New Jersey Statutes

N.J. Stat. § 46:3-23 (2026)

Discrimination prohibited in promise, covenant, restriction

✓ current as of May 2026
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Any promise, covenant or restriction in a contract, mortgage, lease, deed or conveyance or in any other agreement affecting real property, heretofore or hereafter made or entered into, which limits, restrains, prohibits or otherwise provides against the sale, grant, gift, transfer, assignment, conveyance, ownership, lease, rental, use or occupancy of real property to or by any person because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, marital status or sex is hereby declared to be void as against public policy, wholly unenforceable, and shall not constitute a defense in any action, suit or proceeding. No such promise, covenant or restriction shall be listed as a valid provision affecting such property in public notices concerning such property. The invalidity of any such promise, covenant or restriction in any such instrument or agreement shall not affect the validity of any other provision therein, but no reverter shall occur, no possessory estate shall result, nor any right of entry or right to a penalty or forfeiture shall accrue by reason of the disregard of such promise, covenant or restriction. This section shall not apply to conveyances or devises to religious associations or corporations for religious purposes, but, such promise, covenant or restriction shall cease to be enforceable and shall otherwise become subject to the provisions of this section when the real property affected shall cease to be used for such purpose.

Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to bar any person from refusing to sell, rent, lease, assign, or sublease any room, apartment or flat in a dwelling or residential facility which is planned exclusively for or occupied exclusively for individuals of one sex to any individual of the opposite sex on the basis of sex. Nothing in this section shall be construed to bar any place of public accommodation which is in its nature reasonably restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex, which shall include but not be limited to any summer camp, day camp, bathhouse, dressing room, and comfort station, from refusing, withholding from, or denying to any individual of the opposite sex any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges thereof on the basis of sex.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 2 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2003–2024 · leading case: Niemann v. Vaughn Cmty. Church, 118 Wash. App. 824 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
Niemann v. Vaughn Cmty. Church, 118 Wash. App. 824 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “Some of the cited cases are from states that have specific statutory exemptions allowing religiously based restraints on real property alienation.”
John P. Gross v. Ocean Beach Surf Club Unit 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024). “2 There is no suggestion that the OBS Club has been using those criteria to exclude individuals from owning property in Ocean Beach.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.