As used in sections 76-101 to 76-123 and unless a different meaning appears from the context: (a) The term property means one or more interests either legal or equitable, possessory or nonpossessory, present or future, in land, or in things other than land, including choses in action, but excluding powers of appointment, powers of sale and powers of revocation, except when specifically mentioned; (b) the term future interest is applicable equally to property interests in land and in things other than land, and is limited to all varieties of remainders, reversions, executory interests, powers of termination (otherwise known as rights of entry for condition broken), and possibilities of reverter; (c) the term conveyance means an act by which it is intended to create one or more property interests, irrespective of whether the act is effective to create such interests, and irrespective of whether the act is intended to have inter vivos or testamentary operation; (d) the term otherwise effective conveyance means that the conveyance in question satisfies all the requirements of law other than the particular matter dealt with in the section of sections 76-101 to 76-123 in which the term is used; and (e) an intent is effectively manifested when it is manifested by the evidence of intent admissible according to the applicable rules of law with respect to the admissibility of evidence.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
8
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1953–2022 · leading case:
Strunk v. Chromy-Strunk, 708 N.W.2d 821 (Neb. 2006).
Strunk v. Chromy-Strunk, 708 N.W.2d 821 (Neb. 2006).
· cites it 3× “The Uniform Property Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-101 et seq. (Reissue 2003), defines the term “conveyance” as “an act by which it is intended to create one or more property interests, irrespective of whether the act is effective to create such interests, and irrespective of…”
Beren Corp. v. Spader, 255 N.W.2d 247 (Neb. 1977).
· cites it 6× “A review of pertinent provisions of the Uniform Property Act, sections 76-101 to 76-123, R.R.S.1943, is relevant at this point.”
Walters v. Sporer, 298 Neb. 536 (Neb. 2017).
· cites it 2× “47 The intent is the primary matter to be considered.48 The Legislature’s intent to modify and eliminate such common- law technicalities and exactions was codified in its adoption of the Uniform Property Act, Neb.”
Cont'l Resources v. Fair, 311 Neb. 184 (Neb. 2022).
· cites it 2× “In support of this argument, Fair cites the defini- tion of property in Nebraska’s Uniform Property Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-101 (Reissue 2018); the definition of property - 200 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports CONTINENTAL RESOURCES v.”
Crowell v. Milligan, 59 N.W.2d 346 (Neb. 1953).
· cites it 4× “1943, when read in connection with the definition of "property" in section 76-101, R.R.S.1943, there remains no question of the right of an owner of property to convey to himself and another and thereby create a joint tenancy, tenancy in common, or tenancy in partnership.”
Rhett Sears v. Korley Sears, 863 F.3d 980 (8th Cir. 2017).
“Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 76-101 , 76-103. Even with a finding of concealment, Korley asserts that he did not act with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove intent, and the so-called “badges of fraud” support the bankruptcy…”
Sears v. Sears, 542 B.R. 463 (D. Neb. 2015).
· cites it 2× “” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-101 (a). . The bankruptcy court also stated that the claim Appellant filed in AFY’s bankruptcy case "probably does qualify as a false claim, and borders on being frivolous.”
Ellingrod v. Trombla, 95 N.W.2d 635 (Neb. 1959).
“It is important, we think, to discuss the historical background of the Uniform Property Act, now sections 76-101 to 76-123, R. R. S. 1943.”
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