Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030
Degrees of murder; penalties
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NRS 200.030 Degrees of murder; penalties.
1. Murder of the first degree is murder which is:
(a) Perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait or torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing;
(b) Committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of sexual assault, kidnapping, arson, robbery, burglary, invasion of the home, sexual abuse of a child, sexual molestation of a child under the age of 14 years, child abuse or abuse of an older person or vulnerable person pursuant to NRS 200.5099;
(c) Committed to avoid or prevent the lawful arrest of any person by a peace officer or to effect the escape of any person from legal custody;
(d) Committed on the property of a public or private school, at an activity sponsored by a public or private school or on a school bus while the bus was engaged in its official duties by a person who intended to create a great risk of death or substantial bodily harm to more than one person by means of a weapon, device or course of action that would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person; or
(e) Committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an act of terrorism.
2. Murder of the second degree is all other kinds of murder.
3. The jury before whom any person indicted for murder is tried shall, if they find the person guilty thereof, designate by their verdict whether the person is guilty of murder of the first or second degree.
4. A person convicted of murder of the first degree is guilty of a category A felony and shall be punished:
(a) By death, only if one or more aggravating circumstances are found and any mitigating circumstance or circumstances which are found do not outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances, unless a court has made a finding pursuant to NRS 174.098 that the defendant is a person with an intellectual disability and has stricken the notice of intent to seek the death penalty; or
(b) By imprisonment in the state prison:
(1) For life without the possibility of parole;
(2) For life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 20 years has been served; or
(3) For a definite term of 50 years, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 20 years has been served.
Ê A determination of whether aggravating circumstances exist is not necessary to fix the penalty at imprisonment for life with or without the possibility of parole.
5. A person convicted of murder of the second degree is guilty of a category A felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison:
(a) For life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 10 years has been served; or
(b) For a definite term of 25 years, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 10 years has been served.
6. As used in this section:
(a) “Act of terrorism” has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 202.4415;
(b) “Child abuse” means physical injury of a nonaccidental nature to a child under the age of 18 years;
(c) “School bus” has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 483.160;
(d) “Sexual abuse of a child” means any of the acts described in NRS 432B.100; and
(e) “Sexual molestation” means any willful and lewd or lascivious act, other than acts constituting the crime of sexual assault, upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions or sexual desires of the perpetrator or of the child.
[1911 C&P § 121; A 1915, 67; 1919, 468; 1947, 302; 1943 NCL § 10068]—(NRS A 1957, 330; 1959, 781; 1960, 399; 1961, 235, 486; 1967, 467, 1470; 1973, 1803; 1975, 1580; 1977, 864, 1541, 1627; 1989, 865, 1451; 1995, 257, 1181; 1999, 1335; 2003, 770, 2944; 2007, 74; 2013, 689)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 363
cases (51 in the last 5 years), 1960–2025 · leading case: Byford v. State
Byford v. State (2000)
“(The 1999 legislature amended NRS 200.030, transferring murders perpetrated by child abuse into the felony-murder subcategory of first-degree murder.”
Collman v. State (2000)
“The issue presented in this case is: for first-degree murder under subsection (1)(a) of NRS 200.030, can malice be established simply by proving that the killing was done by an enumerated means? The State answers this question affirmatively, offering three or four arguments in…”
McConnell v. State (2004)
“NRS 200.030(1) then provided in pertinent part that murder "committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery or burglary, .”
Nunnery v. State (2011)
“554(3), (4); see also NRS 200.030(4). Nunnery is not alone in this, as the same misstatement has occasionally appeared in our opinions.”
Sheriff, Washoe County v. Smith (1975)
“OPINION MOWBRAY, Justice: Edward Leroy Smith is charged in a three-count indictment with two counts of first-degree murder in violation of NRS 200.030, subsection 2(a), [1] and with one count of capital murder in violation of NRS 200.”
Bejarano v. State (2006)
“We addressed Lowenfield for the first time in light of the death-eligibility narrowing constitutionally required of all state death penalty schemes, and we specifically considered the degree of narrowing produced by a felony-murder conviction, pursuant to NRS 200.030(1)(b), in…”
Naovarath v. State (1989)
“As stated above, the judgment of conviction makes no mention of the degree of the murder (except for citation of NRS 200.030, which merely recites that there are two degrees of murder, first degree and second degree).”
Valdez v. State (2008)
“First-degree murder Pursuant to NRS 200.030(1)(a), a conviction of first-degree murder requires the jury to conclude that the defendant committed a "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.”
Canape v. State (1993)
“Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.030 (4)(a) (1992) (emphasis supplied).”
Leonard v. State (2001)
“The second trial commenced approximately seven months later, and the third trial commenced approximately one year after the second. [21] We recognize that Leonard personally complained to the court on at least one occasion about the delay in the case.”
Gregg v. Georgia (1976)
“§§ 28-401 , 29-2521 to 29-2523 (1975); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030 (1973); N. H. Rev.”
Crawford v. State (2005)
“The information alleged two alternative theories of first-degree murder: (1) that Crawford committed a willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, as defined in NRS 200.030(l)(a); and (2) that under NRS 200.”
State v. Contreras (2002)
“[2] See NRS 200.030(1) ("Murder of the first degree is murder which is: .”
State of Iowa v. Keyon Harrison (2018)
“4(E)(1)(a) (A juvenile offender convicted of first-degree murder may become parole eligible after “[t]he offender has served twenty-five years of the sentence imposed”); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.030 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg.”
Enmund v. Florida (1982)
“1981); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 200.030 (1)(b), 200.030(4), 200.”
Petrocelli v. State (1985)
“4 Petrocelli argues that when an individual is convicted of first degree murder under an alternative felony-murder theory (NRS 200.030), proof of the underlying felony may not be used as an aggravating circumstance without a specific finding that the defendant premeditatedly and…”
United States v. Alejandro Umana (2014)
“§ 28-303 ; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030 ; N.H. Rev. Stat.”
Labastida v. State (1999)
“3 The 1999 legislature amended NRS 200.030 by removing “child abuse” from the definition of first degree murder set forth in subsection 1(a), and by including child abuse among the felonies stated in subsection 1(b) as sufficient to support a conviction of first degree felony…”
Tison v. Arizona (1987)
“Oregon now authorizes capital punishment for felony murders when the defendant intends to kill.”
Shuman v. State (1978)
“NRS 200.030 (1973) (amended 1975, 1977). [1] He has appealed, asserting numerous assignments of error, which we reject as meritless; therefore, we affirm.”
Deutscher v. State (1979)
“585, at 1541 (amending NRS 200.030), which prescribed the circumstances under which the capital penalty may be imposed for first degree murder.”
Coker v. Georgia (1977)
“1975); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030 (1975); N. C. Gen.”
Leslie v. Warden (2002)
“033(13), which provides that "nonconsensual sexual penetration" aggravates murder. [8] NRS 200.033(4)(a), (b); see also Enmund v.”
Fiegehen v. State (2005)
“We therefore hold that it is unnecessary to instruct juries on deliberation, premeditation, and second-degree murder when proofs in the case can only support a theory of guilt described within one of the specifically enumerated categories set forth in NRS 200.030(1). 13 *301…”
Jones v. Mississippi (2021)
“§§2–201 to 2– 203, 2–304 (2012); Nev. Rev. Stat. §200.030 (2012); N. M. Stat.”
