Noddin v. Noddin, 455 A.2d 1051 (N.H. 1983). · Go Syfert
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Noddin v. Noddin, 455 A.2d 1051 (N.H. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
127 citation events (28 in the last 25 years) across 25 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Richard Polonsky v. Town of Bedford (nh, 2020-04-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 30 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Richard Polonsky v. Town of Bedford
N.H. · 2020 · confidence medium
Under this doctrine, “[e]quitable relief will be denied if one comes to the court with unclean hands.” Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hays v. Hays
Neb. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
The court noted that while a decrease in earnings could sometimes be a ground for modification, a modification will be denied “if the change in financial condition is due to the fault or voluntary wastage or dissipation of one’s talents and assets.” Id. at 777 , 559 N.W.2d at 195 (quoting Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Matter of the State of New Hampshire and Cory R. Lounder
N.H. · 2014 · confidence medium
Following a hearing, the court denied the respondent’s petition, stating: “[The respondent’s] incarcerated status does not warrant a reduction in his child support obligation.” The respondent moved for reconsideration, which the court denied “for the reasons discussed in Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 (1983).” This appeal followed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Muller
N.H. · 2013 · confidence medium
Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Yerkes v. Yerkes (2×)
Pa. · 2003 · confidence medium
Marshall v. Marshall, 15 S.W.3d 396, 401 (Ky.Ct.App.2000); Louisiana, see State v. Nelson, 587 So.2d 176, 178 (La.Ct.App.1991); Montana, see Mooney v. Brennan, 257 Mont. 197 , 848 P.2d 1020, 1023-24 (1993); New Hampshire, see Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053-54 (1983); New York, see Matter of Knights, 71 N.Y.2d 865 , 527 N.Y.S.2d 748 , 522 N.E.2d 1045, 1046 (1988); North Dakota, see Koch v. Williams, 456 N.W.2d 299, 302 (N.D.1990); Ohio, see Richardson v. Ballard, 113 Ohio App.3d 552 , 681 N.E.2d 507, 508 (1996); Oklahoma, see State ex rel.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Lurvey
N.H. · 2002 · confidence medium
The trial court adopted the petitioner’s requested rulings of law, including the standard that “[t]o obtain a modification of an alimony award, a change in circumstances of the parties must be shown which will make the continuance of the original provisions ‘improper and unfair.’ Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 (1983).” We agree with the respondent that Noddin does not fully articulate the standard for modification of an alimony award.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Willis v. Willis
Mo. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
The cases cited in Oberg to support this proposition include: Mooney v. Brennan, 257 Mont. 197 , 848 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1993); In re Marriage of Phillips, 493 N.W.2d 872, 877 (Iowa Ct.App.1992); Davis v. Vance, 574 N.E.2d 330, 331 (Ind.Ct.App.1991); Div. of Child Support Enforcement v. Barrows, 570 A.2d 1180, 1183 (Del.Super.1990); Cole v. Cole, 70 Ohio App.3d 188 , 590 N.E.2d 862, 865-866 (1990); Ohler v. Ohler, 220 Neb. 272 , 369 N.W.2d 615, 618 (1985); Koch v. Williams, 456 N.W.2d 299, 301 (N.D.1990); Parker v. Parker, 152 Wis.2d 1 , 447 N.W.2d 64, 65 (1989); Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73 , 4…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) STATE, EX REL. DHS v. Baggett
Okla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983). ¶ 24 Although this Court has never decided the precise issue, numerous courts from other jurisdictions have grappled with the question of how to handle child support in the situation where the non-custodial parent *245 is serving time in prison.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Halliwell v. Halliwell
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1999 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Mooney v. Brennan, 257 Mont. 197 , 848 P. 2d 1020, 1023 (1993) (finding that criminal conduct cannot excuse a child support obligation and that "[a] person who has a support obligation should not profit from his criminal conduct, particularly at his children's expense."); Davis v. Vance, 574 N.E. 2d 330, 330 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (finding that public policy requires obligors to take responsibility for criminal acts and all repercussions that flow from them); State v. Nelson, 587 So. 2d 176, 178 (La.Ct.App. 1991) (finding that a voluntary act cannot be used to justify the extinction of a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State ex rel. Department of Human Services ex rel. Jones v. Baggett
Okla. · 1999 · confidence medium
Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983). ¶ 24 Although this Court has never decided the precise issue, numerous courts from other jurisdictions have grappled with the question of how to handle child support in the situation where the non-custodial parent is serving time in prison.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moulton-Garland v. Cabletron Systems, Inc.
N.H. · 1999 · confidence medium
Assuming, without deciding, that the unclean hands doctrine could bar Cabletron from asserting the statute of limitations defense, see Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983) (unclean hands doctrine may bar equitable relief), we hold that the doctrine does not apply under the circumstances of this case.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bendixen v. Bendixen
Alaska · 1998 · confidence medium
For cases reaching contrary results, see, for example, Mooney, 848 P.2d at 1022 ; Willis, 820 P.2d at 860 , rev’d, 314 Or. 566 , 840 P.2d 697 (1992); Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983); Proctor v. Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah App.1989) (all reasoning that incarceration is akin to voluntary underemployment because the non-custodial parents choose to engage in behavior that interferes with their ability to pay child support). 15 . 896 P.2d 240 (Alaska 1995). 16 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miami Subs Corp. v. Murray Family Trust & Kenneth Dash Partnership
N.H. · 1997 · confidence medium
Based on these findings of breach, the court denied Miami Subs’ request for declaratory judgment, reasoning that Miami Subs had come to court with “unclean hands.” See Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Pope v. Pope (4×)
Neb. · 1997 · confidence medium
For instance, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has stated, “Although unemployment or diminution of earnings is a common ground for modification, a petition for modification will be denied if the change in financial condition is due to fault or voluntary wastage or dissipation of one’s talents and assets.” Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983) (involving petition to modify alimony and child support where father brought about his own reduced financial condition when he lost job for stealing trade secrets).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pacamor Bearings v. Minebea Co.
D.N.H. · 1996 · confidence medium
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has recognized the maxim that "[e]quitable relief will be denied if one comes to the court with unclean hands." Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983) (citing Morrill v. Amoskeaq Savings Bank, 90 N.H. 358, 368 , 9 A.2d 519, 527 (1939)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomasson v. Johnson
N.M. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
See In re Marriage of Phillips, 493 N.W.2d at 877-78 (even though court considered act voluntary, assets of defendant considered); Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983) (court found that defendant’s voluntary wastage of his talents created his financial condition, but determined that defendant’s assets could be used for support); Peters v. Peters, 69 Ohio App.3d 275 , 590 N.E.2d 777, 778 (1990) (court found that incarceration was not voluntary and remanded to lower court for hearing to determine defendant’s assets).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wills v. Jones
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
The Ohler court recognized that the appellant was requesting relief in equity and that “one who seeks equity must come with clean hands.” Id, See also, Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shaw v. Shaw
Vt. · 1994 · confidence medium
Ct. App. 1986) (modification not warranted where adverse impact on former husband’s financial condition was caused by publicity and expense of defending against criminal charges resulting from voluntary act of seeking to hire someone to murder former wife); Noddin v. Noddin, 455 A.2d 1051, 1053-54 (N.H. 1983) (modification not warranted where husband was fired for stealing trade secrets from employer).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland
D.C. · 1993 · confidence medium
In addition, New Hampshire adheres to the age-old precept that equitable relief will be denied if the party seeking it “comes to the court with unclean hands." Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Center for Gastrointestinal Medicine, Inc. v. Willitts
N.H. · 1993 · confidence medium
In upholding the $5,000 wage assignment, the superior court relied on Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983), where we held that a petition to modify an alimony or child support order will be denied if a “change in financial condition is due to fault or voluntary wastage or dissipation of one’s talents and assets.” Noddin , however, concerned the substantive grant or modification of a support order, while we are now concerned with the enforcement of such an order.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Division of Child Support Enforcement ex. rel. Harper v. Barrows (3×) also: Cited "see"
