NRS
41.141 When comparative negligence not bar to recovery; jury
instructions; liability of multiple defendants.
1. In any action to recover damages for
death or injury to persons or for injury to property in which comparative
negligence is asserted as a defense, the comparative negligence of the
plaintiff or the plaintiff’s decedent does not bar a recovery if that
negligence was not greater than the negligence or gross negligence of the
parties to the action against whom recovery is sought.
2. In those cases, the judge shall
instruct the jury that:
(a) The plaintiff may not recover if the
plaintiff’s comparative negligence or that of the plaintiff’s decedent is
greater than the negligence of the defendant or the combined negligence of
multiple defendants.
(b) If the jury determines the plaintiff is
entitled to recover, it shall return:
(1) By general verdict the total amount of
damages the plaintiff would be entitled to recover without regard to the
plaintiff’s comparative negligence; and
(2) A special verdict indicating the
percentage of negligence attributable to each party remaining in the action.
3. If a defendant in such an action
settles with the plaintiff before the entry of judgment, the comparative
negligence of that defendant and the amount of the settlement must not
thereafter be admitted into evidence nor considered by the jury. The judge
shall deduct the amount of the settlement from the net sum otherwise
recoverable by the plaintiff pursuant to the general and special verdicts.
4. Where recovery is allowed against more
than one defendant in such an action, except as otherwise provided in
subsection 5, each defendant is severally liable to the plaintiff only for that
portion of the judgment which represents the percentage of negligence
attributable to that defendant.
5. This section does not affect the joint
and several liability, if any, of the defendants in an action based upon:
(a) Strict liability;
(b) An intentional tort;
(c) The emission, disposal or spillage of a toxic
or hazardous substance;
(d) The concerted acts of the defendants; or
(e) An injury to any person or property resulting
from a product which is manufactured, distributed, sold or used in this State.
6. As used in this section:
(a) “Concerted acts of the defendants” does not
include negligent acts committed by providers of health care while working
together to provide treatment to a patient.
(b) “Provider of health care” has the meaning
ascribed to it in NRS 629.031.
(Added to NRS by 1973,
1722; A 1979,
1356; 1987,
1697; 1989,
72)
PROCEDURE FOR EVIDENCING DOMICILE
Notes of Decisions
Ges, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001).
· cites it 10× “NRS 41.141 was amended in 1987 to read, in relevant part: 4.”
Café Moda, LLC v. Palma, 272 P.3d 137 (Nev. 2012).
· cites it 38× “: In this appeal, we consider whether NRS 41.141, Nevada’s comparative-negligence statute, permits liability to be apportioned between a negligent tortfeasor and an intentional tortfeasor.”
Cromer v. Wilson, 225 P.3d 788 (Nev. 2010).
· cites it 14× “133 allows a judgment of conviction to conclusively establish civil liability for a crime and should have precluded Wilson from arguing comparative fault pursuant to NRS 41.141. We conclude that the conclusive presumption of NRS 41.”
Woosley v. State Farm Ins., 18 P.3d 317 (Nev. 2001).
· cites it 10× “12 Appellants argue that the third element should be revised in accordance with contemporary comparative negligence law and NRS 41.141. We agree. The district court concluded that because Adams was contributorily negligent, appellants failed to meet the third element of res ipsa…”
Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1988).
· cites it 2× “1987) [adopting several liability as a general rule, but retaining joint and several liability in several, specified areas]; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.141 (Supp. 1987) [same].”
Davies v. Butler, 602 P.2d 605 (Nev. 1979).
· cites it 4× “Appellants, on the other hand, contend that, since the statute does not mention willful or wanton misconduct, there is no basis for concluding that the legislature intended to change the previous rule. We agree with the appellants that, read in light of our previous decisions…”
State v. Eaton, 710 P.2d 1370 (Nev. 1985).
· cites it 3× “Under Nevada’s comparative negligence statute, NRS 41.141, 9 a plaintiff may recover for negligently caused injuries only if his or her negligence does not exceed the negligence of the defendant.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(1) — 18 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(2) — 3 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(2)(a) — 5 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(2)(b) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(2)(b)(1) — 2 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(2)(b)(2) — 3 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(3) — 7 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(4) — 7 cases
Ges, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001).
“NRS 41.141 was amended in 1987 to read, in relevant part: 4.”
Café Moda, LLC v. Palma, 272 P.3d 137 (Nev. 2012).
“: In this appeal, we consider whether NRS 41.141, Nevada’s comparative-negligence statute, permits liability to be apportioned between a negligent tortfeasor and an intentional tortfeasor.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(4)(d) — 1 case
Ges, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001).
“NRS 41.141 was amended in 1987 to read, in relevant part: 4.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(5) — 5 cases
Ges, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001).
“NRS 41.141 was amended in 1987 to read, in relevant part: 4.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(5)(a) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(5)(b) — 2 cases
Café Moda, LLC v. Palma, 272 P.3d 137 (Nev. 2012).
“: In this appeal, we consider whether NRS 41.141, Nevada’s comparative-negligence statute, permits liability to be apportioned between a negligent tortfeasor and an intentional tortfeasor.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(5)(d) — 1 case
Ges, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001).
“NRS 41.141 was amended in 1987 to read, in relevant part: 4.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(5)(e) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(6) — 1 case
Café Moda, LLC v. Palma, 272 P.3d 137 (Nev. 2012).
“: In this appeal, we consider whether NRS 41.141, Nevada’s comparative-negligence statute, permits liability to be apportioned between a negligent tortfeasor and an intentional tortfeasor.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(6)(a) — 1 case
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