2C:14-1. Definitions. The following definitions apply to this chapter:
a. "Actor" means a person accused of an offense proscribed under this act;
b. "Victim" means a person alleging to have been subjected to offenses proscribed by this act;
c. "Sexual penetration" means vaginal intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse between persons or insertion of the hand, finger or object into the anus or vagina either by the actor or upon the actor's instruction. The depth of insertion shall not be relevant as to the question of commission of the crime;
d. "Sexual contact" means an intentional touching by the victim or actor, either directly or through clothing, of the victim's or actor's intimate parts for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim or sexually arousing or sexually gratifying the actor. Sexual contact of the actor with himself must be in view of the victim whom the actor knows to be present;
e. "Intimate parts" means the following body parts: sexual organs, genital area, anal area, inner thigh, groin, buttock or breast of a person;
f. "Severe personal injury" means severe bodily injury, disfigurement, disease, incapacitating mental anguish or chronic pain;
g. "Physically helpless" means that condition in which a person is unconscious or is physically unable to flee or is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to act;
h. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2011, c.232)
i. "Mentally incapacitated" means that condition in which a person is rendered temporarily incapable of understanding or controlling his conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, intoxicant, or other substance administered to that person without his prior knowledge or consent, or due to any other act committed upon that person which rendered that person incapable of appraising or controlling his conduct;
j. "Coercion" as used in this chapter shall refer to those acts which are defined as criminal coercion in section 2C:13-5(1), (2), (3), (4), (6) and (7).
Notes of Decisions
Restrepo v. Attorney Gen. of US, 617 F.3d 787 (3rd Cir. 2010).
· cites it 2× “In Pennsylvania, an actor may be guilty of indecent assault, which is defined as a “sexual offense,” if he or she touches any of the "sexual or other intimate parts” of a person under the age of thirteen or, alternatively, under the age of sixteen when the offender is four or…”
State v. Twiggs, 187 A.3d 123 (N.J. 2018).
“For example, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1, relating to sexual offenses, defines "actor" as "a person accused of an offense proscribed under this act.”
State ex rel. A.R., 188 A.3d 332 (N.J. 2018).
· cites it 2× “" N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(d). 12 Because we resolve this case on state-law grounds, we need not tackle the constitutional issue at the heart of the Appellate Division's opinion-whether the admission of John's incompetent testimony denied Alex his Sixth Amendment confrontation right.”
State of New Jersey v. Keith Drake, 132 A.3d 1270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).
“In Mosley, we similarly ruled that NERA did not apply in a case of aggravated sexual assault by penetration of a minor less than thirteen years old, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(a)(1), again contrasting that "use or threat of immediate use of physical force is an element .”
State of New Jersey v. Gary Twiggs, 135 A.3d 981 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).
· cites it 2× “2C:1-14(e), (g), and (j), and N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(a)). The Court concluded "that the word 'actor' refers to a defendant- perpetrator of an offense and includes both principals and accomplices.”
May v. Ryan, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1145 (D. Ariz. 2017).
“§ 45-2-101 (67) (2016) (Montana); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-1(d) (West 2012) (New Jersey); N.”
State v. Kyle O., 703 N.W.2d 909 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005).
“§ 45-2-101 (67)(a) (2005); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-1(d) (West 1995); Wis.”
Luis Grijalva Martinez v. Attorney Gen. United States, 978 F.3d 860 (3rd Cir. 2020).
“” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-1(d). Section 3509(a) “defines ‘sexually explicit conduct’ to include ‘sexual contact[,]’ which refers to ‘the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with…”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:14-1(a) — 3 cases
State of New Jersey v. Gary Twiggs, 135 A.3d 981 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).
“2C:1-14(e), (g), and (j), and N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(a)). The Court concluded "that the word 'actor' refers to a defendant- perpetrator of an offense and includes both principals and accomplices.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:14-1(a)(1) — 2 cases
State of New Jersey v. Keith Drake, 132 A.3d 1270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).
“In Mosley, we similarly ruled that NERA did not apply in a case of aggravated sexual assault by penetration of a minor less than thirteen years old, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(a)(1), again contrasting that "use or threat of immediate use of physical force is an element .”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:14-1(b)(14) — 2 cases
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:14-1(c) — 20 cases
Keeley, 27 I. & N. Dec. 146 (2017).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:14-1(d) — 26 cases
State ex rel. A.R., 188 A.3d 332 (N.J. 2018).
“" N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(d). 12 Because we resolve this case on state-law grounds, we need not tackle the constitutional issue at the heart of the Appellate Division's opinion-whether the admission of John's incompetent testimony denied Alex his Sixth Amendment confrontation right.”
Restrepo v. Attorney Gen. of US, 617 F.3d 787 (3rd Cir. 2010).
“In Pennsylvania, an actor may be guilty of indecent assault, which is defined as a “sexual offense,” if he or she touches any of the "sexual or other intimate parts” of a person under the age of thirteen or, alternatively, under the age of sixteen when the offender is four or…”
May v. Ryan, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1145 (D. Ariz. 2017).
“§ 45-2-101 (67) (2016) (Montana); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-1(d) (West 2012) (New Jersey); N.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:14-1(e) — 6 cases
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:14-1(f) — 1 case
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:14-1(g) — 6 cases
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:14-1(h) — 2 cases
Keeley, 27 I. & N. Dec. 146 (2017).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:14-1(i) — 3 cases
Keeley, 27 I. & N. Dec. 146 (2017).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:14-1(j) — 4 cases
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