter 23, part 5.

(8) If a felony sentence includes probation, the department of corrections shall supervise the offender unless the court specifies otherwise.

(9) As used in this section, "dangerous drug" has the meaning provided in 50-32-101.

History: En. 95-2206 by Sec. 1, Ch. 196, L. 1967; rep. and re-en. by Sec. 31, Ch. 513, L. 1973; amd. Sec. 36, Ch. 184, L. 1977; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 436, L. 1977; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 580, L. 1977; amd. Sec. 12, Ch. 584, L. 1977; R.C.M. 1947, 95-2206(1), (2), (4); amd. Sec. 21, Ch. 116, L. 1979; amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 322, L. 1979; amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 587, L. 1979; amd. Sec. 6, Ch. 198, L. 1981; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 207, L. 1981; amd. Sec. 7, Ch. 415, L. 1981; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 189, L. 1983; amd. Sec. 9, Ch. 581, L. 1983; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 205, L. 1985; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 524, L. 1985; amd. Sec. 104, Ch. 370, L. 1987; amd. Sec. 7, Ch. 610, L. 1987; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 626, L. 1987; amd. Sec. 10, Ch. 293, L. 1989; amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 575, L. 1989; amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 42, L. 1991; amd. Sec. 10, Ch. 105, L. 1991; amd. Sec. 17, Ch. 554, L. 1991; amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 564, L. 1991; amd. Sec. 3, Ch. 794, L. 1991; amd. Sec. 5, Ch. 802, L. 1991; amd. Sec. 65, Ch. 10, L. 1993; amd. Sec. 43, Ch. 262, L. 1993; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 365, L. 1993; amd. Sec. 3, Ch. 579, L. 1993; amd. Sec. 10, Ch. 125, L. 1995; amd. Sec. 5, Ch. 394, L. 1995; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 407, L. 1995; amd. Sec. 13, Ch. 482, L. 1995; amd. Sec. 214, Ch. 546, L. 1995; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 181, L. 1997; amd. Sec. 6, Ch. 189, L. 1997; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 322, L. 1997; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 341, L. 1997; amd. Sec. 3, Ch. 375, L. 1997; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 525, L. 1997; amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 52, L. 1999; amd. Sec. 19, Ch. 395, L. 1999; amd. Sec. 16, Ch. 432, L. 1999; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 505, L. 1999; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 258, L. 2003; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 272, L. 2003; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 437, L. 2003; amd. Sec. 52, Ch. 449, L. 2005; amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 517, L. 2005; amd. Sec. 13, Ch. 483, L. 2007; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 128, L. 2009; amd. Sec. 8, Ch. 318, L. 2011; amd. Sec. 4, Ch. 153, L. 2013; amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 177, L. 2013; amd. Sec. 7, Ch. 309, L. 2013; amd. Sec. 9, Ch. 374, L. 2013; amd. Sec. 22, Ch. 55, L. 2015; amd. Sec. 18, Ch. 285, L. 2015; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 61, L. 2017; amd. Sec. 24, Ch. 321, L. 2017; amd. Sec. 12, Ch. 384, L. 2017; amd. Sec. 27, Ch. 3, L. 2019; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 348, L. 2019; amd. Sec. 25, Ch. 498, L. 2021; amd. Secs. 1, 4, Ch. 537, L. 2021; amd. Sec. 25, Ch. 167, L. 2023; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 509, L. 2023; amd. Sec. 3, Ch. 226, L. 2025; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 498, L. 2025; amd. Sec. 3, Ch. 509, L. 2025.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 435 cases (89 in the last 5 years), 1979–2026 · leading case: State v. Stiles, 2008 MT 390 (Mont. 2008).
State v. Stiles, 2008 MT 390 (Mont. 2008). · cites it 76× “We then proceeded to analyze the condition, concluding that it “has a sufficient nexus to Brotherton’s unique background and characteristics,” that it 16 thus “is a reasonable restriction necessary for Brotherton’s rehabilitation,” and that it accordingly “is legal under §§…”
State v. Heath, 2004 MT 126 (Mont. 2004). · cites it 48× “3d 886 , issued June 12, 2001, which explained that “an apparent codification error” in the 1999 amendments to § 46-18-201, MCA, had raised a question about a sentencing court’s continued authority to impose restitution as a condition of a suspended execution of sentence.”
