(1) When any person presents to the county board an affidavit satisfying it (a) that he or she is the owner of the real estate described therein located within the county, (b) that such real estate is shut out from all public access, other than a waterway, by being surrounded on all sides by real estate belonging to other persons, or by such real estate and by water, (c) that he or she is unable to purchase from any of such persons the right-of-way over or through the same to a public road or that it cannot be purchased except at an exorbitant price, stating the lowest price for which the same can be purchased by him or her, and (d) asking that an access road be provided in accordance with section 39-1716, the county board shall appoint a time and place for hearing the matter, which hearing shall be not more than thirty days after the receipt of such affidavit. The application for an access road may be included in a separate petition instead of in such affidavit.
(2) For purposes of sections 39-1713 to 39-1719:
(a) Access road means a right-of-way open to the general public for ingress to and egress from a tract of isolated land provided in accordance with section 39-1716; and
(b) State of Nebraska includes the Board of Educational Lands and Funds, Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges, Department of Transportation, Department of Administrative Services, and Game and Parks Commission and all other state agencies, boards, departments, and commissions.
Notes of Decisions
Teadtke v. Havranek, 777 N.W.2d 810 (Neb. 2010).
· cites it 15× “The Havraneks assert that the court erred by exercising its equity jurisdiction in this action, because the Teadtkes failed to avail themselves of the statutory remedy dealing with isolated land provided under Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 39-1713 through 39-1719 (Reissue 2008) prior to…”
Young v. Dodge Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 493 N.W.2d 160 (Neb. 1992).
· cites it 21× “The mandamus was based on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1713 (Reissue 1978), which provided: When any person shall present to the county board an affidavit satisfying it (1) that he is the owner of the real estate described therein located within the county, (2) that the same is shut out…”
Burton v. Annett, 341 N.W.2d 318 (Neb. 1983).
· cites it 5× “Alderman, from laying out a public road across Charles and Ida’s real estate to the land of John Burton (John) pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-1713 and 39-1714 (Reissue 1978).”
Moritz v. Buglewicz, 194 N.W.2d 215 (Neb. 1972).
· cites it 5× “The intervener commenced proceedings under section 39-1713, R. R. S. 1943, to establish a public road across the plaintiff’s property which would provide access to its land.”
Lewis v. Bd. of Com'rs of Loup Cnty., 529 N.W.2d 745 (Neb. 1995).
· cites it 9× “*748 §§ 39-1713, 39-1714, and 39-1716 (Reissue 1993), the law existing when Lewis and his wife created and recorded the Beverly Hills Subdivision.”
Young v. Dodge Cnty. Bd. of Sup'rs, 493 N.W.2d 160 (Neb. 1992).
· cites it 21× “The mandamus was based on Neb.Rev. Stat. § 39-1713 (Reissue 1978), which provided: When any person shall present to the county board an affidavit satisfying it (1) that he is the owner of the real estate described therein located within the county, (2) that the same is shut out…”
Lewis v. Bd. of Commissioners, 529 N.W.2d 745 (Neb. 1995).
· cites it 10× “the district court found that (1) article 8 of the subdivision’s declaration of covenants expressly provided Lewis the right to use Sunset Drive to access the property he claimed was isolated from an existing public road; (2) the outlot (Sunset Drive) was 60 feet wide and could…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1713(1) — 1 case
Teadtke v. Havranek, 777 N.W.2d 810 (Neb. 2010).
“The Havraneks assert that the court erred by exercising its equity jurisdiction in this action, because the Teadtkes failed to avail themselves of the statutory remedy dealing with isolated land provided under Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 39-1713 through 39-1719 (Reissue 2008) prior to…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1713(2) — 4 cases
Young v. Dodge Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 493 N.W.2d 160 (Neb. 1992).
“The mandamus was based on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1713 (Reissue 1978), which provided: When any person shall present to the county board an affidavit satisfying it (1) that he is the owner of the real estate described therein located within the county, (2) that the same is shut out…”
Lewis v. Bd. of Com'rs of Loup Cnty., 529 N.W.2d 745 (Neb. 1995).
“*748 §§ 39-1713, 39-1714, and 39-1716 (Reissue 1993), the law existing when Lewis and his wife created and recorded the Beverly Hills Subdivision.”
Lewis v. Bd. of Commissioners, 529 N.W.2d 745 (Neb. 1995).
“the district court found that (1) article 8 of the subdivision’s declaration of covenants expressly provided Lewis the right to use Sunset Drive to access the property he claimed was isolated from an existing public road; (2) the outlot (Sunset Drive) was 60 feet wide and could…”
Young v. Dodge Cnty. Bd. of Sup'rs, 493 N.W.2d 160 (Neb. 1992).
“The mandamus was based on Neb.Rev. Stat. § 39-1713 (Reissue 1978), which provided: When any person shall present to the county board an affidavit satisfying it (1) that he is the owner of the real estate described therein located within the county, (2) that the same is shut out…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1713(3) — 1 case
Burton v. Annett, 341 N.W.2d 318 (Neb. 1983).
“Alderman, from laying out a public road across Charles and Ida’s real estate to the land of John Burton (John) pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-1713 and 39-1714 (Reissue 1978).”
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