New Jersey Statutes

N.J. Stat. § 59:9-2 (2026)

Judgments, interest, limitations

✓ current as of May 2026
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59:9-2. a. No interest shall accrue prior to the entry of judgment against a public entity or public employee.

b. No judgment shall be granted against a public entity or public employee on the basis of strict liability, implied warranty, or products liability.

c. No punitive or exemplary damages shall be awarded against a public entity.

d. (1) Except as provided in this subsection, no damages shall be awarded against a public entity or public employee for pain and suffering resulting from any injury.

(2) The limitation on the recovery of damages for pain and suffering pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply:

(a) in cases of permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement, or dismemberment where the medical treatment expenses are in excess of $3,600.00; or

(b) to an action at law filed pursuant to section 7 of P.L.2019, c.120 (C.59:2-1.3).

For purposes of this section, "medical treatment expenses" are defined as the reasonable value of services rendered for necessary surgical, medical, and dental treatment of the claimant for such injury, sickness, or disease, including prosthetic devices and ambulance, hospital, or professional nursing service.

e. If a claimant receives or is entitled to receive benefits for the injuries allegedly incurred from a policy or policies of insurance or any other source other than a joint tortfeasor, such benefits shall be disclosed to the court and the amount thereof which duplicates any benefit contained in the award shall be deducted from any award against a public entity or public employee recovered by such claimant, provided, however, that nothing in this provision shall be construed to limit the rights of a beneficiary under a life insurance policy. No insurer or other person shall be entitled to bring an action under a subrogation provision in an insurance contract against a public entity or public employee.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 142 cases (59 in the last 5 years), 1980–2026 · leading case: Kounelis v. Sherrer, 529 F. Supp. 2d 503 (D.N.J. 2008).
Kounelis v. Sherrer, 529 F. Supp. 2d 503 (D.N.J. 2008). · cites it 7× “Section 59:9-2 states: No damages shall be awarded against a public entity or public employee for pain and suffering resulting from any injury; provided, however, that this limitation on the recovery of damages for pain and suffering shall not apply in cases of permanent loss of…”
Ramirez v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 425 (D.N.J. 1998). · cites it 9× “Because the New Jersey Tort Claims Act bars recovery of punitive damages against a public entity, see N.J.S.A. § 59:9-2(c) 10 , plaintiffs common law claims against the County of Hudson, the Hudson County Sheriffs Office, and the Hudson County Correctional Center are dismissed…”
PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Dep't, 832 F. Supp. 808 (D.N.J. 1993). · cites it 3× “N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) provides: No damages shall be awarded against a public entity or public employee for pain and suffering resulting from any injury; provided, however, that this limitation on the recovery of damages for pain and suffering shall not apply in cases of permanent…”
Collins v. Union Cnty. Jail, 696 A.2d 625 (N.J. 1997). · cites it 3× “*412 Plaintiffs argument requires an analysis of N.J.S.A 59:9-2(d). That statute establishes a rule of absolute immunity when the threshold requirement is not met for certain categories of injuries.”
Carlino v. Gloucester City High Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.N.J. 1999). · cites it 4× “Thus, I find that Evans has failed to state a claim for emotional distress and, even if he had, such a claim is barred by N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:9-2 . Accordingly, I will dismiss Count Four of the Amended Complaint, which contains Evans’s claim for emotional distress.”
Thomas v. East Orange Bd. of Educ., 998 F. Supp. 2d 338 (D.N.J. 2014). · cites it 3× “Because she has not produced evidence of any physical injury resulting in medical treatment expenses in excess of $3,600.”
Gretzula v. Camden Cnty. Technical Schs. Bd. of Educ., 965 F. Supp. 2d 478 (D.N.J. 2013). · cites it 3× “*491 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:9-2 (d). The 1972 Task Force Comment to the NJTCA explained that “[t]he prohibition of recovery for pain and suffering reflects the policy judgment that in view of the economic burdens presently placed upon public entities the claimant should not be…”
