N.M. Stat. § 30-1-12 (2026)

As used in the Criminal Code:

   A. "great bodily harm" means an injury to the person which creates a high
probability of death; or which causes serious disfigurement; or which results in
permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any member or organ of
the body;

   B. "deadly weapon" means any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded; or any
weapon which is capable of producing death or great bodily harm, including but not
restricted to any types of daggers, brass knuckles, switchblade knives, bowie knives,
poniards, butcher knives, dirk knives and all such weapons with which dangerous cuts
can be given, or with which dangerous thrusts can be inflicted, including swordcanes,
and any kind of sharp pointed canes, also slingshots, slung shots, bludgeons; or any
other weapons with which dangerous wounds can be inflicted;

    C. "peace officer" means any public official or public officer vested by law with a
duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for crime, whether that duty extends to
all crimes or is limited to specific crimes;

   D. "another" or "other" means any other human being or legal entity, whether
incorporated or unincorporated, including the United States, the state of New Mexico or
any subdivision thereof;

   E. "person" means any human being or legal entity, whether incorporated or
unincorporated, including the United States, the state of New Mexico or any subdivision
thereof;

    F. "anything of value" means any conceivable thing of the slightest value, tangible
or intangible, movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal, public or private. The
term is not necessarily synonymous with the traditional legal term "property";

   G. "official proceeding" means a proceeding heard before any legislative, judicial,
administrative or other governmental agency or official authorized to hear evidence
under oath, including any referee, hearing examiner, commissioner, notary or other
person taking testimony or depositions in any proceeding;

    H. "lawful custody or confinement" means the holding of any person pursuant to
lawful authority, including, without limitation, actual or conseructive [constructive]
custody of prisoners temporarily outside a penal institution, reformatory, jail, prison farm
or ranch;
    I. "public officer" means any elected or appointed officer of the state or any of its
political subdivisions, and whether or not he receives remuneration for his services; and

   J. "public employee" means any person receiving remuneration for regular services
rendered to the state or any of its political subdivisions.

History: 1953 Comp., § 40A-1-13, enacted by Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 1-13.

                                    ANNOTATIONS

Bracketed material. — The bracketed material was inserted by the compiler and is not
part of the law.

Furlough as "lawful custody or confinement". — Where, after defendant began
serving a sentence for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, the
metropolitan court released defendant on furlough and the furlough order imposed
limitations on defendant’s movement, required defendant to return to custody at the end
of the furlough period, and informed defendant that failure to return would result in a
charge of escape, Defendant continued to serve the sentence while on furlough
because defendant was in "lawful custody or confinement" while on furlough and
defendant was entitled to credit for the time defendant was on furlough. State v. Padilla,
2011-NMCA-029, 150 N.M. 344, 258 P.3d 1136.

Great bodily harm: evidence that injury has actually caused death may be used to
demonstrate the element of great bodily harm because, consistent with Subsection A of
this section, it establishes an injury that creates a high probability of death. State v.
Dominguez, 2005-NMSC-001, 137 N.M. 1, 106 P.3d 563.

Great bodily harm: death not equated with great bodily harm.— Comparing the
voluntary manslaughter statute with the shooting at or from a motor vehicle statute and
the statutory definition of great bodily harm in Subsection A of Section 30-1-12 NMSA
1978, it is clear that the legislature does not "equate" death with great bodily harm.
State v. Dominguez, 2005-NMSC-001, 137 N.M. 1, 106 P.3d 563.

Great bodily harm: construction with other laws. — Section 30-3-8A NMSA 1978,
construed with the definition of "great bodily harm" in Subsection A, includes a shooting
at a dwelling that results in death. State v. Varela, 1999-NMSC-045, 128 N.M. 454, 993
P.2d 1280.

Great bodily harm: protracted impairment. — Section 66-8-101B NMSA 1978, which
defines great bodily injury by a motor vehicle as "the injuring of a human being, to the
extent defined in Section 30-1-12 NMSA 1978, in the unlawful operation of a motor
vehicle," is not unconstitutionally vague. The term "protracted impairment" in Section
30-1-12A NMSA 1978 is capable of reasonable application by a jury of common
intelligence after consideration of the circumstances involved. State v. Jim, 1988-
NMCA-092, 107 N.M. 779, 765 P.2d 195, cert. denied, 107 N.M. 720, 764 P.2d 491.
Great bodily harm: serious disfigurement. — Under this section, the word
"disfigurement" has no technical meaning and should be considered in the ordinary
sense, as should the word "serious." State v. Ortega, 1966-NMSC-186, 77 N.M. 312,
422 P.2d 353.