Sheriff, Clark County v. Morris (1983)
“The resolution of the issue is the product of the combined meaning of NRS 200.030, and NRS 200.070. The former statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 1.”
Holmes v. State (2013)
“137, § 7, at 770-71 (NRS 200.030(4)(3)); NRS 200.380(2); 1995 Nev.”
Nika v. State (2008)
“Compiled Laws, § 10068; NRS 200.030(1)(a). [18] 96 Nev. 258, 263 , 607 P.”
Lane v. State (1994)
“" [8] "Death eligibility" is determined under NRS 200.030 "only if one or more aggravating circumstances are found" and if "mitigating .”
Wesley v. State (1996)
“Nevada’s death penalty statute At the time of Wesley’s trial, Nevada’s death penalty statute, found at NRS 200.030(4), stated: Every person convicted of murder of the first degree shall be punished: (a) By death, only if one or more aggravating circumstances are found and any…”
Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968)
“§ 28-401 (1964); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030 (1963); Okla. Stat.”
Schoels v. State (1998)
“" See NRS 200.030. Schoels contends that the district court, by defining only "premeditation" and by failing to define "willful" and "deliberate," rendered NRS 200.”
Middleton v. State (1998)
“See NRS 200.030(4)(a); NRS 175.554(3). 8 If an enu *1117 merated aggravator or aggravators are found, the jury must find that any mitigators do not outweigh the aggravators before a defendant is death eligible.”
Jackson v. State (2012)
“[w]ith malice aforethought,” while NRS 200.030 deems murder a category A felony.”
Graham v. State (2000)
“In Williams , we concluded that the term “nonaccidental” as used in NRS 200.030 was not unconstitutionally vague because [a]ny person of ordinary intelligence who contemplates causing the purposeful, or nonaccidental, injury of a child should be readily aware, .”
Blake v. State (2005)
“He complains that NRS 200.030 shifts the burden of proof by requiring the defense to present evidence in mitigation and the defendant should therefore have the last opportunity to plead for his life before jury deliberations.”
Sumner v. Shuman (1987)
“1803-1804, amended and current provision at Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030 (1985); 1973 Okla.”
Sheriff, Clark County v. Hanks (1975)
“Thus, the duty to reconcile all parts of a statute, where possible, and the doctrine requiring strict construction of penal statutes, both support the district court’s view that evidence of an agreed purpose to kill will not, by itself, support a prosecution under NRS 200.030…”
Bishop v. State (1979)
“NRS 200.030(1)(b). [1] At an early stage in the proceedings Bishop made it known that he wanted to represent himself and plead guilty to all charges.”
Rose v. State (2011)
“When read together, those statutes broadly provide that killings occurring in the commission of an unlawful act that naturally tends to destroy human life or committed in the “prosecution of a felonious intent” are murder and, unless the murder is committed in a manner that…”
Moran v. State (1987)
State v. Higgins (1979)
Meller v. State (1978)
“030(l)(a) and NRS 200.030(5), which provide for a mandatory death penalty for the murder of a peace officer acting in his official capacity.”
Harrison v. Gillespie (2011)
Thomas v. State (1998)
Miranda v. State (1985)
“See NRS 200.030(4). [3] Specifically, the state argued that the murder had been committed during the course of a robbery.”
Ybarra v. State (1984)
Hern v. State (1981)
“) NRS 200.030(2) defines murder of the second degree as comprehending “all other kinds of murder.”
Williams v. State (1994)
“Any person of ordinary intelligence who contemplates causing the purposeful, or nonaccidental, injury of a child should be readily aware, based upon a plain reading of NRS 200.030(6)(a), that such conduct constitutes child abuse, and, if the abuse results in the death of the…”
Smith v. State (1977)
“030(1) (e) as it relates to the mandatory death penalty of NRS 200.030(5). The offense of “killing more than one person as the result of a single plan, scheme or design” comes within NRS 200.”
Brimmage v. State (1977)
State v. Brown (1997)
BARLOW (KEITH) v. STATE (DEATH PENALTY-DIRECT) (2022)
“3 See NRS 200.030(4)(b). A hung jury occurs only when the jury cannot unanimously agree on the sentence to be imposed.”
Thomas v. State (2006)
Doyle v. State (1996)
Talancon v. State (1986)
Hollaway v. State (2000)
Rippo v. State (1997)
Hernandez v. State (2002)
McConnell v. State (2009)
– State v. Patterson – (2020)
Servin v. State (2001)
Zessman v. State (1978)
“” 3 NRS 200.030(3) defines murder of the second degree as comprehending “all other kinds of murder.”
Wegner v. State (2000)
“” NRS 200.030(6)(a) defines child abuse as “physical injury of a nonaccidental nature to a child under the age of 18 years.”
Garner v. State (2000)
Gallego v. State (1985)
State v. Campbell (1984)
Cortinas v. State (2008)
CABRERA (IVONNE) VS. STATE (2019)
Riley v. State (1991)
Williams v. State (1997)
Maestas v. State (2012)
Demosthenes v. Williams (1981)
McKenna v. State (1985)
Riker v. State (1995)
Larsen v. State (1977)
“Because a jury in a previous trial found appellant’s co-defendent Hulett only guilty of first degree kidnapping, appellant contends that, pursuant to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, he cannot be convicted under our felony murder statute, NRS 200.030(2)…”
Castillo v. State (2019)
Hanley v. State (1981)
Pinana v. State (1960)
Hill v. State (2008)
Snow v. State (1985)
Furbay v. State (2000)
Wilkins v. State (1980)
Sharma v. State (2002)
Sims v. State (1991)
“NRS 200.030(4)(b). If sentenced to life without, the inmate is never eligible for parole, unless his sentence is commuted to life with by the Pardons Board, and thereafter the Parole Board cannot take any action to parole until the inmate has served 20 calendar years.”
Moore v. State (2000)
Lobato v. State (2004)
Ewish v. State (1994)
Nay v. State (2007)
Spillers v. State (1968)
“The court alone could not. Admittedly there is a distinction on a homicide charge if a defendant pleads guilty to an open charge of murder.”
Rainsberger v. State (1965)
Leonard v. State (1998)
Payne v. State (1965)
Holmes v. State (1998)
LaPena v. State (1976)
“[1] Although NRS 200.030(5) expressly declares the death penalty mandatory for capital murder, in an extra-statutory exercise of discretion the prosecution agreed to charge Weakland merely with second degree murder, to withhold related robbery charges, and in addition to drop…”
Moser v. State (1975)
Daniels v. State (1998)
Beets v. State (1991)
Rippo v. State (2006)
Evans v. State (1997)
Standen v. State (1983)
Walker v. State (1997)
Ex Parte Wheeler (1965)
Collins v. State (1977)
Powell v. State (1992)
Randell v. State (1993)
Dawson v. State (1992)
Alford v. State (1995)
Colwell v. State (1996)
Bennett v. State (1990)
Ramirez v. State (2010)
“070, when read in conjunction with Nevada’s murder statute, NRS 200.030(2), permitted the offense of second-degree murder under the felony-murder rule.”
Walker v. State (1962)
Sonner v. State (1998)
Elvik v. State (1998)
Briano v. State (1978)
Leonard v. State (1998)
“However, this court need not decide whether the reasoning in Laws applies to the relevant Nevada statute (NRS 200.030(1)(a)) or whether the first paragraph of the instruction might mislead a reasonable juror.”
