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Nev. Rev. Stat.Nrs: Chapter 193 - Criminality Generally

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 193.130 (2026)

Categories and punishment of felonies

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1968–2026 107citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 107 opinions since 1968, 11 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (16 cases).

NRS 193.130  Categories and punishment of felonies.

      1.  Except when a person is convicted of a category A felony, and except as otherwise provided by specific statute, a person convicted of a felony shall be sentenced to a minimum term and a maximum term of imprisonment which must be within the limits prescribed by the applicable statute, unless the statute in force at the time of commission of the felony prescribed a different penalty. The minimum term of imprisonment that may be imposed must not exceed 40 percent of the maximum term imposed.

      2.  Except as otherwise provided by specific statute, for each felony committed on or after July 1, 1995:

      (a) A category A felony is a felony for which a sentence of death or imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without the possibility of parole may be imposed, as provided by specific statute.

      (b) A category B felony is a felony for which the minimum term of imprisonment in the state prison that may be imposed is not less than 1 year and the maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed is not more than 20 years, as provided by specific statute.

      (c) A category C felony is a felony for which a court shall sentence a convicted person to imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 5 years. In addition to any other penalty, the court may impose a fine of not more than $10,000, unless a greater fine is authorized or required by statute.

      (d) A category D felony is a felony for which a court shall sentence a convicted person to imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 4 years. In addition to any other penalty, the court may impose a fine of not more than $5,000, unless a greater fine is authorized or required by statute.

      (e) A category E felony is a felony for which a court shall sentence a convicted person to imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 4 years. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of subsection 1 of NRS 176A.100 or paragraph (a) of subsection 2 of NRS 453.336, upon sentencing a person who is found guilty of a category E felony, the court shall suspend the execution of the sentence and grant probation to the person upon such conditions as the court deems appropriate. Such conditions of probation may include, but are not limited to, requiring the person to serve a term of confinement of not more than 1 year in the county jail. In addition to any other penalty, the court may impose a fine of not more than $5,000, unless a greater penalty is authorized or required by statute.

      [1911 C&P § 18; RL § 6283; NCL § 9967]—(NRS A 1967, 458; 1995, 1167; 1997, 1177; 1999, 1186; 2019, 4419)

     

