NRS
125.150 Alimony, adjudication of property rights and explanation of
disposition of pension or retirement benefits; award of attorney’s fee;
postjudgment motion; subsequent modification by court. Except
as otherwise provided in
NRS 125.155 and
125.165, and unless the action is
contrary to a premarital agreement between the parties which is enforceable
pursuant to
chapter 123A of NRS:
1. In granting a divorce, the court:
(a) May award such alimony to either spouse, in a
specified principal sum or as specified periodic payments, as appears just and
equitable;
(b) Shall, to the extent practicable, make an
equal disposition of the community property of the parties, including, without
limitation, any community property transferred into an irrevocable trust
pursuant to NRS 123.125 over which the
court acquires jurisdiction pursuant to NRS
164.010, except that the court may make an unequal disposition of the
community property in such proportions as it deems just if the court finds a
compelling reason to do so and sets forth in writing the reasons for making the
unequal disposition; and
(c) Shall provide an explanation, or ensure that
an explanation has been provided, to the parties of any provision relating to
the disposition of pension or retirement benefits that will be included in the
decree of divorce or any related order.
2. Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, in granting a divorce, the court shall dispose of any property held
in joint tenancy in the manner set forth in subsection 1 for the disposition of
community property. If a party has made a contribution of separate property to
the acquisition or improvement of property held in joint tenancy, the court may
provide for the reimbursement of that party for his or her contribution. The
amount of reimbursement must not exceed the amount of the contribution of
separate property that can be traced to the acquisition or improvement of
property held in joint tenancy, without interest or any adjustment because of
an increase in the value of the property held in joint tenancy. The amount of
reimbursement must not exceed the value, at the time of the disposition, of the
property held in joint tenancy for which the contribution of separate property
was made. In determining whether to provide for the reimbursement, in whole or
in part, of a party who has contributed separate property, the court shall
consider:
(a) The intention of the parties in placing the
property in joint tenancy;
(b) The length of the marriage; and
(c) Any other factor which the court deems
relevant in making a just and equitable disposition of that property.
Ê As used in
this subsection, “contribution” includes, without limitation, a down payment, a
payment for the acquisition or improvement of property, and a payment reducing
the principal of a loan used to finance the purchase or improvement of
property. The term does not include a payment of interest on a loan used to
finance the purchase or improvement of property, or a payment made for
maintenance, insurance or taxes on property.
3. A party may file a postjudgment motion
in any action for divorce, annulment or separate maintenance to obtain
adjudication of any community property or liability omitted from the decree or
judgment as the result of fraud or mistake. A motion pursuant to this
subsection must be filed within 3 years after the discovery by the aggrieved
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. The court has continuing
jurisdiction to hear such a motion and shall equally divide the omitted
community property or liability between the parties unless the court finds
that:
(a) The community property or liability was
included in a prior equal disposition of the community property of the parties
or in an unequal disposition of the community property of the parties which was
made pursuant to written findings of a compelling reason for making that
unequal disposition; or
(b) The court determines a compelling reason in
the interests of justice to make an unequal disposition of the community
property or liability and sets forth in writing the reasons for making the
unequal disposition.
Ê If a motion
pursuant to this subsection results in a judgment dividing a defined benefit
pension plan, the judgment may not be enforced against an installment payment
made by the plan more than 6 years after the installment payment.
4. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 125.141, whether or not application for
suit money has been made under the provisions of NRS 125.040, the court may award a
reasonable attorney’s fee to either party to an action for divorce.
5. In granting a divorce, the court may
also set apart such portion of the separate property of either spouse for the
other spouse’s support or the separate property of either spouse for the
support of their children as is deemed just and equitable.
6. In the event of the death of either
party or the subsequent remarriage of the spouse to whom specified periodic
payments were to be made, all the payments required by the decree must cease,
unless it was otherwise ordered by the court.
7. If the court adjudicates the property
rights of the parties, or an agreement by the parties settling their property
rights has been approved by the court, whether or not the court has retained
jurisdiction to modify them, the adjudication of property rights, and the agreements
settling property rights, may nevertheless at any time thereafter be modified
by the court upon written stipulation signed and acknowledged by the parties to
the action, and in accordance with the terms thereof.
