Nev. Rev. Stat. » NRS: CHAPTER 178 - GENERAL PROVISIONS
Nevada Revised Statutes

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.460 (2026)

Powers and duties of court following finding of incompetence; limitation on length of commitment

✓ current as of July 2026
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NRS 178.460  Powers and duties of court following finding of incompetence; limitation on length of commitment.

      1.  If requested by the district attorney or counsel for the defendant within 10 days after the report by the Administrator or the Administrator’s designee is sent to them, the judge shall hold a hearing within 10 days after the request at which the district attorney and the defense counsel may examine the members of the treatment team on their report.

      2.  If the judge orders the appointment of a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist who is not employed by the Division to perform an additional evaluation and report concerning the defendant, the cost of the additional evaluation and report is a charge against the county.

      3.  Within 10 days after the hearing or 10 days after the report is sent, if no hearing is requested, the judge shall make and enter a finding of competence or incompetence, and if the judge finds the defendant to be incompetent:

      (a) Whether there is substantial probability that the defendant can receive treatment to competency and will attain competency to stand trial or receive pronouncement of judgment in the foreseeable future; and

      (b) Whether the defendant is at that time a danger to himself or herself or to society.

      4.  If the judge finds the defendant:

      (a) Competent, the judge shall, within 10 days, forward the finding to the prosecuting attorney and counsel for the defendant. Upon receipt thereof, the prosecuting attorney shall notify the sheriff of the county or chief of police of the city that the defendant has been found competent and prearrange with the facility, if applicable, for the return of the defendant to that county or city for trial upon the offense there charged or the pronouncement of judgment, as the case may be. If the defendant is receiving treatment to competency through a facility located within the county jail or detention facility pursuant to subsection 1 of NRS 178.425, the judge shall order the defendant discharged from the facility for treatment to competency within the jail or detention facility. A defendant so discharged may continue to reside in a designated mental health unit of a jail or detention facility to continue mental health treatment not related to treatment to competency. If the defendant is receiving treatment through a program established pursuant to subsection 3 of NRS 178.426, the judge shall order the termination of such treatment.

      (b) Incompetent, but there is a substantial probability that the defendant can receive treatment to competency and will attain competency to stand trial or receive pronouncement of judgment in the foreseeable future and finds that the defendant is dangerous to himself or herself or to society, the judge shall recommit the defendant and may order the involuntary administration of medication for the purpose of treatment to competency.

      (c) Incompetent, but there is a substantial probability that the defendant can receive treatment to competency and will attain competency to stand trial or receive pronouncement of judgment in the foreseeable future and finds that the defendant is not dangerous to himself or herself or to society, the judge shall order that the defendant remain an outpatient or be transferred to the status of an outpatient under the provisions of NRS 178.425.

      (d) Incompetent, with no substantial probability of attaining competency in the foreseeable future, the judge shall order the defendant released from custody or, if the defendant is an outpatient, released from any obligations as an outpatient if, within 10 judicial days, the prosecuting attorney has not filed a motion pursuant to NRS 178.461 or if, within 10 judicial days, a petition is not filed for the involuntary court-ordered admission of the person to a mental health facility pursuant to NRS 433A.200. After the initial 10 judicial days, the person may remain an outpatient or in custody under the provisions of this chapter only as long as the motion or petition is pending unless the person is committed to the custody of the Administrator pursuant to NRS 178.461 or involuntarily admitted to a mental health facility pursuant to chapter 433A of NRS.

      5.  Except as otherwise provided in subsections 4 and 7 of NRS 178.461, no person who is committed under the provisions of this chapter may be held in the custody of the Administrator or the Administrator’s designee longer than the longest period of incarceration provided for the crime or crimes with which the person is charged or 10 years, whichever period is shorter. Upon expiration of the applicable period provided in this section, subsection 4 or 7 of NRS 178.461 or subsection 4 of NRS 178.463, the person must be returned to the committing court for a determination as to whether or not involuntary commitment pursuant to chapter 433A of NRS is required.