State v. Honey, 2005 MT 107 (Mont. 2005). · cites it 64× “Section 46-18-201(1)(a) and (b) address deferred sentences, § 46-18-201(2) addresses suspended sentences, and § 46-18-201(3)(a)-(h) addresses sentences that have neither a deferred nor a suspended component.”
State v. Holt, 2011 MT 42 (Mont. 2011). · cites it 39× “' In other words, the sentencing authority of sentencing judges is constrained and defined by § 46-18-201, MCA." Burch, ¶ 24 (ellipsis in original, emphasis added, citation omitted).”
State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204 (Mont. 2007). · cites it 14× “¶ 179 Section 46-18-201(5), MCA (2001) provides that "if the sentencing judge finds that the victim of the offense has sustained a pecuniary loss, the sentencing judge shall require payment of full restitution to the victim as provided in XX-XX-XXX through XX-XX-XXX.”
State v. Benoit, 2002 MT 166 (Mont. 2002). · cites it 23× “Rather, the District Court deferred imposition of Benoit's sentence for the maximum allowable period in accordance with § 46-18-201(1)(a)(ii), MCA, which specifically authorizes a deferment for six years "if a financial obligation is imposed as a condition of sentence[.”
State v. Zimmerman, 2010 MT 44 (Mont. 2010). · cites it 26× “We concur: JAMES C. NELSON, BRIAN MORRIS and JIM RICE, JJ.”
State v. Strong, 2009 MT 65 (Mont. 2009). · cites it 25× “¶20 Section 46-18-201, MCA, governs the form of a criminal sentence.”
State v. Horton, 2000 MT 100 (Mont. 2001). · cites it 21× “While the 1999 Legislature extensively amended § 46-18-201, MCA, the majority of those amendments did not take effect until October 1, 1999, three weeks after Horton was sentenced.”
City of Bozeman v. Cantu, 2013 MT 40 (Mont. 2013). · cites it 16× “Leyva, ¶ 19 (“That the Legislature has mandated certain conditions of probation for persons convicted of prescribed sex offenses does not limit the otherwise broad discretion of a sentencing court under §§ 46-18-201 and -202, MCA.”
State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17 (Mont. 2007). · cites it 10× “If the court fails to abide by this requirement, the sentence is subject to challenge or objection. That does not mean, however, that in the absence of an objection, the sentence is thereby illegal.”
State v. Ommundson, 1999 MT 16 (Mont. 1999). · cites it 19× “He argues that it is not enough that a condition of sentence relate generally to rehabilitation; rather, there must be a correlation between the crime for which the defendant was convicted and the condition imposed.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(1) — 7 cases
State v. Lenihan, 602 P.2d 997 (Mont. 1979).
State v. Heath, 2004 MT 126 (Mont. 2004). “3d 886 , issued June 12, 2001, which explained that “an apparent codification error” in the 1999 amendments to § 46-18-201, MCA, had raised a question about a sentencing court’s continued authority to impose restitution as a condition of a suspended execution of sentence.”
State v. Welling, 2002 MT 308 (Mont. 2002).
State v. Honey, 2005 MT 107 (Mont. 2005). “Section 46-18-201(1)(a) and (b) address deferred sentences, § 46-18-201(2) addresses suspended sentences, and § 46-18-201(3)(a)-(h) addresses sentences that have neither a deferred nor a suspended component.”
State v. Docken, 908 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1995).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(1)(a) — 12 cases
State v. Henry, 898 P.2d 1195 (Mont. 1995).
State v. Shaver, 760 P.2d 1230 (Mont. 1988).
City of Missoula v. Franklin, 425 P.3d 1285 (Mont. 2018).
State v. T.Thibeault, 2021 MT 162 (Mont. 2021).
State v. Honey, 2005 MT 107 (Mont. 2005). “Section 46-18-201(1)(a) and (b) address deferred sentences, § 46-18-201(2) addresses suspended sentences, and § 46-18-201(3)(a)-(h) addresses sentences that have neither a deferred nor a suspended component.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(1)(a)(i) — 4 cases
State v. T.Thibeault, 2021 MT 162 (Mont. 2021).
State v. Henry, 898 P.2d 1195 (Mont. 1995).
State v. D. Landucci, 2024 MT 35N (Mont. 2024).