The 20 cases that cite Nev. Rev. Stat. § 193.130 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct.(pullin), 188 P.3d 1079 (Nev. 2008).
cites § 193.130 8×subsections: (1)cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“Three examples of the Legislature’s intent in this regard are the savings clause set forth in the Crimes and Punishments Act of 1911; 14 the general savings statutes adopted *568 in 1967 as NRS 193.130, 15 193.140, 16 and 193.150; 17 and the savings statute adopted in 1971 as…”
The case’s holding
The law in effect at the time of a crime's commission governs the prosecution of criminal offenses (including sentencing penalties).
Later courts cite it for
“the proper penalty is the penalty in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. . . .” · 6 citing courts
2
GREENHudson v. Warden, 22 P.3d 1154 (Nev. 2001).
cites § 193.130 8×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“3395, a person who violates this section shall be punished: (a) For the first or second offense, if the controlled substance is listed in schedule I, II, III or IV, for a category E felony as provided in NRS 193.130. (b) For a third or subsequent offense, if the controlled…”
The case’s holding
A reference to prior convictions in a presentence investigation report does not constitute prima facie evidence of a prior felony conviction for sentencing enhancement purposes.
Later courts cite it for
“is not prima facie evidence of a prior felony conviction.” · 1 citing court
3
GREENWilliamson v. Hawai'i Paroling Auth., 35 P.3d 210 (Haw. 2001).
cites § 193.130 4×subsections: (1) 4×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“§ 9756(b) (1998) (stating that the minimum term shall not exceed one-half of the maximum sentence); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 193.130(1) (2000) (stating that the minimum *223 term shall not exceed forty percent of the maximum sentence).”
The case’s holding
A prisoner has no statutory right to a minimum term of imprisonment shorter than the maximum sentence.
Later courts cite it for
“judicial intervention is appropriate where the hpa has failed to exercise any discretion at all, acted arbitrarily and capriciously so as to give rise to a due process violation, or otherwise violated the prisoner's constitutional rights.” · 8 citing courts
4
GREENWashington v. State, 30 P.3d 1134 (Nev. 2001).
cites § 193.130 3×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“A person who offers, agrees or arranges unlawfully to sell, supply, transport, deliver, give or administer any controlled substance classified in schedule I or II and then sells, supplies, transports, delivers, gives or administers any other substance in place of the controlled…”
The case’s holding
Courts disfavor implied repeal and will only consider a statute repealed by implication if no other reasonable construction of the two statutes exists (implied repeal approach is heavily disfavored).
Later courts cite it for
“is heavily disfavored, and this court will not consider a statute to be repealed by implication unless there is no other reasonable construction of the two statutes” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENLader v. Warden, N. Nevada Corr. Ctr., 120 P.3d 1164 (Nev. 2005).
cites § 193.130 1×cited by 362 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“10 percent by weight of alcohol in his blood within two hours of driving.”
The case’s holding
Questions regarding counsel performance present a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review of legal applications and deference to factual findings.
Later courts cite it for
“a district court's factual findings will be given deference by this court on appeal, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly wrong.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENAllred v. State, 92 P.3d 1246 (Nev. 2004).
cites § 193.130 2×subsections: (2) (2)(c)cited by 54 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“NRS 193.130(2) (c). 114 Nev. 910 , 965 P.”
The case’s holding
A severe sentence is not unconstitutionally disproportionate if it falls within statutory guidelines and the underlying statute is constitutional.
Later courts cite it for
“this court will refrain from interfering with the sentence imposed slo long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence.” · 8 citing courts
7
GREENUnited States v. Miguel Angel Arellano-Torres, 303 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2002).
cites § 193.130 2×subsections: (2)(e)cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“” NRS 193.130. 5 *1179 “[U]pon sentencing a person who is found guilty of a category E felony, the court shall suspend the execution of the sentence and grant probation to the person upon such conditions as the court deems appropriate.”
The case’s holding
A state offense qualifies as a felony if the statute authorizes a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, regardless of whether the sentence is suspended or probation is mandatory.
Later courts cite it for
“arizona's statutory scheme ... is materially different ... because a first time offender in arizona will never be incarcerated for more than one year in connection with his first-time offense, even if he repeatedly violates probation.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENWashington v. State, 30 P.3d 1134 (Nev. 2001).
cites § 193.130 3×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“A person who offers, agrees or arranges unlawfully to sell, supply, transport, deliver, give or administer any controlled substance classified in schedule I or II and then sells, supplies, transports, delivers, gives or administers any other substance in place of the controlled…”
9
GREENLocker v. State, 516 P.3d 149 (Nev. 2022).
cites § 193.130 8×subsections: (2)(e) 4×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“shall be punished for a category E felony as provided in NRS 193.130.[3] In accordance with NRS 176.”
Later courts cite it for
“we begin with the text of the rule to determine its plain meaning and apply 'clear and unambiguous' language 'as written.” · 1 citing court
10
GREENMiller v. State, 941 P.2d 456 (Nev. 1997).
cites § 193.130 8×subsections: (2)(e) 6× (2)cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“41 l(3)(a) provides that a category *725 E felony offender shall be punished as provided in NRS 193.130. NRS 193.130(2)(e) provides that for a category E felony a court shall sentence a convicted person to imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of 1 year and a…”
The case’s holding
Sentencing claims warrant judicial review even if moot because the challenged activity is capable of repetition yet evades review (Miller v. State).
Later courts cite it for
