New Jersey Statutes
N.J. Stat. § 2C:33-2 (2026)
Disorderly conduct
✓ current as of May 2026
2C:33-2. Disorderly Conduct. a. Improper behavior. Except as otherwise provided in subsection c. of this section, a person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, the person:
(1) Engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior; or
(2) Creates a hazardous or physically dangerous condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.
b. Offensive language. A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense if, in a public place, and with purpose to offend the sensibilities of a hearer or in reckless disregard of the probability of so doing, he addresses unreasonably loud and offensively coarse or abusive language, given the circumstances of the person present and the setting of the utterance, to any person present.
c. Concealing identity. A person who attempts to conceal or conceals the person's identity by wearing a mask or disguise while engaging in a course of disorderly conduct, as defined in subsection a. of this section, with purpose to instill fear, hinder prosecution, or avoid apprehension is guilty of a disorderly persons offense.
d Disturbance at a public gathering. A person who acts with purpose to disrupt or cause a disturbance at a public gathering or event or who engages in behavior knowing that it will disrupt or cause a disturbance at a public gathering or event is guilty of a disorderly persons offense. For purposes of this subsection, a person who wears a mask or disguise solely for medical, religious, or expressive purposes shall not be deemed to have acted with purpose to instill fear, hinder prosecution, or avoid apprehension.
"Public" means affecting or likely to affect persons in a place to which the public or a substantial group has access; among the places included are highways, transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment houses, places of business or amusement, or any neighborhood.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 56
cases (29 in the last 5 years), 1988–2026 · leading case: Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417 (D.N.J. 2011).
Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417 (D.N.J. 2011). “Eventually the handcuffs were removed and Plaintiff was charged with three offenses, (1) obstructing the administration of law, in violation of NJSA 2C:29-1, (2) disorderly conduct, in violation of NJSA 2C:33-2(a) and (3) resisting arrest, in violation of NJSA 2C:29-2.”
State v. Hoffman, 695 A.2d 236 (N.J. 1997). “The commentary to the Final Report states: Special provision for these private annoyances is required since Section 2C:33-2 (Disorderly Conduct) is limited to disturbance of some general impact [as opposed to impact on a particular individual].”
Palma v. Atl. Cnty., 53 F. Supp. 2d 743 (D.N.J. 1999). “Section 2C:33-2A provides, in relevant part: A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof he (1) Engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous…”
Mantz v. Chain, 239 F. Supp. 2d 486 (D.N.J. 2002). “See N.J.S.A. § 2C:33-2(b) ("A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if in a public place, and with purpose to offend the sensibilities of a hearer or in reckless disregard of the probability of so doing, he addresses unreasonably loud and offensively coarse or…”
832 CORP. INC. v. Gloucester Tp., 404 F. Supp. 2d 614 (D.N.J. 2005). “17 See N.J.S.A. § 2C:33-2. Given that the overbreadth doctrine “has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged statute,” Broadrick, 413 U.”
United States v. Erick Garcia-Sandobal, 703 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2013). “§ 28-1322 (providing that “disturbing the peace” including any conduct that “disturb[s] the peace and quiet of any person”); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-2 (providing that “disorderly conduct” includes “[c]reat[ing] a hazardous or physically dangerous condition by any act which…”
Davis v. Twp. of Paulsboro, 421 F. Supp. 2d 835 (D.N.J. 2006). “Thus, Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims are at least to some extent a back-door attack on the constitutionality of New Jersey's disorderly conduct statute, N.J. Stat. § 2C:33-2. We note, however, that the New Jersey Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the statute.”
Demian Boroff v. N. Lynn, 643 F. App'x 130 (3rd Cir. 2016). “Stadium personnel then brought Boroff across the hall to the New Jersey State Police office where he was processed, charged with disorderly conduct under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2, and issued a summons. Two state troopers then attempted to escort Boroff out of the stadium.”
Wilkes v. Borough of Clayton, 696 F. Supp. 144 (D.N.J. 1988). “39:4-97), and disorderly conduct (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(2)). 1 While at the station, Ms.”
State v. Paserchia, 813 A.2d 556 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003). “THE MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE IS PRE-EMPTED BY N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2. A. The West Orange Ordinance 4-12.”
State of New Jersey v. Rodney J. Miles, 128 A.3d 700 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). “1 Prior to that proceeding, the disorderly persons offense of possession of a CDS was amended to the offense of loitering to possess marijuana, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(b)(1). The 2 A-2692-12T1 following colloquy took place between the judge and defendant: Q.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Darien D. Anderson(14-12-2063, Monmouth Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). “When N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2 was enacted in 1978, "tumultuous" was defined "as marked by tumult," "tending or disposed to cause or excite a tumult," and "marked by violent or overwhelming 8 A-0812-15T2 turbulence or upheaval.”
