N.M. Stat. § 30-31-22 (2026)

prohibited.
    A. Except as authorized by the Controlled Substances Act, it is unlawful for a
person to intentionally distribute or possess with intent to distribute a controlled
substance or a controlled substance analog except a substance enumerated in
Schedule I or II that is a narcotic drug, a controlled substance analog of a controlled
substance enumerated in Schedule I or II that is a narcotic drug or methamphetamine,
its salts, isomers and salts of isomers. A person who violates this subsection with
respect to:

       (1)    synthetic cannabinoids is:

          (a) for the first offense, guilty of a fourth degree felony and shall be sentenced
pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978;

          (b) for the second and subsequent offenses, guilty of a third degree felony
and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978;
           (c) for the first offense, if more than one hundred pounds is possessed with
intent to distribute or distributed or both, guilty of a third degree felony and shall be
sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978; and

          (d) for the second and subsequent offenses, if more than one hundred
pounds is possessed with intent to distribute or distributed or both, guilty of a second
degree felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15
NMSA 1978;

        (2)   any other controlled substance enumerated in Schedule I, II, III or IV or a
controlled substance analog of a controlled substance enumerated in Schedule I, II, III
or IV except a substance enumerated in Schedule I or II that is a narcotic drug, a
controlled substance analog of a controlled substance enumerated in Schedule I or II
that is a narcotic drug or methamphetamine, its salts, isomers and salts of isomers, is:

          (a) for the first offense, guilty of a third degree felony and shall be sentenced
pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978; and

          (b) for the second and subsequent offenses, guilty of a second degree felony
and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978; and

       (3)    a controlled substance enumerated in Schedule V or a controlled
substance analog of a controlled substance enumerated in Schedule V is guilty of a
misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars
($100) or more than five hundred dollars ($500) or by imprisonment for a definite term
not less than one hundred eighty days but less than one year, or both.

    B. It is unlawful for a person to distribute gamma hydroxybutyric acid or
flunitrazepam to another person without that person's knowledge and with intent to
commit a crime against that person, including criminal sexual penetration. For the
purposes of this subsection, "without that person's knowledge" means the person is
unaware that a substance with the ability to alter that person's ability to appraise
conduct or to decline participation in or communicate unwillingness to participate in
conduct is being distributed to that person. Any person who violates this subsection is:

      (1)     for the first offense, guilty of a third degree felony and shall be sentenced
pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978; and

      (2)     for the second and subsequent offenses, guilty of a second degree felony
and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978.

   C. Except as authorized by the Controlled Substances Act, it is unlawful for a
person to intentionally create or deliver, or possess with intent to deliver, a counterfeit
substance. A person who violates this subsection with respect to:
       (1)   a counterfeit substance enumerated in Schedule I, II, III or IV is guilty of a
fourth degree felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-
18-15 NMSA 1978; and

      (2)     a counterfeit substance enumerated in Schedule V is guilty of a petty
misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars
($100) or by imprisonment for a definite term not to exceed six months, or both.

   D. A person who knowingly violates Subsection A or C of this section while within a
drug-free school zone with respect to:

       (1)    synthetic cannabinoids is:

          (a) for the first offense, guilty of a third degree felony and shall be sentenced
pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978;

          (b) for the second and subsequent offenses, guilty of a second degree felony
and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978;

           (c) for the first offense, if more than one hundred pounds is possessed with
intent to distribute or distributed or both, guilty of a second degree felony and shall be
sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978; and

          (d) for the second and subsequent offenses, if more than one hundred
pounds is possessed with intent to distribute or distributed or both, guilty of a first
degree felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15
NMSA 1978;

        (2)   any other controlled substance enumerated in Schedule I, II, III or IV or a
controlled substance analog of a controlled substance enumerated in Schedule I, II, III
or IV except a substance enumerated in Schedule I or II that is a narcotic drug, a
controlled substance analog of a controlled substance enumerated in Schedule I or II
that is a narcotic drug or methamphetamine, its salts, isomers and salts of isomers, is:

         (a) for the first offense, guilty of a second degree felony and shall be
sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978; and

