NRS
433A.310 Findings and order; expiration and renewal of admission to
facility; alternative courses of treatment; transmittal of record to Central
Repository for Nevada Records of Criminal History and law enforcement agencies;
prohibition on transfer of case; notification of transfer of admitted person.
1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 432B.6076 and 432B.60815, if the district court
finds, after proceedings for the involuntary court-ordered admission of a
person:
(a) That there is not clear and convincing
evidence that the person with respect to whom the hearing was held is a person
in a mental health crisis, the court must enter its finding to that effect and
the person must not be involuntarily admitted to a public or private mental
health facility. If the person has been detained in a public or private mental
health facility or hospital under a mental health crisis hold pursuant to NRS 433A.160, including, without
limitation, where the person has been admitted under an emergency admission
pursuant to NRS 433A.162, the court
must issue a written order requiring the facility or hospital to release the
person not later than 24 hours after the court issues the order, unless the
person applies for admission as a voluntary consumer pursuant to NRS 433A.140.
(b) That there is clear and convincing evidence
that the person with respect to whom the hearing was held is a person in a
mental health crisis, the court may order the involuntary admission of the
person to a public or private mental health facility. The order of the court
must be interlocutory and must not become final if, within 30 days after the
involuntary admission, the person is unconditionally released pursuant to NRS 433A.390.
2. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 432B.608 and 432B.60818, an involuntary admission
pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection 1 automatically expires at the end of 6
months if not terminated previously by the medical director of the public or
private mental health facility after a determination by the physician primarily
responsible for treating the patient, a psychiatrist or an advanced practice
registered nurse as provided for in subsection 3 of NRS 433A.390. Except as otherwise
provided in NRS 432B.608 and 432B.60818, at the end of the
involuntary court-ordered admission, the Division or any mental health facility
that is not operated by the Division may petition to renew the involuntary
admission of the person for additional periods not to exceed 6 months each. For
each renewal, the petition must include evidence which meets the same standard
set forth in subsection 1 that was required for the initial period of admission
of the person to a public or private mental health facility.
3. Before issuing an order for involuntary
admission or a renewal thereof, the court shall explore other alternative
courses of treatment within the least restrictive appropriate environment,
including assisted outpatient treatment, as suggested by the evaluation team
who evaluated the person, or other persons professionally qualified in the
field of psychiatric mental health, which the court believes may be in the best
interests of the person.
4. If the court issues an order
involuntarily admitting a person to a public or private mental health facility
pursuant to this section, the court must, notwithstanding the provisions of NRS 433A.715, cause, within 5 business
days after the order becomes final pursuant to this section, on a form
prescribed by the Department of Public Safety, a record of the order to be
transmitted to:
(a) The Central Repository for Nevada Records of
Criminal History, along with a statement indicating that the record is being
transmitted for inclusion in each appropriate database of the National Instant
Criminal Background Check System; and
(b) Each law enforcement agency of this State
with which the court has entered into an agreement for such transmission, along
with a statement indicating that the record is being transmitted for inclusion
in each of this State’s appropriate databases of information relating to
crimes.
5. After issuing an order pursuant to this
section, a court shall not transfer the case to another court.
6. A public or private mental health
facility to which a person is involuntarily admitted pursuant to this section
shall notify the court and the counsel for the person if the person is
transferred to another facility.
7. As used in this section, “National
Instant Criminal Background Check System” has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 179A.062.
(Added to NRS by 1975,
1606; A 1981,
1134; 1983,
508; 1989,
1761; 1993,
2115; 2001,
3046; 2005,
1323; 2009,
2491; 2013,
3492; 2015,
1815; 2017,
1646, 3006;
2021,
3090; 2023,
2350)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
5
cases, 1988–2019 · leading case:
Hager v. State, 447 P.3d 1063 (Nev. 2019).
Hager v. State, 447 P.3d 1063 (Nev. 2019).
· cites it 2× “Unlike a commitment order, which requires a judge to find by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a danger to him or herself or to others, see NRS 433A.310(1)(b) (2017)-an adjudication that disarms the person under NRS 202.”
Vu (phong) Vs. Dist. Ct. (gammick), 2016 NV 21 (Nev. 2016).
· cites it 75× “" According to Vu, because NRS 433A.310's subsection 1(b) numerically precedes subsection 5, subsection 1(b)'s distinction between an interlocutory and final order applies to NRS 433A.”
People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768 (Colo. 1988).