State v. Vangilder, 2016 MT 252N (Mont. 2015).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(1)(a)(ii) — 5 cases
State v. Benoit, 2002 MT 166 (Mont. 2002). “Rather, the District Court deferred imposition of Benoit's sentence for the maximum allowable period in accordance with § 46-18-201(1)(a)(ii), MCA, which specifically authorizes a deferment for six years "if a financial obligation is imposed as a condition of sentence[.”
State v. Essig, 2009 MT 340 (Mont. 2009).
State v. Grindheim, 2004 MT 311 (Mont. 2004).
State v. T.Thibeault, 2021 MT 162 (Mont. 2021).
State v. D. Landucci, 2024 MT 35N (Mont. 2024).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(1)(a)(iv) — 3 cases
State v. Morgan, 646 P.2d 1177 (Mont. 1982).
State v. Farrell, 676 P.2d 168 (Mont. 1984).
State v. Henry, 898 P.2d 1195 (Mont. 1995).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(1)(a)(viii) — 1 case
State v. Henry, 898 P.2d 1195 (Mont. 1995).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(1)(a)(xii) — 2 cases
State v. Henry, 898 P.2d 1195 (Mont. 1995).
State v. Brown, 867 P.2d 1098 (Mont. 1994).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(1)(b) — 14 cases
State v. Heath, 2004 MT 126 (Mont. 2004). “3d 886 , issued June 12, 2001, which explained that “an apparent codification error” in the 1999 amendments to § 46-18-201, MCA, had raised a question about a sentencing court’s continued authority to impose restitution as a condition of a suspended execution of sentence.”
State v. Nelson, 437 P.3d 127 (Mont. 2019).
State v. Henry, 898 P.2d 1195 (Mont. 1995).
State v. Shaver, 760 P.2d 1230 (Mont. 1988).
State v. Cleveland, 2014 MT 305 (Mont. 2014).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(1)(e) — 9 cases
Pena v. State, 2004 MT 293 (Mont. 2004).
State v. Southwick, 2007 MT 257 (Mont. 2007).
Camarillo v. State, 2005 MT 29 (Mont. 2005).
MacPheat v. Mahoney, 2000 MT 62 (Mont. 2000).
State v. Todd, 849 P.2d 175 (Mont. 1993).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(10) — 11 cases
State v. Pence, 902 P.2d 41 (Mont. 1995).
State v. Stevens, 854 P.2d 336 (Mont. 1993).
Thurston v. State, 2004 MT 142 (Mont. 2004).
State v. LaMere, 900 P.2d 926 (Mont. 1995).
State v. Savaria, 945 P.2d 24 (Mont. 1997).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(11) — 12 cases
State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17 (Mont. 2007). “If the court fails to abide by this requirement, the sentence is subject to challenge or objection. That does not mean, however, that in the absence of an objection, the sentence is thereby illegal.”
State v. Garrymore, 2006 MT 245 (Mont. 2006).
State v. Swoboda, 918 P.2d 296 (Mont. 1996).
State v. Renee, 1999 MT 135 (Mont. 1999).
State v. Nelson, 906 P.2d 663 (Mont. 1995).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(2) — 23 cases
State v. Muhammad, 2002 MT 47 (Mont. 2002).
State v. Honey, 2005 MT 107 (Mont. 2005). “Section 46-18-201(1)(a) and (b) address deferred sentences, § 46-18-201(2) addresses suspended sentences, and § 46-18-201(3)(a)-(h) addresses sentences that have neither a deferred nor a suspended component.”
State v. LeDEAU, 2009 MT 276 (Mont. 2009).
State v. Setters, 2001 MT 101 (Mont. 2001).
State v. Horton, 2000 MT 100 (Mont. 2001). “While the 1999 Legislature extensively amended § 46-18-201, MCA, the majority of those amendments did not take effect until October 1, 1999, three weeks after Horton was sentenced.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(2)(a) — 5 cases
City of Whitefish v. Curran, 2023 MT 118 (Mont. 2023).
State v. N. Cole, 2026 MT 52 (Mont. 2026).
State v. Roberts, 2025 MT 110 (Mont. 2025).
State v. Trombley (Mont. 2026).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(3) — 8 cases
Mcdermott v. Montana Dep't of Corr., 2001 MT 134 (Mont. 2001).
State v. Welling, 2002 MT 308 (Mont. 2002).