8. If a decree of divorce, or an agreement
between the parties which was ratified, adopted or approved in a decree of
divorce, provides for specified periodic payments of alimony, the decree or
agreement is not subject to modification by the court as to accrued payments.
Payments pursuant to a decree entered on or after July 1, 1975, which have not
accrued at the time a motion for modification is filed may be modified upon a
showing of changed circumstances, whether or not the court has expressly
retained jurisdiction for the modification. In addition to any other factors
the court considers relevant in determining whether to modify the order, the
court shall consider whether the income of the spouse who is ordered to pay
alimony, as indicated on the spouse’s federal income tax return for the
preceding calendar year, has been reduced to such a level that the spouse is
financially unable to pay the amount of alimony the spouse has been ordered to
pay.
9. In addition to any other factors the
court considers relevant in determining whether to award alimony and the amount
of such an award, the court shall consider:
(a) The financial condition of each spouse;
(b) The nature and value of the respective
property of each spouse;
(c) The contribution of each spouse to any
property held by the spouses pursuant to NRS
123.030;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The income, earning capacity, age and health
of each spouse;
(f) The standard of living during the marriage;
(g) The career before the marriage of the spouse
who would receive the alimony;
(h) The existence of specialized education or
training or the level of marketable skills attained by each spouse during the
marriage;
(i) The contribution of either spouse as
homemaker;
(j) The award of property granted by the court in
the divorce, other than child support and alimony, to the spouse who would
receive the alimony; and
(k) The physical and mental condition of each
party as it relates to the financial condition, health and ability to work of
that spouse.
10. In granting a divorce, the court shall
consider the need to grant alimony to a spouse for the purpose of obtaining
training or education relating to a job, career or profession. In addition to
any other factors the court considers relevant in determining whether such
alimony should be granted, the court shall consider:
(a) Whether the spouse who would pay such alimony
has obtained greater job skills or education during the marriage; and
(b) Whether the spouse who would receive such
alimony provided financial support while the other spouse obtained job skills
or education.
11. If the court determines that alimony
should be awarded pursuant to the provisions of subsection 10:
(a) The court, in its order, shall provide for
the time within which the spouse who is the recipient of the alimony must
commence the training or education relating to a job, career or profession.
(b) The spouse who is ordered to pay the alimony
may, upon changed circumstances, file a motion to modify the order.
(c) The spouse who is the recipient of the
alimony may be granted, in addition to any other alimony granted by the court,
money to provide for:
(1) Testing of the recipient’s skills
relating to a job, career or profession;
(2) Evaluation of the recipient’s
abilities and goals relating to a job, career or profession;
(3) Guidance for the recipient in
establishing a specific plan for training or education relating to a job,
career or profession;
(4) Subsidization of an employer’s costs
incurred in training the recipient;
(5) Assisting the recipient to search for
a job; or
(6) Payment of the costs of tuition, books
and fees for:
(I) The equivalent of a high school
diploma;
(II) College courses which are
directly applicable to the recipient’s goals for his or her career; or
(III) Courses of training in skills
desirable for employment.
12. For the purposes of this section, a
change of 20 percent or more in the gross monthly income of a spouse who is
ordered to pay alimony shall be deemed to constitute changed circumstances
requiring a review for modification of the payments of alimony. As used in this
subsection, “gross monthly income” means the total amount of income received
each month from any source of a person who is not self-employed or the gross
income from any source of a self-employed person, after deduction of all
legitimate business expenses, but without deduction for personal income taxes,
contributions for retirement benefits, contributions to a pension or for any
other personal expenses.
[Part 25:33:1861; A 1939,
18; 1943,
117; 1949,
54; 1943 NCL § 9463]—(NRS A 1961,
401; 1975,
1588; 1979,
1821; 1989,
744, 1005;
1993,
240, 2550;
1995,
1968; 1999,
2023; 2003,
544; 2007,
2479; 2013,
2953; 2015,
792, 860;
2017,
765, 1669,
2281;
2023,
2460)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
165
cases (
19 in the last 5 years), 1958–2025 · leading case:
Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 439 P.3d 397 (Nev. 2019).
Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 439 P.3d 397 (Nev. 2019).
· cites it 20× “150(9)(a) ; "[t]he nature and value of the respective property of each spouse," (9)(b); "[t]he income, earning capacity, age and health of each spouse," (9)(e); "[t]he award of property granted by the court in the divorce .”
W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220 (Nev. 1992).
· cites it 14× “" The final decree in this case was entered in accordance with the divorce statute, NRS 125.150, which provides that "[i]n granting a divorce, the court .”
Wolff v. Wolff, 929 P.2d 916 (Nev. 1996).
· cites it 9× “NRS 125.150. I would consider the inequity presented in this case as a compelling reason; and I see no reason why a district judge cannot look at the totality of circumstances as directed by Nevada law and consider the benefits one party may derive in the future from accrued…”
Shydler v. Shydler, 954 P.2d 37 (Nev. 1998).
· cites it 16× “2d 645, 647 (1994); NRS 125.150. It follows from our decisions in this area that two of the primary purposes of alimony, at least in marriages of significant length, are to narrow any large gaps between the post-divorce earning capacities of the parties, see Gardner, 110 Nev.”
Kilgore Vs. Kilgore, 2019 NV 47 (Nev. 2019).
· cites it 18× “Finally, she argues that the district court's refusal to compel Richard to pay the full monthly amount of his PERS benefits amounts to an unequal distribution of property in violation of NRS 125.150(1)(b). We have long held that "retirement benefits earned during the marriage…”
Sprenger v. Sprenger, 878 P.2d 284 (Nev. 1994).
· cites it 12× “" Barbara claims that the district court erred in finding that the interest in Moana Lane Nursery was By's separate property and argues that this property should have been distributed pursuant to NRS 125.150 as a community asset. She claims that the original business which By…”
McNabney v. McNabney, 782 P.2d 1291 (Nev. 1989).
· cites it 20× “) [2] Although Ohio is a non-community property state, it utilizes equitable distribution, a concept similar to fair and equitable distribution under NRS 125.150.”
Kishner v. Kishner, 562 P.2d 493 (Nev. 1977).
· cites it 15× “NRS 125.150 provides for the allowance of an award of alimony incident to the granting of a divorce.”
Gilman v. Gilman, 956 P.2d 761 (Nev. 1998).
· cites it 12× “" Ken argued that this cohabitation constituted a change of circumstances under NRS 125.150. *763 On April 30, 1996, at a hearing on the motion, Valerie admitted that she was romantically involved with Chuck and cohabitated with him, but stated that he did not support her…”
Gardner v. Gardner, 881 P.2d 645 (Nev. 1994).
· cites it 10× “A second type of alimony (rehabilitative alimony) is that provided by the legislature under NRS 125.”
Fick v. Fick, 851 P.2d 445 (Nev. 1993).
· cites it 7× “However, assuming that we address this issue and conclude that the Ficks possessed a valid deed registering the lot as joint tenancy, NRS 125.150 allows for the equitable division of community property and joint tenancies, and thus the district court’s alleged error in…”
Spears v. Spears, 596 P.2d 210 (Nev. 1979).
· cites it 5× “*417 OPINION Per Curiam: David Kendric Spears, who lost his motion to reduce his alimony payments, has appealed, challenging the constitutionality of Nevada’s alimony statute NRS 125.150(1). 1 David and respondent, Frances Bird Spears, were divorced on December 16, 1975.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(1) — 22 cases
McNabney v. McNabney, 782 P.2d 1291 (Nev. 1989).
“) [2] Although Ohio is a non-community property state, it utilizes equitable distribution, a concept similar to fair and equitable distribution under NRS 125.150.”
Spears v. Spears, 596 P.2d 210 (Nev. 1979).
“*417 OPINION Per Curiam: David Kendric Spears, who lost his motion to reduce his alimony payments, has appealed, challenging the constitutionality of Nevada’s alimony statute NRS 125.150(1). 1 David and respondent, Frances Bird Spears, were divorced on December 16, 1975.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(1)(a) — 22 cases
Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 439 P.3d 397 (Nev. 2019).