          (b) for the second and subsequent offenses, guilty of a first degree felony and
shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978;

       (3)   a controlled substance enumerated in Schedule V or a controlled
substance analog of a controlled substance enumerated in Schedule V is guilty of a
fourth degree felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-
18-15 NMSA 1978; and

       (4)    the intentional creation, delivery or possession with the intent to deliver:
          (a) a counterfeit substance enumerated in Schedule I, II, III or IV is guilty of a
third degree felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-
15 NMSA 1978; and

           (b) a counterfeit substance enumerated in Schedule V is guilty of a
misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars
($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) or by imprisonment for a definite term
not less than one hundred eighty days but less than one year, or both.

   E. Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection A of this section, distribution of a
small amount of synthetic cannabinoids for no remuneration shall be treated as
provided in Paragraph (1) of Subsection B of Section 30-31-23 NMSA 1978.

History: 1953 Comp., § 54-11-22, enacted by Laws 1972, ch. 84, § 22; 1974, ch. 9, § 3;
1977, ch. 183, § 1; 1980, ch. 23, § 3; 1987, ch. 68, § 4; 1990, ch. 19, § 4; 2005, ch. 280,
§ 6; 2006, ch. 17, § 3; 2011, ch. 16, § 2; 2021 (1st S.S.), ch. 4, § 67.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

Cross references. — For legal use of marijuana in research, see 26-2A-1 to 26-2A-7
NMSA 1978.

The 2021 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective June 29, 2021, removed the distribution of
marijuana from the application of the section; in Subsection A, Paragraph A(1), after the
paragraph designation, deleted "marijuana or"; and in Subsection D, Paragraph D(1),
after the paragraph designation, deleted "marijuana or".

The 2011 amendment, effective March 31, 2011, made it a crime to possess and
distribute synthetic cannabinoids.

The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, added a provision to Subsection A to
provide that it is unlawful to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and its
salts and isomers; added the provision to Paragraph (2) of Subsection A that a person
who violates Subsection A with respect to methamphetamine and its salts and isomers
is subject to the penalties specified in Paragraph (2) of Subsection A; deleted the former
provision in Subsection D that excluded private property residentially zoned or used
primarily as a residence; and added the provision in Paragraph (2) of Subsection D that
a person who violates Subsections A and C while in a drug-free school zone with
respect to methamphetamine and its salts and isomers is subject to the penalties
specified in Paragraph (2) of Subsection D.

The 2005 amendment, effective June 17, 2005, added Subsection B to provide that it is
unlawful distribute the specified chemicals to a person without that person's knowledge
with the intent to commit a crime against that person; defined "without that person’s
knowledge"; and provided that a first offense of violating Subsection B is a third degree
felony and a second and subsequent offense is a second degree felony.
The 1990 amendment, effective July 1, 1990, added Subsection C, designated the
former last sentence of Subsection B as present Subsection D, and made minor stylistic
changes in Subsections A and B.

                         I.     GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Title constitutional. — Sections 30-31-20 to 30-31-25 NMSA 1978, which define
unlawful activities and provide penalties therefor, are not unconstitutional on the
grounds that "unlawful activities" are not mentioned in the title of the act. State v.
Atencio, 1973-NMCA-110, 85 N.M. 484, 513 P.2d 1266, cert. denied, 85 N.M. 483, 513
P.2d 1265.

Greater penalty imposed on seller than on user. — The legislature clearly intended
to impose greater penalties on the seller of a controlled substance than upon the user.
State v. Sandoval, 1982-NMCA-091, 98 N.M. 417, 649 P.2d 485.

Marijuana use not intrinsic part of religion. — Where the evidence shows that
defendant's belief was derived from defendant's personal views of the bible, and those
views under the evidence are no more than that the use and distribution of marijuana
was permitted because marijuana is a gift from God, such a personal use does not
amount to an intrinsic part of a religion. State v. Brashear, 1979-NMCA-027, 92 N.M.
622, 593 P.2d 63.