State v. Arbgast, 656 P.2d 828 (Mont. 1983).
State v. W. Rossbach, 2022 MT 2 (Mont. 2022).
State v. George, 2002 MT 300 (Mont. 2002).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(3)(a) — 7 cases
State v. D. Ingram, 2020 MT 327 (Mont. 2020).
State v. Bekemans, 2013 MT 11 (Mont. 2013).
State v. R. Gibbons, 2024 MT 63 (Mont. 2024).
State v. Honey, 2005 MT 107 (Mont. 2005). “Section 46-18-201(1)(a) and (b) address deferred sentences, § 46-18-201(2) addresses suspended sentences, and § 46-18-201(3)(a)-(h) addresses sentences that have neither a deferred nor a suspended component.”
State v. J. Marsh, 2021 MT 23N (Mont. 2021).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(3)(a)(iii) — 8 cases
State v. Holt, 2011 MT 42 (Mont. 2011). “' In other words, the sentencing authority of sentencing judges is constrained and defined by § 46-18-201, MCA." Burch, ¶ 24 (ellipsis in original, emphasis added, citation omitted).”
State v. Amanda Byrd, 2015 MT 20 (Mont. 2015).
State v. C. Armstrong (Mont. 2021).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(3)(a)(iv) — 1 case
State v. W. Rossbach, 2022 MT 2 (Mont. 2022).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(3)(a)(iv)(A) — 23 cases
State v. Roberts, 2010 MT 110 (Mont. 2010).
Vanskyock v. Twentieth Jud. Dist. Court, 2017 MT 99 (Mont. 2017).
State v. Habets, 2011 MT 275 (Mont. 2011).
State v. F. Day, 2018 MT 51 (Mont. 2018).
State v. J. Marsh, 2021 MT 23N (Mont. 2021).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(3)(a)(iv)(B) — 4 cases
D. Jones v. Bludworth (Mont. 2020).
Friedt v. State (Mont. 2022).
J. Henderson v. State (Mont. 2023).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(3)(a)(vi) — 1 case
State v. E. Hoschouer, 2024 MT 206N (Mont. 2024).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(3)(a)(vii) — 2 cases
State v. C. Armstrong (Mont. 2021).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(3)(a)(viii) — 1 case
D. Jones v. Bludworth (Mont. 2020).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(3)(b) — 3 cases
City of Whitefish v. Curran, 2023 MT 118 (Mont. 2023).
State v. N. Cole, 2026 MT 52 (Mont. 2026).
State v. Holland, 2008 MT 26 (Mont. 2008).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(3)(c) — 3 cases
State v. Heath, 2004 MT 58 (Mont. 2004).
State v. Heath, 2005 MT 280 (Mont. 2005).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(3)(d) — 2 cases
State v. Strong, 2009 MT 65 (Mont. 2009). “¶20 Section 46-18-201, MCA, governs the form of a criminal sentence.”
State v. Whalen, 2013 MT 26 (Mont. 2013).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(3)(d)(i) — 17 cases
State v. Southwick, 2007 MT 257 (Mont. 2007).
State v. Strong, 2009 MT 65 (Mont. 2009). “¶20 Section 46-18-201, MCA, governs the form of a criminal sentence.”
State v. Kern, 2003 MT 77 (Mont. 2003).
State v. Hicks, 2006 MT 71 (Mont. 2006).
State v. Deserly, 2008 MT 242 (Mont. 2008).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(3)(d)(ii) — 3 cases
State v. Strong, 2009 MT 65 (Mont. 2009). “¶20 Section 46-18-201, MCA, governs the form of a criminal sentence.”
State v. Quesnel, 2009 MT 388 (Mont. 2009).
State v. Kodiak Quesnel, 2009 MT 388 (Mont. 2009).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(4) — 60 cases
State v. Michael Letasky, 2007 MT 51 (Mont. 2007).
State v. Tracy, 2005 MT 128 (Mont. 2005).
State v. Herd, 2004 MT 85 (Mont. 2004).
City of Bozeman v. Cantu, 2013 MT 40 (Mont. 2013). “Leyva, ¶ 19 (“That the Legislature has mandated certain conditions of probation for persons convicted of prescribed sex offenses does not limit the otherwise broad discretion of a sentencing court under §§ 46-18-201 and -202, MCA.”
