NRS
21.090 Property exempt from execution.
1. The following property is exempt from
execution, except as otherwise specifically provided in this section or
required by federal law:
(a) Private libraries, works of art, musical
instruments and jewelry not to exceed $5,000 in value, belonging to the
judgment debtor or a dependent of the judgment debtor, to be selected by the
judgment debtor, and all family pictures and keepsakes.
(b) Necessary household goods, furnishings,
electronics, wearing apparel, other personal effects and yard equipment, not to
exceed $12,000 in value, belonging to the judgment debtor or a dependent of the
judgment debtor, to be selected by the judgment debtor.
(c) Farm trucks, farm stock, farm tools, farm
equipment, supplies and seed not to exceed $4,500 in value, belonging to the
judgment debtor to be selected by the judgment debtor.
(d) Professional libraries, equipment, supplies,
and the tools, inventory, instruments and materials used to carry on the trade
or business of the judgment debtor for the support of the judgment debtor and
his or her family not to exceed $10,000 in value.
(e) The cabin or dwelling of a miner or
prospector, the miner’s or prospector’s cars, implements and appliances
necessary for carrying on any mining operations and the mining claim actually
worked by the miner or prospector, not exceeding $4,500 in total value.
(f) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph
(p), one vehicle if the judgment debtor’s equity does not exceed $15,000 or the
creditor is paid an amount equal to any excess above that equity.
(g) For any workweek, 82 percent of the
disposable earnings of a judgment debtor during that week if the gross weekly
salary or wage of the judgment debtor on the date the most recent writ of
garnishment was issued was $770 or less, 75 percent of the disposable earnings
of a judgment debtor during that week if the gross weekly salary or wage of the
judgment debtor on the date the most recent writ of garnishment was issued
exceeded $770, or 50 times the minimum hourly wage prescribed by section
206(a)(1) of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et
seq., and in effect at the time the earnings are payable, whichever is greater.
Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (o), (s) and (t), the exemption
provided in this paragraph does not apply in the case of any order of a court
of competent jurisdiction for the support of any person, any order of a court
of bankruptcy or of any debt due for any state or federal tax. As used in this
paragraph:
(1) “Disposable earnings” means that part
of the earnings of a judgment debtor remaining after the deduction from those
earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld.
(2) “Earnings” means compensation paid or
payable for personal services performed by a judgment debtor in the regular
course of business, including, without limitation, compensation designated as
income, wages, tips, a salary, a commission or a bonus. The term includes
compensation received by a judgment debtor that is in the possession of the
judgment debtor, compensation held in accounts maintained in a bank or any
other financial institution or, in the case of a receivable, compensation that
is due the judgment debtor.
(h) All fire engines, hooks and ladders, with the
carts, trucks and carriages, hose, buckets, implements and apparatus thereunto
appertaining, and all furniture and uniforms of any fire company or department
organized under the laws of this State.
(i) All arms, uniforms and accouterments required
by law to be kept by any person, and also one gun, to be selected by the
debtor.
(j) All courthouses, jails, public offices and
buildings, lots, grounds and personal property, the fixtures, furniture, books,
papers and appurtenances belonging and pertaining to the courthouse, jail and
public offices belonging to any county of this State, all cemeteries, public
squares, parks and places, public buildings, town halls, markets, buildings for
the use of fire departments and military organizations, and the lots and
grounds thereto belonging and appertaining, owned or held by any town or
incorporated city, or dedicated by the town or city to health, ornament or
public use, or for the use of any fire or military company organized under the
laws of this State and all lots, buildings and other school property owned by a
school district and devoted to public school purposes.
(k) All money, benefits, privileges or immunities
accruing or in any manner growing out of any life insurance.
(l) The homestead as provided for by law,
including:
(1) Subject to the provisions of NRS 115.055, the sum of $605,000 that is
paid to the defendant in execution pursuant to subsection 2 of NRS 115.050 or to a spouse pursuant to
subsection 3 of NRS 115.050; and
(2) A homestead for which allodial title
has been established and not relinquished and for which a waiver executed
pursuant to NRS 115.010 is not
applicable.
(m) The dwelling of the judgment debtor occupied
as a home for himself or herself and family, where the amount of equity held by
the judgment debtor in the home does not exceed $605,000 in value and the
dwelling is situated upon lands not owned by the judgment debtor.