Effect of Subsection C (now Subsection E). — The "notwithstanding" provision of
Subsection C (now E) does not provide for a lesser penalty for the first marijuana
distribution offense but rather affects only the penalties for second and subsequent
marijuana distribution offenses; for second and subsequent marijuana distribution
offenses that factually come within Subsection C (now Subsection E), the penalty of
Section 30-31-23B(3) NMSA 1978 applies, and a defendant thus avoids the higher
penalty stated in Subsection A(1)(b) of this section. State v. Bustamante, 1978-NMCA-
062, 91 N.M. 772, 581 P.2d 460.

Penalty applicable to drugs scheduled by regulation. — Express legislative
authority is not required to make the penalty provisions of the Controlled Substances
Act applicable to drugs scheduled by administrative regulation. State v. Reams, 1981-
NMCA-158, 98 N.M. 372, 648 P.2d 1185, aff'd in part, rev'd on other grounds, 1982-
NMSC-075, 98 N.M. 215, 647 P.2d 417.

Sections not conflicting. — There is no conflict between Subsection A of this section
and Sections 30-31-20A(3) and B NMSA 1978. State v. Atencio, 1973-NMCA-110, 85
N.M. 484, 513 P.2d 1266, cert. denied, 85 N.M. 483, 513 P.2d 1265.

Distribution of quaalude. — This section, and not Section 26-1-16A NMSA 1978, is
the appropriate legislation under which defendants are to be prosecuted for allegedly
unauthorized distribution of quaalude. State v. Reams, 1982-NMSC-075, 98 N.M. 215,
647 P.2d 417.
Sentencing under Habitual Offenders Act. — In 1983 the habitual offender statute
was amended to include persons convicted of narcotics offenses, overruling that part of
State v. Lujan, 1966-NMSC-051, 76 N.M. 111, 412 P.2d 405, which held that the
Habitual Offender Act did not apply to persons convicted under the Controlled
Substances Act. Minner v. Kerby, 30 F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. 1994).

Applicability of former habitual criminal law to burglary conviction after drug
offense. — There was no conflict between the provisions of Subsection A of this
section and Section 31-18-5 NMSA 1978 (repealed, see Section 31-18-17 NMSA 1978),
nor any legislative intent within the Controlled Substances Act, to prohibit use of a
Controlled Substances Act conviction to enhance a subsequent burglary conviction,
since it was the fact of the prior felony that was the basis for the enhanced sentence for
the current burglary. State v. Jordan, 1975-NMCA-102, 88 N.M. 230, 539 P.2d 620.

    II.    ELEMENTS OF DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED OR COUNTERFEIT
                              SUBSTANCE.

Distribution by prescription. — When a physician writes a prescription neither for a
legitimate medical purpose nor in the usual course of his professional practice, he is
"distributing" drugs. State v. Carr, 1981-NMCA-029, 95 N.M. 755, 626 P.2d 292, cert.
denied, 95 N.M. 669, 625 P.2d 1186, and cert. denied, 454 U.S. 853, 102 S. Ct. 298, 70
L. Ed. 2d 145 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Olguin, 1994-NMCA-050,
118 N.M. 91, 879 P.2d 92, aff'd in part, 1995-NMSC-077, 120 N.M. 740, 906 P.2d 731.

Narcotic drugs not included. — Subsection A of this section concerns unlawful
conduct involving controlled substances other than the narcotic drugs enumerated in
Schedules I and II. State v. Atencio, 1973-NMCA-110, 85 N.M. 484, 513 P.2d 1266,
cert. denied, 85 N.M. 483, 513 P.2d 1265.

Drugs excluded. — The "except" language in Subsection A excludes a narcotic drug
such as heroin, enumerated in Schedule I, from the purview of the subsection. State v.
Atencio, 1973-NMCA-110, 85 N.M. 484, 513 P.2d 1266, cert. denied, 85 N.M. 483, 513
P.2d 1265.

Sale of narcotics is not involved under this section. State v. Montoya, 1974-NMCA-
025, 86 N.M. 155, 520 P.2d 1100, overruled on other grounds by State v. Bender, 1978-
NMSC-044, 91 N.M. 670, 579 P.2d 796.

