N.M. Stat. § 37-1-3 (2026)

computation of period.
   A. Actions founded upon any bond, promissory note, bill of exchange or other
contract in writing shall be brought within six years.
    If the payee of any bond, promissory note, bill of exchange or other contract in
writing enters into any contract or agreement in writing to defer the payment thereof, or
contracts or agrees not to assert any claim against the payor or against the assets of
the payor until the happening of some contingency, the time during the period from the
execution of the contract or agreement and the happening of the contingency shall not
be included in computing the six-year period of limitation provided in this subsection.

   B. Actions against any banking or financial organization subject to the provisions of
the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (1995) [Chapter 7, Article 8A NMSA 1978] founded
upon a bill of exchange shall be brought within ten years.

   C. Actions founded upon a traveler's check shall be brought within fifteen years.

History: Laws 1880, ch. 5, § 3; C.L. 1884, § 1862; C.L. 1897, § 2915; Code 1915, §
3348; C.S. 1929, § 83-103; Laws 1939, ch. 89, § 1; 1941 Comp., § 27-103; 1953
Comp., § 23-1-3; Laws 1975, ch. 70, § 1; 2015, ch. 91, § 1.

                                    ANNOTATIONS

Cross references. — For Public Securities Limitation of Action Act, see 6-14-4 NMSA
1978.

For statute of limitations in contracts for sale, see 55-2-725 NMSA 1978.

The 2015 amendment, effective June 19, 2015, removed the reference to "courts not of
record" from the statute providing for limitations on actions based on certain private
instruments; in the catchline, after "instruments", deleted "judgments of courts not of
record"; in Subsection A, deleted "Those" and added "Actions", after the first occurrence
of "contract in writing", deleted "or upon any judgment of any court not of record" and
added "shall be brought", after the second occurrence of "contract in writing", deleted
"or upon any judgment of any court not of record", after "execution of", deleted "such"
and added "the", after "happening of", deleted "such" and added "the", after "period of
limitation", deleted "above", and after "provided", deleted "in this subsection"; in
Subsection B, deleted "Those" and added "Actions", after "Uniform", deleted
"Disposition of", after "Act", added "1995", and after "bill of exchange", added "shall be
brought"; and in Subsection C, deleted "Those" and added "Actions", and after
"traveler’s check", added "shall be brought".

                         I.     GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Statutes of limitations are procedural and law of forum governs matters of
procedure. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 1973-NMSC-079, 85 N.M. 409,
512 P.2d 1245.

Effect of dismissal without prejudice. — A dismissal without prejudice operates to
leave the parties as if no action had been brought at all. Following such dismissal, the
statute of limitations is deemed not to have been suspended during the period in which
the suit was pending. King v. Lujan, 1982-NMSC-063, 98 N.M. 179, 646 P.2d 1243.

Filing of complaint tolls statute. — Filing of the complaint is commencement of the
action which generally tolls the applicable statute of limitations. King v. Lujan, 1982-
NMSC-063, 98 N.M. 179, 646 P.2d 1243.

Contract provisions control. — Provision of fire insurance policy that no suit should
be sustainable thereunder unless commenced within 12 months next after loss
prevailed over this section as to time when suit on policy must be commenced. Electric
Gin Co. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 1935-NMSC-001, 39 N.M. 73, 39 P.2d 1024.

Insurance policy provision. — Provisions in insurance policies which limit the period
within which suit may be brought after damage occurs are valid and enforceable if the
time period is reasonable. A three-year limit is reasonable, even though the general
limitations period for actions on a contract is six years. Willey v. United Mercantile Life
Ins. Co., 1999-NMCA-137, 128 N.M. 98, 990 P.2d 211.

Discount agreement. — An agreement providing for scheduled discounts dependent
upon future purchases whose dominant objective was to provide a discount schedule, if
sales were made, is not a contract of sale. The limitation of this section controls rather
than Section 55-2-725 NMSA 1978. Data Gen. Corp. v. Communications Diversified,
Inc., 1986-NMSC-088, 105 N.M. 59, 728 P.2d 469.