State v. Zimmerman, 2010 MT 44 (Mont. 2010). “We concur: JAMES C. NELSON, BRIAN MORRIS and JIM RICE, JJ.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(4)(0) — 1 case
State v. Brotherton, 2008 MT 119 (Mont. 2008).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(4)(a) — 7 cases
State v. Brotherton, 2008 MT 119 (Mont. 2008).
State v. Lessard, 2008 MT 192 (Mont. 2008).
State v. Honey, 2005 MT 107 (Mont. 2005). “Section 46-18-201(1)(a) and (b) address deferred sentences, § 46-18-201(2) addresses suspended sentences, and § 46-18-201(3)(a)-(h) addresses sentences that have neither a deferred nor a suspended component.”
State v. Jones, 2008 MT 440 (Mont. 2008).
State v. Greensweight, 2008 MT 185 (Mont. 2008).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(4)(b) — 1 case
State v. T.Thibeault, 2021 MT 162 (Mont. 2021).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(4)(c) — 2 cases
State v. Tonya Sadowsky, 2008 MT 405 (Mont. 2008).
State v. C. Sangrey, 2023 MT 80N (Mont. 2023).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(4)(d) — 3 cases
State v. Ashby, 2008 MT 83 (Mont. 2008).
State v. Lee, 2015 MT 259 (Mont. 2015).
State v. Powell, 2025 MT 218 (Mont. 2025).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(4)(e) — 2 cases
State v. Palmer, 2001 MT 5N (Mont. 2001).
State v. George, 2002 MT 300 (Mont. 2002).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(4)(h) — 1 case
State v. Peone, 2014 MT 124N (Mont. 2014).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(4)(j) — 3 cases
State v. Grindheim, 2004 MT 311 (Mont. 2004).
State v. Grindheim, 2004 MT 311 (Mont. 2004).
State v. M. Bonacorsi, 2022 MT 86N (Mont. 2022).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(4)(k) — 2 cases
State v. McCaslin, 2004 MT 212 (Mont. 2004).
State v. Morigeau, 2000 MT 177N (Mont. 2000).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(4)(n) — 19 cases
State v. Heath, 2004 MT 126 (Mont. 2004). “3d 886 , issued June 12, 2001, which explained that “an apparent codification error” in the 1999 amendments to § 46-18-201, MCA, had raised a question about a sentencing court’s continued authority to impose restitution as a condition of a suspended execution of sentence.”
State v. Ashby, 2008 MT 83 (Mont. 2008).
State v. Nelson, 2008 MT 359 (Mont. 2008).
State v. Michael Letasky, 2007 MT 51 (Mont. 2007).
State v. Malloy, 2004 MT 377 (Mont. 2004).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(4)(n)(2005) — 1 case
State v. Ashby, 2008 MT 83 (Mont. 2008).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(4)(o) — 26 cases
State v. Stiles, 2008 MT 390 (Mont. 2008). “We then proceeded to analyze the condition, concluding that it “has a sufficient nexus to Brotherton’s unique background and characteristics,” that it 16 thus “is a reasonable restriction necessary for Brotherton’s rehabilitation,” and that it accordingly “is legal under §§…”
State v. Zimmerman, 2010 MT 44 (Mont. 2010). “We concur: JAMES C. NELSON, BRIAN MORRIS and JIM RICE, JJ.”
State v. Holt, 2011 MT 42 (Mont. 2011). “' In other words, the sentencing authority of sentencing judges is constrained and defined by § 46-18-201, MCA." Burch, ¶ 24 (ellipsis in original, emphasis added, citation omitted).”
State v. VanWinkle, 2008 MT 208 (Mont. 2008).
State v. Ashby, 2008 MT 83 (Mont. 2008).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(4)(p) — 12 cases
City of Bozeman v. Cantu, 2013 MT 40 (Mont. 2013). “Leyva, ¶ 19 (“That the Legislature has mandated certain conditions of probation for persons convicted of prescribed sex offenses does not limit the otherwise broad discretion of a sentencing court under §§ 46-18-201 and -202, MCA.”
State v. J. Parkhill, 2018 MT 69 (Mont. 2018).
State v. R. Brady, 2025 MT 105 (Mont. 2025).
State v. Coleman, 431 P.3d 26 (Mont. 2018).
State v. MacDonald, 2013 MT 105 (Mont. 2013).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(4)(q) — 4 cases
City of Billings v. D. Barth, 390 P.3d 951 (Mont. 2017).
