Notes of Decisions
Cited in
168
cases (
26 in the last 5 years), 1979–2026 · leading case:
State v. Garrymore, 2006 MT 245 (Mont. 2006).
State v. Garrymore, 2006 MT 245 (Mont. 2006).
· cites it 174× “¶ 2 We consider the following issues on appeal: ¶ 3 (1) Does Garrymore's failure to object to the District Court's imposition of sentence preclude our review on appeal? ¶ 4 (2) Did the District Court's imposition of the parole eligibility restriction pursuant to § 46-18-202(2),…”
State v. Holt, 2011 MT 42 (Mont. 2011).
· cites it 116× “We review the reasonableness of conditions or restrictions imposed in a sentence under § 46-18-202, MCA, for abuse of discretion, if the conditions are objected to at sentencing.”
State v. Muhammad, 2002 MT 47 (Mont. 2002).
· cites it 56× “The record reflects that protection of the victim was a consideration in the District Court's decision, and I would specifically hold that the victim's protection can justify a properly imposed banishment condition under the broad authority granted to sentencing courts in §…”
State v. Stiles, 2008 MT 390 (Mont. 2008).
· cites it 64× “3d 1106 , we observed that “in order to be ‘reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and protection of the victim and society,’ as required by § 46-18-202(1)(e), MCA, a sentencing limitation or condition must have some correlation to the underlying offense for…”
State v. Christopher Lewis, 2012 MT 157 (Mont. 2012).
· cites it 39× “The prosecutor also responded to Lewis’ sentencing memorandum and stated that § 46-18-202(2), MCA, authorizes a district court to reasonably restrict a defendant’s parole eligibility, but made no recommendation to the court regarding Lewis’ parole eligibility.”
State v. Essig, 2009 MT 340 (Mont. 2009).
· cites it 32× “Section 46-18-202(1), MCA. We review for abuse of discretion a sentencing judge's conclusion that a condition of a probationary sentence, which is specifically authorized by statute, is necessary.”
Cavanaugh v. Crist, 615 P.2d 890 (Mont. 1980).
· cites it 50× “This is an original application for a writ of habeas corpus in which petitioners James Cavanaugh and James Mesler jointly challenge the constitutionality of section 46-18-202(2), MCA. That section permits district judges to sentence persons convicted of felonies to imprisonment…”
State v. Kirkbride, 2008 MT 178 (Mont. 2008).
· cites it 27× “Did the District Court err by imposing a restriction on Kirkbride’s parole eligibility for fifty-five (55) years? Judges may impose partial parole restrictions ¶17 Section 46-18-202(2), MCA, in pertinent part, says, “the sentencing judge may also impose the restriction that the…”
State v. Burch, 2008 MT 118 (Mont. 2008).
· cites it 15× “For instance, the State maintains that § 46-18-202(1), MCA, provides a statutory basis for a sentencing judge to impose conditions on parole.”
State v. Dunfee, 2005 MT 147 (Mont. 2005).
· cites it 14× “¶ 54 Montana's statutes provide that a sentencing judge may impose conditions and restrictions on the offender's freedom of association, § 46-18-202(1)(c), MCA, restrictions on the offender's freedom of movement, § 46-18-202(1)(d), MCA, and "any other limitation reasonably…”
State v. Olivares-Coster, 2011 MT 196 (Mont. 2011).
· cites it 30× “Section 46-18-202(2), MCA. We should not speculate whether the District Court would have imposed a discretionary parole restriction when in fact the District Court explicitly declined to do so in the oral pronouncement of sentence.”
State v. Zimmerman, 2010 MT 44 (Mont. 2010).
· cites it 18× “Here, the District Court apparently imposed the challenged condition pursuant to § 46-18-201(4)( o ), MCA, and § 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA. With these provisions, the legislature has granted district courts legal authority to exercise discretion in imposing conditions on deferred…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(1) — 24 cases
State v. Essig, 2009 MT 340 (Mont. 2009).
“Section 46-18-202(1), MCA. We review for abuse of discretion a sentencing judge's conclusion that a condition of a probationary sentence, which is specifically authorized by statute, is necessary.”
State v. Holt, 2011 MT 42 (Mont. 2011).
“We review the reasonableness of conditions or restrictions imposed in a sentence under § 46-18-202, MCA, for abuse of discretion, if the conditions are objected to at sentencing.”
State v. Burch, 2008 MT 118 (Mont. 2008).
“For instance, the State maintains that § 46-18-202(1), MCA, provides a statutory basis for a sentencing judge to impose conditions on parole.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(1)(b) — 3 cases
State v. Essig, 2009 MT 340 (Mont. 2009).
“Section 46-18-202(1), MCA. We review for abuse of discretion a sentencing judge's conclusion that a condition of a probationary sentence, which is specifically authorized by statute, is necessary.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(1)(c) — 8 cases
State v. Muhammad, 2002 MT 47 (Mont. 2002).
“The record reflects that protection of the victim was a consideration in the District Court's decision, and I would specifically hold that the victim's protection can justify a properly imposed banishment condition under the broad authority granted to sentencing courts in §…”
State v. Dunfee, 2005 MT 147 (Mont. 2005).
“¶ 54 Montana's statutes provide that a sentencing judge may impose conditions and restrictions on the offender's freedom of association, § 46-18-202(1)(c), MCA, restrictions on the offender's freedom of movement, § 46-18-202(1)(d), MCA, and "any other limitation reasonably…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(1)(d) — 2 cases
State v. Muhammad, 2002 MT 47 (Mont. 2002).
