Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.085
Board prohibited from commuting sentence of death or imprisonment for life without possibility of parole to sentence that would allow parole; exception
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NRS 213.085 Board prohibited from commuting sentence of death or
imprisonment for life without possibility of parole to sentence that would
allow parole; exception.
1. If a person is convicted on or after July 1, 1995, of any crime that the person committed when he or she was 18 years of age or older, the Board shall not commute:
(a) A sentence of death; or
(b) A sentence of imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole,
Ê to a sentence that would allow parole.
2. If a person is convicted of any crime that the person committed when he or she was less than 18 years of age, the Board may, in its discretion, commute:
(a) A sentence of death; or
(b) A sentence of imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole,
Ê to a sentence that would allow parole.
(Added to NRS by 1995, 1258; A 2017, 1642)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1996–2021 · leading case: Miller v. Warden, Nevada State Prison
Miller v. Warden, Nevada State Prison (1996)
“OPINION Per Curiam: Petitioner Ivan Miller challenges newly enacted NRS 213.085, 1 *932 which applies retroactively to first-degree murderers already sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, on the ground that it constitutes an unconstitutional ex post…”
Leonard v. State (2001)
“However, the primary reason for this decision was the 1995 enactment of NRS 213.085 that precluded the Pardons Board from commuting certain death sentences and sentences of life without the possibility of parole to sentences that would allow for parole.”
Colwell v. State (1996)
“Colwell’s appointed appellate counsel appeals Colwell’s death sentence on the following grounds: (1) the death penalty was unconstitutionally imposed in this case because the constitutionally-mandated narrowing function could not be implemented; (2) this court cannot conduct…”
Thomas v. State (2004)
“” 16 Such a modification occurred in 1995 with the enactment of NRS 213.085. Under that statute, for offenses committed on or after July 1, 1995, the Pardons Board cannot commute either a death sentence or a prison term of life without possibility of parole to a sentence…”
Flanagan v. State (1996)
“This argument may be valid as far as it goes but overlooks the fact that the State affirmatively invoked the evidence during its closing argument as general character evidence.”
Sonner v. State (1996)
“444, § 29 at 1360 (codified at NRS 213.085). 4 To comport with this change, the fourth paragraph of the Petrocelli instruction 5 should now read: Although under some limited circumstances and conditions the State Board of Pardons Commissioners has the power to modify certain…”
Sonner v. State (1998)
“Revising the Petrocelli instruction In regard to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1995, the Pardons Board no longer has the power to commute a sentence of *327 death or of life imprisonment without possibility of parole to a sentence allowing parole.”
Middleton v. State (1998)
“Counsel asked if Middleton were sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under NRS 213.085, “could that sentence ever be commuted to parole?” She said, “No, it cannot.”
Geary v. State (1996)
“2d 707 (1996) (modifying last paragraph of Petrocelli instruction to comport with NRS 213.085). *1445 2. Aggravating circumstances a.”
Powell v. State of Nevada (2021)
“on or after July 1, 1995”); see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.085 (1) (2017) (providing “[i]f a person is convicted on or after July 1, 1995”).”
Leonard (William) Vs. Warden (Death Penalty-Pc) (2021)
“In fact, for death row inmates like Leonard who committed the capital offense before July 1, 1995, there are no limits on the availability of clemency. See NRS 213.”
Powell (Richard) v. State (2019)
“To the extent that appellant challenges the computation of time served, which would not be subject to NRS 34.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.085(1) — 8 cases
Miller v. Warden, Nevada State Prison (1996)
“OPINION Per Curiam: Petitioner Ivan Miller challenges newly enacted NRS 213.085, 1 *932 which applies retroactively to first-degree murderers already sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, on the ground that it constitutes an unconstitutional ex post…”
Flanagan v. State (1996)
“This argument may be valid as far as it goes but overlooks the fact that the State affirmatively invoked the evidence during its closing argument as general character evidence.”
Leonard v. State (2001)
“However, the primary reason for this decision was the 1995 enactment of NRS 213.085 that precluded the Pardons Board from commuting certain death sentences and sentences of life without the possibility of parole to sentences that would allow for parole.”
Colwell v. State (1996)
“Colwell’s appointed appellate counsel appeals Colwell’s death sentence on the following grounds: (1) the death penalty was unconstitutionally imposed in this case because the constitutionally-mandated narrowing function could not be implemented; (2) this court cannot conduct…”
Powell v. State of Nevada (2021)
“on or after July 1, 1995”); see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.085 (1) (2017) (providing “[i]f a person is convicted on or after July 1, 1995”).”
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