      [Part 3:292:1955]—(NRS A 1961, 477; 1968, 54; 1973, 94, 253; 1981, 1659; 1991, 1006; 1995, 2458; 1999, 107; 2001, 1087; 2003, 1472, 1950; 2007, 187, 1779; 2009, 115; 2017, 2997; 2021, 3104; 2025, 3121)

     

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 15 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1975–2022 · leading case: Fergusen v. State, 192 P.3d 712 (Nev. 2008).
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Fergusen v. State, 192 P.3d 712 (Nev. 2008). · cites it 10× “455 and NRS 178.460 after he returned from Lake's Crossing.”
Sharris v. Commonwealth, 106 N.E.3d 661 (Mass. 2018). · cites it 2× “§ 46-14-221 ; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.460 ; N.H. Rev. Stat.”
Scarbo v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, 206 P.3d 975 (Nev. 2009). “Additionally, the Administrator or his designee shall maintain a copy of the report and send a copy of the report to counsel for both sides after the competency treatment is completed.”
Sheriff, Clark Cnty. v. Berman, 659 P.2d 298 (Nev. 1983). · cites it 2× “2d 474 (1975) (violation of NRS 178.460, which requires that the State bring a defendant to trial within 60 days after being notified that the defendant is competent to stand trial, does not establish constitutional speedy trial violation or right to habeas relief.”
Craig v. Hocker, 405 F. Supp. 656 (D. Nev. 1975). “Proceedings against the defendant must be suspended until the sanity commission finds him capable of standing trial or opposing pronouncement of judgment as provided in NRS 178.460.” “209.145 Warden to provide facility for detention, treatment of persons committed to custody of…”
Woerner v. Just. Court, 1 P.3d 377 (Nev. 2000). “425(5) states, as follows: Whenever the defendant has been found incompetent, with no substantial probability of attaining competency in the foreseeable future, and released from custody or from obligations as an outpatient pursuant to paragraph (d) of subsection 3 of NRS…”
Sondergaard v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 531 P.2d 474 (Nev. 1975). “NRS 178.460. The State made no effort to do so, and has acknowledged its inadvertence in this regard.”
Martin v. State, 608 P.2d 502 (Nev. 1980). “Martin’s argument that the district judge committed error by not commencing trial within 60 days after the sanity commission report, as required by NRS 178.460(1), also lacks merit. His counsel expressly agreed to the trial date and Martin did not demand an earlier trial nor did…”
Ashraf (Farid) v. Dist. Ct. (State) (Nev. 2017). · cites it 4× “425(5); NRS 178.460. Although Ashraf has been treated longer than the defendant in Jackson, the record before us does not conclusively indicate that this delay was "more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he…”
State v. Manson (Tariq) (Nev. 2022). · cites it 3× “” NRS 178.460(4)(d); see also NRS 178.425(5).”
State v. Adams (Vinnie) (Nev. 2022). · cites it 2× “" NRS 178.460(4)(d); see also NRS 178.425(5).”
State v. Dist. Ct. Ashraf (Farid) (Nev. 2014). · cites it 2× “450(2); NRS 178.460(1); Fergusen v. State, 124 Nev.”
Show all 15 citing cases →
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.460(1) — 3 cases
Martin v. State, 608 P.2d 502 (Nev. 1980). “Martin’s argument that the district judge committed error by not commencing trial within 60 days after the sanity commission report, as required by NRS 178.460(1), also lacks merit. His counsel expressly agreed to the trial date and Martin did not demand an earlier trial nor did…”
Ashraf (Farid) v. Dist. Ct. (State) (Nev. 2017). “425(5); NRS 178.460. Although Ashraf has been treated longer than the defendant in Jackson, the record before us does not conclusively indicate that this delay was "more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he…”
State v. Dist. Ct. Ashraf (Farid) (Nev. 2014). “450(2); NRS 178.460(1); Fergusen v. State, 124 Nev.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.460(3) — 2 cases
Pigeon (Christopher) v. State (Nev. 2017).
State v. Dist. Ct. Ashraf (Farid) (Nev. 2014). “450(2); NRS 178.460(1); Fergusen v. State, 124 Nev.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.460(3)(a) — 1 case
Hedger (Christopher) v. Dist. Ct. (State) (Nev. 2013).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.460(4)(d) — 4 cases
State v. Manson (Tariq) (Nev. 2022). “” NRS 178.460(4)(d); see also NRS 178.425(5).”
State v. Adams (Vinnie) (Nev. 2022). “" NRS 178.460(4)(d); see also NRS 178.425(5).”
Ashraf (Farid) v. Dist. Ct. (State) (Nev. 2017). “425(5); NRS 178.460. Although Ashraf has been treated longer than the defendant in Jackson, the record before us does not conclusively indicate that this delay was "more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he…”
State v. Adams (Vinnie) (Nev. 2022).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.460(5) — 1 case
Ashraf (Farid) v. Dist. Ct. (State) (Nev. 2017). “425(5); NRS 178.460. Although Ashraf has been treated longer than the defendant in Jackson, the record before us does not conclusively indicate that this delay was "more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he…”
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