N.J. Stat. » Title 2C — THE NEW JERSEY CODE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
New Jersey Statutes

N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7 (2026)

Distribution on or within 1,000 feet of school property

✓ current as of May 2026
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1. a. Any person who violates subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:35-5 by distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog while on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property or a school bus, or while on any school bus, is guilty of a crime of the third degree and shall, except as provided in N.J.S.2C:35-12, be sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment. Where the violation involves less than one ounce of marijuana, the term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term which shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed, or one year, whichever is greater, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole. In all other cases, the term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term which shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed, or three years, whichever is greater, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $150,000 may also be imposed upon any conviction for a violation of this section.

b. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:35-12 or subsection a. of this section, the court may waive or reduce the minimum term of parole ineligibility required under subsection a. of this section or place the defendant on probation pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-2. In making this determination, the court shall consider:

(a) the extent of the defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses for which the defendant has been convicted;

(b) the specific location of the present offense in relation to the school property, including distance from the school and the reasonable likelihood of exposing children to drug-related activities at that location;

(c) whether school was in session at the time of the offense; and

(d) whether children were present at or in the immediate vicinity of the location when the offense took place.

(2) The court shall not waive or reduce the minimum term of parole ineligibility or sentence the defendant to probation if it finds that:

(a) the offense took place while on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or while on any school bus; or

(b) the defendant in the course of committing the offense used or threatened violence or was in possession of a firearm.

If the court at sentencing elects not to impose a minimum term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility pursuant to this subsection, imposes a term of parole ineligibility less than the minimum term prescribed in subsection a. of this section, or places the defendant on probation for a violation of subsection a. of this section, the sentence shall not become final for 10 days in order to permit the prosecution to appeal the court's finding and the sentence imposed. The Attorney General shall develop guidelines to ensure the uniform exercise of discretion in making determinations regarding whether to appeal a decision to waive or reduce the minimum term of parole ineligibility or place the defendant on probation.

Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to establish a basis for overcoming a presumption of imprisonment authorized or required by subsection d. of N.J.S.2C:44-1, or a basis for not imposing a term of imprisonment or term of parole ineligibility authorized or required to be imposed pursuant to subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:43-6 or upon conviction for a crime other than the offense set forth in this subsection.

c. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:1-8 or any other provisions of law, a conviction arising under this section shall not merge with a conviction for a violation of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:35-5 (manufacturing, distributing or dispensing) or N.J.S.2C:35-6 (employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme).

d. It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of this section that the actor was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property. Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under this section, or under any other provision of this title, that no juveniles were present on the school property at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session.

e. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for a violation of this section that the prohibited conduct took place entirely within a private residence, that no person 17 years of age or younger was present in such private residence at any time during the commission of the offense, and that the prohibited conduct did not involve distributing, dispensing or possessing with the intent to distribute or dispense any controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog for profit. The affirmative defense established in this section shall be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. Nothing herein shall be construed to establish an affirmative defense with respect to a prosecution for an offense defined in any other section of this chapter.