“150(9)(a) ; "[t]he nature and value of the respective property of each spouse," (9)(b); "[t]he income, earning capacity, age and health of each spouse," (9)(e); "[t]he award of property granted by the court in the divorce .”
Sprenger v. Sprenger, 878 P.2d 284 (Nev. 1994).
“" Barbara claims that the district court erred in finding that the interest in Moana Lane Nursery was By's separate property and argues that this property should have been distributed pursuant to NRS 125.150 as a community asset. She claims that the original business which By…”
Shydler v. Shydler, 954 P.2d 37 (Nev. 1998).
“2d 645, 647 (1994); NRS 125.150. It follows from our decisions in this area that two of the primary purposes of alimony, at least in marriages of significant length, are to narrow any large gaps between the post-divorce earning capacities of the parties, see Gardner, 110 Nev.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(1)(a)(3) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(1)(b) — 27 cases
Wolff v. Wolff, 929 P.2d 916 (Nev. 1996).
“NRS 125.150. I would consider the inequity presented in this case as a compelling reason; and I see no reason why a district judge cannot look at the totality of circumstances as directed by Nevada law and consider the benefits one party may derive in the future from accrued…”
Kilgore Vs. Kilgore, 2019 NV 47 (Nev. 2019).
“Finally, she argues that the district court's refusal to compel Richard to pay the full monthly amount of his PERS benefits amounts to an unequal distribution of property in violation of NRS 125.150(1)(b). We have long held that "retirement benefits earned during the marriage…”
Shydler v. Shydler, 954 P.2d 37 (Nev. 1998).
“2d 645, 647 (1994); NRS 125.150. It follows from our decisions in this area that two of the primary purposes of alimony, at least in marriages of significant length, are to narrow any large gaps between the post-divorce earning capacities of the parties, see Gardner, 110 Nev.”
Sprenger v. Sprenger, 878 P.2d 284 (Nev. 1994).
“" Barbara claims that the district court erred in finding that the interest in Moana Lane Nursery was By's separate property and argues that this property should have been distributed pursuant to NRS 125.150 as a community asset. She claims that the original business which By…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(1)(b)(2) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(2) — 9 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(3) — 32 cases
Kilgore Vs. Kilgore, 2019 NV 47 (Nev. 2019).
“Finally, she argues that the district court's refusal to compel Richard to pay the full monthly amount of his PERS benefits amounts to an unequal distribution of property in violation of NRS 125.150(1)(b). We have long held that "retirement benefits earned during the marriage…”
Sprenger v. Sprenger, 878 P.2d 284 (Nev. 1994).
“" Barbara claims that the district court erred in finding that the interest in Moana Lane Nursery was By's separate property and argues that this property should have been distributed pursuant to NRS 125.150 as a community asset. She claims that the original business which By…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(4) — 9 cases
Kishner v. Kishner, 562 P.2d 493 (Nev. 1977).
“NRS 125.150 provides for the allowance of an award of alimony incident to the granting of a divorce.”
Shydler v. Shydler, 954 P.2d 37 (Nev. 1998).
“2d 645, 647 (1994); NRS 125.150. It follows from our decisions in this area that two of the primary purposes of alimony, at least in marriages of significant length, are to narrow any large gaps between the post-divorce earning capacities of the parties, see Gardner, 110 Nev.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(5) — 11 cases
Wolff v. Wolff, 929 P.2d 916 (Nev. 1996).
“NRS 125.150. I would consider the inequity presented in this case as a compelling reason; and I see no reason why a district judge cannot look at the totality of circumstances as directed by Nevada law and consider the benefits one party may derive in the future from accrued…”
Gilman v. Gilman, 956 P.2d 761 (Nev. 1998).
“" Ken argued that this cohabitation constituted a change of circumstances under NRS 125.150. *763 On April 30, 1996, at a hearing on the motion, Valerie admitted that she was romantically involved with Chuck and cohabitated with him, but stated that he did not support her…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(6) — 6 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(7) — 13 cases
Wolff v. Wolff, 929 P.2d 916 (Nev. 1996).
“NRS 125.150. I would consider the inequity presented in this case as a compelling reason; and I see no reason why a district judge cannot look at the totality of circumstances as directed by Nevada law and consider the benefits one party may derive in the future from accrued…”
Gilman v. Gilman, 956 P.2d 761 (Nev. 1998).
