NRS
178.508 Duties of court when defendant fails to appear; procedure for
issuing order of forfeiture; when forfeiture becomes effective; grounds for
extending date of forfeiture.
1. If the defendant fails to appear when
the defendant’s presence in court is lawfully required for the commission of a
misdemeanor and the failure to appear is not excused or is lawfully required
for the commission of a gross misdemeanor or felony, the court shall:
(a) Enter upon its minutes that the defendant
failed to appear;
(b) Not later than 14 judicial days after the
date on which the defendant failed to appear, order the issuance of a warrant
for the arrest of the defendant; and
(c) If the undertaking exceeds $50 or money
deposited instead of bail bond exceeds $500, direct that each surety and the
local agent of each surety, or the depositor if the depositor is not the
defendant, be given notice that the defendant has failed to appear, by
certified mail or electronic transmission, receipt of delivery requested, within
20 days after the date on which the defendant failed to appear. The court shall
execute an affidavit of such mailing or electronic transmission to be kept as
an official public record of the court and shall direct that a copy of the
notice be transmitted to the prosecuting attorney at the same time that notice
is given to each surety or the depositor.
2. Except as otherwise provided in
subsection 3 and NRS 178.509, an order
of forfeiture of any undertaking or money deposited instead of bail bond must
be prepared by the clerk of the court and signed by the court. An order of
forfeiture must include the date on which the forfeiture becomes effective. The
undertaking or money deposited instead of bail bond is forfeited 180 days after
the date on which the notice is mailed or electronically transmitted pursuant
to subsection 1.
3. The court may extend the date of the
forfeiture for any reasonable period set by the court if the surety or depositor
submits to the court:
(a) An application for an extension and the court
determines that the surety or the depositor is making reasonable and ongoing
efforts to bring the defendant before the court.
(b) An application for an extension on the ground
that the defendant is temporarily prevented from appearing before the court
because the defendant:
(1) Is ill;
(2) Is insane; or
(3) Is being detained by civil or military
authorities,
Ê and the
court, upon hearing the matter, determines that one or more of the grounds
described in this paragraph exist and that the surety or depositor did not in
any way cause or aid the absence of the defendant.
(Added to NRS by 1967,
1453; A 1969,
625; 1971,
598; 1979,
1400; 1983,
210; 1987,
1025; 1991,
1015; 1999,
1845; 2003,
2103; 2015,
2567; 2017,
276)
Notes of Decisions
State v. Am. Bankers Ins., 802 P.2d 1276 (Nev. 1990).
· cites it 6× “OPINION Per Curiam: This court is asked to interpret the meaning and effect of a 1987 amendment to NRS 178.508 requiring that a surety and its local agent be notified within fifteen days after their bonded criminal defendant fails to appear in court.”
Wilshire Ins. v. State, 582 P.2d 372 (Nev. 1978).
· cites it 4× “On March 8, 1977, movants filed points and authorities contending failure by the court to comply with NRS 178.508 pertaining to notice requirements in bail forfeiture proceedings.”
Harris v. State, 756 P.2d 556 (Nev. 1988).
· cites it 5× “The motion was premised on noncompliance with NRS 178.508. An affidavit of mailing did not accompany the Notice of Intent to Forfeit, as required by the statute.”
State v. Sargent, 128 P.3d 1052 (Nev. 2006).
· cites it 2× “Nor do we find persuasive the State’s suggestion that the justice courts would cease to function and that “some tens of thousands of bench warrants outstanding” would need to be quashed if this court concludes that the justice courts cannot require the defendant’s physical…”
Int'l Fid. Ins. v. State, 967 P.2d 804 (Nev. 1998).
· cites it 7× “On March 5, 1997, the district court issued its final order denying a motion by IFIC for exoneration of the bonds claiming failure of the district court to comply with NRS 178.”
Seigworth v. State, 539 P.2d 464 (Nev. 1975).
· cites it 2× “The district judge ordered notice of the defendant’s failure to appear pursuant to NRS 178.508, and that the bondsman had 90 days to produce the defendant before bond was forfeited.”
State v. Am. Bankers Ins., 782 P.2d 1316 (Nev. 1989).
“Ninety days later, on January 6, 1986, the bond was automatically forfeited pursuant to the terms of the court’s notices and the provisions of NRS 178.508. On November 16, 1987, the State moved to dismiss the case *694 because it could not locate a confidential informant.”
Starr v. State, 433 P.3d 301 (Nev. 2018).
“340(4) ; see also NRS 178.508(1)-(2) ; NRS 179.177 -.235. In either situation, juries are permitted to rationally infer that people wholly innocent of any crime are unlikely to flee unless motivated by some measure of consciousness of guilt.”
Justin Vs. Dist. Ct. (state), 2016 NV 47 (Nev. 2016).
· cites it 5× “If the defendant fails to appear when the defendant's presence in court is lawfully required, the court shall not exonerate the surety before the date of forfeiture prescribed in NRS 178.508 unless: (a) The defendant appears before the court and the court, upon hearing the…”
State Vs. Eclectic Servs., Inc. (Nev. 2019).
· cites it 4× “The crux of the dispute is NRS 178.508, which provides that a court must notify a defendant's surety of the defendant's failure to appear.”
Starr (brandon) Vs. State, 2018 NV 90 (Nev. 2018).
· cites it 2× “340(4); see also NRS 178.508(1)-(2); NRS 179.177- .235. In either situation, juries are permitted to rationally infer that people wholly innocent of any crime are unlikely to flee unless motivated by some measure of consciousness of guilt.”
Starr v. State (Nev. 2018).
· cites it 2× “340(4); see also NRS 178.508(1)-(2); NRS 179.177- .235. In either situation, juries are permitted to rationally infer that people wholly innocent of any crime are unlikely to flee unless motivated by some measure of consciousness of guilt.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.508(1) — 4 cases
Starr v. State, 433 P.3d 301 (Nev. 2018).
“340(4) ; see also NRS 178.508(1)-(2) ; NRS 179.177 -.235. In either situation, juries are permitted to rationally infer that people wholly innocent of any crime are unlikely to flee unless motivated by some measure of consciousness of guilt.”
Starr (brandon) Vs. State, 2018 NV 90 (Nev. 2018).
“340(4); see also NRS 178.508(1)-(2); NRS 179.177- .235. In either situation, juries are permitted to rationally infer that people wholly innocent of any crime are unlikely to flee unless motivated by some measure of consciousness of guilt.”
Starr v. State (Nev. 2018).
“340(4); see also NRS 178.508(1)-(2); NRS 179.177- .235. In either situation, juries are permitted to rationally infer that people wholly innocent of any crime are unlikely to flee unless motivated by some measure of consciousness of guilt.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.