N.J. Stat. » Title 2C — THE NEW JERSEY CODE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
New Jersey Statutes

N.J. Stat. § 2C:29-9 (2026)

Contempt

✓ current as of May 2026
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2C:29-9. Contempt. a. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if the person purposely or knowingly disobeys a judicial order or protective order, pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1985, c.250 (C.2C:28-5.1), or hinders, obstructs, or impedes the effectuation of a judicial order or the exercise of jurisdiction over any person, thing, or controversy by a court, administrative body, or investigative entity, or purposely or knowingly violates a condition to avoid all contact with an alleged victim or a condition of home detention with or without the use of an approved electronic monitoring device, ordered pursuant to subparagraph (b) of paragraph (1) or subparagraph (k) of paragraph (2) of subsection b. of section 3 of P.L. 2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-17), when the conduct which constitutes the violation could also constitute a crime or a disorderly persons offense.

(2) In all other cases a person is guilty of a disorderly persons offense if that person purposely or knowingly violates a condition to avoid contact with an alleged victim or a condition of home detention with or without the use of an approved electronic monitoring device.

b. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if that person purposely or knowingly violates any provision in an order entered under the provisions of the "Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991," P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et al.) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States when the conduct which constitutes the violation could also constitute a crime or a disorderly persons offense.

Orders entered pursuant to paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (8), and (9) of subsection b. of section 13 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-29) or substantially similar orders entered under the laws of another state or the United States shall be excluded from the provisions of this paragraph.

(2) In all other cases a person is guilty of a disorderly persons offense if that person purposely or knowingly violates an order entered under the provisions of the "Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991," P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et al.) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States.

Orders entered pursuant to paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (8), and (9) of subsection b. of section 13 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-29) or substantially similar orders entered under the laws of another state or the United States shall be excluded from the provisions of this paragraph.

c. A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if that person purposely or knowingly violates any provision in an order entered under the provisions of section 3 of P.L.1996, c.39 (C.2C:12-10.1) or section 2 of P.L.1999, c.47 (C.2C:12-10.2) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States when the conduct which constitutes the violation could also constitute a crime or a disorderly persons offense.

d. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if that person purposely or knowingly violates any provision in an order entered under the provisions of P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-13 et al.) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States when the conduct which constitutes the violation could also constitute a crime or a disorderly persons offense.

(2) In all other cases a person is guilty of a disorderly persons offense if that person purposely or knowingly violates an order entered under the provisions of P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-13 et al.) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States.

e. A person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if the person purposely or knowingly violates any provision of an order entered under the provisions of the "Extreme Risk Protective Order Act of 2018," P.L.2018, c.35 (C.2C:58-20 et al.) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States.

As used in this section, "state" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an Indian tribe or band, or Alaskan native village, which is recognized by a federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.