Del. · 1990 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Ohler v. Ohler, 220 Neb. 272 , 369 N.W.2d 615, 618 (1985); Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983); Proctor v. Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Richelson v. Richelson
N.H. · 1987 · confidence medium
The plaintiff argues that since the original order imposed no child support, and since the defendant continues to earn more than twice the income of the plaintiff, there has not been any change in circumstances as required under Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Williams
N.H. · 1987 · confidence medium
“The master has broad discretion in determining whether an alimony award should be modified or terminated.” Hannemann v. Newcomb, 125 N.H. 289, 292 , 480 A.2d 132, 134 (1984) (citing Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 75 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983); Collette v. Collette, 108 N.H. 469, 470 , 238 A.2d 598, 598 (1968)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re the Marriage of Kern
Iowa Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983), and Ohler v. Ohler, 220 Neb. 272, 275 , 369 N.W.2d 615, 617 (1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Butterick v. Butterick
N.H. · 1986 · confidence medium
However, it is also clear that although Plaintiff’s costs have increased, his income has also substantially increased since 1980, and that the financial ‘savings’ to Defendant because her oldest son no longer lives with her certainly do not approach a proportionate percentage of the present $2,500/month amount.” “To obtain a modification of support or alimony obligations, the [party seeking a modification] must show such a change in circumstances of the parties as to make the continuance of the original order ‘improper and unfair.’” Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 , 455 A.2d …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ohler v. Ohler (2×)
Neb. · 1985 · confidence medium
Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983), reasoned as follows: Although unemployment or diminution of earnings is a common ground for modification, a petition for modification will be denied if the change in financial condition is due to fault or voluntary wastage or dissipation of one’s talents and assets....
examined Cited as authority (rule) Hannemann v. Newcomb (3×) also: Cited "see"
N.H. · 1984 · confidence medium
To obtain a modification of an alimony award, a change in circumstances of the parties must be shown as will make a continuance of the original provisions “improper and unfair.” Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983) (quoting Fortuna v. Fortuna, 103 N.H. 547, 548 , 176 A.2d 708, 709 (1961)).
discussed Cited "see" In re Canaway
N.H. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 (1983) (holding that a change in financial condition “due to fault or voluntary wastage or dissipation of one’s talents and assets,” is not grounds for modification), superseded on other grounds by statute as recognized by In the Matter of Sarvela and Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 435 (2006), and In the Matter of Rossino and Rossino, 153 N.H. 367, 370 (2006); see also Fortuna v. Fortuna, 103 N.H. 547, 549-50 (1961) (holding that obligations resulting from associating with another partner are assumed at the payor’s own risk and do not affect his obligation…
discussed Cited "see" In Re the Marriage of Phillips (2×)
Iowa Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73 , 455 A.2d 1051 (1983) (court denied modification because obligor possessed at least one valuable asset and criminal activity was voluntary); Koch v. Williams, 456 N.W.2d 299 (N.D.1990) (court denied modification based on voluntariness of obligor’s actions); In re Marriage of Willis, 109 Or.App. 584 , 820 P.2d 858 (1991) (court denied modification even though obligor possessed no other assets; voluntary criminal conduct cannot excuse obligation).
discussed Cited "see" Gnirk v. Gnirk (2×)
N.H. · 1991 · signal: accord · confidence high
A modification should not be granted in the absence of evidence of a substantial change in circumstances of the parties arising since the grant of the initial award, “making the current support amount either improper or unfair.” Morrill v. Millard (Morrill), 132 N.H. 685, 689-90 , 570 A.2d 387, 390 (1990); accord Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 , 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983); Fortuna v. Fortuna, 103 N.H. 547, 548 , 176 A.2d 708, 709 (1961).
Elizabeth S. Noddin
v.
Charles W. Noddin, Jr.
82-088.
Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
Jan 26, 1983.
455 A.2d 1051
Law Offices of Stanton E. Tefft, of Bedford (Daniel J. Harkinson on the brief, and Mr. Tefft orally), for the plaintiff., Eaton, Solms, Mills & Mclninch, of Manchester (Douglas A. Mclninch on the brief and orally), for the defendant.
Batchelder.
Cited by 58 opinions  |  Published
Batchelder, J.

