New Jersey Statutes
N.J. Stat. § 2C:40-26 (2026)
Operating motor vehicle during period of license suspension, fourth degree crime
✓ current as of May 2026
1. a. It shall be a crime of the fourth degree to operate a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension in violation of R.S.39:3-40, if the actor's license was suspended or revoked for a first violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) and the actor had previously been convicted of violating R.S.39:3-40 while under suspension for that first offense. A person convicted of an offense under this subsection shall be sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment.
b. It shall be a crime of the fourth degree to operate a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension in violation of R.S.39:3-40, if the actor's license was suspended or revoked for a second or subsequent violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a). A person convicted of an offense under this subsection shall be sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment.
c. Notwithstanding the term of imprisonment provided under N.J.S.2C:43-6 and the provisions of subsection e. of N.J.S.2C:44-1, if a person is convicted of a crime under this section the sentence imposed shall include a fixed minimum sentence of not less than 180 days during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 87
cases (22 in the last 5 years), 2014–2026 · leading case: State v. Rene M. Rodriguez (081046) (Camden Cnty. & Statewide), 207 A.3d 1269 (N.J. 2019).
State v. Rene M. Rodriguez (081046) (Camden Cnty. & Statewide), 207 A.3d 1269 (N.J. 2019). “**108 In these consolidated appeals, defendants were convicted of fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension for driving while intoxicated (DWI) under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26. Their sentences were each to be served intermittently on nights or…”
State of New Jersey v. Idris R. Perry, 110 A.3d 122 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). “Defendants distinguish Zalta, responding that to extend the meaning of "the period of license suspension" as the State proposes violates the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 and renders the statute both unworkable and unconstitutional.”
State v. Rodriguez, 185 A.3d 221 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018). “N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26. The statute prescribes a sentence of a "fixed minimum" term of at least 180 days without parole eligibility.”
State of New Jersey v. Steven Rizzitello, 147 A.3d 480 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016). “An Ocean County Grand Jury indicted defendant Steven Rizzitello on a single count of fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension for a second or subsequent conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI),1 in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b).…”
State of New Jersey v. Robert Luzhak, 137 A.3d 555 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016). “When N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 was enacted in 2009, L.”
State of New Jersey v. James W. French, 98 A.3d 603 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014). “N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 provides in pertinent part: b.”
State of New Jersey v. Melvin Hester, 157 A.3d 865 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). “2C:40-26(b) (effective August 1, 2011), which makes it a fourth-degree crime for a motorist to operate a vehicle at a time when his driver's license has been suspended or revoked for a second or subsequent conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The defendant had been…”
State v. Sutherland, 176 A.3d 775 (N.J. 2018). “On June 2, 2014, defendant was charged in municipal court with fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26. A Morris County grand jury later indicted defendant and charged him with fourth-degree operating a…”
State v. Locane, 184 A.3d 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018). “In 2011, the Legislature even made driving with a license suspended under N.”
State v. Dougherty, 189 A.3d 932 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018). “"When N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 was enacted in 2009, L.”
State of New Jersey v. Michelle Toussaint, 114 A.3d 1016 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). “In 2009, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26, making it a crime to violate N.”
State of New Jersey v. John D. Harris, III, 106 A.3d 1265 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). “N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 provides: a. It shall be a crime of the fourth degree to operate a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension .”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:40-26(a) — 8 cases
State of New Jersey v. Idris R. Perry, 110 A.3d 122 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). “Defendants distinguish Zalta, responding that to extend the meaning of "the period of license suspension" as the State proposes violates the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 and renders the statute both unworkable and unconstitutional.”
State v. Rene M. Rodriguez (081046) (Camden Cnty. & Statewide), 207 A.3d 1269 (N.J. 2019). “**108 In these consolidated appeals, defendants were convicted of fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension for driving while intoxicated (DWI) under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26. Their sentences were each to be served intermittently on nights or…”
State v. Rodriguez, 185 A.3d 221 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018). “N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26. The statute prescribes a sentence of a "fixed minimum" term of at least 180 days without parole eligibility.”
State of New Jersey Vs. James W. Bollinger (13-10-0973, Cape May Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).
State of New Jersey Vs. Pierre R. Crumpler (15-11-0740, Union Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:40-26(b) — 75 cases
State of New Jersey v. Steven Rizzitello, 147 A.3d 480 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016). “An Ocean County Grand Jury indicted defendant Steven Rizzitello on a single count of fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension for a second or subsequent conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI),1 in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b).…”
State of New Jersey v. Robert Luzhak, 137 A.3d 555 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016). “When N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 was enacted in 2009, L.”
State of New Jersey v. Melvin Hester, 157 A.3d 865 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). “2C:40-26(b) (effective August 1, 2011), which makes it a fourth-degree crime for a motorist to operate a vehicle at a time when his driver's license has been suspended or revoked for a second or subsequent conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The defendant had been…”
State of New Jersey v. James W. French, 98 A.3d 603 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014). “N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 provides in pertinent part: b.”
State of New Jersey v. Idris R. Perry, 110 A.3d 122 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). “Defendants distinguish Zalta, responding that to extend the meaning of "the period of license suspension" as the State proposes violates the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 and renders the statute both unworkable and unconstitutional.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:40-26(c) — 26 cases
State v. Rene M. Rodriguez (081046) (Camden Cnty. & Statewide), 207 A.3d 1269 (N.J. 2019). “**108 In these consolidated appeals, defendants were convicted of fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension for driving while intoxicated (DWI) under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26. Their sentences were each to be served intermittently on nights or…”
State v. Rodriguez, 185 A.3d 221 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018). “N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26. The statute prescribes a sentence of a "fixed minimum" term of at least 180 days without parole eligibility.”
State of New Jersey v. Michelle Toussaint, 114 A.3d 1016 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). “In 2009, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26, making it a crime to violate N.”
State of New Jersey v. James W. French, 98 A.3d 603 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014). “N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 provides in pertinent part: b.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Andres I. Chavarria (18-10-0303 & 18-10-0304, Sussex Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020).
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