Morales v. Maxwell (D.N.J. 2022). “I will therefore 3 In their Answer, Defendants assert qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, see ECF No. 20 at 12, but they do not advance any specific legal arguments pertaining to qualified immunity other than the points raised concerning Count One in their Motion.”
Sanders v. Jersey City (D.N.J. 2021). “As to fighting, there is no evidence of Sanders attempting to fight the officers.”
Carr v. Cnty. of Camden (D.N.J. 2024). “NJS.A. § 2C:33-2(a); SMF 4] 6-7. From the record, the Court finds there is sufficient evidence to suggest Plaintiff was engaging in activities that fall into the scope of “improper behavior” as defined by N.”
State of New Jersey v. Michael L. Metcalfe (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025). “at 253-54 (emphasizing how purposeful conduct is integral of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)). Determining whether the defendant acted purposefully is a question of fact based on all the circumstances, including direct testimony and credible evidence.”
State of New Jersey v. John Molina (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2023). “N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2[(a)]. The court notes that although defendant was intoxicated at the time, his level of voluntary intoxication did not rise to a prostration of faculties that negates a necessary mental state (i.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Nasir Finnemen(a-07-15, Camden Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). “PER CURIAM Following a trial de novo in the Law Division, defendant Nasir Finnemen was convicted of disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2, and resisting arrest, N.”
Tarus v. Borough of Pine Hill, 105 F. App'x 357 (3rd Cir. 2004). “See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-2. 1 Tarus thus argues that Chief Welker acted improperly because his conduct did not meet the description of disorderly conduct as invoking violence or threats.”
Rowley v. Sullivan (D.N.J. 2020). “Montalto found Plaintiff guilty on the charge of disorderly conduct in violation of N.J.S.A. § 2C:33-2. At trial, Judge Montalto found that even if Plaintiff was not intoxicated, the facts still supported a finding that Plaintiff was guilty of disorderly conduct.”
Stankevicius v. Town of Harrison, New Jersey (D.N.J. 2022). “See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-2(a)–(b). whether an officer’s conduct violated a clearly established right,” it has “also acknowledged that the existence of disputed historical facts material to the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct will give rise to a jury issue.”
State of New Jersey v. Shakira A. Lasisi (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024). “2C:33-2(a), "[a] person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof," the person either "[e]ngages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior" or…”
State of New Jersey Vs. David J. Lomanto (15-04-0776, Ocean Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). “N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2 provides that: A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof he .”
State of New Jersey Vs. Leslie Knight (15-08-0569, Union Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021). “The State agreed to amend count four of the indictment, which charged defendant with theft by deception, and she pled guilty to disorderly conduct in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(2), a petty disorderly persons offense.”
Catalano v. City of Trenton (D.N.J. 2019). “Thus, because Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Officer Palinczar acted without probable cause in arresting and detaining Plaintiff for improper behavior, Plaintiff has stated a claim for false arrest and false imprisonment against Officer Palinczar.”
Richard Rivera v. Lake Como (3rd Cir. 2018). “) Rivera was found guilty in municipal court of Disorderly Conduct, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-2(a), and Resisting Arrest, in violation of N.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Collene Wronko (08-2018, Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020). “On November 23, 2014, defendant was arrested and charged in a summons complaint with a petty disorderly persons offense of disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(b); and disorderly persons resisting arrest, N.”
Rodriguez v. The State of New Jersey (D.N.J. 2021). “Moreover, pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 2C:33-2(a)(1), “[a] person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof he .”
Olexsak v. Jones (D.N.J. 2022). “) On that same date, the Disorderly Conduct, N.J.S.A. § 2C:33-2 charge against Plaintiff was dismissed.”
Jerald Lee v. Bd. of Trs., Etc. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024). “having entered a guilty plea to one count of petty disorderly person's Disorderly Conduct, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2[(a)](2); and [d]efendant’s criminal conduct related to, involved and touched upon his position as a police officer, contrary to N.”
In Re Registrant S.O. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025). “2C:29-2(a)(1); and disorderly conduct and offensive language, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(b). A-2878-23 5 where he slammed her back and lower buttocks into the dashboard, [and] then rammed her into the driver's seat screaming and yelling in her face," threatened her with a knife then…”
Alexander (D.N.J. 2026). “” 10 Pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-2, “a person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, the person engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or…”
In the Matter of the Appeal of the Denial of the Application for Firearms Purchaser Identification Card, Etc. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2026). “A SPPD officer conducted a background investigation, uncovering a twenty-year history of law enforcement encounters, including: • A 2003 conviction for disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a), from an arrest in Toms River for "creating a loud and profanity[-]filled disturbance…”
United States v. Vincent Livingston (3rd Cir. 2019).