The issue in this case is whether it was error to grant a modification of a support and alimony decree where the defendant brought about his reduced financial condition by his own criminal conduct and where the defendant still had an asset which could be applied to meet his support and alimony obligations. We hold that it was not unfair and improper to continue the original support order, and accordingly, we reverse and remand.

Charles and Elizabeth Noddin were divorced in December 1979 by a decree of the Rockingham County Superior Court which incorporated the parties’ stipulation as to support and alimony. The stipulation provided that the defendant, Charles, would pay the plaintiff, Elizabeth, $150 per week, fifty dollars to be allocated as alimony and $100 to be allocated as child support. Additionally, the jointly owned home was awarded to the plaintiff, with the provision that upon the sale of the house on or before January 1, 1986, the defendant would receive 25.1% of the proceeds.

In October 1981, the defendant filed a motion requesting that the support and alimony obligations set forth in the divorce decree be reduced because of a change in his financial condition. At the time of the divorce, he had been earning $23,000 per year, but because he had been arrested for stealing trade secrets from his employer, he was later fired from the position and was receiving considerably less income.

The plaintiff objected to the defendant’s motion and moved to have the court permit her to attach the defendant’s interest in the jointly owned home in the amount of the defendant’s then existing arrearage in child support and alimony. She also petitioned the court for permission to attach the defendant’s equity in the home when there[*75] were future arrearages because of the defendant’s failure to keep up with the $150-per-week support and alimony payments called for in the final divorce decree.

After a hearing, the Master (Earl J. Dearborn, Esq.) found that the defendant was unable to obtain employment similar to the position he had lost and was now employed as a surveyor’s helper at five dollars per hour, resulting in a net income of $165.35 per week. He also found that the plaintiff was, at the time of the hearing, gainfully employed with a net weekly income of $133. The master concluded that the defendant’s earning had been substantially reduced so that he was no longer able to meet his obligations set forth in the divorce decree. The master recommended that the child support payments be reduced to fifty dollars per week and the alimony payments be suspended.

In effect, the master denied the plaintiff’s motion to provide that the support and alimony obligations be assessed against the defendant’s interest in the house. He did, however, recommend that the defendant’s arrearage of $2,671.31 in alimony and support payments should be held in abeyance until the time the jointly owned home was sold and that the outstanding arrearage should then be deducted from the defendant’s share of the net proceeds of the sale of the house. The master’s recommendations were approved by the Trial Court (Nadeau, J.). The plaintiff appeals.

The plaintiff contends that because the defendant’s diminished income is due to his own criminal conduct, it was error to reduce his child support and alimony obligations, particularly where he had an asset against which these obligations could be applied. We agree.

A modification of a support order “will be set aside only if it clearly appears on the evidence that there has been an abuse of judicial discretion.” Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 42, 242 A.2d 78, 79 (1968) (citations omitted). Modification orders are measured in terms of the needs of the parties and their respective abilities to meet those needs, and trial courts, of necessity, are accorded wide discretion in regard to these determinations. Id. at 43, 242 A.2d at 79.

Recently, we have held that a trial court has the discretion to provide one party a security interest in property of the other party when modifying a support order, and that the rule prohibiting modification of property settlements does not shield property acquired pursuant to a divorce decree from the exercise of that discretion. Murano v. Murano, 122 N.H. 223, 230, 442 A.2d 597, 601 (1982); Dubois v. Dubois, 121 N.H. 664, 668-69, 433 A.2d 1277, 1279-80 (1981); see C. Douglas, 3 N.H. Practice, Family Law § 309 (1982).

[*76] Accordingly, if the trial court had ordered the defendant’s interest in the house held as security for future payments of the original support and alimony obligations, such action would not have been an abuse of discretion, because any of the defendant’s property may be applied to meet the support and alimony obligations. Dubois v. Dubois, 121 N.H. at 669, 433 A.2d at 1280.

To obtain a modification of support or alimony obligations, the defendant must show such a change in circumstances of the parties as to make the continuance of the original order “improper and unfair.” Fortuna v. Fortuna, 103 N.H. 547, 548, 176 A.2d 708, 709 (1961). In this case, we must determine whether the continuance of the original order was improper and unfair, and whether it was error for the trial court to grant a modification where the defendant had an asset which could be applied to meet his obligations, and where the change in his financial ability was due to his own misconduct.

Although unemployment or diminution of earnings is a common ground for modification, a petition for modification will be denied if the change in financial condition is due to fault or voluntary wastage or dissipation of one’s talents and assets. 2A W. Nelson, Divorce and Annulment § 17.16, at 87-88 (1961 rev. ed.). A Louisiana court has held that a request for modification of support was properly denied where a father brought about his own unstable financial condition by failing to show up for work, drinking in bars and, generally, not producing the work he was paid to perform. Baer v. Simon, 334 So. 2d 796, 798 (La. App. 1976); cf. Fortuna v. Fortuna, 103 N.H. at 549-50, 176 A.2d at 710 (defendant’s association with another woman increased his financial obligations, was assumed at his own risk, and was insufficient to warrant modification).

In the case at hand, the defendant was engaged in criminal activity at his own peril, and his reduced financial ability was due to his own fault. His child support and alimony obligations should not be reduced where his own conduct has resulted in his loss of high-earning employment and he has at least one valuable asset, while his former spouse and his child must make sacrifices. Modification of support decrees is an exercise of the court’s equity powers. Equitable relief will be denied if one comes to the court with unclean hands. See Morrill v. Bank, 90 N.H. 358, 368, 9 A.2d 519, 527 (1939). Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in modifying the defendant’s support and alimony obligations.

Reversed and remanded.

All concurred.