DePasquale v. State (1990)
Jones v. State (1985)
Cavanaugh v. State (1986)
Lisby v. State (1966)
Howard v. Gittere (2019)
Bean v. State (1965)
Ford v. State (1983)
Chappell v. State (1998)
Paine v. State (1994)
Stroup v. State (1994)
Neuschafer v. Whitley (1986)
Mears v. State of Nevada (1973)
Labastida v. State (1996)
State v. Harte (2008)
Baal v. State (1990)
Archibald v. State (1961)
St. Pierre v. Sheriff (1974)
Turpen v. State (1978)
Ramos v. State (1979)
Noonan v. State (1999)
Peterson v. Sheriff (1979)
Graves v. State (1966)
BURNS (DAVID) VS. STATE (2021)
“Burns' sentence was certainly within the statutory limits, see NRS 200.030(4)(b)(1), and was not unreasonably disproportionate to his offense of murder with the use of a deadly weapon.”
Application of Rainsberger (1961)
McCurdy v. State (1991)
Athey v. State (1990)
Rainsberger v. State (1960)
King v. State (1964)
Hancock v. State (1964)
Graves v. Young (1966)
Summers v. State (1970)
“1 NRS 200.030(3): If the jury shall find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, then the jury by its verdict shall fix the penalty at death or imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of parole.”
Davies v. State (1979)
Kirksey v. State (1991)
Phillips v. Sheriff (1977)
Johnston v. State (1985)
Morford v. State (1964)
Jackson v. State (1968)
Wood v. State (1981)
Givens v. State (1982)
Sellers v. State (1992)
Anderson v. State (1974)
United States v. Toliver (2007)
Raggio v. Campbell (1964)
Getz v. Palmer (2014)
Shaw v. State (1988)
Farmer v. Sheriff (1977)
Moore v. State (1972)
Frost v. Sheriff (1979)
In re Knast (1980)
State v. Dunckhurst (1983)
Walker v. State (1972)
In Re Shin (2009)
Moore v. Helling (2012)
Sang Man Shin v. State (2009)
Palmer v. Garrett (2024)
Larsgaard v. Sheriff (1979)
Sanchez-Dominguez v. State (2014)
Witter v. State (1996)
Shuman v. Wolff (1982)
HARTE (SHAWN) VS. STATE (2016)
TALLEY (OMAR) v. STATE (2025)
Dominguez v. Williams (2020)
Ross v. State (1981)
DESAI (DIPAK) VS. STATE (2017)
Slaughter (Danielle) v. State (2019)
“030(1)(b) (outlining child abuse as a predicate felony for application of the felony-murder rule); NRS 200.030(6)(b) (defining child abuse in the context of felony murder).”
Slaughter (Danielle) v. State (2019)
“030(1)(b) (outlining child abuse as a predicate felony for application of the felony-murder rule); NRS 200.030(6)(b) (defining child abuse in the context of felony murder).”
Lee (Michael) Vs. State (2019)
“" NRS 200.030(6)(b). We have held that jury instructions that expand the category of offenses that constitute child abuse for purposes of defining first-degree murder are impermissible, particularly where they permit a jury to convict a defendant of first-degree felony murder…”
Cameron (Wayne) v. State (2022)
Evans v. Baker (2019)
“See NRS § 200.030(5). 2 53, 106-08.) 3 In light of the foregoing, this Court concludes that Evans’ counsel provided sound 4 advice based on their competent investigation of the facts of his case.”
Parker v. Baca (2019)
“26 Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to NRS § 200.030(5), which provides that a 27 second-degree murder conviction carries a punishment of imprisonment “[f]or life with 28 the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 10 years 2 when a…”
Kravetz v. State of Nevada (2022)
Owens v. Bean (2025)
Huntley v. Sheriff (1974)
Palmer (Markiece) v. State (2018)
“" Additionally, the second sentence of jury instruction 7 (defining child abuse) is an exact mirror of NRS 200.030(6)(b). Jury instruction 7 is an almost direct quote of the NRS and is thus a correct statement of law.”
Love-Camp (Royal) v. State (2019)
Love-Camp (Royal) v. State (2019)
Burnett (Carlton) Vs. State (2020)
Redman (William) v. State (2013)
James Harrison v. Gillespie (2010)
Perez (Johnathan) v. State (2017)
Daniel (Dorion) v. Warden (2017)
“4465(7)(b) (1997) provided that credits earned under the statute apply to parole eligibility "unless the offender was sentenced pursuant to a statute which specifies a minimum sentence that must be served before a person becomes eligible for parole.”
WILLIAMS (JESSICA) VS. STATE, DEP'T OF CORR. (2017)
“, NRS 200.030(4)(b)(2)-(3) (listing sentencing options for first-degree murder, including "life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 20 years has been served," or "a definite term of 50 years, with eligibility for parole…”
Hood (Dempsey) v. Warden (2019)
Deloney (Donald) v. Warden (2019)
“Deloney therefore was sentenced for the deadly weapon enhancement to a term that was equal to his murder sentence—life in prison with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 20 years has been served.”
Powell (Richard) v. State (2019)
Perez (Gerardo) v. Warden (2019)
Powell (Richard) v. State (2019)
Perez (Gerardo) v. Warden (2019)
“" NRS 200.030(5)(a), (b) (emphasis added). Perez therefore was sentenced for the weapon enhancement pursuant to a statute that specified a minimum sentence-10 years—that he had to serve before becoming eligible for parole on the enhancement sentence.”
DESAI (DIPAK) VS. STATE (2017)
HARTE (SHAWN) VS. STATE (2016)
Cotton (Ivan) Vs. State (2020)
“165(1); NRS 200.030(4)(b)(1). We conclude Cotton's sentence is not so unreasonably disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience, and the district court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing.”
Robinson (Javon) Vs. State (2020)
Davis (Kenneth) Vs. State (2021)
PEREZ (GERARDO) VS. WARDEN (2019)
“" NRS 200.030(5)(a), (b) (emphasis added). Perez therefore was sentenced for the weapon enhancement pursuant to a statute that specified a minimum sentence-10 years—that he had to serve before becoming eligible for parole on the enhancement sentence.”
Bailey, Iv (Jesse) v. State (2022)
“NRS 200.030(5)(a). The sentencing range for the deadly weapon enhancement is a consecutive 1 to 20 years.”
Perez v. Williams (2019)
“" NRS 200.030(5)(a), (b) (emphasis added). Perez therefore was sentenced for the weapon enhancement pursuant to a statute that specified a minimum sentence-10 years-that he had to serve before becoming eligible for parole on the enhancement sentence.”
Commonwealth v. Mattis (2024)
Orr v. State of Nevada (2019)
Azcarate v. Williams (2020)
Lozano v. Legeand (2020)
Park v. Williams (2021)
Slade v. Baca (2021)
Moore v. Howell (2021)
Armas v. Garrett (2021)
King-Hardiman v. Gittere (2022)
DiNunzio v. Williams (2023)
Smith v. State of Nevada (2023)
King-Hardiman v. Gittere (2024)
Costa v. Baca (2025)
Voss v. Russell (2025)
Jackson (Donald) v. State (2014)
Walker (Codie) v. State (2014)
Watson v. State (2014)
Conner v. State (2014)
Polk v. Sandoval (2007)
Lee (Donald) v. State (2016)
Paet (Michelle) v. State (2016)
Maldonado (Elita) v. State (2017)
Granados (Richard) v. State (2017)
Ayala (Omar) v. State (2017)
Marin (Harold) v. State (2017)
Fields (Trion) v. Warden (2017)
Pete (James) v. State (2017)
“Pete's sentence was within the statutory limits and did not violate the Eighth Amendment. His objection to the victim-impact witness fails because Pete raised, then waived, the objection in district court.”