State of New Jersey Vs. Rosemary Ekeada (a-07-17, Camden Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019).
State of New Jersey Vs. Marlin Schneeberger (12-16, Hudson Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019).
State of New Jersey Vs. Elman Marroquin (16-05-0284, Somerset Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020).
State of New Jersey Vs. Elman Marroquin (16-05-0284, Somerset Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020).
Yanley Sandy Vs. Twp. of Orange (l-2274-17, Essex Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021).
State of New Jersey Vs. Schuyler M. Drake (fo-02-0350-20, Bergen Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021).
State of New Jersey v. Jahmil Jasper (19-03-0841, Essex Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2022).
State of New Jersey v. Albert French (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2023).
In the Matter of John Shaw, Fire Lieutenant (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024).
Carranza Gomez v. Tsoukaris (D.N.J. 2020).
Cost v. Borough of Dickson City (M.D. Penn. 2020).
IMO Registrant R.H.: IMO Registrant T.L. (N.J. 2024).
State of New Jersey v. Leslie Knight (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024).
State of New Jersey v. Daiquan C. Blake (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024). “2C:33-1(b), in 2015, and one petty disorderly persons offense for disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(1), in 2016. He had one adult ordinance violation for improper conduct in 2016.”
Forsman v. Dykstra (D.N.J. 2023). “is not the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the Legislature under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(b) since . . . an involuntary single [expletive] said out of pain does not have the purpose to offend[.”
N.K. v. A.D. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025). “, plaintiff's husband, cross-appeals from the May 30, 2023, amended FRO denying his request for reconsideration of the March 22, 2023 FRO entered against him under the PDVA based on the predicate act of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a). Plaintiff contends the court erred by…”
State of New Jersey v. Meliton Alvarez (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025). “2C:29-1(a), and petty disorderly persons disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(1). A-2487-22 6 The jury found defendant guilty of petty disorderly persons harassment, 2C:33-4(c), as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault (count one); third- degree resisting arrest…”
State of New Jersey v. Michael Cirrincione (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025). “PER CURIAM Defendant Michael Cirrincione was arrested and charged with disorderly persons, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(1); obstructing administration of law, N.”
Yohananov v. Devine (D.N.J. 2025). “§ 2C:33-2 (disorderly conduct). With all this in mind, step back now to see the Plaintiff’s overall procedural due process argument.”
State of New Jersey v. Michael A. Howey (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2026). “2C:29-1(a), and disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(2). Defendant raises several procedural and constitutional arguments, including lack of jurisdiction and violation of his due process rights.”
Aksanov v. Harrah's Casino Hotel Atl. City, 109 F. Supp. 3d 709 (D.N.J. 2015).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:33-2(a) — 13 cases
Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417 (D.N.J. 2011). “Eventually the handcuffs were removed and Plaintiff was charged with three offenses, (1) obstructing the administration of law, in violation of NJSA 2C:29-1, (2) disorderly conduct, in violation of NJSA 2C:33-2(a) and (3) resisting arrest, in violation of NJSA 2C:29-2.”
Palma v. Atl. Cnty., 53 F. Supp. 2d 743 (D.N.J. 1999). “Section 2C:33-2A provides, in relevant part: A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof he (1) Engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous…”
Carr v. Cnty. of Camden (D.N.J. 2024). “NJS.A. § 2C:33-2(a); SMF 4] 6-7. From the record, the Court finds there is sufficient evidence to suggest Plaintiff was engaging in activities that fall into the scope of “improper behavior” as defined by N.”
Morales v. Maxwell (D.N.J. 2022). “I will therefore 3 In their Answer, Defendants assert qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, see ECF No. 20 at 12, but they do not advance any specific legal arguments pertaining to qualified immunity other than the points raised concerning Count One in their Motion.”
State of New Jersey v. John Molina (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2023). “N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2[(a)]. The court notes that although defendant was intoxicated at the time, his level of voluntary intoxication did not rise to a prostration of faculties that negates a necessary mental state (i.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Darien D. Anderson(14-12-2063, Monmouth Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). “When N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2 was enacted in 1978, "tumultuous" was defined "as marked by tumult," "tending or disposed to cause or excite a tumult," and "marked by violent or overwhelming 8 A-0812-15T2 turbulence or upheaval.”