(n) All money reasonably deposited with a
landlord by the judgment debtor to secure an agreement to rent or lease a
dwelling that is used by the judgment debtor as his or her primary residence,
except that such money is not exempt with respect to a landlord or the
landlord’s successor in interest who seeks to enforce the terms of the
agreement to rent or lease the dwelling.
(o) All property in this State of the judgment
debtor where the judgment is in favor of any state for failure to pay that
state’s income tax on benefits received from a pension or other retirement
plan.
(p) Any vehicle owned by the judgment debtor for
use by the judgment debtor or the judgment debtor’s dependent that is equipped
or modified to provide mobility for a person with a permanent disability.
(q) Any prosthesis or equipment prescribed by a
physician or dentist for the judgment debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(r) Money, not to exceed $1,000,000 in present
value, held in:
(1) An individual retirement arrangement
which conforms with or is maintained pursuant to the applicable limitations and
requirements of section 408 or 408A of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§
408 and 408A, including, without limitation, an inherited individual retirement
arrangement;
(2) A written simplified employee pension
plan which conforms with or is maintained pursuant to the applicable
limitations and requirements of section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26
U.S.C. § 408, including, without limitation, an inherited simplified employee
pension plan;
(3) A cash or deferred arrangement plan
which is qualified and maintained pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code,
including, without limitation, an inherited cash or deferred arrangement plan;
(4) A trust forming part of a stock bonus,
pension or profit-sharing plan which is qualified and maintained pursuant to
sections 401 et seq. of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.;
and
(5) A trust forming part of a qualified
tuition program pursuant to chapter 353B of
NRS, any applicable regulations adopted pursuant to chapter 353B of NRS and section 529 of the
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 529, unless the money is deposited after the
entry of a judgment against the purchaser or account owner or the money will
not be used by any beneficiary to attend a college or university.
(s) All money and other benefits paid pursuant to
the order of a court of competent jurisdiction for the support, education and
maintenance of a child, whether collected by the judgment debtor or the State.
(t) All money and other benefits paid pursuant to
the order of a court of competent jurisdiction for the support and maintenance
of a former spouse, including the amount of any arrearages in the payment of
such support and maintenance to which the former spouse may be entitled.
(u) Payments, in an amount not to exceed $16,150,
received as compensation for personal injury, not including compensation for
pain and suffering or actual pecuniary loss, by the judgment debtor or by a
person upon whom the judgment debtor is dependent at the time the payment is received.
(v) Payments received as compensation for the
wrongful death of a person upon whom the judgment debtor was dependent at the
time of the wrongful death, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support
of the judgment debtor and any dependent of the judgment debtor.
(w) Payments received as compensation for the
loss of future earnings of the judgment debtor or of a person upon whom the
judgment debtor is dependent at the time the payment is received, to the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of the judgment debtor and any dependent
of the judgment debtor.
(x) Payments received as restitution for a
criminal act.
(y) Payments received pursuant to the federal
Social Security Act, including, without limitation, retirement and survivors’
benefits, supplemental security income benefits and disability insurance
benefits.
(z) Any personal property not otherwise exempt
from execution pursuant to this subsection belonging to the judgment debtor,
including, without limitation, the judgment debtor’s equity in any property,
money, stocks, bonds or other funds on deposit with a financial institution,
not to exceed $10,000 in total value, to be selected by the judgment debtor.
(aa) Any tax refund received by the judgment
debtor that is derived from the earned income credit described in section 32 of
the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 32, or a similar credit provided
pursuant to a state law.
(bb) Stock of a corporation described in
subsection 2 of NRS 78.746 except as set
forth in that section.
(cc) Regardless of whether a trust contains a
spendthrift provision:
(1) A distribution interest in the trust
as defined in NRS 163.4155 that is a
contingent interest, if the contingency has not been satisfied or removed;
(2) A distribution interest in the trust
as defined in NRS 163.4155 that is a
discretionary interest as described in NRS
163.4185, if the interest has not been distributed;
(3) A power of appointment in the trust as
defined in NRS 163.4157 regardless of
whether the power has been exercised;
(4) A power listed in NRS 163.5553 that is held by a trust
protector as defined in NRS 163.5547 or
any other person regardless of whether the power has been exercised; and
(5) A reserved power in the trust as
defined in NRS 163.4165 regardless of
whether the power has been exercised.
(dd) If a trust contains a spendthrift provision:
(1) A distribution interest in the trust
as defined in NRS 163.4155 that is a
mandatory interest as described in NRS
163.4185, if the interest has not been distributed; and
(2) Notwithstanding a beneficiary’s right
to enforce a support interest, a distribution interest in the trust as defined
in NRS 163.4155 that is a support
interest as described in NRS 163.4185,
if the interest has not been distributed.