Great bodily harm: high probability of death. — Sheriff's description of being choked
by defendant was evidence that the choking created a "high probability of death", which
is one part of the definition of great bodily harm. State v. Hollowell, 1969-NMCA-105, 80
N.M. 756, 461 P.2d 238.

Sufficient evidence of great bodily harm. — Where defendant was convicted of
causing great bodily injury by vehicle following a collision in which defendant’s vehicle,
while traveling on a state road, crossed the center lane and struck a group of
motorcyclists, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of "prolonged
impairment" where the victim testified that she experienced severe bruising, road rash,
and bruised ribs as a result of the collision, that the bruising and road rash covered her
right side, that she was unable to work for approximately a month, that for the first two
weeks, she was unable to move because of the extreme pain resulting from her bruised
ribs and that she still experiences pain resulting from the bruised ribs. State v. Cordova,
2016-NMCA-019, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-008.

Great bodily harm: mayhem. — The legislature adopted the definition in Subsection A
of Section 30-1-12 NMSA 1978 in an effort to cover, among others, the crime of
mayhem, originally enacted in 1853 to 1854 and compiled as former 40-30-1, 1953
Comp. State v. Ortega, 1966-NMSC-186, 77 N.M. 312, 422 P.2d 353.

Great bodily harm: establishing. — The conditions in Subsection A of Section 30-1-
12 NMSA 1978 are not cumulative, and only one need be shown in order to establish
"great bodily harm". State v. Bell, 1977-NMSC-013, 90 N.M. 134, 560 P.2d 925.

Great bodily harm does not require that disfigurement be permanent. State v. Bell,
1977-NMSC-013, 90 N.M. 134, 560 P.2d 925.

Great bodily harm: need not be proved solely by medical experts. — Furthermore,
the law does not require that "great bodily harm" be proved exclusively by medical
testimony. The jury is entitled to rely upon rational inferences deducible from the
evidence. State v. Bell, 1977-NMSC-013, 90 N.M. 134, 560 P.2d 925.

Great bodily harm: degree of bodily harm a question of fact. — Where the evidence
showed that defendants forcibly tattooed victim with a needle and India ink, which tattoo
extended from the back of the victim's neck to the center part of the waist and recited an
offensive sentence, it became a question of fact as to whether or not the injuries
sustained were sufficiently substantial to come within the statutory definition of "great
bodily harm". State v. Ortega, 1966-NMSC-186, 77 N.M. 312, 422 P.2d 353.
Great bodily harm: instruction on personal injury. — In a prosecution for criminal
sexual penetration, where the trial court gave the statutory definition of personal injury
appearing at Section 30-9-10C (now D) NMSA 1978, and also gave the statutory
definition of great bodily harm in Subsection A of this section in the instruction on first
degree criminal sexual penetration, the lack of additional definition of personal injury
was not error; if defendant desired that personal injury be further defined, he should
have submitted a requested instruction to that effect, and since he did not do so, he
could not complain of the lack of additional definition of the term. State v. Jiminez, 1976-
NMCA-096, 89 N.M. 652, 556 P.2d 60.

Deadly weapon: knife. — For a knife to be a deadly weapon it must come within the
portion of this statute as to any other deadly weapons with which dangerous wounds
can be inflicted. State v. Martinez, 1953-NMSC-031, 57 N.M. 174, 256 P.2d 791.

Deadly weapon: butterfly knife. — Where a defendant was charged with carrying a
concealed deadly weapon, the prosecution was not required to prove that the knife
could actually be used to inflict great bodily harm; the prosecution needed to prove only
that a butterfly knife was a switchblade. There was sufficient evidence that the knife
carried by defendant was a switchblade as defined in Section 30-7-8 NMSA 1978. State
v. Riddall, 1991-NMCA-033, 112 N.M. 78, 811 P.2d 576, cert. denied, 112 N.M. 21, 810
P.2d 1241.