Hadley (Ryan) v. Warden (2017)
Pough, Sr. (Jerry) v. State (2017)
Moran (Marvin) v. State (2018)
Montalvo (Elias) v. State (2018)
Warden v. White (Shawn) (2019)
Moore (James) v. State (2019)
Buhl (Eric) v. State (2019)
“Buhl was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after 20 years under NRS 200.030(4)(b)(2), but argues that, given his traumatic childhood, the district court should have sentenced him to a definite term of 20 to 50 years.”
Wood (Ryan) v. State (2019)
White (Sean) v. State (2019)
McKnight (Derrick) v. State (2019)
Buhl (Eric) v. State (2019)
“Buhl was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after 20 years under NRS 200.030(4)(b)(2), but argues that, given his traumatic childhood, the district court should have sentenced him to a definite term of 20 to 50 years.”
WILLIAMS (JESSICA) VS. STATE, DEP'T OF CORR. (2017)
“, NRS 200.030(4)(b)(2)-(3) (listing sentencing options for first-degree murder, including "life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 20 years has been served," or "a definite term of 50 years, with eligibility for parole…”
Cash (Thomas) Vs. State (2019)
Scott (Eric) Vs. State (2019)
Campis (Frank) Vs. State (2019)
“other mitigating factors and that the sentence is within the parameters provided by NRS 200.030(5)(a) (punishment for second-degree murder) and NRS 193.”
Robbins (Daniel) Vs. State (2019)
Lemos (Carl) Vs. State (2020)
Sidhu (Ramanjeet) Vs. State (2020)
Smith (Brenton) Vs. State (2021)
Kelley (John) Vs. State (2021)
Fuller (Lawrence) Vs. State (2021)
Clark (Walter) Vs. State (2021)
Scott (Christian) Vs. State (2021)
Mcnair (Michael) v. State (2022)
Coddington v. State (2018)
Lopez v. State (2019)
Randolph (Louis) v. State (2022)
Randolph (Louis) v. State (2022)
Bryant v. United States (2019)
Garcia v. Baker (2020)
Pough v. Gittere (2020)
Chao v. Neven (2021)
Schnueringer v. Russell (2021)
Duarte-Herrera v. Williams (2022)
Jefferson v. Russell (2022)
Brock v. Renee Baker (2022)
Garner v. Najera (2022)
Burns v. Warden Russell (2023)
“3 Turning to Respondents’ procedural default argument, Burns agrees that grounds 4 2, 4, and 6 are procedurally defaulted.”
Skenandore v. Russell (2025)
ACOSTA (XAVIER) v. STATE (2025)
Devose v. Oliver (2025)
Glover v. Bean (2025)
King v. Garrett (2025)
Bacon v. State (1974)
GARCIA (JONATHAN) v. STATE (2025)
Williams (Christian) v. State (2013)
“010(1); NRS 200.030(b); NRS 200.380(1). Second, Williams argues that the prosecution committed misconduct during opening statements by quoting gangster John Gotti and by showing an image during its PowerPoint presentation of one figure executing another next to the words "stop…”
Wingo (Kirk) v. State (2013)
“NRS 200.030(4)(b)(1). Accordingly, this allegation, if true, would not have entitled Wingo to relief.”
Pineda (Ray) v. State (2013)
Anthony (Steven) v. State (2013)
Hermansen (Branden) v. State (2013)
Nelson (Charles) v. State (2013)
Esquivel (Johnny) v. State (2013)
Rogers v. McDaniel (2011)
Reed, II (Max) v. State (2014)
Robbins (Daniel) v. State (2014)
Ponce (Freddy) v. State (2014)
People v. Yi CA2/5 (2014)
Guzman (Marco) v. State (2014)
Garcia (Evaristo) v. State (2015)
Park (Keon) v. State (2015)
White (Jerry) v. Warden (2015)
McKnight (Derrick) v. State (2015)
Greene (Marshall) v. State (2015)
Malone (Deangelo) v. State (2015)
Howard v. State (1968)
Beets v. Sheriff (1976)
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(1) — 33 cases
Sheriff, Washoe County v. Smith (1975)
“OPINION MOWBRAY, Justice: Edward Leroy Smith is charged in a three-count indictment with two counts of first-degree murder in violation of NRS 200.030, subsection 2(a), [1] and with one count of capital murder in violation of NRS 200.”
McConnell v. State (2004)
“NRS 200.030(1) then provided in pertinent part that murder "committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery or burglary, .”
Sheriff, Clark County v. Hanks (1975)
“Thus, the duty to reconcile all parts of a statute, where possible, and the doctrine requiring strict construction of penal statutes, both support the district court’s view that evidence of an agreed purpose to kill will not, by itself, support a prosecution under NRS 200.030…”
Collman v. State (2000)
“The issue presented in this case is: for first-degree murder under subsection (1)(a) of NRS 200.030, can malice be established simply by proving that the killing was done by an enumerated means? The State answers this question affirmatively, offering three or four arguments in…”
State v. Contreras (2002)
“[2] See NRS 200.030(1) ("Murder of the first degree is murder which is: .”
Graham v. State (2000)
“In Williams , we concluded that the term “nonaccidental” as used in NRS 200.030 was not unconstitutionally vague because [a]ny person of ordinary intelligence who contemplates causing the purposeful, or nonaccidental, injury of a child should be readily aware, .”
Wegner v. State (2000)
“” NRS 200.030(6)(a) defines child abuse as “physical injury of a nonaccidental nature to a child under the age of 18 years.”
Smith v. State (1977)
“030(1) (e) as it relates to the mandatory death penalty of NRS 200.030(5). The offense of “killing more than one person as the result of a single plan, scheme or design” comes within NRS 200.”
Fiegehen v. State (2005)
“We therefore hold that it is unnecessary to instruct juries on deliberation, premeditation, and second-degree murder when proofs in the case can only support a theory of guilt described within one of the specifically enumerated categories set forth in NRS 200.030(1). 13 *301…”
Thomas v. State (1998)
Rose v. State (2011)
“When read together, those statutes broadly provide that killings occurring in the commission of an unlawful act that naturally tends to destroy human life or committed in the “prosecution of a felonious intent” are murder and, unless the murder is committed in a manner that…”
Labastida v. State (1999)
“3 The 1999 legislature amended NRS 200.030 by removing “child abuse” from the definition of first degree murder set forth in subsection 1(a), and by including child abuse among the felonies stated in subsection 1(b) as sufficient to support a conviction of first degree felony…”
Furbay v. State (2000)
State v. Harte (2008)
Evans v. State (1997)
Graves v. State (1966)
Rainsberger v. State (1965)
Shaw v. State (1988)
Hancock v. State (1964)
St. Pierre v. Sheriff (1974)
Larsgaard v. Sheriff (1979)
Burnett (Carlton) Vs. State (2020)
Palmer (Markiece) v. State (2018)
“" Additionally, the second sentence of jury instruction 7 (defining child abuse) is an exact mirror of NRS 200.030(6)(b). Jury instruction 7 is an almost direct quote of the NRS and is thus a correct statement of law.”
