Nev. Rev. Stat. » NRS: CHAPTER 41 - ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS IN PARTICULAR CASES CONCERNING PERSONS
Nevada Revised Statutes

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.745 (2026)

Liability of employer for intentional conduct of employee; limitations

✓ current as of July 2026
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NRS 41.745  Liability of employer for intentional conduct of employee; limitations.

      1.  An employer is not liable for harm or injury caused by the intentional conduct of an employee if the conduct of the employee:

      (a) Was a truly independent venture of the employee;

      (b) Was not committed in the course of the very task assigned to the employee; and

      (c) Was not reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the nature and scope of his or her employment.

Ê For the purposes of this subsection, conduct of an employee is reasonably foreseeable if a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence could have reasonably anticipated the conduct and the probability of injury.

      2.  Nothing in this section imposes strict liability on an employer for any unforeseeable intentional act of an employee.

      3.  For the purposes of this section:

      (a) “Employee” means any person who is employed by an employer, including, without limitation, any present or former officer or employee, immune contractor, an employee of a university school for profoundly gifted pupils described in chapter 388C of NRS or a member of a board or commission or Legislator in this State.

      (b) “Employer” means any public or private employer in this State, including, without limitation, the State of Nevada, a university school for profoundly gifted pupils described in chapter 388C of NRS, any agency of this State and any political subdivision of the State.

      (c) “Immune contractor” has the meaning ascribed to it in subsection 3 of NRS 41.0307.

      (d) “Officer” has the meaning ascribed to it in subsection 4 of NRS 41.0307.

      (Added to NRS by 1997, 1357; A 2005, 2430)

     

