N.M. Stat. » N.M. Stat. / Chapter 31 / Article 1
New Mexico Statutes

N.M. Stat. § 31-1-5 (2026)

Procedures on arrest; reports.

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section NM-LEGnmonesource.com JustiaChapter on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar 
A. Following arrest, any person accused of a crime is entitled to have reasonable
opportunity to make three telephone calls beginning not later than twenty minutes after
the time of arrival at a police station, sheriff's office or other place of detention. Nothing
in this subsection limits any right to make telephone calls at any time later than twenty
minutes after the time of arrival at the police station.

   B. Every accused shall be brought before a court having jurisdiction to release the
accused without unnecessary delay.
   C. Within eighteen hours after the arrest of any person accused with having
committed a misdemeanor or a felony, the arresting law enforcement agency shall notify
the district attorney of:

       (1)    the name of the accused; and

       (2)    the offense charged.

History: 1953 Comp., § 41-1-5, enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 73, § 3.

                                       ANNOTATIONS

Repeals. — Laws 1972, ch. 71, § 18, repealed former 41-1-5, 1953 Comp., relating to
issuance of warrants for fugitives.

Jury instruction on right to make telephone calls. — Where defendant claimed that
defendant had not been informed that defendant could make three telephone calls after
arrest, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when the court refused defendant’s
request to instruct the jury on the requirements of Section 31-1-5 NMSA 1978, because
the statute neither provides a defendant with a right to make three calls nor addresses
an officer’s duty to inform a defendant of the defendant’s entitlement to make the calls.
State v. Coleman, 2011-NMCA-087, 150 N.M. 622, 264 P.3d 523, cert. denied, 2011-
NMCERT-008, 268 P.3d 513.

Effect of denial to accused to make calls. — Absent prejudice, no basis for release is
established by denial of use of a telephone after arrest. State v. Gibby, 1967-NMSC-
219, 78 N.M. 414, 432 P.2d 258.

Burden of proof. — Once a defendant proves that he has been denied access to a
telephone for an extended period of time, the state bears the burden of proving a
reasonable basis for the denial. State v. Bearly, 1991-NMCA-022, 112 N.M. 50, 811
P.2d 83.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases, 1991–2018 · leading case: State v. Coleman, 264 P.3d 523 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
State v. Coleman, 264 P.3d 523 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 16× “{8} As to jury instructions, Defendant asked the court to provide the jury with an instruction informing them of the requirements of NMSA 1978, Section 31-1-5(A) (1973), which states that “[fjollowing arrest, any person accused of a crime is entitled to have reasonable…”
State v. Bearly, 811 P.2d 83 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 32× “Perhaps in this case there were reasonable grounds — grounds that would establish that detention personnel complied with Section 31-1-5. Yet there are no findings to that effect.”
Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645 (10th Cir. 2016). · cites it 2× “” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-1-5 (B). This standard allows for considerable discretion and thus cannot be the basis of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.”
Moya v. Garcia, 895 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2018). “" N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-1-5 (B). Arkansas's version goes no further, omitting any mention of who is required to bring the arrestee to court.”
State v. Jacquez, 888 P.2d 1009 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2× “” On these bases, Defendant argued that the delay between the time the amended complaint was filed and the time Defendant was arraigned violated his rights guaranteed under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, Article II, Sections 14 and 18 of…”
Jenkins v. Chief Just. of the Dist. Court Dept., 619 N.E.2d 324 (Mass. 1993). “3:4-1(a) (1992); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-1-5 (B) (1984); N.Y.”
Moya v. Garcia, 887 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2018). “" N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-1-5 (B). Arkansas's version goes no further, omitting any mention *1167 of who is required to bring the arrestee to court.”
State v. Claudio (N.M. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 4× “” In support of this argument, Defendant cites 17 to NMSA 1978, Section 31-15-4 (2013) (describing the chief public defender; 18 appointment; qualification; removal), NMSA 1978, Section 31-1-5 (1973) (describing 11 1 the procedures on arrests; reports), and NMSA 1978, Section…”
Jenkins v. Chief Just. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 416 Mass. 221 (Mass. 1993). “3:4-1 (a) (1992); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-1-5 (8) (1984); N.Y.”
— N.M. Stat. § 31-1-5(A) — 2 cases
State v. Coleman, 264 P.3d 523 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011). “{8} As to jury instructions, Defendant asked the court to provide the jury with an instruction informing them of the requirements of NMSA 1978, Section 31-1-5(A) (1973), which states that “[fjollowing arrest, any person accused of a crime is entitled to have reasonable…”
State v. Bearly, 811 P.2d 83 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). “Perhaps in this case there were reasonable grounds — grounds that would establish that detention personnel complied with Section 31-1-5. Yet there are no findings to that effect.”
— N.M. Stat. § 31-1-5(B) — 1 case
State v. Jacquez, 888 P.2d 1009 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). “” On these bases, Defendant argued that the delay between the time the amended complaint was filed and the time Defendant was arraigned violated his rights guaranteed under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, Article II, Sections 14 and 18 of…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.