Mere possession insufficient. — A conviction based on the offense of possession of
marijuana with intent to illegally sell and deliver cannot be sustained upon proof of
illegal possession alone and the verdict and judgment based thereon must be reversed.
State v. Moreno, 1961-NMSC-070, 69 N.M. 113, 364 P.2d 594.

Place of distribution immaterial. — The crime of possession with intent to distribute is
complete if there is possession with the requisite intent, and the state is not required to
prove the place of the intended distribution. State v. Bowers, 1974-NMCA-135, 87 N.M.
74, 529 P.2d 300, cert. denied, 88 N.M. 29, 536 P.2d 1085 (1975).

                              III.        DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

Double jeopardy. — Defendant’s convictions for possession of methamphetamine and
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute based on a single act of
possessing methamphetamine violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. State v. Quick,
2009-NMSC-015, 146 N.M. 80, 206 P.3d 985.

Lesser included offense. — The separate crimes of possession of methamphetamine
and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute apply in the alternative
when based on a single act of possession. State v. Quick, 2009-NMSC-015, 146 N.M.
80, 206 P.3d 985.

Possession is lesser offense necessarily included in distribution of marijuana.
State v. Medina, 1975-NMCA-033, 87 N.M. 394, 534 P.2d 486.

Distribution prosecution barred by conviction of possession. — Where defendant
was convicted of the lesser offense of possession of marijuana, the principles of double
jeopardy barred his subsequent prosecution of the greater offense of distribution. State
v. Medina, 1975-NMCA-033, 87 N.M. 394, 534 P.2d 486.

Retrial for possession barred. — When two counts were charged in an indictment,
one for illegal possession of marijuana and the other for possession with intent to sell,
an instruction by the court that the jury was to disregard the possession count if it found
defendant guilty of the latter offense operated as an acquittal on the possession count
and prevented retrial of this issue when the verdict on possession with intent to
distribute was overturned. State v. Moreno, 1961-NMSC-070, 69 N.M. 113, 364 P.2d
594.

Constructive proof of possession sufficient. — Proof of actual possession is not
necessary to sustain a conviction of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
Constructive possession will suffice. State v. Muniz, 1990-NMCA-105, 110 N.M. 799,
800 P.2d 734, cert. denied, 110 N.M. 749, 799 P.2d 1121.

                            IV.      EVIDENCE AND PROOF.

                                     A.     IN GENERAL.

Police officer's suspicions based on experience. — Where the police officer had 11
years of experience, of which he had spent eight years in the drug interdiction program
actively participating in exercises on the freeways in various counties, and he estimated
making an average of five drug trafficking arrests per year during that time, with up to 85
percent of those arrests involving rental cars and he testified that in his experience, it
was common to find rental cars being used to transport drugs, frequently where the
actual renter of the vehicle was not present, in light of the totality of the circumstances
and the officer's training and experience, the officer's suspicion about drugs was based
on specific articulable facts and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from
those facts. State v. Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, 138 N.M. 408, 120 P.3d 830.

Nature of substance inferred. — Where all of the alleged marijuana was in the form of
bricks having the same size, color and appearance as those tested, the fact finder could
infer from the evidence that the remaining substance was the same as the tested
portion. State v. Bowers, 1974-NMCA-135, 87 N.M. 74, 529 P.2d 300, cert. denied, 88
N.M. 29, 536 P.2d 1085 (1975).

Evidence not inherently improbable. — Testimony in prosecution for unlawful sale
and possession of marijuana was not inherently improbable despite fact that defendant
was claimed to have insisted on delivering the cigarettes in question in the restroom
where only he and undercover officer were present, yet afterwards supposedly received
the money for the transaction and discussed other possible dealings in a car in the
presence of several other persons. State v. Soliz, 1969-NMCA-043, 80 N.M. 297, 454
P.2d 779.

Establishing entrapment. — The necessity of having to resort to a greater degree of
subterfuge, or to exercise more persistence, in making inquiries to set up an illegal sale
of marijuana, without more, does not constitute evidence of illegal entrapment, nor is it
necessary that a suspected crime be in the process of being committed in order to show
a predisposition to commit that crime. State v. Akin, 1965-NMSC-078, 75 N.M. 308, 404
P.2d 134.