Love-Camp (Royal) v. State (2019)
Love-Camp (Royal) v. State (2019)
Clark (Walter) Vs. State (2021)
Palmer v. Garrett (2024)
King v. Garrett (2025)
Jackson (Donald) v. State (2014)
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(1)(a) — 39 cases
Byford v. State (2000)
“(The 1999 legislature amended NRS 200.030, transferring murders perpetrated by child abuse into the felony-murder subcategory of first-degree murder.”
Collman v. State (2000)
“The issue presented in this case is: for first-degree murder under subsection (1)(a) of NRS 200.030, can malice be established simply by proving that the killing was done by an enumerated means? The State answers this question affirmatively, offering three or four arguments in…”
Valdez v. State (2008)
“First-degree murder Pursuant to NRS 200.030(1)(a), a conviction of first-degree murder requires the jury to conclude that the defendant committed a "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.”
Nika v. State (2008)
“Compiled Laws, § 10068; NRS 200.030(1)(a). [18] 96 Nev. 258, 263 , 607 P.”
Leonard v. State (1998)
“However, this court need not decide whether the reasoning in Laws applies to the relevant Nevada statute (NRS 200.030(1)(a)) or whether the first paragraph of the instruction might mislead a reasonable juror.”
Chappell v. State (1998)
Beets v. State (1991)
TALLEY (OMAR) v. STATE (2025)
DESAI (DIPAK) VS. STATE (2017)
Cameron (Wayne) v. State (2022)
Lozano v. Legeand (2020)
Slade v. Baca (2021)
Kravetz v. State of Nevada (2022)
Watson v. State (2014)
Conner v. State (2014)
Maldonado (Elita) v. State (2017)
Granados (Richard) v. State (2017)
Marin (Harold) v. State (2017)
Pough, Sr. (Jerry) v. State (2017)
Moran (Marvin) v. State (2018)
Slaughter (Danielle) v. State (2019)
“030(1)(b) (outlining child abuse as a predicate felony for application of the felony-murder rule); NRS 200.030(6)(b) (defining child abuse in the context of felony murder).”
Slaughter (Danielle) v. State (2019)
“030(1)(b) (outlining child abuse as a predicate felony for application of the felony-murder rule); NRS 200.030(6)(b) (defining child abuse in the context of felony murder).”
DESAI (DIPAK) VS. STATE (2017)
Sidhu (Ramanjeet) Vs. State (2020)
Fuller (Lawrence) Vs. State (2021)
Mcnair (Michael) v. State (2022)
Coddington v. State (2018)
Pough v. Gittere (2020)
Chao v. Neven (2021)
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(1)(b) — 37 cases
Bejarano v. State (2006)
“We addressed Lowenfield for the first time in light of the death-eligibility narrowing constitutionally required of all state death penalty schemes, and we specifically considered the degree of narrowing produced by a felony-murder conviction, pursuant to NRS 200.030(1)(b), in…”
McConnell v. State (2004)
“NRS 200.030(1) then provided in pertinent part that murder "committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery or burglary, .”
Collman v. State (2000)
“The issue presented in this case is: for first-degree murder under subsection (1)(a) of NRS 200.030, can malice be established simply by proving that the killing was done by an enumerated means? The State answers this question affirmatively, offering three or four arguments in…”
State v. Contreras (2002)
“[2] See NRS 200.030(1) ("Murder of the first degree is murder which is: .”
Bishop v. State (1979)
“NRS 200.030(1)(b). [1] At an early stage in the proceedings Bishop made it known that he wanted to represent himself and plead guilty to all charges.”
Leslie v. Warden (2002)
“033(13), which provides that "nonconsensual sexual penetration" aggravates murder. [8] NRS 200.033(4)(a), (b); see also Enmund v.”
Ewish v. State (1994)
Nay v. State (2007)
Doyle v. State (1996)
Shuman v. State (1978)
“NRS 200.030 (1973) (amended 1975, 1977). [1] He has appealed, asserting numerous assignments of error, which we reject as meritless; therefore, we affirm.”
Ford v. State (1983)
Graham v. State (2000)
“In Williams , we concluded that the term “nonaccidental” as used in NRS 200.030 was not unconstitutionally vague because [a]ny person of ordinary intelligence who contemplates causing the purposeful, or nonaccidental, injury of a child should be readily aware, .”
Sanchez-Dominguez v. State (2014)
Slaughter (Danielle) v. State (2019)
“030(1)(b) (outlining child abuse as a predicate felony for application of the felony-murder rule); NRS 200.030(6)(b) (defining child abuse in the context of felony murder).”
Slaughter (Danielle) v. State (2019)
“030(1)(b) (outlining child abuse as a predicate felony for application of the felony-murder rule); NRS 200.030(6)(b) (defining child abuse in the context of felony murder).”
Cameron (Wayne) v. State (2022)
Redman (William) v. State (2013)
Walker (Codie) v. State (2014)
Perez (Johnathan) v. State (2017)
Palmer (Markiece) v. State (2018)
“" Additionally, the second sentence of jury instruction 7 (defining child abuse) is an exact mirror of NRS 200.030(6)(b). Jury instruction 7 is an almost direct quote of the NRS and is thus a correct statement of law.”
Moore (James) v. State (2019)
White (Sean) v. State (2019)
McKnight (Derrick) v. State (2019)
Lee (Michael) Vs. State (2019)
“" NRS 200.030(6)(b). We have held that jury instructions that expand the category of offenses that constitute child abuse for purposes of defining first-degree murder are impermissible, particularly where they permit a jury to convict a defendant of first-degree felony murder…”
Davis (Kenneth) Vs. State (2021)
Palmer v. Garrett (2024)
Skenandore v. Russell (2025)
Nelson (Charles) v. State (2013)
Reed, II (Max) v. State (2014)
Jackson (Donald) v. State (2014)
White (Jerry) v. Warden (2015)
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(1)(e) — 1 case
Sheriff, Washoe County v. Smith (1975)
“OPINION MOWBRAY, Justice: Edward Leroy Smith is charged in a three-count indictment with two counts of first-degree murder in violation of NRS 200.030, subsection 2(a), [1] and with one count of capital murder in violation of NRS 200.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(2) — 31 cases
Labastida v. State (1999)
“3 The 1999 legislature amended NRS 200.030 by removing “child abuse” from the definition of first degree murder set forth in subsection 1(a), and by including child abuse among the felonies stated in subsection 1(b) as sufficient to support a conviction of first degree felony…”
Larsen v. State (1977)
“Because a jury in a previous trial found appellant’s co-defendent Hulett only guilty of first degree kidnapping, appellant contends that, pursuant to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, he cannot be convicted under our felony murder statute, NRS 200.030(2)…”
Hern v. State (1981)
“) NRS 200.030(2) defines murder of the second degree as comprehending “all other kinds of murder.”
Rose v. State (2011)
“When read together, those statutes broadly provide that killings occurring in the commission of an unlawful act that naturally tends to destroy human life or committed in the “prosecution of a felonious intent” are murder and, unless the murder is committed in a manner that…”
Ramirez v. State (2010)
“070, when read in conjunction with Nevada’s murder statute, NRS 200.030(2), permitted the offense of second-degree murder under the felony-murder rule.”
Brimmage v. State (1977)
Zessman v. State (1978)
“” 3 NRS 200.030(3) defines murder of the second degree as comprehending “all other kinds of murder.”