Richard Rivera v. Lake Como (3rd Cir. 2018). “) Rivera was found guilty in municipal court of Disorderly Conduct, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-2(a), and Resisting Arrest, in violation of N.”
Stankevicius v. Town of Harrison, New Jersey (D.N.J. 2022). “See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-2(a)–(b). whether an officer’s conduct violated a clearly established right,” it has “also acknowledged that the existence of disputed historical facts material to the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct will give rise to a jury issue.”
State of New Jersey v. Shakira A. Lasisi (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024). “2C:33-2(a), "[a] person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof," the person either "[e]ngages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior" or…”
State of New Jersey Vs. Nasir Finnemen(a-07-15, Camden Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). “PER CURIAM Following a trial de novo in the Law Division, defendant Nasir Finnemen was convicted of disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2, and resisting arrest, N.”
N.K. v. A.D. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025). “, plaintiff's husband, cross-appeals from the May 30, 2023, amended FRO denying his request for reconsideration of the March 22, 2023 FRO entered against him under the PDVA based on the predicate act of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a). Plaintiff contends the court erred by…”
State of New Jersey v. Michael L. Metcalfe (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025). “at 253-54 (emphasizing how purposeful conduct is integral of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)). Determining whether the defendant acted purposefully is a question of fact based on all the circumstances, including direct testimony and credible evidence.”
In the Matter of the Appeal of the Denial of the Application for Firearms Purchaser Identification Card, Etc. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2026). “A SPPD officer conducted a background investigation, uncovering a twenty-year history of law enforcement encounters, including: • A 2003 conviction for disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a), from an arrest in Toms River for "creating a loud and profanity[-]filled disturbance…”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:33-2(a)(1) — 20 cases
State of New Jersey Vs. Darien D. Anderson(14-12-2063, Monmouth Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). “When N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2 was enacted in 1978, "tumultuous" was defined "as marked by tumult," "tending or disposed to cause or excite a tumult," and "marked by violent or overwhelming 8 A-0812-15T2 turbulence or upheaval.”
State of New Jersey v. Michael L. Metcalfe (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025). “at 253-54 (emphasizing how purposeful conduct is integral of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)). Determining whether the defendant acted purposefully is a question of fact based on all the circumstances, including direct testimony and credible evidence.”
Sanders v. Jersey City (D.N.J. 2021). “As to fighting, there is no evidence of Sanders attempting to fight the officers.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Nasir Finnemen(a-07-15, Camden Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). “PER CURIAM Following a trial de novo in the Law Division, defendant Nasir Finnemen was convicted of disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2, and resisting arrest, N.”
State of New Jersey v. John Molina (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2023). “N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2[(a)]. The court notes that although defendant was intoxicated at the time, his level of voluntary intoxication did not rise to a prostration of faculties that negates a necessary mental state (i.”
Rodriguez v. The State of New Jersey (D.N.J. 2021). “Moreover, pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 2C:33-2(a)(1), “[a] person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof he .”
Stankevicius v. Town of Harrison, New Jersey (D.N.J. 2022). “See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-2(a)–(b). whether an officer’s conduct violated a clearly established right,” it has “also acknowledged that the existence of disputed historical facts material to the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct will give rise to a jury issue.”
State of New Jersey v. Shakira A. Lasisi (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024). “2C:33-2(a), "[a] person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof," the person either "[e]ngages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior" or…”
State of New Jersey Vs. Rosemary Ekeada (a-07-17, Camden Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019).
State of New Jersey Vs. Marlin Schneeberger (12-16, Hudson Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019).
State of New Jersey Vs. Elman Marroquin (16-05-0284, Somerset Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020).
State of New Jersey Vs. Elman Marroquin (16-05-0284, Somerset Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020).
Yanley Sandy Vs. Twp. of Orange (l-2274-17, Essex Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021).
State of New Jersey Vs. Schuyler M. Drake (fo-02-0350-20, Bergen Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021).
Carranza Gomez v. Tsoukaris (D.N.J. 2020).
Morales v. Maxwell (D.N.J. 2022). “I will therefore 3 In their Answer, Defendants assert qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, see ECF No. 20 at 12, but they do not advance any specific legal arguments pertaining to qualified immunity other than the points raised concerning Count One in their Motion.”
State of New Jersey v. Daiquan C. Blake (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024). “2C:33-1(b), in 2015, and one petty disorderly persons offense for disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(1), in 2016. He had one adult ordinance violation for improper conduct in 2016.”