Similar offenses indicative of predisposition. — When the defense is entrapment,
evidence of similar narcotics offenses bears on the defendant's predisposition, or
readiness and willingness, to commit the offenses for which he is charged; and
evidence of prior similar sales of heroin within a period shortly before those in question
was admissible on the issue of entrapment. State v. Anaya, 1969-NMCA-120, 81 N.M.
52, 462 P.2d 637.

Entrapment for the jury. — Defendant's testimony that he was having financial
difficulties, with his wife expecting a baby and his daughter having problems, and that
he considered agent's numerous requests that he obtain marijuana for a month or two
before he finally agreed to involve himself, raised a factual issue as to whether the
criminal conduct was the product of the agent's creative activity. State v. Martinez,
1971-NMCA-110, 83 N.M. 13, 487 P.2d 923.

Entrapment not shown. — Suggestion that the act of officer in supplying the defendant
with his favorite brand of whiskey constituted undue inducement was without merit
where defendant not only dealt in the illegal sale of beer but also drank beer and
whiskey of his own as well as that furnished by others. State v. Akin, 1965-NMSC-078,
75 N.M. 308, 404 P.2d 134.
Evidence of knowledge and control. — Even if someone else had knowledge of the
presence of marijuana in defendant's bedroom and exercised some control over it,
defendant could also have had sufficient knowledge and control to be in constructive
possession, and the link establishing defendant's knowledge and control was evidence
of his commerce in illicit drugs. State v. Muniz, 1990-NMCA-105, 110 N.M. 799, 800
P.2d 734, cert. denied, 110 N.M. 749, 799 P.2d 1121.

                        B.     CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

Inference of intent to distribute. — While there was no evidence of defendants' sale
or an attempted sale of marijuana, the possession of 246.15 pounds of the substance,
together with the defendants' activities, allowed the court to infer that the defendants
had the necessary intent to distribute. State v. Bowers, 1974-NMCA-135, 87 N.M. 74,
529 P.2d 300, cert. denied, 88 N.M. 29, 536 P.2d 1085 (1975).

Evidence of the amount of the cocaine possessed, about three grams, and evidence of
the packaging and purity of the cocaine, as well as evidence that defendant had on his
person a relatively large amount of cash, supported the state's argument that appellant
intended to distribute the cocaine. Minner v. Kerby, 30 F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. 1994).

                         C.     SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

Shared criminal intent. — Evidence regarding marijuana transaction established more
than the mere presence of the defendant during the consummation of the sale,
supporting a finding that he was in charge and directing the sale, or at least counseling,
aiding and abetting in its consummation and sharing a criminal intent and purpose with
the others. State v. Favela, 1968-NMCA-065, 79 N.M. 490, 444 P.2d 1001.

Evidence of possession. — There was sufficient evidence for conviction since it was
shown that the defendant was the owner of the premises from which the sale of illegal
drugs was carried out in her presence and within her view. State v. Chandler, 1995-
NMCA-033, 119 N.M. 727, 895 P.2d 249, cert. denied, 119 N.M. 617, 894 P.2d 394.

Constructive possession and sale shown. — Evidence that witness bought six
ounces of marijuana from defendant, who then gave witness detailed instructions as to
the location of the drug behind a metal shack near the road leading to the airport, was
ample evidence that defendant had constructive possession of and sold the marijuana
to the witness. State v. Wesson, 1972-NMCA-013, 83 N.M. 480, 493 P.2d 965.

Testimony of a single witness was sufficient evidence for conviction of unlawful
possession and sale of marijuana. State v. Soliz, 1969-NMCA-043, 80 N.M. 297, 454
P.2d 779.

Modified trustworthiness standard did not apply to defendant’s extrajudicial
statements. — Where defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit drug trafficking
by distribution, his pre-crime and course-of-crime statements were not subject to the
modified trustworthiness standard, because the majority position views statements
made prior to and in the course of the crime as bearing none of the indicia of
unreliability as post-crime confessions and that there is little need for independent proof
that the crime occurred as a safeguard against a conviction for an imagined crime
where the defendant’s statements at issue were made in the course of the crime. State
v. Saiz, 2017-NMCA-072, cert. denied.