“failure to raise a claim below generally bars its consideration on appeal, but this rule is relaxed in cases involving plain error or constitutional issues.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENEnglish v. State, 9 P.3d 60 (Nev. 2000).
cites § 193.130 4×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“(c) For the third and any subsequent offense within the immediately preceding 7 years, is guilty of a category C felony and shall be punished as provided in NRS 193.130. This provision of the domestic violence enhancement law took effect on January 1, 1998.”
The case’s holding
Prior misdemeanor convictions may be used to enhance a subsequent domestic battery offense even if the prior conviction occurred before the enhancement statute's effective date.
12
GREENGrey v. State, 178 P.3d 154 (Nev. 2008).
cites § 193.130 1×cited by 74 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“033; NRS 193.130; see also Villanueva v. State, 117 Nev.”
The case’s holding
A defendant must object at trial on the same ground asserted on appeal to properly preserve the issue for review.
Later courts cite it for
“after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” · 4 citing courts
13
GREENBreault v. State, 996 P.2d 888 (Nev. 2000).
cites § 193.130 6×subsections: (1) 5×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“In his motion, appellant contended that his sentences were illegal because the minimum sentence exceeded forty percent of the maximum sentence for each offense in violation of NRS 193.130. Appellant requested the district court to modify his sentences to a maximum term of 70…”
The case’s holding
A defendant who knowingly and voluntarily agrees to an infirm sentence through plea negotiations waives the right to later challenge that sentence as illegal.
14
GREENHobbs v. State, 251 P.3d 177 (Nev. 2011).
cites § 193.130 1×cited by 68 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“485, provides that a defendant’s third domestic violence battery conviction within seven years must be enhanced to a felony and punished as such under NRS 193.130. NRS 200.485(l)(c). It further states that: An offense that occurred within 7 years immediately preceding the date…”
The case’s holding
Courts avoid statutory interpretations that render language meaningless or superfluous and enforce clear and unambiguous statutory language as written.
Later courts cite it for
“is to give effect to the legislature's intent.” · 10 citing courts
15
GREENMiranda v. State, 956 P.2d 1377 (Nev. 1998).
cites § 193.130 4×subsections: (1) 4×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“The district court subsequently realized that the sentences violated NRS 193.130(1), which provides that a minimum term of imprisonment "must not exceed 40 percent of the maximum term imposed.”
The case’s holding
A district court may increase the severity of an illegal sentence only when necessary to comply with a statute and no less severe correction exists.
Later courts cite it for
“a district court may correct an illegal sentence by increasing its severity only when necessary to bring the sentence into compliance with the pertinent statute, and a correction that increases sentence severity is 'necessary' only when there is no other, less severe means of correcting the illegality.” · 4 citing courts
16
GREENLane v. Allstate Ins., 969 P.2d 938 (Nev. 1998).
cites § 193.130 2×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“620 prohibits the recording of telephone conversations without the consent of both parties to the conversation, unless authorized or ratified by the court.”
The case’s holding
Telephone conversations are private communications protected from unauthorized interception (recognizing the private nature of telephone conversations).
Later courts cite it for
“the taping of a telephone conversation is clearly the aural acquisition of the contents of a wire communication through the use of a mechanical device or receiving equipment.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENState v. Weddell, 43 P.3d 987 (Nev. 2002).
cites § 193.130 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“222; NRS 193.130. NRS 207.340. NRS 193.130. Garner, 471 U.”
The case’s holding
A private person may use deadly force during an arrest only if it is reasonable and necessary to defend against a threat of serious bodily injury.
Later courts cite it for
“oho rule was developed at a time when felonies were only the very serious, violent or dangerous crimes and 'virtually all felonies were punishable by death” · 3 citing courts
18
YELLOWBerry v. State, 212 P.3d 1085 (Nev. 2009).
cites § 193.130 1×cited by 31 cases
Abrogated by State v. Castaneda on other grounds: 14 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 193.130
“In this case, the challenged statute provides: “A person who commits any act of open or gross lewdness is guilty: (a) [f]or the first offense, of a gross misdemeanor [and] (b) [f|or any subsequent offense, of a category D felony and shall be punished as provided in NRS 193.130.”…”
The case’s holding
The state must prove that a weapon meets the statutory definition of a deadly weapon (NRS 193.165(6)).
Later courts cite it for
“is a 'deadly weapon' as defined in nrs 193.165(6)” · 3 citing courts
19
GREENEstes v. State, 146 P.3d 1114 (Nev. 2006).
cites § 193.130 1×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“inal prosecution or a proceeding for the revocation of a parole or probation, or seeking or assisting in such a prosecution or proceeding; or (c) Causing the arrest of a person in connection with a crime, or who hinders or delays such a victim, agent or witness in his effort to…”
The case’s holding
Introducing a photograph of a minor sexual assault victim is harmless error when overwhelming evidence of guilt exists (noting the tension between Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) and NRS 50.295).
Later courts cite it for
“two offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not.” · 5 citing courts
20
GREENState v. Javier C., 289 P.3d 1194 (Nev. 2012).
cites § 193.130 1×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 193.130
“(b) If the battery is not committed with a deadly weapon, and either substantial bodily harm to the victim results or the battery is committed by strangulation, for a category C felony as provided in NRS 193.130. (c) If: (1) The battery is committed upon an officer, provider of…”
The case’s holding
A juvenile in civil detention is not a prisoner under the felony battery by a prisoner statute because juvenile proceedings are civil rather than criminal in nature.
Later courts cite it for
“the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” · 6 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
196819972026