(ee) Proceeds received from a private disability
insurance plan.
(ff) Money in a trust fund for funeral or burial
services pursuant to NRS 689.700.
(gg) Compensation that was payable or paid pursuant
to chapters 616A to 616D, inclusive, or chapter 617 of NRS as provided in NRS 616C.205.
(hh) Unemployment compensation benefits received
pursuant to NRS 612.710.
(ii) Benefits or refunds payable or paid from the
Public Employees’ Retirement System pursuant to NRS 286.670.
(jj) Money paid or rights existing for vocational
rehabilitation pursuant to NRS 615.270.
(kk) Public assistance provided through the
Nevada Health Authority and the Department of Human Services pursuant to NRS 422.291 and 422A.325, respectively.
(ll) Child welfare assistance provided pursuant
to NRS 432.036.
2. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 115.010, no article or species of
property mentioned in this section is exempt from execution issued upon a
judgment to recover for its price, or upon a judgment of foreclosure of a
mortgage or other lien thereon.
3. Any exemptions specified in subsection
(d) of section 522 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et
seq., do not apply to property owned by a resident of this State unless
conferred also by subsection 1, as limited by subsection 2.
[1911 CPA § 346; A 1921,
22; 1941,
32; 1931 NCL § 8844]—(NRS A 1969,
841; 1971,
1498; 1973,
23; 1975,
215; 1977,
650; 1979,
985, 1637;
1981,
626; 1983,
99, 665;
1987,
1206; 1989,
4, 176,
645;
1991,
812, 1414;
1993,
2629; 1995,
229; 1997,
267, 3414;
2003,
1012, 1814;
2005,
385, 974,
1015,
2230;
2007,
2710, 3018;
2009,
807; 2011,
1409, 1895,
3567;
2013,
1312; 2017,
1661, 1970;
2019,
282, 1838;
2025,
3600)
Notes of Decisions
Platte River Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 2021 NV 82 (Nev. 2021).
· cites it 96× “However, a property's designation as "exempt" or "nonexempt" in NRS 21.090 does not depend solely on whether the statute enumerates such property because some types of property receive only partial-exemption status.”
Christensen v. Pack, 149 P.3d 40 (Nev. 2006).
· cites it 50× “” 7 The Legislature ultimately elected to “opt-out” of the federal exemption scheme found in § 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code 8 and set forth various forms of property exempt from execution in NRS 21.090. NRS 21.090(l)(g) specifically exempts from execution a particular amount of…”
Savage v. Pierson, 157 P.3d 697 (Nev. 2007).
· cites it 30× “The Legislature enacted what is now NRS 21.090 to fulfill the mandate set forth in Nevada’s Constitution.”
In re: Robert A. Alexander & Gloria J. Alexander, 472 B.R. 815 (9th Cir. BAP 2012).
· cites it 26× “Debtors contended that because the Mobile Kitchen had a Vehicle Identification Number and because it was registered with the DMV, it was a “vehicle” under Nevada law and therefore exemptible under NRS § 21.090(1)®. In her brief, Trastee maintained that the Mobile Kitchen was not…”
Weinstein v. Fox, 302 P.3d 1137 (Nev. 2013).
· cites it 21× “: The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit has certified a question of law to this court relating to permissible exemptions claimed by judgment debtors under Nevada’s exemption statute, NRS 21.090. In particular, the certified question asks, “[i]n…”
In re Gagow, 590 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2018).
· cites it 39× “3d 1137 , 1139 (2013) ("The legislative purpose of NRS 21.090 is 'to secure to the debtor the necessary means of gaining a livelihood, while doing as little injury as possible to the creditor.”
In Re Norris, 203 B.R. 463 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996).
· cites it 13× “090, the statutory scheme for exemptions, were carefully drafted; they are a result of a legislative drafting process which began in 1911 and they have been the subject of numerous legislative revisions since that *468 time. 8 Based upon this premise, this Court will not supply…”
Suter v. Goedert, 396 B.R. 535 (D. Nev. 2008).
· cites it 5× “5 Nevada exempts from the bankruptcy estate payments “received as compensation for personal injury, not including compensation for pain and suffering or actual pecuniary loss, by the judgment debtor .”
In Re Anders, 151 B.R. 543 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1993).
· cites it 7× “Subsection 1 of § 21.090 does not provide an exemption for the right to receive spousal support.”