Extension by guarantor. — Where contract of guaranty appearing on note involved in
foreclosure suit provided that, in consideration of extension of time of payment of note,
payment of note on demand at any time six years from stated date was guaranteed by
the guarantor, such contract of guaranty extended time of payment six years, and suit
by payee a few months after execution of contract of guaranty was not barred by
limitation. Cullender v. Levers, 1934-NMSC-061, 38 N.M. 436, 34 P.2d 1089.

Effect of verbal promise. — Verbal promise to pay an old debt in monthly installments
in consideration for extension of time for paying balance due was not a new contract
superseding original loan contracts and did not toll running of the statute of limitations.
Petranovich v. Frkovich, 1945-NMSC-037, 49 N.M. 365, 164 P.2d 386.

Written deferral of payments. — Where an agreement is written into promissory notes
that payment is to be deferred for 60 days after demand, the period between their dates
and demand is not to be counted in computing the six-year period of limitation.
Schoonover v. Caudill, 1959-NMSC-030, 65 N.M. 335, 337 P.2d 402.

Effect of nonclaim statute. — The nonclaim statute is not a substitute for the general
statute of limitations as to claims against a decedent's estate and the holder of a
promissory note cannot rely on nonclaim statute where general statute had run but not
the statute of nonclaim. In re Matson's Estate, 1946-NMSC-028, 50 N.M. 155, 173 P.2d
484.
Statute not tolled by performance. — A contract vendee's claim of title, where the
vendee has fully performed and whether or not he or she is in possession, is not cut off
by the running of a statute of limitations. Garcia v. Garcia, 1991-NMSC-023, 111 N.M.
581, 808 P.2d 31.

Statute not tolled by possession. — Possession of mortgaged land by mortgagee
with consent of mortgagor does not toll the statute of limitations; the court will not create
an exception not provided by law. Buss v. Kemp Lumber Co., 1918-NMSC-005, 23 N.M.
567, 170 P. 54.

Equitable estoppel as tolling statute. — The party asserting estoppel must sustain
the burden of showing not only that he failed to discover the cause of action prior to the
running of the statute of limitations, but also that he exercised due diligence and that
some affirmative act of fraudulent concealment frustrated discovery notwithstanding
such diligence. The district court in this case abused its discretion in applying the
doctrine of equitable estoppel to toll the six-year statute of limitations on the breach of
contract claim. The grounds upon which the plaintiffs based their claims were apparent
to them many years prior to filing the 1982 complaint, and they could have commenced
the action within the statutory period. Continental Potash, Inc. v. Freeport-McMoran,
Inc., 1993-NMSC-039, 115 N.M. 690, 858 P.2d 66, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1116, 114 S.
Ct. 1064, 127 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994).

In an action for breach of contract, proof that the defendant intended to deceive or delay
the plaintiff or to dissuade him from pursuing legal action was not required for the
plaintiff to claim equitable estoppel. Tiberi v. CIGNA Corp., 89 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir.
1996).

In an action for breach of contract, the defendant's claim that it made no representations
to the plaintiff upon which he could reasonably rely could not be used to prevent the
application of equitable estoppel. Tiberi v. Cigna Corp., 89 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir. 1996).

Nor pending administrator's appointment. — There is no tolling of the six-year
statute of limitations during the time period in which the decedent's widow has
preferential right to apply for appointment as administrator. In re Matson's Estate, 1946-
NMSC-028, 50 N.M. 155, 173 P.2d 484.

Extension letters satisfied tolling provisions. — In a foreclosure action, where
defendant mortgagor (mortgagor), a business corporation, executed a promissory note
made payable to plaintiff trust (trust) and executed a mortgage on a parcel of land
mortgagor owned in favor of the trust to secure the note, and where mortgagor failed to
pay off the balance of the note before it matured and failed to pay the property taxes on
the property resulting in the attachment of a tax lien, and where the New Mexico
department of taxation and revenue sold the property at a public auction to defendant
Landau, and where the trust and mortgagor twice agreed in writing to extend the
maturity date of the promissory note and mortgage to August 17, 2011 and October 25,
2012, respectively, and where in 2017 the trust filed a foreclosure action seeking to
collect the remaining balance of the note and to foreclose on the mortgage, and where
defendant Landau claimed that the trust was barred by the statute of limitations from
foreclosing on the mortgage, the district court did not err in holding that the extension
letters tolled the six-year statute of limitations, because the letters constituted an
agreement in writing to defer payment on the note and mortgage as provided for in
Subsection A of this section. Reynolds Revocable Trust Agreement v. Landau, 2020-
NMCA-036.