“The record reflects that protection of the victim was a consideration in the District Court's decision, and I would specifically hold that the victim's protection can justify a properly imposed banishment condition under the broad authority granted to sentencing courts in §…”
State v. Dunfee, 2005 MT 147 (Mont. 2005).
“¶ 54 Montana's statutes provide that a sentencing judge may impose conditions and restrictions on the offender's freedom of association, § 46-18-202(1)(c), MCA, restrictions on the offender's freedom of movement, § 46-18-202(1)(d), MCA, and "any other limitation reasonably…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(1)(e) — 12 cases
State v. Muhammad, 2002 MT 47 (Mont. 2002).
“The record reflects that protection of the victim was a consideration in the District Court's decision, and I would specifically hold that the victim's protection can justify a properly imposed banishment condition under the broad authority granted to sentencing courts in §…”
State v. Stiles, 2008 MT 390 (Mont. 2008).
“3d 1106 , we observed that “in order to be ‘reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and protection of the victim and society,’ as required by § 46-18-202(1)(e), MCA, a sentencing limitation or condition must have some correlation to the underlying offense for…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(1)(f) — 22 cases
State v. Stiles, 2008 MT 390 (Mont. 2008).
“3d 1106 , we observed that “in order to be ‘reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and protection of the victim and society,’ as required by § 46-18-202(1)(e), MCA, a sentencing limitation or condition must have some correlation to the underlying offense for…”
State v. Holt, 2011 MT 42 (Mont. 2011).
“We review the reasonableness of conditions or restrictions imposed in a sentence under § 46-18-202, MCA, for abuse of discretion, if the conditions are objected to at sentencing.”
State v. Zimmerman, 2010 MT 44 (Mont. 2010).
“Here, the District Court apparently imposed the challenged condition pursuant to § 46-18-201(4)( o ), MCA, and § 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA. With these provisions, the legislature has granted district courts legal authority to exercise discretion in imposing conditions on deferred…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(1)(g) — 7 cases
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(18) — 2 cases
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(2) — 70 cases
State v. Garrymore, 2006 MT 245 (Mont. 2006).
“¶ 2 We consider the following issues on appeal: ¶ 3 (1) Does Garrymore's failure to object to the District Court's imposition of sentence preclude our review on appeal? ¶ 4 (2) Did the District Court's imposition of the parole eligibility restriction pursuant to § 46-18-202(2),…”
State v. Holt, 2011 MT 42 (Mont. 2011).
“We review the reasonableness of conditions or restrictions imposed in a sentence under § 46-18-202, MCA, for abuse of discretion, if the conditions are objected to at sentencing.”
State v. Christopher Lewis, 2012 MT 157 (Mont. 2012).
“The prosecutor also responded to Lewis’ sentencing memorandum and stated that § 46-18-202(2), MCA, authorizes a district court to reasonably restrict a defendant’s parole eligibility, but made no recommendation to the court regarding Lewis’ parole eligibility.”
Cavanaugh v. Crist, 615 P.2d 890 (Mont. 1980).
“This is an original application for a writ of habeas corpus in which petitioners James Cavanaugh and James Mesler jointly challenge the constitutionality of section 46-18-202(2), MCA. That section permits district judges to sentence persons convicted of felonies to imprisonment…”
State v. Kirkbride, 2008 MT 178 (Mont. 2008).
“Did the District Court err by imposing a restriction on Kirkbride’s parole eligibility for fifty-five (55) years? Judges may impose partial parole restrictions ¶17 Section 46-18-202(2), MCA, in pertinent part, says, “the sentencing judge may also impose the restriction that the…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(3) — 2 cases
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(4) — 1 case
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(b)(ii) — 1 case
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(c) — 1 case
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(l)(b) — 2 cases
State v. Essig, 2009 MT 340 (Mont. 2009).
“Section 46-18-202(1), MCA. We review for abuse of discretion a sentencing judge's conclusion that a condition of a probationary sentence, which is specifically authorized by statute, is necessary.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(l)(c) — 5 cases
State v. Muhammad, 2002 MT 47 (Mont. 2002).
“The record reflects that protection of the victim was a consideration in the District Court's decision, and I would specifically hold that the victim's protection can justify a properly imposed banishment condition under the broad authority granted to sentencing courts in §…”
State v. Dunfee, 2005 MT 147 (Mont. 2005).
“¶ 54 Montana's statutes provide that a sentencing judge may impose conditions and restrictions on the offender's freedom of association, § 46-18-202(1)(c), MCA, restrictions on the offender's freedom of movement, § 46-18-202(1)(d), MCA, and "any other limitation reasonably…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(l)(d) — 1 case
State v. Dunfee, 2005 MT 147 (Mont. 2005).
“¶ 54 Montana's statutes provide that a sentencing judge may impose conditions and restrictions on the offender's freedom of association, § 46-18-202(1)(c), MCA, restrictions on the offender's freedom of movement, § 46-18-202(1)(d), MCA, and "any other limitation reasonably…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(l)(e) — 12 cases
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(l)(f) — 19 cases
State v. Holt, 2011 MT 42 (Mont. 2011).
“We review the reasonableness of conditions or restrictions imposed in a sentence under § 46-18-202, MCA, for abuse of discretion, if the conditions are objected to at sentencing.”
State v. Zimmerman, 2010 MT 44 (Mont. 2010).
“Here, the District Court apparently imposed the challenged condition pursuant to § 46-18-201(4)( o ), MCA, and § 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA. With these provisions, the legislature has granted district courts legal authority to exercise discretion in imposing conditions on deferred…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(l)(g) — 4 cases
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.