Nevada Revised Statutes

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.800 (2026)

Dismissal of petition for delay in filing

✓ current as of July 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section NRSleg.state.nv.us (official) Justiaon Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
NRS 34.800  Dismissal of petition for delay in filing.

      1.  A petition may be dismissed if delay in the filing of the petition:

      (a) Prejudices the respondent or the State of Nevada in responding to the petition, unless the petitioner shows that the petition is based upon grounds of which the petitioner could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the State occurred; or

      (b) Prejudices the State of Nevada in its ability to conduct a retrial of the petitioner, unless the petitioner demonstrates that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred in the proceedings resulting in the judgment of conviction.

      2.  A period exceeding 5 years between the filing of a judgment of conviction, an order imposing a sentence of imprisonment or a decision on direct appeal of a judgment of conviction and the filing of a petition challenging the validity of a judgment of conviction creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the State. In a motion to dismiss the petition based on that prejudice, the respondent or the State of Nevada must specifically plead laches. The petitioner must be given an opportunity to respond to the allegations in the pleading before a ruling on the motion is made.

      (Added to NRS by 1985, 1231; A 1987, 1219; 1991, 87; 2023, 1631)

     

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 226 cases (32 in the last 5 years), 1993–2025 · leading case: Pellegrini v. State, 34 P.3d 519 (Nev. 2001).
Pellegrini v. State, 34 P.3d 519 (Nev. 2001). · cites it 14× “726 applies just to first petitions and that dismissal for delayed filing *865 of second or successive petitions is governed only by the laches provisions of NRS 34.800. We reject this contention and conclude that NRS 34.”
State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, 112 P.3d 1070 (Nev. 2005). · cites it 5× “810, NRS 34.800, or the law of the case previously pronounced by this court.”
Rippo v. State, 423 P.3d 1084 (Nev. 2018). · cites it 3× “Rippo's petition was subject to a fourth procedural bar, laches under NRS 34.800, because it was filed more than five years after our decision on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction.”
Chappell (james) v. State (death Penalty-pc), 2021 NV 83 (Nev. 2021). · cites it 21× “3d at 1159 (indicating that if a petitioner could not show a fundamental miscarriage of justice for purposes of an actual-innocence-gateway claim, his or her petition would also be barred by NRS 34.800). Here, the State pleaded laches under NRS 34.”
Mitchell v. State, 149 P.3d 33 (Nev. 2006). · cites it 4× “[9] NRS 34.800(1). [10] See NRS 34.800(2). [11] See Pellegrini v.”
State v. Powell, 138 P.3d 453 (Nev. 2006). · cites it 4× “The State also alleges that the passage of time has prejudiced it and cites NRS 34.800, which provides courts the discretion to dismiss a petition if delay in its filing prejudices the State.”
Means v. State, 103 P.3d 25 (Nev. 2004). “NRS 34.800 and NRS 34.810 allow the district court to dismiss a petition if the habeas petitioner fails to comply with procedural rules.”
Matter of Pers. Restraint of Runyan, 853 P.2d 424 (Wash. 2000). · cites it 2× “15; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.800 (1991); N.J. Crim.”
McConnell v. State, 212 P.3d 307 (Nev. 2009). “726, NRS 34.800, or NRS 34.810. 5 Our decision today does not leave McConnell without a remedy.”
State v. Dist. Ct., 112 P.3d 1070 (Nev. 2005). · cites it 5× “810, NRS 34.800, or the law of the case previously pronounced by this court.”
Clem v. State, 81 P.3d 521 (Nev. 2003). · cites it 2× “[22] Although the State also raises laches under NRS 34.800 and the equitable-laches doctrine of Hart v.”
Castillo v. State, 442 P.3d 558 (Nev. 2019). “, and barred by laches, see NRS 34.800(2), concluding that Castillo failed to demonstrate good cause and prejudice to excuse the various procedural bars.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.800(1) — 25 cases
Mitchell v. State, 149 P.3d 33 (Nev. 2006). “[9] NRS 34.800(1). [10] See NRS 34.800(2). [11] See Pellegrini v.”
State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, 112 P.3d 1070 (Nev. 2005). “810, NRS 34.800, or the law of the case previously pronounced by this court.”
State v. Powell, 138 P.3d 453 (Nev. 2006). “The State also alleges that the passage of time has prejudiced it and cites NRS 34.800, which provides courts the discretion to dismiss a petition if delay in its filing prejudices the State.”
Chappell (james) v. State (death Penalty-pc), 2021 NV 83 (Nev. 2021). “3d at 1159 (indicating that if a petitioner could not show a fundamental miscarriage of justice for purposes of an actual-innocence-gateway claim, his or her petition would also be barred by NRS 34.800). Here, the State pleaded laches under NRS 34.”
State v. Dist. Ct., 112 P.3d 1070 (Nev. 2005). “810, NRS 34.800, or the law of the case previously pronounced by this court.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.800(1)(a) — 23 cases
Chappell (james) v. State (death Penalty-pc), 2021 NV 83 (Nev. 2021). “3d at 1159 (indicating that if a petitioner could not show a fundamental miscarriage of justice for purposes of an actual-innocence-gateway claim, his or her petition would also be barred by NRS 34.800). Here, the State pleaded laches under NRS 34.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.800(1)(b) — 28 cases
Chappell (james) v. State (death Penalty-pc), 2021 NV 83 (Nev. 2021). “3d at 1159 (indicating that if a petitioner could not show a fundamental miscarriage of justice for purposes of an actual-innocence-gateway claim, his or her petition would also be barred by NRS 34.800). Here, the State pleaded laches under NRS 34.”
Branham v. Baca, 434 P.3d 313 (Nev. 2018).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.800(1Xa) — 2 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.800(1Xb) — 2 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.800(2) — 159 cases
Rippo v. State, 423 P.3d 1084 (Nev. 2018). “Rippo's petition was subject to a fourth procedural bar, laches under NRS 34.800, because it was filed more than five years after our decision on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction.”
State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, 112 P.3d 1070 (Nev. 2005). “810, NRS 34.800, or the law of the case previously pronounced by this court.”
Mitchell v. State, 149 P.3d 33 (Nev. 2006). “[9] NRS 34.800(1). [10] See NRS 34.800(2). [11] See Pellegrini v.”
Pellegrini v. State, 34 P.3d 519 (Nev. 2001). “726 applies just to first petitions and that dismissal for delayed filing *865 of second or successive petitions is governed only by the laches provisions of NRS 34.800. We reject this contention and conclude that NRS 34.”
Castillo v. State, 442 P.3d 558 (Nev. 2019). “, and barred by laches, see NRS 34.800(2), concluding that Castillo failed to demonstrate good cause and prejudice to excuse the various procedural bars.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.800(l)(b) — 1 case
Pellegrini v. State, 34 P.3d 519 (Nev. 2001). “726 applies just to first petitions and that dismissal for delayed filing *865 of second or successive petitions is governed only by the laches provisions of NRS 34.800. We reject this contention and conclude that NRS 34.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.