One bar per year. Tallest: 12 cases in 2019. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Nev.85D. Nev.129th Cir.3Nev.3Ala. Crim. App.1Cal. Ct. App.1Haw.1Bankr. D. Nev.1
By subsection
(1)16 cases
Williamson v. Hawai'i Paroling Auth., 35 P.3d 210 (Haw. 2001).“§ 9756(b) (1998) (stating that the minimum term shall not exceed one-half of the maximum sentence); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 193.130(1) (2000) (stating that the minimum *223 term shall not exceed forty percent of the maximum sentence).”
Miranda v. State, 956 P.2d 1377 (Nev. 1998).“The district court subsequently realized that the sentences violated NRS 193.130(1), which provides that a minimum term of imprisonment "must not exceed 40 percent of the maximum term imposed.”
Breault v. State, 996 P.2d 888 (Nev. 2000).“In his motion, appellant contended that his sentences were illegal because the minimum sentence exceeded forty percent of the maximum sentence for each offense in violation of NRS 193.130. Appellant requested the district court to modify his sentences to a maximum term of 70…”
State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct.(pullin), 188 P.3d 1079 (Nev. 2008).“Three examples of the Legislature’s intent in this regard are the savings clause set forth in the Crimes and Punishments Act of 1911; 14 the general savings statutes adopted *568 in 1967 as NRS 193.130, 15 193.140, 16 and 193.150; 17 and the savings statute adopted in 1971 as…”
Shepley v. Warden, 518 P.2d 619 (Nev. 1974).
Showing the top 5 of 16. More in the list view →
(2)2 cases
Allred v. State, 92 P.3d 1246 (Nev. 2004).“NRS 193.130(2) (c). 114 Nev. 910 , 965 P.”
Miller v. State, 941 P.2d 456 (Nev. 1997).“41 l(3)(a) provides that a category *725 E felony offender shall be punished as provided in NRS 193.130. NRS 193.130(2)(e) provides that for a category E felony a court shall sentence a convicted person to imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of 1 year and a…”
(2)(b)7 cases
Vickers v. Dzurenda, 433 P.3d 306 (Nev. 2018).
Vickers (tracey) v. Dir., 2018 NV 91 (Nev. 2018).
Vickers v. Dzurenda, No. 72352-COA (Nev. Nov. 21, 2018).
Vickers (tracey) v. Dir., 2018 NV 91 (Nev. 2018).
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(2)(c)12 cases
Allred v. State, 92 P.3d 1246 (Nev. 2004).
Fullerton v. State, 997 P.2d 807 (Nev. 2000).
State v. Dist. Ct. Barreras (Jose), No. 63044 (Nev. Sept. 19, 2013).
Young (Frazier) v. State, No. 75854 (Nev. June 17, 2019).
Rudd (Neil) v. State C/W 77102, 456 P.3d 254 (Nev. 2020).
Showing the top 5 of 12. More in the list view →
(2)(d)12 cases
Augello (Christopher) v. State C/W 64779, No. 64706 (Nev. May 12, 2014).
Augello (Christopher) v. State C/W 64779, No. 64706 (Nev. May 12, 2014).
Orpiada (Antonio) v. Warden, No. 71309 (Nev. Nov. 1, 2017).
Wirth (Charles) v. Warden, No. 72663 (Nev. Nov. 3, 2017).
Raspperry (Kevin) v. State, 519 P.3d 1265 (Nev. 2022).
Showing the top 5 of 12. More in the list view →
(2)(e)14 cases
Miller v. State, 941 P.2d 456 (Nev. 1997).
United States v. Miguel Angel Arellano-Torres, 303 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2002).“” NRS 193.130. 5 *1179 “[U]pon sentencing a person who is found guilty of a category E felony, the court shall suspend the execution of the sentence and grant probation to the person upon such conditions as the court deems appropriate.”
Locker v. State, 516 P.3d 149 (Nev. 2022).“shall be punished for a category E felony as provided in NRS 193.130.[3] In accordance with NRS 176.”
Daniels v. State, 988 P.2d 791 (Nev. 1999).
Luna (Homar) v. Warden, No. 71507 (Nev. June 15, 2017).
Showing the top 5 of 14. More in the list view →

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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