Deadly weapon: wounds establishing deadliness of knife. — Where no one directly
testified the knife was one with which dangerous wounds could be inflicted, but the
wounds were described by the physician who treated the victim, and they were
sufficiently severe to keep him in a hospital under the doctor's care for a week, and in
addition, the scars caused by the knife wounds were shown to the jury, in view of the
depth and the length of the wounds the jury was fully justified in finding the knife used
was a deadly weapon, although the blade used was only about two inches in length.
State v. Martinez, 1953-NMSC-031, 57 N.M. 174, 256 P.2d 791.

Deadly weapon: other deadly weapons. — Under an aggravated stalking charge,
when the object or instrument in question is an unlisted one that falls within the catchall
language of Section 30-1-12B NMSA 1978, the jury must be instructed: (1) that the
defendant must have possessed the object or instrument with the intent to use it as a
weapon, and (2) the object or instrument is one that, if so used, could inflict dangerous
wounds. State v. Anderson, 2001-NMCA-027, 130 N.M. 295, 24 P.3d 327.

Deadly weapon: tire iron. — Defendant's use of a tire iron to break into a house fell
under the definition that defendant was "armed" with a weapon under this section. State
v. Alvarez-Lopez, 2003-NMCA-039, 133 N.M. 404, 62 P.3d 1286, rev'd on other
grounds, 2004-NMSC-030, 136 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699.

Deadly weapon: bullets not deadly weapon. — Defendant’s mere possession of
bullets did not constitute possession of a deadly weapon under Subsection B of this
section. State v. Galaz, 2003-NMCA-076, 133 N.M. 794, 70 P.3d 784.
Deadly weapon: jury to determine character of weapon. — The question of whether
a weapon is capable of producing death or great bodily harm or is a weapon with which
dangerous wounds can be inflicted is ordinarily for the jury who are to determine the
question by considering the character of the instrument and the manner of its use, either
by a description thereof (even though the weapon is not in evidence), or by viewing the
weapon admitted into evidence (even though it is not described). State v. Gonzales,
1973-NMCA-153, 85 N.M. 780, 517 P.2d 1306.

Deadly weapon: factual considerations. — Factors to be considered in determining
whether an instrument is a deadly weapon include the nature of the instrument, that is,
its size, shape, condition and possible alteration; the circumstances under which it is
carried, that is, the time, place and situation in which defendant is found with the
instrument; defendant's actions with regard to the instrument; and the place of
concealment. State v. Blea, 1983-NMCA-089, 100 N.M. 237, 668 P.2d 1114.

Deadly weapon: screwdriver. — Although the screwdriver was not introduced into
evidence, the jury could determine the factual question of whether a deadly weapon
was used by a description of the weapon and its use. State v. Candelaria, 1981-NMCA-
122, 97 N.M. 64, 636 P.2d 883.

Deadly weapon: brick wall. — Determination of whether a brick wall is a deadly
weapon is a question of fact for the jury or fact finder to determine, given the evidence
presented as to the manner and use of the wall. State v. Montano, 1999-NMCA-023,
126 N.M. 609, 973 P.2d 861, cert. denied, 126 N.M. 533, 972 P.2d 352, and cert.
denied, 127 N.M. 390, 981 P.2d 1208 .

Deadly weapon: baseball bat. — In a prosecution for aggravated battery with a deadly
weapon, the question of whether a baseball bat was a deadly weapon should have
been left to the jury; however, when such a determination is made by the trial judge, the
error is not fundamental and must be preserved for appeal. State v. Traeger, 2001-
NMSC-022, 130 N.M. 618, 29 P.3d 518.

Deadly weapon: jury to determine existence of weapon. — Whether defendant
actually had gun, defined in this section as a deadly weapon, whether loaded or
unloaded, in her hand as testified to by robbery victim was for the jury to resolve. State
v. Encee, 1968-NMCA-012, 79 N.M. 23, 439 P.2d 240.

Deadly weapon: insufficient evidence to show deadly character of weapon. —
Evidence that defendant raised an undescribed tire tool over attendant's head "like a
threat," without more, was insufficient for a determination that the tire tool was a deadly
weapon capable of producing death or great bodily harm or a weapon with which
dangerous wounds could be inflicted. State v. Gonzales, 1973-NMCA-153, 85 N.M. 780,
517 P.2d 1306.
Deadly weapon: pocketknife. — An ordinary pocketknife is not a per se deadly
weapon, without regard to its actual or intended use. State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC-050,
147 N.M. 182, 218 P.3d 868.