“§ 83-1036 (1987); Nev. Rev.Stat.Ann. § 433A.310(3) (Michie 1986); N.”
Vu (phong) Vs. Dist. Ct. (gammick), 2016 NV 21 (Nev. 2016).
· cites it 25× “" According to Vu, because NRS 433A.310's subsection 1(b) numerically precedes subsection 5, subsection 1(b)'s distinction between an interlocutory and final order applies to NRS 433A.”
Hager (ian) Vs. State, 2019 NV 34 (Nev. 2019).
· cites it 4× “Unlike a commitment order, which requires a judge to find by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a danger to him or herself or to others, see NRS 433A.310(1)(b) (2017)—an adjudication that disarms the person under NRS 202.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 433A.310(1) — 2 cases
Vu (phong) Vs. Dist. Ct. (gammick), 2016 NV 21 (Nev. 2016).
“" According to Vu, because NRS 433A.310's subsection 1(b) numerically precedes subsection 5, subsection 1(b)'s distinction between an interlocutory and final order applies to NRS 433A.”
Vu (phong) Vs. Dist. Ct. (gammick), 2016 NV 21 (Nev. 2016).
“" According to Vu, because NRS 433A.310's subsection 1(b) numerically precedes subsection 5, subsection 1(b)'s distinction between an interlocutory and final order applies to NRS 433A.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 433A.310(1)(13) — 2 cases
Vu (phong) Vs. Dist. Ct. (gammick), 2016 NV 21 (Nev. 2016).
“" According to Vu, because NRS 433A.310's subsection 1(b) numerically precedes subsection 5, subsection 1(b)'s distinction between an interlocutory and final order applies to NRS 433A.”
Vu (phong) Vs. Dist. Ct. (gammick), 2016 NV 21 (Nev. 2016).
“" According to Vu, because NRS 433A.310's subsection 1(b) numerically precedes subsection 5, subsection 1(b)'s distinction between an interlocutory and final order applies to NRS 433A.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 433A.310(1)(b) — 4 cases
Hager v. State, 447 P.3d 1063 (Nev. 2019).
“Unlike a commitment order, which requires a judge to find by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a danger to him or herself or to others, see NRS 433A.310(1)(b) (2017)-an adjudication that disarms the person under NRS 202.”
Vu (phong) Vs. Dist. Ct. (gammick), 2016 NV 21 (Nev. 2016).
“" According to Vu, because NRS 433A.310's subsection 1(b) numerically precedes subsection 5, subsection 1(b)'s distinction between an interlocutory and final order applies to NRS 433A.”
Vu (phong) Vs. Dist. Ct. (gammick), 2016 NV 21 (Nev. 2016).
“" According to Vu, because NRS 433A.310's subsection 1(b) numerically precedes subsection 5, subsection 1(b)'s distinction between an interlocutory and final order applies to NRS 433A.”
Hager (ian) Vs. State, 2019 NV 34 (Nev. 2019).
“Unlike a commitment order, which requires a judge to find by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a danger to him or herself or to others, see NRS 433A.310(1)(b) (2017)—an adjudication that disarms the person under NRS 202.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 433A.310(3) — 1 case
People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768 (Colo. 1988).
“§ 83-1036 (1987); Nev. Rev.Stat.Ann. § 433A.310(3) (Michie 1986); N.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 433A.310(5) — 2 cases
Vu (phong) Vs. Dist. Ct. (gammick), 2016 NV 21 (Nev. 2016).
“" According to Vu, because NRS 433A.310's subsection 1(b) numerically precedes subsection 5, subsection 1(b)'s distinction between an interlocutory and final order applies to NRS 433A.”
Vu (phong) Vs. Dist. Ct. (gammick), 2016 NV 21 (Nev. 2016).
“" According to Vu, because NRS 433A.310's subsection 1(b) numerically precedes subsection 5, subsection 1(b)'s distinction between an interlocutory and final order applies to NRS 433A.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 433A.310(7) — 2 cases
Hager v. State, 447 P.3d 1063 (Nev. 2019).
“Unlike a commitment order, which requires a judge to find by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a danger to him or herself or to others, see NRS 433A.310(1)(b) (2017)-an adjudication that disarms the person under NRS 202.”
Hager (ian) Vs. State, 2019 NV 34 (Nev. 2019).
“Unlike a commitment order, which requires a judge to find by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a danger to him or herself or to others, see NRS 433A.310(1)(b) (2017)—an adjudication that disarms the person under NRS 202.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.