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 22 cases (7 in the last 5 years), 2004–2025 · leading case: Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 P.3d 1026 (Nev. 2005).
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Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 P.3d 1026 (Nev. 2005). · cites it 22× “The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of Action Cleaning pursuant to NRS 41.745 because it was not liable for intentional torts committed by its employee and because Ronquillo-Nino's intervening criminal acts were a superseding cause that relieved Action…”
ASAP Storage, Inc. v. City of Sparks, 173 P.3d 734 (Nev. 2007). · cites it 2× “[57] See NRS 41.745 (providing that public and private employers are not liable for harm caused by their employees' intentional conduct if that conduct was (1) "a truly independent venture of the employee," (2) "not committed in the course of the very task assigned to the…”
Jane Doe A. v. Green, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Nev. 2004). · cites it 2× “Nev.Rev.Stat. § 41.745. In asserting that this statute was adopted in 1997 in response to the Jimenez case, the Defense apparently argues that the statute marks a change in Nevada law.”
Shafer v. City of Boulder, 896 F. Supp. 2d 915 (D. Nev. 2012). · cites it 2× “"Respondeat superior liability is statutorily precluded in Nevada only in cases where the employee's conduct '[w]as a truly independent venture of the employee; [w]as not committed in the course of the very task assigned to the employee; and [w]as not reasonably foreseeable…”
Grantham v. Durant, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (D. Nev. 2006). · cites it 2× “Nev.Rev.Stat. § 41.745(1). An employee’s intentional act is reasonably foreseeable “if a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence could have reasonably anticipated the conduct and the probability of injury.”
Fanders v. Riverside Resort & Casino, Inc., 245 P.3d 1159 (Nev. 2010). “Although the Wood court found that workers’ compensation applied to the plaintiff’s claims against her employer, the court went on to analyze her claims against the subcontractor that employed her assailant under the vicarious liability statute, NRS 41.745. Wood, 121 Nev. at…”
Anderson Vs. Mandalay Corp. c/w 61871, 2015 NV 82 (Nev. 2015). · cites it 37× “745(1)(c) sets forth a factual inquiry NRS 41.745 makes employers vicariously liable for employees' intentional torts when—among other circumstances—an employee's act is "reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the nature and scope of his…”
Anderson Vs. Mandalay Corp. c/w 61871, 2015 NV 82 (Nev. 2015). · cites it 19× “745(1)(c) sets forth a factual inquiry NRS 41.745 makes employers vicariously liable for employees' intentional torts when—among other circumstances—an employee's act is "reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the nature and scope of his…”
Anderson Vs. Mandalay Corp. c/w 61871, 2015 NV 82 (Nev. 2015). · cites it 19× “745(1)(c) sets forth a factual inquiry NRS 41.745 makes employers vicariously liable for employees' intentional torts when—among other circumstances—an employee's act is "reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the nature and scope of his…”
Richardson v. United States (D. Nev. 2022). · cites it 8× “) NRS § 41.745(1) specifically addresses an employer’s liability for the intentional conduct of an employee.”
Phipps ex rel. M.P. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 164 F. Supp. 3d 1220 (D. Nev. 2016). · cites it 6× “on the dates in question, but argues instead that it cannot be held liable for Defendant James’ conduct pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.745 (1). This section “promulgates three distinct circumstances in which an employer is liable for an employee’s intentional tort: (1) the…”
Carpenter, Jr. v. Denny (D. Nev. 2024). · cites it 4× “The Wood court was tasked with 18 analyzing whether a defendant employer was liable under NRS 41.745, a statute specific to the 19 vicarious liability of an employer for an employee’s intentional torts.”
Show all 22 citing cases →
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.745(1) — 10 cases
Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 P.3d 1026 (Nev. 2005). “The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of Action Cleaning pursuant to NRS 41.745 because it was not liable for intentional torts committed by its employee and because Ronquillo-Nino's intervening criminal acts were a superseding cause that relieved Action…”
Grantham v. Durant, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (D. Nev. 2006). “Nev.Rev.Stat. § 41.745(1). An employee’s intentional act is reasonably foreseeable “if a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence could have reasonably anticipated the conduct and the probability of injury.”
Richardson v. United States (D. Nev. 2022). “) NRS § 41.745(1) specifically addresses an employer’s liability for the intentional conduct of an employee.”
Anderson Vs. Mandalay Corp. c/w 61871, 2015 NV 82 (Nev. 2015). “745(1)(c) sets forth a factual inquiry NRS 41.745 makes employers vicariously liable for employees' intentional torts when—among other circumstances—an employee's act is "reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the nature and scope of his…”
Hoekstra v. Pershing Cnty. Sheriffs Off. (D. Nev. 2025).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.745(1)(a) — 3 cases
Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 P.3d 1026 (Nev. 2005). “The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of Action Cleaning pursuant to NRS 41.745 because it was not liable for intentional torts committed by its employee and because Ronquillo-Nino's intervening criminal acts were a superseding cause that relieved Action…”
Shafer v. City of Boulder, 896 F. Supp. 2d 915 (D. Nev. 2012). “"Respondeat superior liability is statutorily precluded in Nevada only in cases where the employee's conduct '[w]as a truly independent venture of the employee; [w]as not committed in the course of the very task assigned to the employee; and [w]as not reasonably foreseeable…”
Sabreco, Inc. Vs. Dagger Prop.'S 1, Llc (Nev. 2019).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.745(1)(c) — 3 cases
Anderson Vs. Mandalay Corp. c/w 61871, 2015 NV 82 (Nev. 2015). “745(1)(c) sets forth a factual inquiry NRS 41.745 makes employers vicariously liable for employees' intentional torts when—among other circumstances—an employee's act is "reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the nature and scope of his…”
Anderson Vs. Mandalay Corp. c/w 61871, 2015 NV 82 (Nev. 2015). “745(1)(c) sets forth a factual inquiry NRS 41.745 makes employers vicariously liable for employees' intentional torts when—among other circumstances—an employee's act is "reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the nature and scope of his…”
Anderson Vs. Mandalay Corp. c/w 61871, 2015 NV 82 (Nev. 2015). “745(1)(c) sets forth a factual inquiry NRS 41.745 makes employers vicariously liable for employees' intentional torts when—among other circumstances—an employee's act is "reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the nature and scope of his…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.745(c) — 1 case
Carpenter, Jr. v. Denny (D. Nev. 2024). “The Wood court was tasked with 18 analyzing whether a defendant employer was liable under NRS 41.745, a statute specific to the 19 vicarious liability of an employer for an employee’s intentional torts.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.745(l)(a) — 1 case
Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 P.3d 1026 (Nev. 2005). “The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of Action Cleaning pursuant to NRS 41.745 because it was not liable for intentional torts committed by its employee and because Ronquillo-Nino's intervening criminal acts were a superseding cause that relieved Action…”
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