Defendants with foreign residence. — This section and 37-1-9 NMSA 1978 apply to
defendants residing in another country at time of and since executing note sued on.
Bunton v. Abernathy, 1937-NMSC-084, 41 N.M. 684, 73 P.2d 810.

Extinguishment of lien. — Lien created by the statute authorizing the recordation of a
transcript of the docket thereof is a right as distinguished from a remedy, and if the
remedy of foreclosure of the judgment lien prayed for in a counterclaim is barred, the
lien has been extinguished. Pugh v. Heating & Plumbing Fin. Corp., 1945-NMSC-031,
49 N.M. 234, 161 P.2d 714.

                                 II.    APPLICABILITY.

Unless a governmental entity directly contracts for a shorter time-to-sue
provision with either the contractor or the surety, a shorter time-to-sue provision
contained in a performance bond is unenforceable. City of Santa Fe v. Travelers Cas. &
Sur. Co., 2010-NMSC-010, 147 N.M. 699, 228 P.3d 483.

Enforceability of time-to-sue provisions in performance bond. — Where a
municipality contracted with a contractor to repair a tank; the contract did not contain a
time-to-sue provision; the contractor obtained a performance bond from the surety
pursuant to Section 13-4-18 NMSA 1978; the performance bond contained a two year
time-to-sue provision; the municipality declared the contractor in default and demanded
performance from the surety; and the municipality sued the surety more than two years
after the municipality declared the default, the two year time-to-sue provision in the
performance bond was unenforceable and the six year statute of limitation applied. City
of Santa Fe v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 2010-NMSC-010, 147 N.M. 699, 228 P.3d
483.

"Mortgage" is a contract in writing and it falls within the six-year statute. Griffith v.
Humble, 1942-NMSC-006, 46 N.M. 113, 122 P.2d 134.

Land purchase agreement. — Claim arising out of written agreement by defendant
purchasers to pay an additional amount beyond the agreed purchase price for sale of
land within one and one-half years was barred where the action was brought 13 years
after execution of the contract. Romero v. Sanchez, 1974-NMSC-013, 86 N.M. 55, 519
P.2d 291.
Interest coupons. — An action to recover on interest coupons is an action on written
instruments, and the six year, not the four year, limitation applies. Coler v. Board of
Cnty. Comm'rs, 1891-NMSC-024, 6 N.M. 88, 27 P. 619.

City warrants. — It is not error for the court to enter judgment against plaintiff, after
plea of limitations, on petition to fund city warrants, where 10-year delay is not
explained. Miller v. City of Socorro, 1898-NMSC-019, 9 N.M. 416, 54 P. 756; Cross v.
Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 1898-NMSC-018, 9 N.M. 410, 54 P. 880.

Freight charges. — The limitations for transportation charges on freight moving
intrastate in New Mexico is that provided for written contracts, to wit, six years. 1956
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 56-6417.

Section does not apply to action to recover on deficiency on motor vehicle
installment contract. — Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs an action
to recover a deficiency after a default on a motor vehicle installment contract; thus, the
statute of limitations is four years. First Nat'l Bank v. Chase, 1994-NMSC-127, 118 N.M.
783, 887 P.2d 1250.

