NRS
47.180 Presumptions generally: Effect; direct evidence.
1. A presumption, other than a presumption
against the accused in a criminal action, imposes on the party against whom it
is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is
more probable than its existence.
2. As applied to presumptions, “direct
evidence” means evidence which tends to establish the existence or nonexistence
of the presumed fact independently of the basic facts.
(Added to NRS by 1971,
777)
Notes of Decisions
Quiana M. B. v. State Dep't of Fam. Servs., 283 P.3d 842 (Nev. 2012).
· cites it 5× “Therefore, Quiana contends that NRS 47.180 applies and only requires a party to a civil case to rebut a presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Yeager v. Harrah's Club, Inc., 897 P.2d 1093 (Nev. 1995).
· cites it 4× “NRS 47.180. [4] In Yeager's deposition, the following dialogue took place: Q You didn't have an employment contract, did you? A No.”
Privette v. Faulkner, 550 P.2d 404 (Nev. 1976).
· cites it 6× “NRS 47.180. [2] Because reversal for a new trial is warranted, further discussion of additional purported errors is unnecessary.”
Law Offices of Barry Levinson, P.C. v. Milko, 184 P.3d 378 (Nev. 2008).
“25 NRS 47.180(1) (“A presumption . . . imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence”).”
Matter of Parental Rights as to NJ, 8 P.3d 126 (Nev. 2000).
“Once Talia and Sam introduced evidence that Raja and Hikmet left the child for six months without communication or provisions for support, application of the statutory presumption of abandonment shifted the burden to Raja and Hikmet to prove that they did not abandon the child.”
Rivera v. Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co., 782 P.2d 1322 (Nev. 1989).
“American rightly points out that the second sentence of the instruction correctly and closely tracks the language of NRS 47.180(1) regarding the effect of presumptions.”
Sam Z. v. Hikmet, 8 P.3d 126 (Nev. 2000).
“Once Talia and Sam introduced evidence that Raja and Hikmet left the child for six months without communication or provisions for support, application of the statutory presumption of abandonment shifted the burden to Raja and Hikmet to prove that they did not abandon the child.”
Montes v. State, 603 P.2d 1069 (Nev. 1979).
“2 See NRS 47.180, et seq. The “rebuttable presumption” given to the jury is in reality a misstatement of a holding in Staab v.”
In Re: Parental Rights as to D.J.M. (Nev. 2016).
“3d 758 , 761 (2014); see also NRS 47.180. In reviewing the district court's decision, we do "not substitute [our] own judgment for that of the district court," and we "will uphold termination orders based on substantial evidence.”
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 47.180(1): 11 cases
Quiana M. B. v. State Dep't of Fam. Servs., 283 P.3d 842 (Nev. 2012).
“Therefore, Quiana contends that NRS 47.180 applies and only requires a party to a civil case to rebut a presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Law Offices of Barry Levinson, P.C. v. Milko, 184 P.3d 378 (Nev. 2008).
“25 NRS 47.180(1) (“A presumption . . . imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence”).”
Yeager v. Harrah's Club, Inc., 897 P.2d 1093 (Nev. 1995).
“NRS 47.180. [4] In Yeager's deposition, the following dialogue took place: Q You didn't have an employment contract, did you? A No.”
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 47.180(2): 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.