(1) The conveyance of an existing future interest, whether legal or equitable, is not ineffective on the sole ground that the interest so conveyed is future or contingent, except that possibilities of reverter or rights of reentry for breach of condition subsequent shall not be alienable or devisable.
(2) Neither possibilities of reverter nor rights of reentry for breach of condition subsequent relating to any property, whether created on, before, or after July 9, 1988, when the condition has not been broken, shall be valid for a longer period than thirty years from the date of the creation of the condition or possibility of reverter or right of reentry. If such possibility of reverter or right of reentry is created to endure for a longer period than thirty years, it shall be valid for thirty years. This subsection shall not apply to personal property which has been conveyed to a library or museum for the purpose of public display.
(3) Any cause of action arising from any possibility of reverter or right of reentry for breach of condition subsequent which existed prior to July 9, 1988, shall be commenced within a period of one year following July 9, 1988.
Notes of Decisions
State v. Union Pac. R.R., 490 N.W.2d 461 (Neb. 1992).
· cites it 3× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-107 (Reissue 1990), however, provides in relevant part: (1) The conveyance of an existing future interest, whether legal or equitable, is not ineffective on the sole ground that the interest so conveyed is future or contingent, except that possibilities of…”
Bode v. Flobert Indus., Inc., 249 N.W.2d 750 (Neb. 1977).
· cites it 4× “" The right-of-way through both the Hoefer and Bode properties was conveyed to the defendant Flobert Industries, Inc., by the railroad company.”
Poppleton v. Vill. Realty Co., Inc., 535 N.W.2d 400 (Neb. 1995).
· cites it 3× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-107 (2) (Reissue 1990) provides that possibilities of reverter and rights of reentry for breach of conditions subsequent are limited to a 30-year duration.”
Abboud v. Lakeview, Inc., 391 N.W.2d 575 (Neb. 1986).
· cites it 2× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-107 (Reissue 1981) states that “rights of reentry for breach of condition subsequent shall not be alienable or devisable.”
State v. Union Pac. R.R., 490 N.W.2d 461 (Neb. 1992).
· cites it 2× “Upon consideration of the motion, we have concluded that the possibilities of reverter contained in the right-of-way deeds to the defendant were void as restraints on alienation and that the last paragraph on page 686 of the opinion which appears in volume 241 of the Nebraska…”
Ellingrod v. Trombla, 95 N.W.2d 635 (Neb. 1959).
· cites it 2× “By section 76-107, R. R. S. 1943, of the Uniform Property Act, it was made clear that contingent future interests were to be ■recognized by the use of the following language: “The conveyance of an existing future interest, whether legal or equitable, is not ineffective on the…”
Reikofski v. Bodwell, 529 N.W.2d 531 (Neb. 1995).
· cites it 2× “ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR The Bodwells contend that the district court erred in (1) determining that the 1879 deed conveyed only an easement to the Fremont Railroad Company, their predecessor in title; (2) quieting title in the contested land in the Reikofskis’ names; and (3) not…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-107(2) — 1 case
Poppleton v. Vill. Realty Co., Inc., 535 N.W.2d 400 (Neb. 1995).
“Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-107 (2) (Reissue 1990) provides that possibilities of reverter and rights of reentry for breach of conditions subsequent are limited to a 30-year duration.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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