(1) A person commits arson in
the second degree if he or she intentionally damages a building or property contained within a building by
starting a fire or causing an explosion or if a fire is started or an explosion
is caused in the perpetration of any robbery, burglary, or felony criminal
mischief.
(2) The following affirmative defenses may be introduced into
evidence upon prosecution for a violation of this section:
(a) No person other than the accused has a security or proprietary
interest in the damaged building, or, if other persons have such interests,
all of them consented to his or her conduct; or
(b) The accused's sole intent was to destroy or damage the
building for a lawful and proper purpose.
(3) Arson in the second degree is a Class III felony.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
20
cases (
3 in the last 5 years), 1931–2025 · leading case:
State v. Golyar, 301 Neb. 488 (Neb. 2018).
State v. Golyar, 301 Neb. 488 (Neb. 2018).
· cites it 2× “See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-503 (Reissue 2016). State v.”
State v. Sumstine, 478 N.W.2d 240 (Neb. 1991).
· cites it 3× “*709 BACKGROUND Filed on June 26, 1989, an information charged Sumstine with second degree arson, a Class III felony, and alleged that Sumstine intentionally set fire to her apartment building at 837 G Street on April 29, 1989, a violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-503 (1)…”
State v. Jacobs, 410 N.W.2d 468 (Neb. 1987).
· cites it 2× “A jury found defendant-appellant Sam Jacobs guilty of arson in the second degree in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-503 (Reissue 1985), and of criminal mischief in violation of Neb.”
State v. Marchese, 515 N.W.2d 670 (Neb. 1994).
· cites it 2× “Márchese, having been convicted of second degree arson in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-503 (Reissue 1989), asserts that the postconviction court *977 erred in failing to grant him an evidentiary hearing in order that he might show, among other things, that his plea of…”
State v. McDonald, 430 N.W.2d 282 (Neb. 1988).
· cites it 2× “McDonald, was, pursuant to verdicts, adjudged guilty of arson in the second degree in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-503 (1) (Reissue 1985), and of burning with the intent to defraud an insurer in violation of Neb.”
State v. Ellis, 393 N.W.2d 719 (Neb. 1986).
· cites it 2× “Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-503 (1) and (3), and 28-105(1) (Reissue 1985).”
State v. Brand, 363 N.W.2d 516 (Neb. 1985).
· cites it 2× “§ 28-320 (2) (Reissue 1979); second degree arson, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-503 (Cum. Supp. 1984); and burglary, Neb.”
State v. Dimmitt, 560 N.W.2d 498 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 3× “As noted, however, the fact that Dimmitt may not have removed anything from the house does not mean that the jury could not have inferred the requisite intent.”
State v. James, 573 N.W.2d 816 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 2× “Second degree arson is statutorily defined as a Class III felony, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-503 (Reissue 1995), and carries a potential penalty of 1 to 20 years’ imprisonment, a $25,000 fine, or both, see § 28-105.”
State v. Frizzell, 497 N.W.2d 391 (Neb. 1993).
· cites it 2× “§ 28-105 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-503 (Reissue 1989). On September 22,1986, Frizzell was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment on the murder charge and to not less than 6 nor more than 20 years of imprisonment on the arson charge, the sentences to be served concurrently.”
State v. Hinn, 427 N.W.2d 791 (Neb. 1988).
· cites it 2× “As to the defendant’s excessive sentence claim, count I, second degree arson, is a Class III felony pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-503 (3) (Reissue 1985).”
State v. Workman, 329 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 1983).
· cites it 2× “Workman, was found guilty of arson in the second degree in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. §28-503 (1) (Reissue 1979).”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-503(1) — 2 cases
State v. Sumstine, 478 N.W.2d 240 (Neb. 1991).
“*709 BACKGROUND Filed on June 26, 1989, an information charged Sumstine with second degree arson, a Class III felony, and alleged that Sumstine intentionally set fire to her apartment building at 837 G Street on April 29, 1989, a violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-503 (1)…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-503(3) — 1 case
State v. Dimmitt, 560 N.W.2d 498 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997).
“As noted, however, the fact that Dimmitt may not have removed anything from the house does not mean that the jury could not have inferred the requisite intent.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.