“" Ken argued that this cohabitation constituted a change of circumstances under NRS 125.150. *763 On April 30, 1996, at a hearing on the motion, Valerie admitted that she was romantically involved with Chuck and cohabitated with him, but stated that he did not support her…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(8) — 13 cases
Gardner v. Gardner, 881 P.2d 645 (Nev. 1994).
“A second type of alimony (rehabilitative alimony) is that provided by the legislature under NRS 125.”
Fick v. Fick, 851 P.2d 445 (Nev. 1993).
“However, assuming that we address this issue and conclude that the Ficks possessed a valid deed registering the lot as joint tenancy, NRS 125.150 allows for the equitable division of community property and joint tenancies, and thus the district court’s alleged error in…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(9) — 18 cases
Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 439 P.3d 397 (Nev. 2019).
“150(9)(a) ; "[t]he nature and value of the respective property of each spouse," (9)(b); "[t]he income, earning capacity, age and health of each spouse," (9)(e); "[t]he award of property granted by the court in the divorce .”
Fick v. Fick, 851 P.2d 445 (Nev. 1993).
“However, assuming that we address this issue and conclude that the Ficks possessed a valid deed registering the lot as joint tenancy, NRS 125.150 allows for the equitable division of community property and joint tenancies, and thus the district court’s alleged error in…”
Gardner v. Gardner, 881 P.2d 645 (Nev. 1994).
“A second type of alimony (rehabilitative alimony) is that provided by the legislature under NRS 125.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(9)(a) — 6 cases
Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 439 P.3d 397 (Nev. 2019).
“150(9)(a) ; "[t]he nature and value of the respective property of each spouse," (9)(b); "[t]he income, earning capacity, age and health of each spouse," (9)(e); "[t]he award of property granted by the court in the divorce .”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(9)(b) — 1 case
Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 439 P.3d 397 (Nev. 2019).
“150(9)(a) ; "[t]he nature and value of the respective property of each spouse," (9)(b); "[t]he income, earning capacity, age and health of each spouse," (9)(e); "[t]he award of property granted by the court in the divorce .”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(9)(c) — 1 case
Gardner v. Gardner, 881 P.2d 645 (Nev. 1994).
“A second type of alimony (rehabilitative alimony) is that provided by the legislature under NRS 125.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(9)(d) — 5 cases
Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 439 P.3d 397 (Nev. 2019).
“150(9)(a) ; "[t]he nature and value of the respective property of each spouse," (9)(b); "[t]he income, earning capacity, age and health of each spouse," (9)(e); "[t]he award of property granted by the court in the divorce .”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(9)(e) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(9)(j) — 4 cases
Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 439 P.3d 397 (Nev. 2019).
“150(9)(a) ; "[t]he nature and value of the respective property of each spouse," (9)(b); "[t]he income, earning capacity, age and health of each spouse," (9)(e); "[t]he award of property granted by the court in the divorce .”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(l)(a) — 3 cases
Gardner v. Gardner, 881 P.2d 645 (Nev. 1994).
“A second type of alimony (rehabilitative alimony) is that provided by the legislature under NRS 125.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(l)(b) — 8 cases
Wolff v. Wolff, 929 P.2d 916 (Nev. 1996).
“NRS 125.150. I would consider the inequity presented in this case as a compelling reason; and I see no reason why a district judge cannot look at the totality of circumstances as directed by Nevada law and consider the benefits one party may derive in the future from accrued…”
Sprenger v. Sprenger, 878 P.2d 284 (Nev. 1994).
“" Barbara claims that the district court erred in finding that the interest in Moana Lane Nursery was By's separate property and argues that this property should have been distributed pursuant to NRS 125.150 as a community asset. She claims that the original business which By…”
Shydler v. Shydler, 954 P.2d 37 (Nev. 1998).
“2d 645, 647 (1994); NRS 125.150. It follows from our decisions in this area that two of the primary purposes of alimony, at least in marriages of significant length, are to narrow any large gaps between the post-divorce earning capacities of the parties, see Gardner, 110 Nev.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(l)(b)(2) — 2 cases
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