(1) As used in this rule:
(a) A client is a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either public or private, who is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services from him;
(b) A lawyer is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation;
(c) A representative of the lawyer is one employed to assist the lawyer in the rendition of professional legal services; and
(d) A communication is confidential if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.
(2) A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client (a) between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer's representative, or (b) between his lawyer and the lawyer's representative, or (c) by him or his lawyer to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest, or (d) between representatives of the client or between the client and a representative of the client, or (e) between lawyers representing the client.
(3) The privilege may be claimed by the client, his guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association or other organization, whether or not in existence. The person who was the lawyer at the time of the communication may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client. His authority to do so is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(4) There is no privilege under this rule:
(a) If the services of the lawyer are sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud; or
(b) As to a communication relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos transaction; or
(c) As to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client or by the client to his lawyer; or
(d) As to a communication relevant to an issue concerning an attested document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or
(e) As to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest between two or more clients if the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action between any of the clients.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
41
cases (
6 in the last 5 years), 1934–2025 · leading case:
Doyle v. Union Ins., 277 N.W.2d 36 (Neb. 1979).
Doyle v. Union Ins., 277 N.W.2d 36 (Neb. 1979).
· cites it 12× “" Section 27-503, R.R.S.1943, provides in part as follows: "(2) A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the…”
Kansas-Nebraska Nat. Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12 (D. Neb. 1983).
· cites it 6× “The first question, then, is whether the communications which transpired during the meeting of September 17, 1982 are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege, or the work product rule. The only evidence before the court on this matter is the affidavit of…”
State v. Roeder, 636 N.W.2d 870 (Neb. 2001).
· cites it 3× “Roeder asserts that the testimony of her counsel should not have been allowed at the hearing on her motion to withdraw her pleas because such testimony breached the lawyer-client privilege embodied in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503 (Reissue 1995). Roeder recognizes that § 27-503(4)(c)…”
Greenwalt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 567 N.W.2d 560 (Neb. 1997).
· cites it 2× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503 (Reissue 1995) (attorney-client privilege) states in pertinent part: A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of…”
State v. Hawes, 556 N.W.2d 634 (Neb. 1996).
· cites it 4× “§ 27-503 (2) (Reissue 1995) to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other person from disclosing, confidential communications between the client and his or her lawyer made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services, Neb. Rev.”
State v. Journey, 301 N.W.2d 82 (Neb. 1981).
· cites it 4× “Defendant claims that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503 (4) (Reissue 1979) allows him to waive the privilege, with reservations.”
League v. Vanice, 374 N.W.2d 849 (Neb. 1985).
· cites it 2× “ror League contends the district court erred: (1) In ruling the six causes of action founded on Vanice’s concealment of transactions were barred by the statute of limitations; (2) In admitting evidence of communications between League and his attorney, because admission of such…”
Brozovsky v. Norquest, 437 N.W.2d 798 (Neb. 1989).
· cites it 2× “The objections alleged that a lawyer-client relationship existed between Angle and Brozovsky, that the proposed deposition questions sought to discover privileged information, and that Brozovsky claimed the privilege provided by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503 (3) (Reissue 1985).”
State Ex Rel. Sileven v. Spire, 500 N.W.2d 179 (Neb. 1993).
· cites it 2× “05 lists records which may be withheld from the public, including the following: (4) Records which represent the work product of an attorney and the public body involved which are related to preparation for litigation, labor negotiations, or claims made by or against the public…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503(1) — 1 case
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503(1)(a) — 1 case
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503(1)(c) — 1 case
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503(2) — 3 cases
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503(4) — 1 case
State v. Journey, 301 N.W.2d 82 (Neb. 1981).
“Defendant claims that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503 (4) (Reissue 1979) allows him to waive the privilege, with reservations.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503(4)(a) — 2 cases
Doyle v. Union Ins., 277 N.W.2d 36 (Neb. 1979).
“" Section 27-503, R.R.S.1943, provides in part as follows: "(2) A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503(4)(c) — 1 case
State v. Roeder, 636 N.W.2d 870 (Neb. 2001).
“Roeder asserts that the testimony of her counsel should not have been allowed at the hearing on her motion to withdraw her pleas because such testimony breached the lawyer-client privilege embodied in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503 (Reissue 1995). Roeder recognizes that § 27-503(4)(c)…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503(l)(b) — 1 case
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503(l)(d) — 2 cases
Kansas-Nebraska Nat. Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12 (D. Neb. 1983).
“The first question, then, is whether the communications which transpired during the meeting of September 17, 1982 are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege, or the work product rule. The only evidence before the court on this matter is the affidavit of…”
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