The exclusion provision of 37-1-17 NMSA 1978 was triggered by the Uniform
Commercial Code's four-year statute of limitation period, precluding the
application of the partial payment rule. — In consolidated appeals, where plaintiff
debt collector filed actions to recover deficiencies in motor vehicle installment contracts
following the repossession and sale of the vehicles subject to the installment contracts,
and where debtors argued that the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) barred the claims
because plaintiff initiated the actions more than five years after default and the UCC
specifies a four-year statute of limitations period for transactions involving the sale of
goods, and where plaintiff argued that its complaints were timely because pursuant to
37-1-16 NMSA 1978, debtors' partial payments after the initial breach tolled the four-
year statute of limitations period set forth in 55-2-725 NMSA 1978, plaintiff's actions
were barred as untimely, because 37-1-17 NMSA 1978 functions as an exclusion
provision that prohibits the application of the partial payment rule when another statute
establishes a statute of limitations period different than the statute of limitations periods
set forth in chapter 37 NMSA 1978, and the UCC's four-year statute of limitations period
is a different time than the default statute of limitations period of six years set forth in 37-
1-3(A) NMSA 1978. Autovest v. Agosto, 2021-NMCA-053, 497 P.3d 642, aff'd by 2025-
NMSC-001.

Failure to service debt. — Action for breach of contract, brought more than six years
after defendant failed to bring certain foreclosure action, was barred where plaintiffs had
had previous notice of defendant's breach. First W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Home Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 1972-NMCA-083, 84 N.M. 72, 499 P.2d 694.

Failure to pay wages. — In an action to exact a penalty from an employer for failure to
pay wages, the time limitations of 50-4-4 NMSA 1978 control over this section. Spikes v.
Mittry Constr. Co., 295 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1961).
Published offer of reward. — An offer by publication of reward for the discovery of the
parties concerned in a murder, while it becomes a contract by performance of the thing
for which the reward was offered, was not a "written contract" within this section.
Cunningham v. Fiske, 1906-NMSC-005, 13 N.M. 331, 83 P. 789.

County bonds. — The six-year statute of limitations did not apply to county bonds
maturing in 1881, where taxes were levied for their payment, and the board of county
commissioners recognized the interest due as a continuing liability before the six years
could attach by authorizing a loan to meet it at maturity. Coler v. Board of Cnty.
Comm'rs, 1891-NMSC-024, 6 N.M. 88, 27 P. 619.

Six-year limitation period governs action on insurance policy. — In an action
brought on an insurance policy, the six-year limitation period of this section, pertaining
to actions brought on a written contract, governs the action. Sandoval v. Valdez, 1978-
NMCA-016, 91 N.M. 705, 580 P.2d 131, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 610, 577 P.2d 1256
(specially concurring opinion).

Claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising
from a breach of a written contract is governed by the six-year statute of
limitations. — Where Presbyterian hospital brought an action against its property
insurer alleging breach of contract and covenant of good faith and fair dealing, after the
hospital suffered a loss to its electrical infrastructure and after the property insurer
ceased its adjustment activity and closed its file, and where the facts established that
the property insurer engaged in delay tactics until after a time-to-sue period, contained
in the insurance policy, had expired, causing the hospital to reasonably believe that it
would not have to resort to a lawsuit, the court held that the insurance company, by its
conduct, relinquished its right to assert the time-to-sue provision as a defense against
the lawsuit, that Presbyterian hospital’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing arose from the breach of a written contract and was thus governed
by this section’s six-year statute of limitations, that the hospital’s cause of action
accrued in November of 2017, and that Presbyterian hospital’s lawsuit, filed on August
30, 2019, was within the six-year statute of limitation period. Presbyterian Healthcare
Servs. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 512 F. Supp.3d 1169 (D. N.M. 2021).

Claim for breach of contract to procure insurance. — Where there was no written
contract to procure insurance between surplus lines broker and businessman, claim for
breach of contract to procure insurance was governed by the four-year statute of
limitations for unwritten contracts, and the statute of limitations for claims based upon
written contracts does not apply to this claim. Nance v. L.J. Dolloff Assocs., Inc., 2006-
NMCA-012, 138 N.M. 851, 126 P.3d 1215.