(added)1981, c.290, s.34; amended 1987, c.356, s.9; 1988, c.28, s.3; 1991, c.261, s.18; 2005, c.333; 2008, c.81, s.3; 2015, c.141; 2015, c.147, s.10; 2016, c.93, s.3; 2018, c.35, s.12; 2023, c.46, s.1.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 133 cases (82 in the last 5 years), 2015–2026 · leading case: State v. McCray, 205 A.3d 1178 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019).
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State v. McCray, 205 A.3d 1178 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). · cites it 27× “We held that while we understood "that the court must have some means of enforcing orders involving juveniles who repeatedly run away from home or are chronically truant[,]" a charge under N.”
State of New Jersey v. D.G.M., 110 A.3d 978 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). · cites it 6× “Although the judge interpreted defendant's momentary filming of Joan as a form of "contact," we nevertheless examine whether defendant's 6 We question but need not decide whether the conduct criminalized by N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9 – the violation of an FRO – may encompass a violation…”
Smith & Wesson Brands Inc v. Attorney Gen. New Jersey, 27 F.4th 886 (3rd Cir. 2022). “See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-9(a). But even assuming there is a criminal analogue, two of the three guideposts the Supreme Court established in Sprint—whether there was an investigation leading to formal charges and whether there was wrongdoing to sanction—are not met here.”
State v. Hemenway, 185 A.3d 877 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018). · cites it 3× “When defendant refused to permit the officers entry into his residence to execute the search warrant, the officers lawfully arrested defendant for knowingly obstructing the effectuation of a judicial order pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(1). Once lawfully inside the residence,…”
State of New Jersey Vs. Antoine Mccray State of New Jersey Vs. Sahaile Gabourel (17-11-1346, Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide W-2018-3276-0906, Hudson Cnty. & Statewide) (Consol.) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). · cites it 25× “We held that while we understood "that the court must have some means of enforcing orders involving juveniles who repeatedly run away from home or are chronically truant[,]" a charge under A-3745-17T6 23 N.”
State v. Antoine McCray State v. Sahaile Gabourel (082744) (Middlesex & Hudson Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. 2020). · cites it 10× “And N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9 states that a violation of an order entered under a series of listed statutes or circumstances may be subject to a contempt prosecution.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Malik Kamara (17-12-1394, Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). · cites it 8× “2C:21-6(c)(1); and fourth-degree contempt of court for violating the court's pretrial release order, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a). Defendant and other individuals allegedly committed these offenses on August 2, 2017.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Aaron Norman (18-06-0956, Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). · cites it 8× “He was also charged in complaint-warrant W-2018-0092-1204 with fourth- degree contempt of court, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a). A judge entered an order releasing defendant subject to certain conditions.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Yusef Steele (09-02-0326, Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). · cites it 6× “See N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9. It is therefore clear that, despite the assistant prosecutor's misstatement as to the degree of the crime, the grand jurors previously received the correct instruction on the elements of the crime, which they declined to hear again.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Schuyler M. Drake (fo-02-0350-20, Bergen Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021). · cites it 6× “. . ." In this matter there is no dispute that an FRO had been entered against defendant, that defendant knew the FRO was entered, and that he had been served with a copy of the FRO.”
State of New Jersey v. Lucia Manzano (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2023). · cites it 5× “The State charged defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(1) with contempt of the TRO entered pursuant to the PDVA.”
State of New Jersey Vs. A.D. (fo-02-0422-18, Bergen Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). · cites it 4× “The State Failed to Prove Beyond a Reasonable Doubt That Defendant's Communication to His Son in the Presence of the Protected Party was a Knowing Contempt in Violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9[(b)]. A-0394-18T2 6 1. The State failed to prove any violation of the express terms of the…”
Show all 133 citing cases →
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:29-9(a) — 28 cases
State v. McCray, 205 A.3d 1178 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). “We held that while we understood "that the court must have some means of enforcing orders involving juveniles who repeatedly run away from home or are chronically truant[,]" a charge under N.”
Smith & Wesson Brands Inc v. Attorney Gen. New Jersey, 27 F.4th 886 (3rd Cir. 2022). “See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-9(a). But even assuming there is a criminal analogue, two of the three guideposts the Supreme Court established in Sprint—whether there was an investigation leading to formal charges and whether there was wrongdoing to sanction—are not met here.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Antoine Mccray State of New Jersey Vs. Sahaile Gabourel (17-11-1346, Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide W-2018-3276-0906, Hudson Cnty. & Statewide) (Consol.) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). “We held that while we understood "that the court must have some means of enforcing orders involving juveniles who repeatedly run away from home or are chronically truant[,]" a charge under A-3745-17T6 23 N.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Malik Kamara (17-12-1394, Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). “2C:21-6(c)(1); and fourth-degree contempt of court for violating the court's pretrial release order, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a). Defendant and other individuals allegedly committed these offenses on August 2, 2017.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Aaron Norman (18-06-0956, Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). “He was also charged in complaint-warrant W-2018-0092-1204 with fourth- degree contempt of court, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a). A judge entered an order releasing defendant subject to certain conditions.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:29-9(a)(1) — 1 case
State of New Jersey v. Kevin M. Colvell (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:29-9(a)(2) — 1 case
In Re Registrant S.O. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:29-9(b) — 58 cases
State of New Jersey v. D.G.M., 110 A.3d 978 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). “Although the judge interpreted defendant's momentary filming of Joan as a form of "contact," we nevertheless examine whether defendant's 6 We question but need not decide whether the conduct criminalized by N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9 – the violation of an FRO – may encompass a violation…”
State v. McCray, 205 A.3d 1178 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). “We held that while we understood "that the court must have some means of enforcing orders involving juveniles who repeatedly run away from home or are chronically truant[,]" a charge under N.”
State of New Jersey Vs. A.j.(fo-02-0280-15, Bergen Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).
State of New Jersey Vs. A.D. (fo-02-0422-18, Bergen Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). “The State Failed to Prove Beyond a Reasonable Doubt That Defendant's Communication to His Son in the Presence of the Protected Party was a Knowing Contempt in Violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9[(b)]. A-0394-18T2 6 1. The State failed to prove any violation of the express terms of the…”
State of New Jersey Vs. R.A. (09-10-1036, Burlington Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:29-9(b)(1) — 23 cases
State v. Hemenway, 185 A.3d 877 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018). “When defendant refused to permit the officers entry into his residence to execute the search warrant, the officers lawfully arrested defendant for knowingly obstructing the effectuation of a judicial order pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(1). Once lawfully inside the residence,…”
State of New Jersey v. Lucia Manzano (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2023). “The State charged defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(1) with contempt of the TRO entered pursuant to the PDVA.”
State of New Jersey v. Joshua Simmons (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2026).
State of New Jersey Vs. E.J.H. (fo-20-0144-20, Union Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021).
State of New Jersey v. E.G.L.-o. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2026).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:29-9(b)(2) — 37 cases
State of New Jersey v. N.S.T. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025).
State of New Jersey Vs. Calvin L. Sanchious, Jr. (fo-18-0237-19, Somerset Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021).
State of New Jersey Vs. D.O.P. (fo-04-0223-19, Camden Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021).
State of New Jersey v. Yobane Valdez (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2026).
State of New Jersey v. N.P. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2026).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:29-9(c) — 1 case
State of New Jersey Vs. Schuyler M. Drake (fo-02-0350-20, Bergen Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021). “. . ." In this matter there is no dispute that an FRO had been entered against defendant, that defendant knew the FRO was entered, and that he had been served with a copy of the FRO.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:29-9(d) — 1 case
B.C. Vs. V.C. (fv-03-1788-16 & Fv-03-1789-16, Burlington Cnty. & Statewide)(record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).
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