New Jersey Statutes
N.J. Stat. § 2C:29-1 (2026)
Obstructing administration of law or other governmental function
✓ current as of May 2026 Cite as: N.J. Stat. § 2C:29-1 (2026)
2C:29-1. Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function. a. A person commits an offense if he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully performing an official function by means of flight, intimidation, force, violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by means of any independently unlawful act. This section does not apply to failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative interference with governmental functions.
b. An offense under this section is a crime of the fourth degree if the actor obstructs the detection or investigation of a crime or the prosecution of a person for a crime, otherwise it is a disorderly persons offense.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 199
cases (95 in the last 5 years), 1988–2026 · leading case: State v. Fede
State v. Fede (2019)
“Recognizing that "[a] necessary element of [ N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 ] requires defendant to have affirmatively taken some action to physically interfere, or place an obstacle, to prevent the police from performing their official function," the court nevertheless concluded that because…”
Don Karns v. Kathleen Shanahan (2018)
“Believing that Karns and Parker were interfering with their investigation by failing to produce sufficient identification, the officers then arrested Karns and Parker and charged them each with one count of obstruction under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-1(a) and one count of…”
Trafton v. City of Woodbury (2011)
“Eventually the handcuffs were removed and Plaintiff was charged with three offenses, (1) obstructing the administration of law, in violation of NJSA 2C:29-1, (2) disorderly conduct, in violation of NJSA 2C:33-2(a) and (3) resisting arrest, in violation of NJSA 2C:29-2.”
Hill v. Algor (2000)
“Ultimately, Hill was charged with obstruction of justice in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 and released from the Barracks between 4:30 a.”
State v. Twiggs (2018)
“2C:28-6(1) ; fourth-degree obstructing the administration of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 ; and third-degree hindering the apprehension of another, N.”
State of New Jersey v. Michael Richard Powers (2016)
“" N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). The State claimed that by way of "physical interference" and by means of an "independently unlawful act" defendant obstructed a state trooper in the issuance of a summons for a parking violation at a New Jersey Turnpike rest stop.”
New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (2016)
“2C:29-2(a); and obstruction, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). The record does not disclose the status of these criminal charges.”
Panarello v. City of Vineland (2016)
“(Off Defs.’ SMF ¶ 62; Pis.’ Cross Mot. SMF ¶¶ 26-28.”
State of New Jersey v. James E. Jones and Likisha (2016)
“2C:28-6(1), hindering, and fourth-degree obstruction, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). We affirm the denial of the motion, albeit for different reasons,4 as to the conspiracy count.”
State v. R.J.M. (2018)
“2C:29-2(a)(3)(a), fourth-degree obstructing the administration of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(b), and fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.”
State v. Andrews (2018)
“2C:29-3(a)(2) (counts three and four); and fourth-degree obstruction of the administration of the law or government function, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 (counts five and six). In January 2017, the State filed a motion to compel defendant to disclose the passcodes required to…”
State of New Jersey v. Ramier A. Dunbar (2014)
“2C:29-2(a) (count four); and fourth-degree obstruction of the administration of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 (count five). Based on the facts we have recounted above, drawn from Perez's testimony at the suppression hearing, the trial judge granted defendant's motion and suppressed all…”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:29-1(a) — 108 cases
State v. Fede (2019)
“Recognizing that "[a] necessary element of [ N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 ] requires defendant to have affirmatively taken some action to physically interfere, or place an obstacle, to prevent the police from performing their official function," the court nevertheless concluded that because…”
Don Karns v. Kathleen Shanahan (2018)
“Believing that Karns and Parker were interfering with their investigation by failing to produce sufficient identification, the officers then arrested Karns and Parker and charged them each with one count of obstruction under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-1(a) and one count of…”
State of New Jersey v. Michael Richard Powers (2016)
“" N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). The State claimed that by way of "physical interference" and by means of an "independently unlawful act" defendant obstructed a state trooper in the issuance of a summons for a parking violation at a New Jersey Turnpike rest stop.”
New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (2016)
“2C:29-2(a); and obstruction, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). The record does not disclose the status of these criminal charges.”
State of New Jersey v. James E. Jones and Likisha (2016)
“2C:28-6(1), hindering, and fourth-degree obstruction, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). We affirm the denial of the motion, albeit for different reasons,4 as to the conspiracy count.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:29-1(b) — 22 cases
Don Karns v. Kathleen Shanahan (2018)
“Believing that Karns and Parker were interfering with their investigation by failing to produce sufficient identification, the officers then arrested Karns and Parker and charged them each with one count of obstruction under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-1(a) and one count of…”
State v. R.J.M. (2018)
“2C:29-2(a)(3)(a), fourth-degree obstructing the administration of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(b), and fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.”
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RODNEY CAUTHEN (15-06-0710 AND 15-01-0017, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (2018)
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