Because a binder is a contract of insurance and not a contract for insurance, even if
there is a binder, and thus a written contract, it is not a written contract upon which can
be based a claim for breach of contract. Nance v. L.J. Dolloff Assocs., Inc., 2006-
NMCA-012, 138 N.M. 851, 126 P.3d 1215.
Where uninsured motorist clause in policy. — An insurer under an uninsured
motorist clause in a policy is governed by the contract statute of limitations in this
section. To allow an insurer to lessen the period of time to bring an action on an
insurance policy from six years to one year by means of a contract provision would
thwart the purpose of the insured motorist statute. Sandoval v. Valdez, 1978-NMCA-
016, 91 N.M. 705, 580 P.2d 131, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 610, 577 P.2d 1256 (specially
concurring opinion) Ellis v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Cos., 1999-NMSC-034, 128 N.M. 54,
989 P.2d 429;.

Subrogated insurer action against uninsured motorist. — Since an insured has a
six year limitation period for suit against the insurance carrier under an uninsured
motorist claim, the subrogated insurance carrier is bound by the same limitation period
as the insured would be if the insured were bringing suit against the uninsured motorist.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Warren, 1995-NMCA-009, 119 N.M. 429, 891 P.2d 570.

                      III.   ACCRUAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION.

Accrual at time of breach. — A cause of action for a breach of contract accrues at the
time of the breach. Jeffers v. Butler, 762 F. Supp. 308 (D.N.M. 1990), aff'd, 931 F.2d 62
(10th Cir. 1991).

Accrual at time of breach. — Where the parties were in negotiations over the value of
an underinsured motorist claim, in compliance with the insurance contract, during the
six-year limitations period for bringing contract actions, as long as negotiations in
compliance with the insurance contract were ongoing, there was no breach of contract
and the six-year limitations period did not begin to run on the breach of contract claim.
Brooks v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2007-NMCA-033, 141 N.M. 522, 154 P.3d 697.

Accrual from injury, not wrongful act. — A cause of action accrues, for the purpose
of the statutes of limitations, from the injury rather than the wrongful act. Zamora v.
Prematic Serv. Corp., 936 F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1991).

Cashier's check. — Statute of limitations on cashier's check begins running on date
issued not on the date checks were presented for payment. First Nat'l Bank v. Allison,
1973-NMSC-089, 85 N.M. 511, 514 P.2d 30.

Note payable on demand starts statute running from its date. Schoonover v.
Caudill, 1959-NMSC-030, 65 N.M. 335, 337 P.2d 402.

Promissory note. — The statute of limitations commences to run against a cause of
action on a note upon default in payment of interest, where the note provides that upon
default in interest the principal sum becomes due and collectible. Heisel v. York, 1942-
NMSC-009, 46 N.M. 210, 125 P.2d 717; Buss v. Kemp Lumber Co., 1918-NMSC-005,
23 N.M. 567, 170 P. 54.
Under contract obligations payable by installments, the statute begins to run only
with respect to each installment when due. The statute begins to run with respect to the
whole indebtedness only from the date of an exercise of the option to declare the whole
indebtedness due. Welty v. Western Bank, 1987-NMSC-066, 106 N.M. 126, 740 P.2d
120.

When exercising an option in an installment contract to declare the whole
indebtedness due. — Where plaintiff bank, in February 2016, brought a second
foreclosure action against homeowners who defaulted on a mortgage loan in October
2008, following dismissal of its first foreclosure action, which was filed in October 2009
and where bank exercised an option under the note to accelerate and declare
immediately payable and due the full amount of the principal and all interest still owed
under the note, and where homeowners filed for bankruptcy three times between 2011
and 2012, the third of which resulted in a discharge order, the district court erred in
dismissing bank's entire foreclosure claim as barred by the six-year statute of
limitations, because in the context of an installment contract, like the note in this case,
the statute would have begun to run with respect to the whole indebtedness only from
the date of an exercise of the option to declare the whole indebtedness due, and
pursuant to 37-1-12 NMSA 1978, the statute of limitations for its claim for the
accelerated balance as of October 2009 was tolled during the periods in which
homeowners' three bankruptcies were pending in federal bankruptcy court as a result of
automatic stays. LSF9 Master Participation Trust v. Sanchez, 2019-NMCA-055.

