Counties shall have a lien upon real estate within their boundaries for all taxes due thereon to the state, any governmental subdivision of the state, any municipal corporation, and any drainage or irrigation district. After any parcel of real estate has been offered for sale and not sold for want of bidders, the county board shall make and enter an order directing the county attorney to foreclose the lien for all taxes then delinquent, excluding any lien on real estate for special assessments levied by any community improvement district or sanitary and improvement district which special assessments have not been previously offered for sale by the county treasurer, in the same manner and with like effect as in the foreclosure of real estate mortgages, except as otherwise specifically provided by sections 77-1903 to 77-1917.
Notes of Decisions
Wisner v. Vandelay Invs., L.L.C., 300 Neb. 825 (Neb. 2018).
· cites it 2× “And the failure to implement that statute permits Vandelay to reap a windfall that borders on the obscene. Because I believe that the windfall is an unjust result contrary to statute, I respectfully dissent.”
Cnty. of Seward v. Andelt, 559 N.W.2d 465 (Neb. 1997).
· cites it 14× “The County asserts its foreclosure action is not barred because it was brought under the lien method pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1901 (Reissue 1990).”
SID No. 424 v. Tristar Mgmt., 288 Neb. 425 (Neb. 2014).
· cites it 4× “The court reached this conclusion by applying § 77-1902, which effectively provides for the survival of sanitary improvement district special assessment liens in judi- cial foreclosure proceedings under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1901 Nebraska Advance Sheets 432 288 NEBRASKA REPORTS…”
Sanitary & Improvement Dist. 222 v. Metro. Life Ins., 266 N.W.2d 73 (Neb. 1978).
· cites it 14× “The defendantsappellees, who are parties having an interest in the real property which is the subject of the action, assert that section 77-1901, R. R. S. 1943, which provides that after a parcel of real estate has been offered for sale for 2 consecutive years the county board…”
Wisner v. Vandelay Investments, 300 Neb. 825 (Neb. 2018).
· cites it 2× “2 This certificate represents a transfer of the state’s lien on the property to the purchaser and describes the property, the amount paid by the purchaser, and the date that the purchaser will be entitled to a deed.”
Cnty. of Lancaster v. Maser, 400 N.W.2d 238 (Neb. 1987).
· cites it 2× “We are not concerned here with the county’s tax lien, which continues until that lien has been divested by payment of taxes or sale of real estate in foreclosure of such lien as authorized in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1901 (Reissue 1986).”
Brown v. Glebe, 328 N.W.2d 786 (Neb. 1983).
· cites it 3× “See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 77-1901 to 77-1941 (Reissue 1981).”
DESTINY 98 TD v. Miodowski, 693 N.W.2d 278 (Neb. 2005).
· cites it 2× “§ 40-103 (Reissue 2004) are applicable to the sale of real estate pursuant to the foreclosure of a tax sale certificate under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1901 et seq. (Reissue 2003) and (2) determining that Bel Fury is not entitled to attorney fees.”
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