In Re Galvez, 990 P.2d 187 (Nev. 1999).
· cites it 18× “*419 DISCUSSION Whether commissions earned by an independent contractor real estate agent for personal services fall within the wage garnishment exemption set forth in NRS 21.090 is an issue of first impression in Nevada.”
Contrevo v. Mercury Fin. Co., 153 P.3d 652 (Nev. 2007).
· cites it 5× “’’ 8 To comply with this constitutional mandate, the Nevada Legislature enacted what is now NRS 21.090, which specifically exempts a homestead from execution.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1) — 15 cases
Platte River Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 2021 NV 82 (Nev. 2021).
“However, a property's designation as "exempt" or "nonexempt" in NRS 21.090 does not depend solely on whether the statute enumerates such property because some types of property receive only partial-exemption status.”
In re: Robert A. Alexander & Gloria J. Alexander, 472 B.R. 815 (9th Cir. BAP 2012).
“Debtors contended that because the Mobile Kitchen had a Vehicle Identification Number and because it was registered with the DMV, it was a “vehicle” under Nevada law and therefore exemptible under NRS § 21.090(1)®. In her brief, Trastee maintained that the Mobile Kitchen was not…”
Contrevo v. Mercury Fin. Co., 153 P.3d 652 (Nev. 2007).
“’’ 8 To comply with this constitutional mandate, the Nevada Legislature enacted what is now NRS 21.090, which specifically exempts a homestead from execution.”
Christensen v. Pack, 149 P.3d 40 (Nev. 2006).
“” 7 The Legislature ultimately elected to “opt-out” of the federal exemption scheme found in § 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code 8 and set forth various forms of property exempt from execution in NRS 21.090. NRS 21.090(l)(g) specifically exempts from execution a particular amount of…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(1) — 4 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(Z) — 1 case
In re: Robert A. Alexander & Gloria J. Alexander, 472 B.R. 815 (9th Cir. BAP 2012).
“Debtors contended that because the Mobile Kitchen had a Vehicle Identification Number and because it was registered with the DMV, it was a “vehicle” under Nevada law and therefore exemptible under NRS § 21.090(1)®. In her brief, Trastee maintained that the Mobile Kitchen was not…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(a) — 1 case
Platte River Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 2021 NV 82 (Nev. 2021).
“However, a property's designation as "exempt" or "nonexempt" in NRS 21.090 does not depend solely on whether the statute enumerates such property because some types of property receive only partial-exemption status.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(bb) — 3 cases
In re Gagow, 590 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2018).
“3d 1137 , 1139 (2013) ("The legislative purpose of NRS 21.090 is 'to secure to the debtor the necessary means of gaining a livelihood, while doing as little injury as possible to the creditor.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(d) — 1 case
In re Gagow, 590 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2018).
“3d 1137 , 1139 (2013) ("The legislative purpose of NRS 21.090 is 'to secure to the debtor the necessary means of gaining a livelihood, while doing as little injury as possible to the creditor.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(f) — 3 cases
Weinstein v. Fox, 302 P.3d 1137 (Nev. 2013).
“: The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit has certified a question of law to this court relating to permissible exemptions claimed by judgment debtors under Nevada’s exemption statute, NRS 21.090. In particular, the certified question asks, “[i]n…”
In re Gagow, 590 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2018).
“3d 1137 , 1139 (2013) ("The legislative purpose of NRS 21.090 is 'to secure to the debtor the necessary means of gaining a livelihood, while doing as little injury as possible to the creditor.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(g) — 3 cases
Platte River Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 2021 NV 82 (Nev. 2021).
“However, a property's designation as "exempt" or "nonexempt" in NRS 21.090 does not depend solely on whether the statute enumerates such property because some types of property receive only partial-exemption status.”
In re Gagow, 590 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2018).
“3d 1137 , 1139 (2013) ("The legislative purpose of NRS 21.090 is 'to secure to the debtor the necessary means of gaining a livelihood, while doing as little injury as possible to the creditor.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(g)(1) — 2 cases
Platte River Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 2021 NV 82 (Nev. 2021).
“However, a property's designation as "exempt" or "nonexempt" in NRS 21.090 does not depend solely on whether the statute enumerates such property because some types of property receive only partial-exemption status.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(g)(2) — 1 case
Platte River Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 2021 NV 82 (Nev. 2021).
“However, a property's designation as "exempt" or "nonexempt" in NRS 21.090 does not depend solely on whether the statute enumerates such property because some types of property receive only partial-exemption status.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(gg) — 1 case
In re Gagow, 590 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2018).
