Nebraska Revised Statutes

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02 (2026)

Stalking and harassment; legislative intent; terms, defined

✓ current as of July 2026

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(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to enact laws dealing with stalking offenses which will protect victims from being willfully harassed, intentionally terrified, threatened, or intimidated by individuals who intentionally follow, detain, stalk, or harass them or impose any restraint on their personal liberty and which will not prohibit constitutionally protected activities.

(2) For purposes of sections 28-311.02 to 28-311.05:

(a) Course of conduct means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including a series of acts of following, detaining, restraining the personal liberty of, or stalking the person or telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating with the person;

(b) Family or household member has the same meaning as in section 42-903; and

(c) Harass means to engage in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously terrifies, threatens, or intimidates the person and which serves no legitimate purpose.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 53 cases (24 in the last 5 years), 1996–2026 · leading case: In Re Interest of Jeffrey K., 728 N.W.2d 606 (Neb. 2007).

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Flinn v. Strode, 320 Neb. 813 (Neb. 2026). · cites it 16× “Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02 (2)(a) (Reissue 2016), the inquiry of whether the course of conduct directed at a specific per- son serves a legitimate purpose consists of two parts: (1) whether the actor genuinely holds a justifiable purpose for engaging in the course of -…”

Schroeder v. Clouse (Neb. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 5× “See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02 (Reissue 2016).”

Vance v. Peterson (Neb. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 4× “09(1), any victim who has been harassed as defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02 (Reissue 2016) may file a petition and affidavit for a harassment protection order.”

Dugan v. Sorensen, 319 Neb. 326 (Neb. 2025). · cites it 20× “In harassment protection order cases, a petitioner must prove at least two separate acts of harassment to establish a course of conduct within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02 (2)(b) (Reissue 2016).”

Pettit v. Bolte (Neb. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 8× “02 (2)(a) (Reissue 2016), in turn, defines the term “harass” to mean “to engage in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously terrifies, threatens, or intimidates the person and which serves no legitimate purpose.” “Course of conduct”…”

Ramos v. Maravilla-Alfaro (Neb. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 7× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02 (2)(a). Ramos, self-represented, has appealed from the district court’s order denying his request for a harassment protection order.”

Ramos v. Karen G.H. (Neb. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 6× “The district court determined that there was insufficient evidence to support the entry of a harassment protection order, specifically that Karen did not harass Ramos “as that term is defined” in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02 (2)(a) (Reissue 2016).”

Belina v. Belina (Neb. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 2×

Waters v. Lang (Neb. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 2×

Lethcoe v. Lethcoe (Neb. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 9× “02 (2)(a) (Reissue 2016), in turn, defines the term “harass” to mean “to engage in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously terrifies, threatens, or intimidates the person and which serves no legitimate purpose.”

Hruska v. Helllbusch (Neb. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 7× “02 (2)(a) (Reissue 2016), in turn, defines the term “harass” to mean “to engage in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously terrifies, threatens, or intimidates the person and which serves no legitimate purpose.”

Show all 53 citing cases →

— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02(1) — 12 cases

In Re Interest of Jeffrey K., 728 N.W.2d 606 (Neb. 2007).

Robert M. on behalf of Bella O. v. Danielle O., 303 Neb. 268 (Neb. 2019).

Linda N. v. William N., 289 Neb. 607 (Neb. 2014).

State v. Jeffrey K., 717 N.W.2d 499 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006).

Dugan v. Sorensen, 319 Neb. 326 (Neb. 2025). “In harassment protection order cases, a petitioner must prove at least two separate acts of harassment to establish a course of conduct within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02 (2)(b) (Reissue 2016).”

— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02(2) — 3 cases

Glantz v. Daniel, 837 N.W.2d 563 (Neb. Ct. App. 2013).

Prentice v. Steede, 28 Neb. Ct. App. 423 (Neb. Ct. App. 2020).

Vance v. Peterson (Neb. Ct. App. 2026). “09(1), any victim who has been harassed as defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02 (Reissue 2016) may file a petition and affidavit for a harassment protection order.”

— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02(2)(a) — 10 cases

In Re Interest of Jeffrey K., 728 N.W.2d 606 (Neb. 2007).

Diedra T. v. Justina R., 984 N.W.2d 312 (Neb. 2023).

Hawkins v. Delgado, 308 Neb. 301 (Neb. 2021).

Flinn v. Strode, 320 Neb. 813 (Neb. 2026). “Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02 (2)(a) (Reissue 2016), the inquiry of whether the course of conduct directed at a specific per- son serves a legitimate purpose consists of two parts: (1) whether the actor genuinely holds a justifiable purpose for engaging in the course of -…”

— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02(2)(b) — 18 cases

Hawkins v. Delgado, 308 Neb. 301 (Neb. 2021).

Linda N. v. William N., 289 Neb. 607 (Neb. 2014).

Knopik v. Hahn, 25 Neb. 157 (Neb. Ct. App. 2017).

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