Deadly weapon: BB gun. — The defendant’s use of a BB gun during a robbery
provided a sufficient factual basis to permit a jury to determine that a deadly weapon
had been used because the jury could have concluded that the manner and character of
use of the weapon satisfied the definition of a deadly weapon. State v. Fernandez,
2007-NMCA-091, 142 N.M. 231, 164 P.3d 112.

Deadly weapon: the human mouth is a deadly weapon if the mouth is used in a
manner that could cause death or great bodily harm. State v. Neatherlin, 2007-NMCA-
035, 141 N.M. 328, 154 P.3d 703.

Peace officer: Subsection C inapplicable to capital felony sentencing. — The
definition of "peace officer" in Subsection C of this section is not directly applicable to
Section 31-20A-5 NMSA 1978 because that definition applies only to the Criminal Code.
State v. Young, 2004-NMSC-015, 135 N.M. 458, 90 P.3d 477.

Peace officer: legislature did not exclude jailers from definition of peace officers:
a jailer is an officer in the public domain, charged with the duty to maintain public order.
State v. Rhea, 1980-NMSC-033, 94 N.M. 168, 608 P.2d 144.

Peace officer: juvenile correctional officers were not peace officers within the
meaning of this section, where, although they may have had the power to maintain
order and make arrests in their particular domain, they were not vested by law with a
duty to do so. State v. Tabaha, 1986-NMCA-009, 103 N.M. 789, 714 P.2d 1010.

Public officer: officers of state game commission are state officers. Allen v.
McClellan, 1967-NMSC-114, 77 N.M. 801, 427 P.2d 677, overruled on other grounds by
New Mexico Livestock Bd. v. Dose, 1980-NMSC-022, 94 N.M. 68, 607 P.2d 606.

Peace officer: CSO. — Community service officers are peace officers. State v. Ogden,
1994-NMSC-029, 118 N.M. 234, 880 P.2d 845.

Person: MFA. — The mortgage finance authority, a state agency established to raise
funds through the issuance of tax-exempt bonds is a person within the meaning of the
victim restitution statute. State v. Griffin, 1983-NMCA-072, 100 N.M. 75, 665 P.2d 1166

Person: corporate defendant. — Although a corporate defendant may be charged and
convicted of the offense of racketeering, it was error to submit the racketeering charge
against the corporate defendant to the jury because the corporate defendant was not
specifically charged with commission of such crime in the indictment. State v. Crews,
1989-NMCA-088, 110 N.M. 723, 799 P.2d 592; cert. denied, 109 N.M. 232, 784 P.2d
419.
Lawful custody: electronic monitor. — The use of a conventional jail to hold the
person is not necessary for there to be a "lawful custody or confinement" under the plain
language of the statute. A "lawful custody or confinement" simply consists of the holding
of any person pursuant to lawful authority", and the actual means used to accomplish
holding the person is without limitation. A mandatory sentence or imprisonment may be
served under house arrest by an electronic monitor. State v. Woods, 2010-NMCA-017,
148 N.M. 89, 230 P.3d 836, cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-001, 147 N.M. 673, 227 P.3d
1055.

Special deputy. — Absent a limitation of authority a special deputy is a peace officer
and is cloaked with all of the powers and duties of such. 1966 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-92.

School security force. — Use of the term "peace officer" in describing security officers
who were regular employees of the school system organized into a security and patrol
force to guard school buildings and property would be improper. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen.
No. 70-87 (unofficial opinion issued to superintendent of Albuquerque public schools).

Law reviews. — For comment, "Definitive Sentencing in New Mexico: The 1977
Criminal Sentencing Act," see 9 N.M.L. Rev. 131 (1978-79).

For note and comment, "Criminal Law — Home Alone: Why House Arrest Doesn't
Qualify for Presentence Confinement Credit in New Mexico — State v. Fellhauer," see
28 N.M.L. Rev. 519 (1998).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Sufficiency of allegations or evidence of
serious bodily injury to support charge of aggravated degree of rape, sodomy, or other
sexual abuse, 25 A.L.R.4th 1213.

Corporation's criminal liability for homicide, 45 A.L.R.4th 1021.