NRS
49.095 General rule of privilege. A
client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other person
from disclosing, confidential communications:
1. Between the client or the client’s
representative and the client’s lawyer or the representative of the client’s
lawyer.
2. Between the client’s lawyer and the
lawyer’s representative.
3. Made for the purpose of facilitating
the rendition of professional legal services to the client, by the client or
the client’s lawyer to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common
interest.
(Added to NRS by 1971,
783)
Notes of Decisions
Whitehead v. Nevada Comm'n on Jud. Discipline, 873 P.2d 946 (Nev. 1994).
· cites it 8× “NRS 49.095. Campbell and the Commission members deny any communication between them as to the content of the documents in question; consequently, no bases appear for a valid claim of attorney-client privilege with respect to these documents.”
Manley v. State, 979 P.2d 703 (Nev. 1999).
· cites it 4× “055 (defining "confidential" communication); NRS 49.095 (client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent anyone else from disclosing, confidential communications between the client and the lawyer made to facilitate giving legal services to the client); NRS 49.”
Molina v. State, 87 P.3d 533 (Nev. 2004).
“055 defines attorney-client communications as confidential and NRS 49.095 provides that a client has a privilege of refusing to disclose such confidential communications, a client may waive the privilege.”
Fink v. Oshins, 49 P.3d 640 (Nev. 2002).
“17 See NRS 49.095 (stating the general rule that a client may refuse to disclose confidential communications between himself and his lawyer); Cheyenne Construction v.”
Lamb v. State, 251 P.3d 700 (Nev. 2011).
“Lamb’s argument that the prosecutor’s questions violated his attorney-client privilege, NRS 49.095, is foreclosed by Franko v. State, 94 Nev.”
City of Reno v. Reno Police Prot. Ass'n, 59 P.3d 1212 (Nev. 2002).
“26 NRS 49.095(1). 27 NRS 233B. 123(1) (stating that “[a]gencies shall give effect to the rules of privilege recognized by law”).”
McKay v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 746 P.2d 124 (Nev. 1987).
“So turn we must from the substantive statutory privilege (NRS 49.095) to the area of professional ethics and ask ourselves if there is anything in traditional or codified professional ethics that might have the force to supercede and, in effect, annul the open meeting law when…”
Am. Elevator Co. v. Briscoe, 572 P.2d 534 (Nev. 1977).
“The results of the polygraph examination administered to respondent were purportedly unfavorable, and appellants doubtlessly intended to impeach him with that evidence.”
Clark v. Second Jud. Dist. Court, 692 P.2d 512 (Nev. 1985).
“NRS 49.095 provides: A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other person from disclosing, confidential communications: 1.”
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 49.095(1): 6 cases
City of Reno v. Reno Police Prot. Ass'n, 59 P.3d 1212 (Nev. 2002).
“26 NRS 49.095(1). 27 NRS 233B. 123(1) (stating that “[a]gencies shall give effect to the rules of privilege recognized by law”).”
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