Sufficient evidence of conspiracy to commit trafficking by distribution. — Where
defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit drug trafficking by distribution,
defendant’s statements assuring the undercover officer of the existence of an
agreement to sell him methamphetamine and his actions attempting to achieve the sale
were sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed
conspiracy to commit drug trafficking by distribution, and it was irrelevant that defendant
did not receive money from the undercover officer, no drugs were ever produced or
verified, and no co-conspirator was ever seen, identified, or verified. State v. Saiz, 2017-
NMCA-072, cert. denied.

Evidence sufficient to find intent to distribute. — In prosecution for possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute, based upon the record, where the state
presented enough circumstantial evidence to support an inference of both knowledge
and control, and therefore possession of methamphetamine, there was sufficient
evidence from which a rational jury could have found that defendant intended to
distribute that methamphetamine. State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, 135 N.M. 621, 92
P.3d 633.

Evidence sufficient to infer knowledge. — Defendant's conduct in selling pills,
coupled with his assertion that they would get an undercover agent "good and high,"
was sufficient evidence from which to infer defendant's knowledge of a controlled
substance. State v. Martinez, 1986-NMCA-069, 104 N.M. 584, 725 P.2d 263.

Evidence sufficient to support conviction. — Evidence, including defendant's
exclusive control of the vehicle in which marijuana was found, his lies to the arresting
officer, and his nervous demeanor were sufficient to allow a jury to find that he had
knowledge of the marijuana. State v. Hernandez, 1998-NMCA-082, 125 N.M. 661, 964
P.2d 825.

An undercover agent's testimony that defendant sold him marijuana on two occasions
was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for distributing marijuana.
State v. Laskay, 1986-NMCA-008, 103 N.M. 799, 715 P.2d 72.

Defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute was affirmed,
where the evidence showed that: (1) the black book that defendant used for his drug
transactions was kept in his residence, (2) defendant used the bedroom in which the
marijuana was found at least to the extent of keeping his correspondence, including a
bill for the pager used in his drug transactions, and (3) the marijuana found in a closet
was packaged for distribution. State v. Muniz, 1990-NMCA-105, 110 N.M. 799, 800
P.2d 734, cert. denied, 110 N.M. 749, 799 P.2d 1121.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute where he was in a closed bathroom alone with the
drugs and paraphernalia, he had no clean clothes with him, and after five minutes in the
bathroom, he had not taken a shower and there was no indication that he was planning
to do so; additionally, the folded business card found on the toilet with a powdery
substance in the crease and with handwritten notations of what appeared to have been
drug transactions, connected defendant to the control over and distribution of the drugs.
State v. Barber, 2003-NMCA-053, 133 N.M. 540, 65 P.3d 1095, aff'd, 2004-NMSC-019,
135 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 633.

Sufficient evidence that chemicals were synthetic cannabinoids. — Where
defendant was convicted of trafficking methamphetamine and distribution of synthetic
cannabinoids based on evidence that an accomplice, at the direction of defendant,
delivered methamphetamine and the chemicals PB-22 and 5F-PB22 hidden in
deodorant sticks to an inmate confined in the Curry county detention center, and where
defendant claimed that the state failed to prove that the substances were synthetic
cannabinoids because the particular chemicals were not listed as controlled substances
under the New Mexico Controlled Substances Act (CSA), there was sufficient evidence
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the chemicals collected from the deodorant
sticks were "synthetic cannabinoids" within the meaning of this section where the state
presented testimony from an expert in forensic chemistry that the chemicals PB-22 and
5F-PB22 are categorized as synthetic cannabinoids because while completely
synthetic, the chemicals mimic the effects of cannabis. State v. Salazar, 2018-NMCA-
030, cert. denied.