Sheriff, Clark County v. Hanks (1975)
“Thus, the duty to reconcile all parts of a statute, where possible, and the doctrine requiring strict construction of penal statutes, both support the district court’s view that evidence of an agreed purpose to kill will not, by itself, support a prosecution under NRS 200.030…”
Graham v. State (2000)
“In Williams , we concluded that the term “nonaccidental” as used in NRS 200.030 was not unconstitutionally vague because [a]ny person of ordinary intelligence who contemplates causing the purposeful, or nonaccidental, injury of a child should be readily aware, .”
Huntley v. Sheriff (1974)
DESAI (DIPAK) VS. STATE (2017)
Love-Camp (Royal) v. State (2019)
Love-Camp (Royal) v. State (2019)
DESAI (DIPAK) VS. STATE (2017)
Kelley (John) Vs. State (2021)
Bailey, Iv (Jesse) v. State (2022)
“NRS 200.030(5)(a). The sentencing range for the deadly weapon enhancement is a consecutive 1 to 20 years.”
Schnueringer v. Russell (2021)
Jefferson v. Russell (2022)
Brock v. Renee Baker (2022)
Devose v. Oliver (2025)
Pineda (Ray) v. State (2013)
Esquivel (Johnny) v. State (2013)
Guzman (Marco) v. State (2014)
Garcia (Evaristo) v. State (2015)
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(2)(a) — 1 case
Hern v. State (1981)
“) NRS 200.030(2) defines murder of the second degree as comprehending “all other kinds of murder.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(3) — 9 cases
McConnell v. State (2004)
“NRS 200.030(1) then provided in pertinent part that murder "committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery or burglary, .”
Fiegehen v. State (2005)
“We therefore hold that it is unnecessary to instruct juries on deliberation, premeditation, and second-degree murder when proofs in the case can only support a theory of guilt described within one of the specifically enumerated categories set forth in NRS 200.030(1). 13 *301…”
Spillers v. State (1968)
“The court alone could not. Admittedly there is a distinction on a homicide charge if a defendant pleads guilty to an open charge of murder.”
Zessman v. State (1978)
“” 3 NRS 200.030(3) defines murder of the second degree as comprehending “all other kinds of murder.”
Summers v. State (1970)
“1 NRS 200.030(3): If the jury shall find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, then the jury by its verdict shall fix the penalty at death or imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of parole.”
Rainsberger v. State (1965)
Mears v. State of Nevada (1973)
Sellers v. State (1992)
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(4) — 36 cases
Nunnery v. State (2011)
“554(3), (4); see also NRS 200.030(4). Nunnery is not alone in this, as the same misstatement has occasionally appeared in our opinions.”
Naovarath v. State (1989)
“As stated above, the judgment of conviction makes no mention of the degree of the murder (except for citation of NRS 200.030, which merely recites that there are two degrees of murder, first degree and second degree).”
Wesley v. State (1996)
“Nevada’s death penalty statute At the time of Wesley’s trial, Nevada’s death penalty statute, found at NRS 200.030(4), stated: Every person convicted of murder of the first degree shall be punished: (a) By death, only if one or more aggravating circumstances are found and any…”
Leonard v. State (2001)
“The second trial commenced approximately seven months later, and the third trial commenced approximately one year after the second. [21] We recognize that Leonard personally complained to the court on at least one occasion about the delay in the case.”
Miranda v. State (1985)
“See NRS 200.030(4). [3] Specifically, the state argued that the murder had been committed during the course of a robbery.”
Ybarra v. State (1984)
Deutscher v. State (1979)
“585, at 1541 (amending NRS 200.030), which prescribed the circumstances under which the capital penalty may be imposed for first degree murder.”
Canape v. State (1993)
“Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.030 (4)(a) (1992) (emphasis supplied).”
Gallego v. State (1985)
Williams v. State (1997)
Riker v. State (1995)
State v. Higgins (1979)
Snow v. State (1985)
Moran v. State (1987)
Dawson v. State (1992)
Maestas v. State (2012)
Sonner v. State (1998)
Paine v. State (1994)
Demosthenes v. Williams (1981)
King v. State (1964)
Witter v. State (1996)
HARTE (SHAWN) VS. STATE (2016)
Robinson (Javon) Vs. State (2020)
Evans v. Baker (2019)
“See NRS § 200.030(5). 2 53, 106-08.) 3 In light of the foregoing, this Court concludes that Evans’ counsel provided sound 4 advice based on their competent investigation of the facts of his case.”
HARTE (SHAWN) VS. STATE (2016)
Lemos (Carl) Vs. State (2020)
Davis (Kenneth) Vs. State (2021)
Garner v. Najera (2022)
GARCIA (JONATHAN) v. STATE (2025)
Anthony (Steven) v. State (2013)
Malone (Deangelo) v. State (2015)
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(4)(3) — 1 case
Holmes v. State (2013)
“137, § 7, at 770-71 (NRS 200.030(4)(3)); NRS 200.380(2); 1995 Nev.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(4)(a) — 32 cases
Nunnery v. State (2011)
“554(3), (4); see also NRS 200.030(4). Nunnery is not alone in this, as the same misstatement has occasionally appeared in our opinions.”
Leonard v. State (2001)
“The second trial commenced approximately seven months later, and the third trial commenced approximately one year after the second. [21] We recognize that Leonard personally complained to the court on at least one occasion about the delay in the case.”
Canape v. State (1993)
“Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.030 (4)(a) (1992) (emphasis supplied).”
Middleton v. State (1998)
“See NRS 200.030(4)(a); NRS 175.554(3). 8 If an enu *1117 merated aggravator or aggravators are found, the jury must find that any mitigators do not outweigh the aggravators before a defendant is death eligible.”
Lane v. State (1994)
“" [8] "Death eligibility" is determined under NRS 200.030 "only if one or more aggravating circumstances are found" and if "mitigating .”
Leslie v. Warden (2002)
“033(13), which provides that "nonconsensual sexual penetration" aggravates murder. [8] NRS 200.033(4)(a), (b); see also Enmund v.”
Hollaway v. State (2000)
McConnell v. State (2009)
Servin v. State (2001)
McKenna v. State (1985)
Castillo v. State (2019)
Schoels v. State (1998)
“" See NRS 200.030. Schoels contends that the district court, by defining only "premeditation" and by failing to define "willful" and "deliberate," rendered NRS 200.”
Deutscher v. State (1979)
“585, at 1541 (amending NRS 200.030), which prescribed the circumstances under which the capital penalty may be imposed for first degree murder.”
BARLOW (KEITH) v. STATE (DEATH PENALTY-DIRECT) (2022)
“3 See NRS 200.030(4)(b). A hung jury occurs only when the jury cannot unanimously agree on the sentence to be imposed.”
Rippo v. State (2006)
CABRERA (IVONNE) VS. STATE (2019)
Riley v. State (1991)
Bennett v. State (1990)
Maestas v. State (2012)
Cavanaugh v. State (1986)
Neuschafer v. Whitley (1986)
Kirksey v. State (1991)
Rogers v. McDaniel (2011)
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(4)(b) — 15 cases
Petrocelli v. State (1985)
“4 Petrocelli argues that when an individual is convicted of first degree murder under an alternative felony-murder theory (NRS 200.030), proof of the underlying felony may not be used as an aggravating circumstance without a specific finding that the defendant premeditatedly and…”
Holmes v. State (2013)
“137, § 7, at 770-71 (NRS 200.030(4)(3)); NRS 200.380(2); 1995 Nev.”
