NRS
200.130 Bare fear insufficient to justify killing; reasonable fear
required; rebuttable presumption under certain circumstances.
1. A bare fear of any of the offenses
mentioned in NRS 200.120, to prevent
which the homicide is alleged to have been committed, is not sufficient to
justify the killing. It must appear that the circumstances were sufficient to
excite the fears of a reasonable person and that the person killing really
acted under the influence of those fears and not in a spirit of revenge.
2. There is a rebuttable presumption that
the circumstances were sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person
and that the person killing really acted under the influence of those fears and
not in a spirit of revenge if the person killing:
(a) Knew or reasonably believed that the person
who was killed was entering unlawfully and with force, or attempting to enter
unlawfully and with force, the occupied habitation or occupied motor vehicle,
of another;
(b) Knew or reasonably believed that the person
who was killed was committing or attempting to commit a crime of violence; and
(c) Did not provoke the person who was killed.
3. As used in this section:
(a) “Crime of violence” means any felony for
which there is a substantial risk that force or violence may be used against
the person or property of another in the commission of the felony.
(b) “Motor vehicle” means every vehicle which is
self-propelled.
[1911 C&P § 130; RL § 6395; NCL § 10077]—(NRS A 2015,
1782)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
7
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1979–2026 · leading case:
Daniel v. State, 78 P.3d 890 (Nev. 2003).
Daniel v. State, 78 P.3d 890 (Nev. 2003).
“The person killed was the assailant, or that the slayer had really, and in good faith, endeavored to decline any further struggle before the mortal blow was given. See also Hill v.”
Runion v. State, 13 P.3d 52 (Nev. 2000).
“120 and NRS 200.130 stating: Justifiable homicide is the killing of a human being in necessary self-defense, or in defense of habitation, property or person, against one who manifestly intends, or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or against any person or…”
Kelso v. State, 588 P.2d 1035 (Nev. 1979).
“3 NRS 200.130. This provision applies to all justifiable homicides.”
Chabot (wacey) v. State (Crim.) (Nev. 2026).
“NRS 200.130 (providing that a killing may be justified if the defendant is reasonably and actually afraid for their life).”
Davis v. State, 2014 NV 16 (Nev. 2014).
· cites it 2× “240; NRS 200.130. Second, whether Davis reasonably believed he was in fear of death or great bodily harm, or whether he was defending against an attempt by Rhodes to commit a felony, was a question of fact for the jury.”
Upton (James) Vs. State, 478 P.3d 342 (Nev. 2020).
“3d 867 , 872 (2014) (providing that a battery is justified when "the circumstances were sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person" (quoting NRS 200.130(1)); see also, e.g., State v.”
Murry (Autumn) v. State (Nev. 2014).
“120 (requiring in relevant part that the person killed be one "who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony"); NRS 200.130 (providing that bare fear is insufficient and requiring "that the circumstances were sufficient to excite the fears of a…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.130(1) — 1 case
Upton (James) Vs. State, 478 P.3d 342 (Nev. 2020).
“3d 867 , 872 (2014) (providing that a battery is justified when "the circumstances were sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person" (quoting NRS 200.130(1)); see also, e.g., State v.”
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