State v. Glick, 2015 MT 198N (Mont. 2015).
M M v. 1st Madison Valley Bank, 2015 MT 197N (Mont. 2015).
State v. Foote, 2015 MT 33N (Mont. 2015).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(5) — 77 cases
State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204 (Mont. 2007). “¶ 179 Section 46-18-201(5), MCA (2001) provides that "if the sentencing judge finds that the victim of the offense has sustained a pecuniary loss, the sentencing judge shall require payment of full restitution to the victim as provided in XX-XX-XXX through XX-XX-XXX.”
State v. Benoit, 2002 MT 166 (Mont. 2002). “Rather, the District Court deferred imposition of Benoit's sentence for the maximum allowable period in accordance with § 46-18-201(1)(a)(ii), MCA, which specifically authorizes a deferment for six years "if a financial obligation is imposed as a condition of sentence[.”
State v. Heath, 2004 MT 126 (Mont. 2004). “3d 886 , issued June 12, 2001, which explained that “an apparent codification error” in the 1999 amendments to § 46-18-201, MCA, had raised a question about a sentencing court’s continued authority to impose restitution as a condition of a suspended execution of sentence.”
State v. Honey, 2005 MT 107 (Mont. 2005). “Section 46-18-201(1)(a) and (b) address deferred sentences, § 46-18-201(2) addresses suspended sentences, and § 46-18-201(3)(a)-(h) addresses sentences that have neither a deferred nor a suspended component.”
State v. McClelland, 2015 MT 281 (Mont. 2015).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(6) — 3 cases
State v. Lorash, 777 P.2d 884 (Mont. 1989).
State v. Bowles, 947 P.2d 52 (Mont. 1997).
State v. K.A.B. (Mont. 2023).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(7) — 5 cases
State v. Hastings, 2007 MT 294 (Mont. 2007).
United States v. Juv. Male, 2011 MT 104 (Mont. 2011).
State v. R. Hinman, 2023 MT 116 (Mont. 2023).
State v. Lujan, 911 P.2d 562 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
State v. Olson, 2006 MT 225N (Mont. 2006).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(8) — 3 cases
State v. Bailey, 2004 MT 87 (Mont. 2004).
State v. Fauque, 2000 MT 168 (Mont. 2000).
State v. Rambold, 2014 MT 116 (Mont. 2014).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(9) — 16 cases
State v. M. Mendoza, 2021 MT 197 (Mont. 2021).
State v. T. Risher, 2024 MT 309 (Mont. 2024).
State v. D. Demarie, 2025 MT 115 (Mont. 2025).
State v. W. Pillans, 2025 MT 100 (Mont. 2025).
State v. J. Crowell, 2022 MT 112N (Mont. 2022).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(a)(1) — 1 case
State v. Fogarty, 610 P.2d 140 (Mont. 1980).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(b) — 2 cases
State v. Fogarty, 610 P.2d 140 (Mont. 1980).
State v. Fogarty (Mont. 1980).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(d) — 1 case
City of Helena v. Meyers (Mont. 1997).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(e) — 16 cases
Melone v. State, 2004 MT 93N (Mont. 2004).
State v. Beall, 292 Mont. 66 (Mont. 1998).
State v. Partin, 286 Mont. 88 (Mont. 1997).
State v. Grooms, 292 Mont. 76 (Mont. 1998).
State v. Greer, 274 Mont. 84 (Mont. 1995).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(l) — 1 case
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(l)(a) — 10 cases
DeShields v. State, 2006 MT 58 (Mont. 2006).
State v. Ommundson, 1999 MT 16 (Mont. 1999). “He argues that it is not enough that a condition of sentence relate generally to rehabilitation; rather, there must be a correlation between the crime for which the defendant was convicted and the condition imposed.”
State v. Rice, 910 P.2d 245 (Mont. 1996).
State v. Honey, 2005 MT 107 (Mont. 2005). “Section 46-18-201(1)(a) and (b) address deferred sentences, § 46-18-201(2) addresses suspended sentences, and § 46-18-201(3)(a)-(h) addresses sentences that have neither a deferred nor a suspended component.”