“3d 1137 , 1139 (2013) ("The legislative purpose of NRS 21.090 is 'to secure to the debtor the necessary means of gaining a livelihood, while doing as little injury as possible to the creditor.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(hh) — 1 case
In re Gagow, 590 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2018).
“3d 1137 , 1139 (2013) ("The legislative purpose of NRS 21.090 is 'to secure to the debtor the necessary means of gaining a livelihood, while doing as little injury as possible to the creditor.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(i) — 1 case
Savage v. Pierson, 157 P.3d 697 (Nev. 2007).
“The Legislature enacted what is now NRS 21.090 to fulfill the mandate set forth in Nevada’s Constitution.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(jj) — 1 case
In re Gagow, 590 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2018).
“3d 1137 , 1139 (2013) ("The legislative purpose of NRS 21.090 is 'to secure to the debtor the necessary means of gaining a livelihood, while doing as little injury as possible to the creditor.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(k) — 2 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(l) — 3 cases
Savage v. Pierson, 157 P.3d 697 (Nev. 2007).
“The Legislature enacted what is now NRS 21.090 to fulfill the mandate set forth in Nevada’s Constitution.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(m) — 1 case
Savage v. Pierson, 157 P.3d 697 (Nev. 2007).
“The Legislature enacted what is now NRS 21.090 to fulfill the mandate set forth in Nevada’s Constitution.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(p) — 1 case
Weinstein v. Fox, 302 P.3d 1137 (Nev. 2013).
“: The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit has certified a question of law to this court relating to permissible exemptions claimed by judgment debtors under Nevada’s exemption statute, NRS 21.090. In particular, the certified question asks, “[i]n…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(q) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(r) — 1 case
In re Gagow, 590 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2018).
“3d 1137 , 1139 (2013) ("The legislative purpose of NRS 21.090 is 'to secure to the debtor the necessary means of gaining a livelihood, while doing as little injury as possible to the creditor.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(r)(1) — 1 case
In re Gagow, 590 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2018).
“3d 1137 , 1139 (2013) ("The legislative purpose of NRS 21.090 is 'to secure to the debtor the necessary means of gaining a livelihood, while doing as little injury as possible to the creditor.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(r)(5) — 2 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(s) — 3 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(u) — 5 cases
Suter v. Goedert, 396 B.R. 535 (D. Nev. 2008).
“5 Nevada exempts from the bankruptcy estate payments “received as compensation for personal injury, not including compensation for pain and suffering or actual pecuniary loss, by the judgment debtor .”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(w) — 1 case
In re Gagow, 590 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2018).
“3d 1137 , 1139 (2013) ("The legislative purpose of NRS 21.090 is 'to secure to the debtor the necessary means of gaining a livelihood, while doing as little injury as possible to the creditor.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(x) — 1 case
Platte River Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 2021 NV 82 (Nev. 2021).
“However, a property's designation as "exempt" or "nonexempt" in NRS 21.090 does not depend solely on whether the statute enumerates such property because some types of property receive only partial-exemption status.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(z) — 5 cases
Platte River Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 2021 NV 82 (Nev. 2021).
“However, a property's designation as "exempt" or "nonexempt" in NRS 21.090 does not depend solely on whether the statute enumerates such property because some types of property receive only partial-exemption status.”
In re Gagow, 590 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2018).
“3d 1137 , 1139 (2013) ("The legislative purpose of NRS 21.090 is 'to secure to the debtor the necessary means of gaining a livelihood, while doing as little injury as possible to the creditor.”
Weinstein v. Fox, 302 P.3d 1137 (Nev. 2013).
“: The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit has certified a question of law to this court relating to permissible exemptions claimed by judgment debtors under Nevada’s exemption statute, NRS 21.090. In particular, the certified question asks, “[i]n…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1X1) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(3) — 16 cases
In Re Anders, 151 B.R. 543 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1993).
“Subsection 1 of § 21.090 does not provide an exemption for the right to receive spousal support.”
Christensen v. Pack, 149 P.3d 40 (Nev. 2006).
“” 7 The Legislature ultimately elected to “opt-out” of the federal exemption scheme found in § 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code 8 and set forth various forms of property exempt from execution in NRS 21.090. NRS 21.090(l)(g) specifically exempts from execution a particular amount of…”
Suter v. Goedert, 396 B.R. 535 (D. Nev. 2008).
