Nevada Revised Statutes

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141 (2026)

When comparative negligence not bar to recovery; jury instructions; liability of multiple defendants

✓ current as of July 2026
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NRS 41.141  When comparative negligence not bar to recovery; jury instructions; liability of multiple defendants.

      1.  In any action to recover damages for death or injury to persons or for injury to property in which comparative negligence is asserted as a defense, the comparative negligence of the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s decedent does not bar a recovery if that negligence was not greater than the negligence or gross negligence of the parties to the action against whom recovery is sought.

      2.  In those cases, the judge shall instruct the jury that:

      (a) The plaintiff may not recover if the plaintiff’s comparative negligence or that of the plaintiff’s decedent is greater than the negligence of the defendant or the combined negligence of multiple defendants.

      (b) If the jury determines the plaintiff is entitled to recover, it shall return:

             (1) By general verdict the total amount of damages the plaintiff would be entitled to recover without regard to the plaintiff’s comparative negligence; and

             (2) A special verdict indicating the percentage of negligence attributable to each party remaining in the action.

      3.  If a defendant in such an action settles with the plaintiff before the entry of judgment, the comparative negligence of that defendant and the amount of the settlement must not thereafter be admitted into evidence nor considered by the jury. The judge shall deduct the amount of the settlement from the net sum otherwise recoverable by the plaintiff pursuant to the general and special verdicts.

      4.  Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant in such an action, except as otherwise provided in subsection 5, each defendant is severally liable to the plaintiff only for that portion of the judgment which represents the percentage of negligence attributable to that defendant.

      5.  This section does not affect the joint and several liability, if any, of the defendants in an action based upon:

      (a) Strict liability;

      (b) An intentional tort;

      (c) The emission, disposal or spillage of a toxic or hazardous substance;

      (d) The concerted acts of the defendants; or

      (e) An injury to any person or property resulting from a product which is manufactured, distributed, sold or used in this State.

      6.  As used in this section:

      (a) “Concerted acts of the defendants” does not include negligent acts committed by providers of health care while working together to provide treatment to a patient.

      (b) “Provider of health care” has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 629.031.

      (Added to NRS by 1973, 1722; A 1979, 1356; 1987, 1697; 1989, 72)

PROCEDURE FOR EVIDENCING DOMICILE

     