State v. Klippenstein, 778 P.2d 892 (Mont. 1989).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(l)(a)(ii) — 3 cases
State v. Benoit, 2002 MT 166 (Mont. 2002). “Rather, the District Court deferred imposition of Benoit's sentence for the maximum allowable period in accordance with § 46-18-201(1)(a)(ii), MCA, which specifically authorizes a deferment for six years "if a financial obligation is imposed as a condition of sentence[.”
State v. Essig, 2009 MT 340 (Mont. 2009).
State v. Grindheim, 2004 MT 311 (Mont. 2004).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(l)(a)(iv) — 3 cases
State v. Farrell, 676 P.2d 168 (Mont. 1984).
State v. Ommundson, 1999 MT 16 (Mont. 1999). “He argues that it is not enough that a condition of sentence relate generally to rehabilitation; rather, there must be a correlation between the crime for which the defendant was convicted and the condition imposed.”
Drimmel v. Moran (In re Drimmel), 143 B.R. 249 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1992).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(l)(a)(ix) — 4 cases
State v. Ommundson, 1999 MT 16 (Mont. 1999). “He argues that it is not enough that a condition of sentence relate generally to rehabilitation; rather, there must be a correlation between the crime for which the defendant was convicted and the condition imposed.”
State v. Heath, 2004 MT 126 (Mont. 2004). “3d 886 , issued June 12, 2001, which explained that “an apparent codification error” in the 1999 amendments to § 46-18-201, MCA, had raised a question about a sentencing court’s continued authority to impose restitution as a condition of a suspended execution of sentence.”
Dahlman v. Dist. Ct., Seventeenth Jud. Dist., 698 P.2d 423 (Mont. 1985).
State v. Blanchard, 889 P.2d 1180 (Mont. 1995).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(l)(a)(v) — 3 cases
Dahlman v. Dist. Ct., Seventeenth Jud. Dist., 698 P.2d 423 (Mont. 1985).
State v. Lenihan, 602 P.2d 997 (Mont. 1979).
State v. Ommundson, 1999 MT 16 (Mont. 1999). “He argues that it is not enough that a condition of sentence relate generally to rehabilitation; rather, there must be a correlation between the crime for which the defendant was convicted and the condition imposed.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(l)(a)(x) — 1 case
State v. Evans, 806 P.2d 512 (Mont. 1991).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(l)(a)(xii) — 4 cases
State v. Heath, 2004 MT 126 (Mont. 2004). “3d 886 , issued June 12, 2001, which explained that “an apparent codification error” in the 1999 amendments to § 46-18-201, MCA, had raised a question about a sentencing court’s continued authority to impose restitution as a condition of a suspended execution of sentence.”
State v. Ommundson, 1999 MT 16 (Mont. 1999). “He argues that it is not enough that a condition of sentence relate generally to rehabilitation; rather, there must be a correlation between the crime for which the defendant was convicted and the condition imposed.”
State v. Blanchard, 889 P.2d 1180 (Mont. 1995).
State v. Brown, 867 P.2d 1098 (Mont. 1994).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(l)(aXix) — 1 case
State v. Sullivan, 642 P.2d 1008 (Mont. 1982).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(l)(b) — 12 cases
State v. Ommundson, 1999 MT 16 (Mont. 1999). “He argues that it is not enough that a condition of sentence relate generally to rehabilitation; rather, there must be a correlation between the crime for which the defendant was convicted and the condition imposed.”
City of Billings v. Smith, 932 P.2d 1058 (Mont. 1997).
Dahlman v. Dist. Ct., Seventeenth Jud. Dist., 698 P.2d 423 (Mont. 1985).
State v. Klippenstein, 778 P.2d 892 (Mont. 1989).
State v. Kroll, 2004 MT 203 (Mont. 2004).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(l)(e) — 6 cases
Peña v. State, 2004 MT 293 (Mont. 2004).
Camarillo v. State, 2005 MT 29 (Mont. 2005).
MacPheat v. Mahoney, 2000 MT 62 (Mont. 2000).
State v. George, 2002 MT 300 (Mont. 2002).
State v. Jivelekas, 2005 MT 277 (Mont. 2005).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(l)(g) — 1 case
State v. Martin, 373 Mont. 37 (Mont. 2013).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(lXa) — 1 case
State v. Morgan, 646 P.2d 1177 (Mont. 1982).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(lXb) — 1 case
State v. Cleveland, 2014 MT 305 (Mont. 2014).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.