Naovarath v. State (1989)
“As stated above, the judgment of conviction makes no mention of the degree of the murder (except for citation of NRS 200.030, which merely recites that there are two degrees of murder, first degree and second degree).”
Sims v. State (1991)
“NRS 200.030(4)(b). If sentenced to life without, the inmate is never eligible for parole, unless his sentence is commuted to life with by the Pardons Board, and thereafter the Parole Board cannot take any action to parole until the inmate has served 20 calendar years.”
BARLOW (KEITH) v. STATE (DEATH PENALTY-DIRECT) (2022)
“3 See NRS 200.030(4)(b). A hung jury occurs only when the jury cannot unanimously agree on the sentence to be imposed.”
HARTE (SHAWN) VS. STATE (2016)
King-Hardiman v. Gittere (2022)
Paet (Michelle) v. State (2016)
HARTE (SHAWN) VS. STATE (2016)
Lopez v. State (2019)
Randolph (Louis) v. State (2022)
Randolph (Louis) v. State (2022)
McKnight (Derrick) v. State (2015)
Greene (Marshall) v. State (2015)
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(4)(b)(1) — 5 cases
BURNS (DAVID) VS. STATE (2021)
“Burns' sentence was certainly within the statutory limits, see NRS 200.030(4)(b)(1), and was not unreasonably disproportionate to his offense of murder with the use of a deadly weapon.”
Pete (James) v. State (2017)
“Pete's sentence was within the statutory limits and did not violate the Eighth Amendment. His objection to the victim-impact witness fails because Pete raised, then waived, the objection in district court.”
Cotton (Ivan) Vs. State (2020)
“165(1); NRS 200.030(4)(b)(1). We conclude Cotton's sentence is not so unreasonably disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience, and the district court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing.”
Burns v. Warden Russell (2023)
“3 Turning to Respondents’ procedural default argument, Burns agrees that grounds 4 2, 4, and 6 are procedurally defaulted.”
Wingo (Kirk) v. State (2013)
“NRS 200.030(4)(b)(1). Accordingly, this allegation, if true, would not have entitled Wingo to relief.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(4)(b)(2) — 6 cases
WILLIAMS (JESSICA) VS. STATE, DEP'T OF CORR. (2017)
“, NRS 200.030(4)(b)(2)-(3) (listing sentencing options for first-degree murder, including "life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 20 years has been served," or "a definite term of 50 years, with eligibility for parole…”
Deloney (Donald) v. Warden (2019)
“Deloney therefore was sentenced for the deadly weapon enhancement to a term that was equal to his murder sentence—life in prison with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 20 years has been served.”
Buhl (Eric) v. State (2019)
“Buhl was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after 20 years under NRS 200.030(4)(b)(2), but argues that, given his traumatic childhood, the district court should have sentenced him to a definite term of 20 to 50 years.”
Buhl (Eric) v. State (2019)
“Buhl was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after 20 years under NRS 200.030(4)(b)(2), but argues that, given his traumatic childhood, the district court should have sentenced him to a definite term of 20 to 50 years.”
WILLIAMS (JESSICA) VS. STATE, DEP'T OF CORR. (2017)
“, NRS 200.030(4)(b)(2)-(3) (listing sentencing options for first-degree murder, including "life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 20 years has been served," or "a definite term of 50 years, with eligibility for parole…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(5) — 13 cases
Smith v. State (1977)
“030(1) (e) as it relates to the mandatory death penalty of NRS 200.030(5). The offense of “killing more than one person as the result of a single plan, scheme or design” comes within NRS 200.”
LaPena v. State (1976)
“[1] Although NRS 200.030(5) expressly declares the death penalty mandatory for capital murder, in an extra-statutory exercise of discretion the prosecution agreed to charge Weakland merely with second degree murder, to withhold related robbery charges, and in addition to drop…”
Meller v. State (1978)
“030(l)(a) and NRS 200.030(5), which provide for a mandatory death penalty for the murder of a peace officer acting in his official capacity.”
Parker v. Baca (2019)
“26 Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to NRS § 200.030(5), which provides that a 27 second-degree murder conviction carries a punishment of imprisonment “[f]or life with 28 the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 10 years 2 when a…”
Evans v. Baker (2019)
“See NRS § 200.030(5). 2 53, 106-08.) 3 In light of the foregoing, this Court concludes that Evans’ counsel provided sound 4 advice based on their competent investigation of the facts of his case.”
Hadley (Ryan) v. Warden (2017)
Warden v. White (Shawn) (2019)
Perez (Gerardo) v. Warden (2019)
Perez (Gerardo) v. Warden (2019)
“" NRS 200.030(5)(a), (b) (emphasis added). Perez therefore was sentenced for the weapon enhancement pursuant to a statute that specified a minimum sentence-10 years—that he had to serve before becoming eligible for parole on the enhancement sentence.”
PEREZ (GERARDO) VS. WARDEN (2019)
“" NRS 200.030(5)(a), (b) (emphasis added). Perez therefore was sentenced for the weapon enhancement pursuant to a statute that specified a minimum sentence-10 years—that he had to serve before becoming eligible for parole on the enhancement sentence.”
Perez v. Williams (2019)
“" NRS 200.030(5)(a), (b) (emphasis added). Perez therefore was sentenced for the weapon enhancement pursuant to a statute that specified a minimum sentence-10 years-that he had to serve before becoming eligible for parole on the enhancement sentence.”
Garcia v. Baker (2020)
Ponce (Freddy) v. State (2014)
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(5)(a) — 10 cases
Montalvo (Elias) v. State (2018)
Hood (Dempsey) v. Warden (2019)
Perez (Gerardo) v. Warden (2019)
Perez (Gerardo) v. Warden (2019)
“" NRS 200.030(5)(a), (b) (emphasis added). Perez therefore was sentenced for the weapon enhancement pursuant to a statute that specified a minimum sentence-10 years—that he had to serve before becoming eligible for parole on the enhancement sentence.”
Campis (Frank) Vs. State (2019)
“other mitigating factors and that the sentence is within the parameters provided by NRS 200.030(5)(a) (punishment for second-degree murder) and NRS 193.”
PEREZ (GERARDO) VS. WARDEN (2019)
“" NRS 200.030(5)(a), (b) (emphasis added). Perez therefore was sentenced for the weapon enhancement pursuant to a statute that specified a minimum sentence-10 years—that he had to serve before becoming eligible for parole on the enhancement sentence.”
Bailey, Iv (Jesse) v. State (2022)
“NRS 200.030(5)(a). The sentencing range for the deadly weapon enhancement is a consecutive 1 to 20 years.”
Perez v. Williams (2019)
“" NRS 200.030(5)(a), (b) (emphasis added). Perez therefore was sentenced for the weapon enhancement pursuant to a statute that specified a minimum sentence-10 years-that he had to serve before becoming eligible for parole on the enhancement sentence.”