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 76 cases (16 in the last 5 years), 1976–2025 · leading case: Humphries v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 312 P.3d 484 (Nev. 2013).
Humphries v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 312 P.3d 484 (Nev. 2013). · cites it 33× “3d 137 (2012), in which we interpreted Nevada’s comparative negligence statute, NRS 41.141. In Café Moda, the plaintiff sued two defendants, one as an intentional tortfeasor and the other as a negligent tortfeasor, and the negligent tortfeasor asserted that it was only severally…”
Ges, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001). · cites it 10× “NRS 41.141 was amended in 1987 to read, in relevant part: 4.”
Café Moda, LLC v. Palma, 272 P.3d 137 (Nev. 2012). · cites it 38× “: In this appeal, we consider whether NRS 41.141, Nevada’s comparative-negligence statute, permits liability to be apportioned between a negligent tortfeasor and an intentional tortfeasor.”
Cromer v. Wilson, 225 P.3d 788 (Nev. 2010). · cites it 14× “133 allows a judgment of conviction to conclusively establish civil liability for a crime and should have precluded Wilson from arguing comparative fault pursuant to NRS 41.141. We conclude that the conclusive presumption of NRS 41.”
State v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 995 P.2d 482 (Nev. 2000). · cites it 9× “385 as well as NRS 41.141, the Nevada comparative negligence statute.”
Woosley v. State Farm Ins., 18 P.3d 317 (Nev. 2001). · cites it 10× “12 Appellants argue that the third element should be revised in accordance with contemporary comparative negligence law and NRS 41.141. We agree. The district court concluded that because Adams was contributorily negligent, appellants failed to meet the third element of res ipsa…”
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court of the State of Nevada Ex Rel. Cnty. of Clark, 134 P.3d 111 (Nev. 2006). · cites it 4× “§ 12-2505, with NRS 41.141(1). [38] See, e.g., Englert v.”
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Comm'r of Ins. of Nevada, 958 P.2d 733 (Nev. 1998). · cites it 9× “385 is related to a determination of fault in the tort liability context. 2.”
Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1988). · cites it 2× “1987) [adopting several liability as a general rule, but retaining joint and several liability in several, specified areas]; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.141 (Supp. 1987) [same].”
BUCK BY BUCK v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 783 P.2d 437 (Nev. 1989). · cites it 6× “Under NRS 41.141 (1973 Nev. Stats., Ch. 787, p.”
Davies v. Butler, 602 P.2d 605 (Nev. 1979). · cites it 4× “Appellants, on the other hand, contend that, since the statute does not mention willful or wanton misconduct, there is no basis for concluding that the legislature intended to change the previous rule. We agree with the appellants that, read in light of our previous decisions…”
State v. Eaton, 710 P.2d 1370 (Nev. 1985). · cites it 3× “Under Nevada’s comparative negligence statute, NRS 41.141, 9 a plaintiff may recover for negligently caused injuries only if his or her negligence does not exceed the negligence of the defendant.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(1) — 18 cases
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court of the State of Nevada Ex Rel. Cnty. of Clark, 134 P.3d 111 (Nev. 2006). “§ 12-2505, with NRS 41.141(1). [38] See, e.g., Englert v.”
Humphries v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 312 P.3d 484 (Nev. 2013). “3d 137 (2012), in which we interpreted Nevada’s comparative negligence statute, NRS 41.141. In Café Moda, the plaintiff sued two defendants, one as an intentional tortfeasor and the other as a negligent tortfeasor, and the negligent tortfeasor asserted that it was only severally…”
Arnold v. Mt. Wheeler Power Co., 707 P.2d 1137 (Nev. 1985).
Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc., 761 P.2d 1169 (Idaho 1988).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(2) — 3 cases
Anderson v. Baltrusaitis, 944 P.2d 797 (Nev. 1997).
Verner v. Nevada Power Co., 706 P.2d 147 (Nev. 1985).
Coughlin v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 879 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Nev. 1995).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(2)(a) — 5 cases
Humphries v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 312 P.3d 484 (Nev. 2013). “3d 137 (2012), in which we interpreted Nevada’s comparative negligence statute, NRS 41.141. In Café Moda, the plaintiff sued two defendants, one as an intentional tortfeasor and the other as a negligent tortfeasor, and the negligent tortfeasor asserted that it was only severally…”
Kirby Bldg. Sys. v. Mineral Explorations Co., 704 P.2d 1266 (Wyo. 1985).
Verner v. Nevada Power Co., 706 P.2d 147 (Nev. 1985).
M & R Inv. Co. v. Anzalotti, 773 P.2d 729 (Nev. 1989).
Cox v. Mgm Grand Hotel, LLC, 2022 NV 27 (Nev. 2022).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(2)(b) — 1 case
Steele v. Dillard, 486 S.E.2d 278 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(2)(b)(1) — 2 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(2)(b)(2) — 3 cases
Humphries v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 312 P.3d 484 (Nev. 2013). “3d 137 (2012), in which we interpreted Nevada’s comparative negligence statute, NRS 41.141. In Café Moda, the plaintiff sued two defendants, one as an intentional tortfeasor and the other as a negligent tortfeasor, and the negligent tortfeasor asserted that it was only severally…”
Utter v. United States (D. Nev. 2025).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(3) — 7 cases
Quintero v. McDonald, 14 P.3d 522 (Nev. 2000).
Coughlin v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 879 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Nev. 1995).
Banks Ex Rel. Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 102 P.3d 52 (Nev. 2004).
Piroozi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2015 NV 100 (Nev. 2015).
Piroozi, M.D. Vs. Dist. Ct. (hurst), 2015 NV 100 (Nev. 2015).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(4) — 7 cases
Humphries v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 312 P.3d 484 (Nev. 2013). “3d 137 (2012), in which we interpreted Nevada’s comparative negligence statute, NRS 41.141. In Café Moda, the plaintiff sued two defendants, one as an intentional tortfeasor and the other as a negligent tortfeasor, and the negligent tortfeasor asserted that it was only severally…”
Ges, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001). “NRS 41.141 was amended in 1987 to read, in relevant part: 4.”
Café Moda, LLC v. Palma, 272 P.3d 137 (Nev. 2012). “: In this appeal, we consider whether NRS 41.141, Nevada’s comparative-negligence statute, permits liability to be apportioned between a negligent tortfeasor and an intentional tortfeasor.”
Piroozi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2015 NV 100 (Nev. 2015).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(4)(d) — 1 case
Ges, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001). “NRS 41.141 was amended in 1987 to read, in relevant part: 4.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(5) — 5 cases
Ges, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001). “NRS 41.141 was amended in 1987 to read, in relevant part: 4.”
Humphries v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 312 P.3d 484 (Nev. 2013). “3d 137 (2012), in which we interpreted Nevada’s comparative negligence statute, NRS 41.141. In Café Moda, the plaintiff sued two defendants, one as an intentional tortfeasor and the other as a negligent tortfeasor, and the negligent tortfeasor asserted that it was only severally…”
Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d 1113 (5th Cir. 1995).
Fernanders v. Marks Constr. of South Carolina, Inc., 499 S.E.2d 509 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998).
Fernanders v. Marks Const. of Sc, Inc., 499 S.E.2d 509 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(5)(a) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(5)(b) — 2 cases
Café Moda, LLC v. Palma, 272 P.3d 137 (Nev. 2012). “: In this appeal, we consider whether NRS 41.141, Nevada’s comparative-negligence statute, permits liability to be apportioned between a negligent tortfeasor and an intentional tortfeasor.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(5)(d) — 1 case
Ges, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001). “NRS 41.141 was amended in 1987 to read, in relevant part: 4.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(5)(e) — 1 case
Willett v. Vitek, Inc., 139 B.R. 723 (D. Nev. 1992).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(6) — 1 case
Café Moda, LLC v. Palma, 272 P.3d 137 (Nev. 2012). “: In this appeal, we consider whether NRS 41.141, Nevada’s comparative-negligence statute, permits liability to be apportioned between a negligent tortfeasor and an intentional tortfeasor.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(6)(a) — 1 case
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