N.J. R. Evid. 608 (2026)

(a) A witness’ credibility may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation that relates to the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, provided that evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the witness’ character for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.

(b) (1) In a criminal case, a witness’ character for truthfulness may be attacked by evidence that the witness made a prior false accusation against any person of a crime similar to the crime with which defendant is charged if the judge preliminarily determines, by a hearing pursuant to Rule 104(a), that the witness knowingly made the prior false accusation.

(2) In a criminal case, a witness’ character for truthfulness may be attacked by evidence that the witness made a prior false statement tending to exonerate the defendant if the judge preliminarily determines, by a hearing pursuant to Rule 104(a), that the witness knowingly made the prior false statement of exoneration.

(c) Except as otherwise provided by Rule 609 and paragraph (b) of this Rule, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’ conduct in order to attack or support the witness’ character for truthfulness. In a criminal case, subject to the requirements in paragraphs (d), (e), and (f) of this Rule, the court may, on cross-examination, permit inquiry into specific instances of conduct that are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of:

(1) the witness; or

(2) another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined has testified about pursuant to paragraph (a) of this Rule.

(d) The proponent of the specific conduct inquiry pursuant to paragraph (c) of this Rule must show that

(1) a reasonable factual basis exists that the specific instance of conduct occurred, and

(2) the specific instance of conduct has probative value in assessing the witness’ character for truthfulness.

(3) If the witness is a criminal defendant, the proponent of the specific conduct inquiry pursuant to paragraph (c) of this Rule must give the defendant reasonable notice of the intent to cross-examine on the specific instance of conduct and the court must determine, by a hearing pursuant to Rule 104(a), that a reasonable factual basis exists that the specific instance of conduct occurred and that the specific instance of conduct has probative value in assessing the defendant’s character for truthfulness.

(e) Except as provided below, the court’s determination to allow inquiry under paragraph (c) of this Rule is subject to the balancing standard of Rule 403. If, however, the specific instance of conduct occurred more than ten years before the commencement of the trial, the court must find that the probative value of the specific instance of conduct in assessing the witness’ character for truthfulness outweighs any prejudicial effect.

(f) Inquiry into specific instances of conduct of a witness committed while the witness was a juvenile is generally not permissible under paragraph (c) of this Rule. The court may, however, permit inquiry into such conduct by a witness, other than the defendant in a criminal case, if the inquiry would otherwise be permitted under paragraph (c) of this Rule if the conduct had been committed by an adult and the court determines that the inquiry is necessary for a fair determination of the issues in the action.

(g) By testifying on another matter, a witness does not waive any privilege against self-incrimination for testimony that relates only to the witness’ character for truthfulness.

NOTE: Adopted September 15, 1992 to be effective July 1, 1993; caption amended, paragraph (a) text amended, paragraph (b) amended and redesignated as (b)(1), new text added in paragraph (b)(2), new paragraphs (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) added September 16, 2019 to be effective July 1, 2020.