N.J. Stat. » Title 39 — MOTOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC REGULATION
New Jersey Statutes

N.J. Stat. § 39:6-70 (2026)

Hearing on application for payment of judgment

✓ current as of May 2026
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10. Hearing on application for payment of judgment. The court shall proceed upon such application, in a summary manner, and, upon the hearing thereof, the applicant shall be required to show:

(a) He is not a person covered with respect to such injury or death by any workers' compensation law, or the personal representative of such a person,

(b) He is not a spouse, parent or child of the judgment debtor, or the personal representative of such spouse, parent or child,

(c) He was not at the time of the accident a person (1) operating or riding in a motor vehicle which he had stolen or participated in stealing or (2) operating or riding in a motor vehicle without the permission of the owner, and is not the personal representative of such a person,

(d) He was not at the time of the accident, the owner or registrant of an uninsured motor vehicle, or was not operating a motor vehicle in violation of an order of suspension or revocation,

(e) He has complied with all of the requirements of section 5,

(f) The judgment debtor at the time of the accident was not insured under a policy of automobile liability insurance under the terms of which the insurer is liable to pay in whole or in part the amount of the judgment,

(g) He has obtained a judgment as set out in section 9 of this act, stating the amount thereof and the amount owing thereon at the date of the application,

(h) He has caused to be issued a writ of execution upon said judgment and the sheriff or officer executing the same has made a return showing that no personal or real property of the judgment debtor, liable to be levied upon in satisfaction of the judgment, could be found or that the amount realized on the sale of them or of such of them as were found, under said execution, was insufficient to satisfy the judgment, stating the amount so realized and the balance remaining due on the judgment after application thereon of the amount realized,

(i) He has caused the judgment debtor to make discovery under oath, pursuant to law, concerning his personal property and as to whether such judgment debtor was at the time of the accident insured under any policy or policies of insurance described in subsection (f) of this section,

(j) He has made all reasonable searches and inquiries to ascertain whether the judgment debtor is possessed of personal or real property or other assets, liable to be sold or applied in satisfaction of the judgment,

(k) By such search he has discovered no personal or real property or other assets, liable to be sold or applied or that he has discovered certain of them, describing them, owned by the judgment debtor and liable to be so sold and applied and that he has taken all necessary action and proceedings for the realization thereof and that the amount thereby realized was insufficient to satisfy the judgment, stating the amount so realized and the balance remaining due on the judgment after application of the amount realized,

(l) The application is not made by or on behalf of any insurer by reason of the existence of a policy of insurance, whereby the insurer is liable to pay, in whole or in part, the amount of the judgment and that no part of the amount to be paid out of the fund is sought in lieu of making a claim or receiving a payment which is payable by reason of the existence of such a policy of insurance and that no part of the amount so sought will be paid to an insurer to reimburse or otherwise indemnify the insurer in respect of any amount paid or payable by the insurer by reason of the existence of such a policy of insurance,

(m) Whether or not he has recovered a judgment in an action against any other person against whom he has a cause of action in respect of his damages for bodily injury or death or damage to property arising out of the accident and what amounts, if any, he has received by way of payments upon the judgment, or by way of settlement of such cause of action, in whole or in part, from or on behalf of such other person,

(n) In order to recover for noneconomic loss, as defined in section 2 of P.L.1972, c.70 (C.39:6A-2) for accidents to which the benefits of sections 7 and 10 of P.L.1972, c.198 (C.39:6-86.1 and C.39:6-86.4) apply, the injured person shall have sustained an injury described in subsection a. of section 8 of P.L.1972, c.70 (C.39:6A-8).

Whenever the applicant satisfies the court that it is not possible to comply with one or more of the requirements enumerated in subsections (h) and (i) of this section and that the applicant has taken all reasonable steps to collect the amount of the judgment or the unsatisfied part thereof and has been unable to collect the same, the court may dispense with the necessity for complying with such requirements.

The association may appear and be heard on application and show cause why the order should not be made.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1962–2025 · leading case: Cureton v. Eley, 683 A.2d 248 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
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Cureton v. Eley, 683 A.2d 248 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). · cites it 10× “Section 39:6-70(1) is identical to N.J.S.”
Proskurnja v. Elder, 180 A.2d 200 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1962). · cites it 2× “Plaintiffs having met all other requirements under the act, and the defendant being found financially irresponsible under section 39:6-70 of the act, there is no reason to bar their recovery from the Fund.”
Pearson v. State Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 114 N.W.2d 257 (N.D. 1962). · cites it 3× “N.J.S.A. 39:6-70. Moreover, even within the class of persons who qualify for relief, further limitations are imposed upon the amounts recoverable from the Fund.”
Sanders v. Hunter, 602 A.2d 809 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). “In every instance then, under sections 39:6-70(d), 39:6-78(c), 39:6-86.”
Mena v. Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund, 722 A.2d 128 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). “1, the Legislature has slightly reworded these disqualifications to incorporate again only certain of the general qualifications of the Fund Law.”
Brian Sarratt v. Nj Pliga (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024). “he time of the accident or operating an automobile in violation of an order of suspension or revocation, (d) the plaintiff has a cause of action against the operator or owner of the hit-and-run vehicle, (e) all reasonable efforts have been made to identify the vehicle and its…”
Gibbons v. Borough of South Plainfield (N.J. Tax Ct. 2025). “1973) (under the principles of statutory construction which require that words in a statute be construed according to their “ordinary and well-understood meaning,” the meaning of “spouse” in the Motor Vehicles Act, N.J.S.A. 39:6-70 “is clear” and indicates “a man or woman joined…”
Tracey v. Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund, 259 A.2d 276 (Md. 1969). · cites it 2× “Until 14 January 1962, 3 the New Jersey Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law, N.J.S.A. 39:6-70 provided : “The Court shall proceed upon such application in a summary manner, and upon the hearing thereof, the applicant shall be required to show “(c) He was not at the time of…”
— N.J. Stat. § 39:6-70(1) — 1 case
Cureton v. Eley, 683 A.2d 248 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). “Section 39:6-70(1) is identical to N.J.S.”
— N.J. Stat. § 39:6-70(a) — 1 case
Cureton v. Eley, 683 A.2d 248 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). “Section 39:6-70(1) is identical to N.J.S.”
— N.J. Stat. § 39:6-70(d) — 2 cases
Sanders v. Hunter, 602 A.2d 809 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). “In every instance then, under sections 39:6-70(d), 39:6-78(c), 39:6-86.”
Cureton v. Eley, 683 A.2d 248 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). “Section 39:6-70(1) is identical to N.J.S.”
— N.J. Stat. § 39:6-70(l) — 1 case
Brian Sarratt v. Nj Pliga (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024). “he time of the accident or operating an automobile in violation of an order of suspension or revocation, (d) the plaintiff has a cause of action against the operator or owner of the hit-and-run vehicle, (e) all reasonable efforts have been made to identify the vehicle and its…”
— N.J. Stat. § 39:6-70(m) — 1 case
Pearson v. State Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 114 N.W.2d 257 (N.D. 1962). “N.J.S.A. 39:6-70. Moreover, even within the class of persons who qualify for relief, further limitations are imposed upon the amounts recoverable from the Fund.”
— N.J. Stat. § 39:6-70(n) — 1 case
Cureton v. Eley, 683 A.2d 248 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). “Section 39:6-70(1) is identical to N.J.S.”
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