Hermansen (Branden) v. State (2013)
Robbins (Daniel) v. State (2014)
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(5)(b) — 1 case
Daniel (Dorion) v. Warden (2017)
“4465(7)(b) (1997) provided that credits earned under the statute apply to parole eligibility "unless the offender was sentenced pursuant to a statute which specifies a minimum sentence that must be served before a person becomes eligible for parole.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(6)(a) — 4 cases
Collman v. State (2000)
“The issue presented in this case is: for first-degree murder under subsection (1)(a) of NRS 200.030, can malice be established simply by proving that the killing was done by an enumerated means? The State answers this question affirmatively, offering three or four arguments in…”
Labastida v. State (1999)
“3 The 1999 legislature amended NRS 200.030 by removing “child abuse” from the definition of first degree murder set forth in subsection 1(a), and by including child abuse among the felonies stated in subsection 1(b) as sufficient to support a conviction of first degree felony…”
Wegner v. State (2000)
“” NRS 200.030(6)(a) defines child abuse as “physical injury of a nonaccidental nature to a child under the age of 18 years.”
Williams v. State (1994)
“Any person of ordinary intelligence who contemplates causing the purposeful, or nonaccidental, injury of a child should be readily aware, based upon a plain reading of NRS 200.030(6)(a), that such conduct constitutes child abuse, and, if the abuse results in the death of the…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(6)(b) — 8 cases
McConnell v. State (2004)
“NRS 200.030(1) then provided in pertinent part that murder "committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery or burglary, .”
Lee (Michael) Vs. State (2019)
“" NRS 200.030(6)(b). We have held that jury instructions that expand the category of offenses that constitute child abuse for purposes of defining first-degree murder are impermissible, particularly where they permit a jury to convict a defendant of first-degree felony murder…”
Palmer (Markiece) v. State (2018)
“" Additionally, the second sentence of jury instruction 7 (defining child abuse) is an exact mirror of NRS 200.030(6)(b). Jury instruction 7 is an almost direct quote of the NRS and is thus a correct statement of law.”
Slaughter (Danielle) v. State (2019)
“030(1)(b) (outlining child abuse as a predicate felony for application of the felony-murder rule); NRS 200.030(6)(b) (defining child abuse in the context of felony murder).”
Slaughter (Danielle) v. State (2019)
“030(1)(b) (outlining child abuse as a predicate felony for application of the felony-murder rule); NRS 200.030(6)(b) (defining child abuse in the context of felony murder).”
Redman (William) v. State (2013)
Jackson (Donald) v. State (2014)
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(6)(d) — 1 case
McConnell v. State (2004)
“NRS 200.030(1) then provided in pertinent part that murder "committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery or burglary, .”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(a)(1) — 1 case
Collman v. State (2000)
“The issue presented in this case is: for first-degree murder under subsection (1)(a) of NRS 200.030, can malice be established simply by proving that the killing was done by an enumerated means? The State answers this question affirmatively, offering three or four arguments in…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(b) — 1 case
Williams (Christian) v. State (2013)
“010(1); NRS 200.030(b); NRS 200.380(1). Second, Williams argues that the prosecution committed misconduct during opening statements by quoting gangster John Gotti and by showing an image during its PowerPoint presentation of one figure executing another next to the words "stop…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(l)(a) — 19 cases
Byford v. State (2000)
“(The 1999 legislature amended NRS 200.030, transferring murders perpetrated by child abuse into the felony-murder subcategory of first-degree murder.”
Collman v. State (2000)
“The issue presented in this case is: for first-degree murder under subsection (1)(a) of NRS 200.030, can malice be established simply by proving that the killing was done by an enumerated means? The State answers this question affirmatively, offering three or four arguments in…”
Valdez v. State (2008)
“First-degree murder Pursuant to NRS 200.030(1)(a), a conviction of first-degree murder requires the jury to conclude that the defendant committed a "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.”
Labastida v. State (1999)
“3 The 1999 legislature amended NRS 200.030 by removing “child abuse” from the definition of first degree murder set forth in subsection 1(a), and by including child abuse among the felonies stated in subsection 1(b) as sufficient to support a conviction of first degree felony…”
Crawford v. State (2005)
“The information alleged two alternative theories of first-degree murder: (1) that Crawford committed a willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, as defined in NRS 200.030(l)(a); and (2) that under NRS 200.”
Nika v. State (2008)
“Compiled Laws, § 10068; NRS 200.030(1)(a). [18] 96 Nev. 258, 263 , 607 P.”
Hernandez v. State (2002)
Meller v. State (1978)
“030(l)(a) and NRS 200.030(5), which provide for a mandatory death penalty for the murder of a peace officer acting in his official capacity.”
Wilkins v. State (1980)
Leonard v. State (1998)
Talancon v. State (1986)
Fiegehen v. State (2005)
“We therefore hold that it is unnecessary to instruct juries on deliberation, premeditation, and second-degree murder when proofs in the case can only support a theory of guilt described within one of the specifically enumerated categories set forth in NRS 200.030(1). 13 *301…”
Thomas v. State (1998)
Garner v. State (2000)
Moore v. State (2000)
Beets v. State (1991)
Graham v. State (2000)
“In Williams , we concluded that the term “nonaccidental” as used in NRS 200.030 was not unconstitutionally vague because [a]ny person of ordinary intelligence who contemplates causing the purposeful, or nonaccidental, injury of a child should be readily aware, .”
McCurdy v. State (1991)
Getz v. Palmer (2014)
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(l)(b) — 18 cases
McConnell v. State (2004)
“NRS 200.030(1) then provided in pertinent part that murder "committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery or burglary, .”
Crawford v. State (2005)
“The information alleged two alternative theories of first-degree murder: (1) that Crawford committed a willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, as defined in NRS 200.030(l)(a); and (2) that under NRS 200.”
Collman v. State (2000)
“The issue presented in this case is: for first-degree murder under subsection (1)(a) of NRS 200.030, can malice be established simply by proving that the killing was done by an enumerated means? The State answers this question affirmatively, offering three or four arguments in…”
Bejarano v. State (2006)
“We addressed Lowenfield for the first time in light of the death-eligibility narrowing constitutionally required of all state death penalty schemes, and we specifically considered the degree of narrowing produced by a felony-murder conviction, pursuant to NRS 200.030(1)(b), in…”
State v. Contreras (2002)
“[2] See NRS 200.030(1) ("Murder of the first degree is murder which is: .”
Cortinas v. State (2008)
Bishop v. State (1979)
“NRS 200.030(1)(b). [1] At an early stage in the proceedings Bishop made it known that he wanted to represent himself and plead guilty to all charges.”
Rose v. State (2011)
“When read together, those statutes broadly provide that killings occurring in the commission of an unlawful act that naturally tends to destroy human life or committed in the “prosecution of a felonious intent” are murder and, unless the murder is committed in a manner that…”
Leslie v. Warden (2002)
“033(13), which provides that "nonconsensual sexual penetration" aggravates murder. [8] NRS 200.033(4)(a), (b); see also Enmund v.”
Doyle v. State (1996)
Talancon v. State (1986)
Thomas v. State (1998)
Garner v. State (2000)
Riley v. State (1991)
Shuman v. State (1978)
“NRS 200.030 (1973) (amended 1975, 1977). [1] He has appealed, asserting numerous assignments of error, which we reject as meritless; therefore, we affirm.”
Furbay v. State (2000)
Fiegehen v. State (2005)
“We therefore hold that it is unnecessary to instruct juries on deliberation, premeditation, and second-degree murder when proofs in the case can only support a theory of guilt described within one of the specifically enumerated categories set forth in NRS 200.030(1). 13 *301…”
Moore v. State (2000)
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(l)(c) — 1 case
United States v. Alejandro Umana (2014)
“§ 28-303 ; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030 ; N.H. Rev. Stat.”
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