Sufficient evidence of distribution of synthetic cannabinoids. — Where defendant
was charged with trafficking methamphetamine and distribution of synthetic
cannabinoids after the state alleged that an accomplice, at the direction of defendant,
delivered methamphetamine and synthetic cannabinoids hidden in deodorant sticks to
an inmate confined in the Curry county detention center, there was sufficient evidence
to sustain defendant's convictions beyond a reasonable doubt where the state
presented evidence of recorded phone calls between defendant and the inmate where,
according to testimony by the investigating officer, the two men used code words to
discuss that defendant was going to obtain illegal narcotics by using the inmate's money
from the jail, hide the narcotics in hygiene products, and send the hygiene products into
the jail through a third person, and evidence that an inspection of the hygiene products
at issue contained a green leafy substance and crystal-like substance wrapped in small
baggies in the bottom of deodorant sticks, which were later identified as
methamphetamine and synthetic cannabinoids. State v. Salazar, 2018-NMCA-030, cert.
denied.

                             V.    JURY INSTRUCTIONS.
Instructing on intent. — An instruction substantially in terms of the statute is sufficient.
State v. Tucker, 1974-NMCA-049, 86 N.M. 553, 525 P.2d 913, cert. denied, 86 N.M.
528, 525 P.2d 888, overruled on other grounds by State v. Bender, 1978-NMSC-044, 91
N.M. 670, 579 P.2d 796.

Instructions which are phrased in the terms of this statute were sufficient on element of
intent. State v. Fuentes, 1973-NMCA-069, 85 N.M. 274, 511 P.2d 760, cert. denied, 85
N.M. 265, 511 P.2d 751.

Instruction defining possession. — In prosecution for possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute, although defendant would have been entitled
to a jury instruction defining possession, absent defense counsel’s request, the trial
court was not required to provide the instruction sua sponte. State v. Barber, 2004-
NMSC-019, 135 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 633.

Presumption of innocence. — In prosecution for unlawfully selling and unlawfully
furnishing or giving away marijuana, it was error for the trial court to fail to instruct the
jury on the presumption of innocence, where defendant requested an instruction
thereon. State v. Henderson, 1970-NMCA-022, 81 N.M. 270, 466 P.2d 116.

Law reviews. — For article, "The Confusing Law of Criminal Intent in New Mexico," see
5 N.M. L. Rev. 63 (1974).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 25 Am. Jur. 2d Drugs, Narcotics and
Poisons §§ 179, 181, 187, 188, 191.

Free exercise of religion as defense to prosecution for narcotic or psychedelic drug
offense, 35 A.L.R.3d 939.

Permitting unlawful use of narcotics in private home as criminal offense, 54 A.L.R.3d
1297.

Conviction of possession of illicit drugs found in premises or of which defendant was in
nonexclusive possession, 56 A.L.R.3d 948.

Competency of drug addict or user to identify suspect material as narcotic or controlled
substance, 95 A.L.R.3d 978.

Admissibility, in criminal prosecution, of expert opinion allegedly stating whether drugs
were possessed with intent to distribute - state cases, 83 A.L.R.4th 629.

State law criminal liability of licensed physician for prescribing or dispensing drug or
similar controlled substance, 13 A.L.R.5th 1.

Sufficiency of random sampling of drug or contraband to establish jurisdictional amount
required for conviction, 45 A.L.R.5th 1.
Sufficiency of evidence that possessor of heroin had intent to distribute it, so as to
violate 21 USCS § 841(a)(1), 78 A.L.R. Fed. 413.

Sufficiency of evidence that possessor of marijuana had intent to distribute it, so as to
violate 21 USCS § 841(a)(1), 79 A.L.R. Fed. 113.

Sufficiency of evidence that possessor of controlled substance other than cocaine,
heroin, or marijuana had intent to distribute it, so as to violate 21 USCS § 841(a)(1), 80
A.L.R. Fed. 507.

Sufficiency of showing, in prosecution under Travel Act (18 USC § 1952), of act by
accused, subsequent to accused's travel or use of facilities in interstate or foreign
commerce, which furthers unlawful activity involving narcotics or controlled substances,
113 A.L.R. Fed. 625.

Admissibility, under Rule 404(b) of Federal Rules of Evidence (28 USCS Appx, Federal
Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(b)), of evidence of accused's prior use of illegal drugs in
prosecution for conspiracy to distribute such drugs, 114 A.L.R. Fed. 511.

28 C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics § 156 et seq.