Ward v. Barnes, 545 F. Supp. 2d 400 (D.N.J. 2008). · cites it 3× “2d 280 (holding that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:9-2 (d) does not protect defendant employees acting with willful misconduct).”
O'Donnell v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 199 A.3d 786 (N.J. 2019). “She contacted an attorney who, relying on a published Appellate Division opinion, 5 advised the plaintiff that her tort claim was premature because "her injuries did not appear serious enough" to recover non-economic damages under **349 N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). Ibid. Recognizing that…”
Brooks v. Odom, 696 A.2d 619 (N.J. 1997). · cites it 2× “” N.J.S.A 59:9-2(d). By comparison, the No-Fault Act permits recovery in cases involving: [ (1) ] death; [ (2) ] dismemberment; [ (3) ] significant disfigurement; [ (4) ] a fracture; [(5) ] loss of a fetus; [ (6) ] permanent loss of the use of a body organ, member, function or…”
Mantz v. Chain, 239 F. Supp. 2d 486 (D.N.J. 2002). · cites it 2× “Punitive Damages Defendants also move for partial summary judgment with respect to the demand for punitive damages contained in each of Plaintiffs state law claims.”
Rivera v. Gerner, 446 A.2d 508 (N.J. 1982). · cites it 2× “Gerner moved for a new trial, alleging various trial errors including the failure of the court to address section 59:9-2(d) of the Tort Claims Act earlier in the trial.”
— N.J. Stat. § 59:9-2(D) — 1 case
— N.J. Stat. § 59:9-2(a) — 2 cases
Coleman-Fletcher v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491 (3rd Cir. 1996).
— N.J. Stat. § 59:9-2(b) — 8 cases
STATE OF NJ, DEPE v. Gloucester Env. Mgt. Serv., 821 F. Supp. 999 (D.N.J. 1993).
Mark Cerkez v. Gloucester City, New Jersey (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024).
Mark Cerkez v. Gloucester City, New Jersey (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024).
— N.J. Stat. § 59:9-2(c) — 8 cases
Ramirez v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 425 (D.N.J. 1998). “Because the New Jersey Tort Claims Act bars recovery of punitive damages against a public entity, see N.J.S.A. § 59:9-2(c) 10 , plaintiffs common law claims against the County of Hudson, the Hudson County Sheriffs Office, and the Hudson County Correctional Center are dismissed…”
Thomas v. East Orange Bd. of Educ., 998 F. Supp. 2d 338 (D.N.J. 2014). “Because she has not produced evidence of any physical injury resulting in medical treatment expenses in excess of $3,600.”
— N.J. Stat. § 59:9-2(d) — 81 cases
Kounelis v. Sherrer, 529 F. Supp. 2d 503 (D.N.J. 2008). “Section 59:9-2 states: No damages shall be awarded against a public entity or public employee for pain and suffering resulting from any injury; provided, however, that this limitation on the recovery of damages for pain and suffering shall not apply in cases of permanent loss of…”
PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Dep't, 832 F. Supp. 808 (D.N.J. 1993). “N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) provides: No damages shall be awarded against a public entity or public employee for pain and suffering resulting from any injury; provided, however, that this limitation on the recovery of damages for pain and suffering shall not apply in cases of permanent…”
Collins v. Union Cnty. Jail, 696 A.2d 625 (N.J. 1997). “*412 Plaintiffs argument requires an analysis of N.J.S.A 59:9-2(d). That statute establishes a rule of absolute immunity when the threshold requirement is not met for certain categories of injuries.”
Ramirez v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 425 (D.N.J. 1998). “Because the New Jersey Tort Claims Act bars recovery of punitive damages against a public entity, see N.J.S.A. § 59:9-2(c) 10 , plaintiffs common law claims against the County of Hudson, the Hudson County Sheriffs Office, and the Hudson County Correctional Center are dismissed…”
O'Donnell v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 199 A.3d 786 (N.J. 2019). “She contacted an attorney who, relying on a published Appellate Division opinion, 5 advised the plaintiff that her tort claim was premature because "her injuries did not appear serious enough" to recover non-economic damages under **349 N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). Ibid. Recognizing that…”
— N.J. Stat. § 59:9-2(e) — 9 cases
Mantz v. Chain, 239 F. Supp. 2d 486 (D.N.J. 2002). “Punitive Damages Defendants also move for partial summary judgment with respect to the demand for punitive damages contained in each of Plaintiffs state law claims.”
Session v. I.T.O. Corp. of Ameriport, 618 F. Supp. 325 (D.N.J. 1985).
HAYES EX REL. HAYES v. Pittsgrove Tp. Bd. of Educ., 635 A.2d 998 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
Waldorf v. Borough of Kenilworth, 959 F. Supp. 675 (D.N.J. 1997).
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