“5 Nevada exempts from the bankruptcy estate payments “received as compensation for personal injury, not including compensation for pain and suffering or actual pecuniary loss, by the judgment debtor .”
In re: Robert A. Alexander & Gloria J. Alexander, 472 B.R. 815 (9th Cir. BAP 2012).
“Debtors contended that because the Mobile Kitchen had a Vehicle Identification Number and because it was registered with the DMV, it was a “vehicle” under Nevada law and therefore exemptible under NRS § 21.090(1)®. In her brief, Trastee maintained that the Mobile Kitchen was not…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(c) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(g) — 1 case
Christensen v. Pack, 149 P.3d 40 (Nev. 2006).
“” 7 The Legislature ultimately elected to “opt-out” of the federal exemption scheme found in § 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code 8 and set forth various forms of property exempt from execution in NRS 21.090. NRS 21.090(l)(g) specifically exempts from execution a particular amount of…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(l)(b) — 1 case
In re: Robert A. Alexander & Gloria J. Alexander, 472 B.R. 815 (9th Cir. BAP 2012).
“Debtors contended that because the Mobile Kitchen had a Vehicle Identification Number and because it was registered with the DMV, it was a “vehicle” under Nevada law and therefore exemptible under NRS § 21.090(1)®. In her brief, Trastee maintained that the Mobile Kitchen was not…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(l)(d) — 1 case
In re: Robert A. Alexander & Gloria J. Alexander, 472 B.R. 815 (9th Cir. BAP 2012).
“Debtors contended that because the Mobile Kitchen had a Vehicle Identification Number and because it was registered with the DMV, it was a “vehicle” under Nevada law and therefore exemptible under NRS § 21.090(1)®. In her brief, Trastee maintained that the Mobile Kitchen was not…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(l)(f) — 3 cases
In re: Robert A. Alexander & Gloria J. Alexander, 472 B.R. 815 (9th Cir. BAP 2012).
“Debtors contended that because the Mobile Kitchen had a Vehicle Identification Number and because it was registered with the DMV, it was a “vehicle” under Nevada law and therefore exemptible under NRS § 21.090(1)®. In her brief, Trastee maintained that the Mobile Kitchen was not…”
Weinstein v. Fox, 302 P.3d 1137 (Nev. 2013).
“: The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit has certified a question of law to this court relating to permissible exemptions claimed by judgment debtors under Nevada’s exemption statute, NRS 21.090. In particular, the certified question asks, “[i]n…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(l)(g) — 5 cases
Christensen v. Pack, 149 P.3d 40 (Nev. 2006).
“” 7 The Legislature ultimately elected to “opt-out” of the federal exemption scheme found in § 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code 8 and set forth various forms of property exempt from execution in NRS 21.090. NRS 21.090(l)(g) specifically exempts from execution a particular amount of…”
In Re Norris, 203 B.R. 463 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996).
“090, the statutory scheme for exemptions, were carefully drafted; they are a result of a legislative drafting process which began in 1911 and they have been the subject of numerous legislative revisions since that *468 time. 8 Based upon this premise, this Court will not supply…”
In Re Galvez, 990 P.2d 187 (Nev. 1999).
“*419 DISCUSSION Whether commissions earned by an independent contractor real estate agent for personal services fall within the wage garnishment exemption set forth in NRS 21.090 is an issue of first impression in Nevada.”
In Re Anders, 151 B.R. 543 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1993).
“Subsection 1 of § 21.090 does not provide an exemption for the right to receive spousal support.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(l)(i) — 1 case
In re: Robert A. Alexander & Gloria J. Alexander, 472 B.R. 815 (9th Cir. BAP 2012).
“Debtors contended that because the Mobile Kitchen had a Vehicle Identification Number and because it was registered with the DMV, it was a “vehicle” under Nevada law and therefore exemptible under NRS § 21.090(1)®. In her brief, Trastee maintained that the Mobile Kitchen was not…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(l)(k) — 2 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(l)(m) — 2 cases
In re: Robert A. Alexander & Gloria J. Alexander, 472 B.R. 815 (9th Cir. BAP 2012).
“Debtors contended that because the Mobile Kitchen had a Vehicle Identification Number and because it was registered with the DMV, it was a “vehicle” under Nevada law and therefore exemptible under NRS § 21.090(1)®. In her brief, Trastee maintained that the Mobile Kitchen was not…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(l)(o) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(l)(o)(1995) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(l)(u) — 1 case
In re Sas, 488 B.R. 178 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2013).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(m) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(r) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(r)(4) — 1 case
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