f. In a prosecution under this section, a map produced or reproduced by any municipal or county engineer for the purpose of depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or a true copy of such a map, shall, upon proper authentication, be admissible and shall constitute prima facie evidence of the location and boundaries of those areas, provided that the governing body of the municipality or county has adopted a resolution or ordinance approving the map as official finding and record of the location and boundaries of the area or areas on or within 1,000 feet of the school property. Any map approved pursuant to this section may be changed from time to time by the governing body of the municipality or county. The original of every map approved or revised pursuant to this section, or a true copy thereof, shall be filed with the clerk of the municipality or county, and shall be maintained as an official record of the municipality or county. Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude the prosecution from introducing or relying upon any other evidence or testimony to establish any element of this offense; nor shall this section be construed to preclude the use or admissibility of any map or diagram other than one which has been approved by the governing body of a municipality or county, provided that the map or diagram is otherwise admissible pursuant to the Rules of Evidence.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 346 cases (116 in the last 5 years), 1988–2026 · leading case: State v. Davon M. Johnson (080394) (Essex Cnty. & Statewide), 207 A.3d 1277 (N.J. 2019).
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State v. Davon M. Johnson (080394) (Essex Cnty. & Statewide), 207 A.3d 1277 (N.J. 2019). · cites it 24× “Caliguiri , we recognized the presumption against PTI for second-degree offenses could be applied to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 offenders because, at the time, a school-zone conviction required the imposition of a period of parole ineligibility.”
United States v. Julio Aviles, Sr., 938 F.3d 503 (3rd Cir. 2019). · cites it 2× “7 Aviles’s second New Jersey conviction, under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-7, presents a thorny issue unaddressed by Mathis.”
State of New Jersey v. Kashif K. Patterson, 89 A.3d 616 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014). · cites it 3× “2C:35-7 subject to Subsection 6(f), it would render superfluous the Legislature's listing of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 in Subsection 6(f).8 We decline to interpret Subsection 6(f) in a manner that would render "words in [the] statute surplusage.”
State v. Pressley, 181 A.3d 1017 (N.J. 2018). “2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(3) ; and third-degree distribution of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. The first charge related to defendant's possession of heroin at the time of his arrest.”
State of New Jersey v. Rodney J. Miles, 128 A.3d 700 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). · cites it 12× “Defendant was charged in a warrant complaint with possession of a CDS with intent to distribute on or near school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 and N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 5(b)(12).”
Andrew Shaw v. Jefferson Sessions III, 898 F.3d 448 (4th Cir. 2018). · cites it 2× “The record contains no conclusive evidence that Shaw admitted to or was convicted of a 2 The indictment contains two other charges, both of which were dropped: one for possession with intent to distribute twenty-five pounds or more of marijuana, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. §…”
State v. Mercedes, 183 A.3d 914 (N.J. 2018). · cites it 2× “According to the PSA, the first conviction was for distribution of a controlled dangerous substance on or near school property on March 15, 2010, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. The second charge, for the same offense, occurred on April 10, 2010.”
State v. Brimage, 706 A.2d 1096 (N.J. 1998). · cites it 2× “The Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office offered, in exchange for defendant’s guilty plea, to recommend the presumptive sentence for a third degree crime — four years incarceration — plus the mandatory three-year period of parole ineligibility specified in N.J.S.A 2C:35-7 for the…”
State v. Rodney J. Miles a/k/a Jamal D. Allen (077035) (Camden Cnty. & Statewide), 160 A.3d 23 (N.J. 2017). “1(b), and possession with the intent to distribute within a school- zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a). The loitering statute provides that a person commits a disorderly-persons offense if: 21 (1) he wanders, remains or prowls in a public place with the purpose of unlawfully obtaining or…”
State v. Shelley, 15 A.3d 818 (N.J. 2011). “In furtherance of that purpose, the Legislature mandated severe punishment for those who possess or distribute drugs in the safety zones established by those statutes.”
State of New Jersey v. Alfred W. Coursey, III, 139 A.3d 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016). · cites it 2× “28, 32, 43 (1999) (third-degree marijuana possession with intent to distribute in a school zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, an offense "carrying a mandatory term of imprisonment[,]" can be treated as included in Guideline 3(i)).”
State of New Jersey v. Deshaun P. Wilson, 121 A.3d 921 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). · cites it 3× “13 A-2097-12T4 The purpose of the statute, and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, is essentially the same: to protect those, predominantly children, in and around schools and public parks from exposure to the drug culture and perils of drug trafficking.”