State of New Jersey v. Meliton Alvarez (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025). “2C:29-1(a), and petty disorderly persons disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(1). A-2487-22 6 The jury found defendant guilty of petty disorderly persons harassment, 2C:33-4(c), as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault (count one); third- degree resisting arrest…”
State of New Jersey v. Michael Cirrincione (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025). “PER CURIAM Defendant Michael Cirrincione was arrested and charged with disorderly persons, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(1); obstructing administration of law, N.”
In the Matter of the Appeal of the Denial of the Application for Firearms Purchaser Identification Card, Etc. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2026). “A SPPD officer conducted a background investigation, uncovering a twenty-year history of law enforcement encounters, including: • A 2003 conviction for disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a), from an arrest in Toms River for "creating a loud and profanity[-]filled disturbance…”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:33-2(a)(2) — 10 cases
Palma v. Atl. Cnty., 53 F. Supp. 2d 743 (D.N.J. 1999). “Section 2C:33-2A provides, in relevant part: A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof he (1) Engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous…”
Wilkes v. Borough of Clayton, 696 F. Supp. 144 (D.N.J. 1988). “39:4-97), and disorderly conduct (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(2)). 1 While at the station, Ms.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Leslie Knight (15-08-0569, Union Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021). “The State agreed to amend count four of the indictment, which charged defendant with theft by deception, and she pled guilty to disorderly conduct in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(2), a petty disorderly persons offense.”
State of New Jersey Vs. David J. Lomanto (15-04-0776, Ocean Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). “N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2 provides that: A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof he .”
Morales v. Maxwell (D.N.J. 2022). “I will therefore 3 In their Answer, Defendants assert qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, see ECF No. 20 at 12, but they do not advance any specific legal arguments pertaining to qualified immunity other than the points raised concerning Count One in their Motion.”
State of New Jersey v. Albert French (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2023).
State of New Jersey v. Leslie Knight (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024).
Jerald Lee v. Bd. of Trs., Etc. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024). “having entered a guilty plea to one count of petty disorderly person's Disorderly Conduct, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2[(a)](2); and [d]efendant’s criminal conduct related to, involved and touched upon his position as a police officer, contrary to N.”
State of New Jersey v. Michael A. Howey (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2026). “2C:29-1(a), and disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(2). Defendant raises several procedural and constitutional arguments, including lack of jurisdiction and violation of his due process rights.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:33-2(b) — 10 cases
Mantz v. Chain, 239 F. Supp. 2d 486 (D.N.J. 2002). “See N.J.S.A. § 2C:33-2(b) ("A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if in a public place, and with purpose to offend the sensibilities of a hearer or in reckless disregard of the probability of so doing, he addresses unreasonably loud and offensively coarse or…”
Sanders v. Jersey City (D.N.J. 2021). “As to fighting, there is no evidence of Sanders attempting to fight the officers.”
Morales v. Maxwell (D.N.J. 2022). “I will therefore 3 In their Answer, Defendants assert qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, see ECF No. 20 at 12, but they do not advance any specific legal arguments pertaining to qualified immunity other than the points raised concerning Count One in their Motion.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Collene Wronko (08-2018, Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020). “On November 23, 2014, defendant was arrested and charged in a summons complaint with a petty disorderly persons offense of disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(b); and disorderly persons resisting arrest, N.”
In Re Registrant S.O. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025). “2C:29-2(a)(1); and disorderly conduct and offensive language, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(b). A-2878-23 5 where he slammed her back and lower buttocks into the dashboard, [and] then rammed her into the driver's seat screaming and yelling in her face," threatened her with a knife then…”
State of New Jersey Vs. Nasir Finnemen(a-07-15, Camden Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). “PER CURIAM Following a trial de novo in the Law Division, defendant Nasir Finnemen was convicted of disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2, and resisting arrest, N.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Darien D. Anderson(14-12-2063, Monmouth Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). “When N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2 was enacted in 1978, "tumultuous" was defined "as marked by tumult," "tending or disposed to cause or excite a tumult," and "marked by violent or overwhelming 8 A-0812-15T2 turbulence or upheaval.”
State of New Jersey v. Jahmil Jasper (19-03-0841, Essex Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2022).
IMO Registrant R.H.: IMO Registrant T.L. (N.J. 2024).
Forsman v. Dykstra (D.N.J. 2023). “is not the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the Legislature under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(b) since . . . an involuntary single [expletive] said out of pain does not have the purpose to offend[.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:33-2(b)(1) — 1 case
State of New Jersey v. Rodney J. Miles, 128 A.3d 700 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). “1 Prior to that proceeding, the disorderly persons offense of possession of a CDS was amended to the offense of loitering to possess marijuana, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(b)(1). The 2 A-2692-12T1 following colloquy took place between the judge and defendant: Q.”
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