Show all 346 citing cases →
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7(1) — 1 case
State of New Jersey v. Michael T. Weathersbee (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7(a) — 76 cases
State v. Davon M. Johnson (080394) (Essex Cnty. & Statewide), 207 A.3d 1277 (N.J. 2019). “Caliguiri , we recognized the presumption against PTI for second-degree offenses could be applied to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 offenders because, at the time, a school-zone conviction required the imposition of a period of parole ineligibility.”
State v. Rodney J. Miles a/k/a Jamal D. Allen (077035) (Camden Cnty. & Statewide), 160 A.3d 23 (N.J. 2017). “1(b), and possession with the intent to distribute within a school- zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a). The loitering statute provides that a person commits a disorderly-persons offense if: 21 (1) he wanders, remains or prowls in a public place with the purpose of unlawfully obtaining or…”
State v. Dickerson, 177 A.3d 788 (N.J. 2018).
State of New Jersey v. Kashif K. Patterson, 89 A.3d 616 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014). “2C:35-7 subject to Subsection 6(f), it would render superfluous the Legislature's listing of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 in Subsection 6(f).8 We decline to interpret Subsection 6(f) in a manner that would render "words in [the] statute surplusage.”
State v. Mercedes, 183 A.3d 914 (N.J. 2018). “According to the PSA, the first conviction was for distribution of a controlled dangerous substance on or near school property on March 15, 2010, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. The second charge, for the same offense, occurred on April 10, 2010.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7(b) — 7 cases
State v. Davon M. Johnson (080394) (Essex Cnty. & Statewide), 207 A.3d 1277 (N.J. 2019). “Caliguiri , we recognized the presumption against PTI for second-degree offenses could be applied to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 offenders because, at the time, a school-zone conviction required the imposition of a period of parole ineligibility.”
State of New Jersey Vs. Almark L. Alston (17-08-2074 & 17-10-2872, Essex Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020).
State of New Jersey v. Lamont Taylor (18-09-0532 & 18-10-0621, Union Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2022).
State of New Jersey Vs. Kurt T. Harris (18-07-0571, Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020).
State of New Jersey Vs. Frances H. Leszczynski (18-08-0606, Cape May Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7(b)(1) — 2 cases
State v. Rene M. Rodriguez (081046) (Camden Cnty. & Statewide), 207 A.3d 1269 (N.J. 2019).
State of New Jersey v. Lamont Taylor (18-09-0532 & 18-10-0621, Union Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2022).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7(b)(1)(a) — 1 case
State v. Davon M. Johnson (080394) (Essex Cnty. & Statewide), 207 A.3d 1277 (N.J. 2019). “Caliguiri , we recognized the presumption against PTI for second-degree offenses could be applied to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 offenders because, at the time, a school-zone conviction required the imposition of a period of parole ineligibility.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7(b)(2) — 1 case
State v. Davon M. Johnson (080394) (Essex Cnty. & Statewide), 207 A.3d 1277 (N.J. 2019). “Caliguiri , we recognized the presumption against PTI for second-degree offenses could be applied to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 offenders because, at the time, a school-zone conviction required the imposition of a period of parole ineligibility.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7(b)(2)(a) — 1 case
State v. Davon M. Johnson (080394) (Essex Cnty. & Statewide), 207 A.3d 1277 (N.J. 2019). “Caliguiri , we recognized the presumption against PTI for second-degree offenses could be applied to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 offenders because, at the time, a school-zone conviction required the imposition of a period of parole ineligibility.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7(c) — 1 case
State of New Jersey v. Jesus M. Herrera (18-08-0668, Passaic Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2022).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7(d) — 3 cases
State of New Jersey v. Ibrahim J. Eldakroury, 108 A.3d 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
State of New Jersey v. Ibrahim J. Eldakroury (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
State of New Jersey Vs. Corey Saunders (13-06-0852, Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7(e) — 4 cases
State of New Jersey v. Rodney J. Miles, 128 A.3d 700 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). “Defendant was charged in a warrant complaint with possession of a CDS with intent to distribute on or near school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 and N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 5(b)(12).”
State of Maine v. David T. Brown, 2019 ME 41 (Me. 2019).
State of New Jersey Vs. Antijuan M. Byers (13-06-1020, Monmouth Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018).
State of Maine v. David T. Brown, 2019 ME 41 (Me. 2019).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7(f) — 2 cases
State of New Jersey Vs. Jose Carrion (15-08-1788, Essex Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020).
State of New Jersey Vs. Marcus J. Covington (17-09-0163, Mercer Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7(n) — 1 case
State of New Jersey Vs. Antonio Winters (17-08-1700, Atl. Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020).
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