Contract of indemnity. — Where a contract of indemnity contains a promise to make
specified payments, an immediate right of action accrues upon the failure of the
indemnitor to perform, regardless of whether actual damages have been sustained.
Zamora v. Prematic Serv. Corp., 936 F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1991).

Certificates of deposit. — The statute of limitations does not begin to run against a
certificate of deposit, until it has been presented to the bank with a demand of payment
and a refusal. Bank of Commerce v. Harrison, 1901-NMSC-014, 11 N.M. 50, 66 P. 460.

The statute of limitations begins to run against the depositor of certificate of deposit at
the time when demand for payment is made. Luna v. Montoya, 1919-NMSC-054, 25
N.M. 430, 184 P. 533).

Guaranty contract. — Statute of limitations does not run against a guarantor until
default of his principal. Cullender v. Levers, 1934-NMSC-061, 38 N.M. 436, 34 P.2d
1089.

County warrants. — Where a county has issued a warrant for feeding prisoners, drawn
upon the treasurer, and one year later the holder presented it to the commissioners to
exchange for bonds, and it was endorsed "presented but not refunded," and signed by
the clerk, this is not a presentment for and refusal of payment; the holder of the warrant
may not then claim that the right of action has not accrued until suit is begun nine years
after the drawing of the warrant. Cross v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 1898-NMSC-018, 9
N.M. 410, 54 P. 880.

Accounting under trust. — Any cause of action under a letter allegedly creating an
express trust in certain motel property in favor of plaintiff arose at the time of the sale or
sales of the property, and at that time, if not before, any right plaintiff might have had to
an accounting came into existence; since there was no evidence of fraudulent
concealment by defendants, the six-year statute of limitations barred plaintiff's action.
Fidel v. Fidel, 1975-NMSC-008, 87 N.M. 283, 532 P.2d 579.

Reformation of deeds. — Where two brothers operated a farm as partners, but
property purchased in 1950 and 1957 was recorded in only one brother's name, the
limitations period to reform the deeds did not begin to run until the brother in whose
name the property was held repudiated the partnership agreement. Bassett v. Bassett,
1990-NMSC-070, 110 N.M. 559, 798 P.2d 160.

Broker's commission. — Where contract for payment of real estate broker's
commission was entered into more than six years before filing of suit, but commission, if
any, would not become due until title to the acreage was obtained by defendant, time
elapsing between the making of the contract and the happening of the condition when
performance became due was not to be counted. Harp v. Gourley, 1961-NMSC-026, 68
N.M. 162, 359 P.2d 942.

Suspension during period where no action possible. — A real estate contract
provided that, should the purchaser continue in default for 30 days after written demand
for payment, the seller could terminate the contract. Since no action on the contract was
possible until 30 days after a notice of default, the statute of limitations was suspended
for 30 days following the notice. Welty v. Western Bank, 1987-NMSC-066, 106 N.M.
126, 740 P.2d 120.

Demand guaranty. — The statute of limitations on a demand guaranty begins to run
when demand is made upon the guarantor. Western Bank v. Franklin Dev. Corp., 1991-
NMSC-009, 111 N.M. 259, 804 P.2d 1078.

Uninsured motorist coverage. — The limitations period on the claim of an insured
against his uninsured motorist carrier for injuries sustained while occupying an
automobile not owned by him does not begin to run until his claim against the
automobile's insurer is finally adjudicated. Ellis v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Cos., 1999-
NMSC-034, 128 N.M. 54, 989 P.2d 429.

Written account. — If a written contract is an account, the four-year limitation of 37-1-4
NMSA 1978 applies; hence, despite written agreements by hospital patients to be
responsible for payment of their accounts, these accounts would still be subject to a
four-year limitation. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-25.
Law reviews. — For article, "Attachment in New Mexico - Part I," see 1 Nat. Resources
J. 303 (1961).

For comment, "Commercial Law - Uniform Commercial Code - Sale of Goods," 8 Nat.
Resources J. 176 (1968).

For comment, "Negotiable Instruments - A Cause of Action on a Cashier's Check
Accrues from the Date of Issuance," see 4 N.M.L. Rev. 253 (1974).

For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to civil procedure, see 12 N.M.L. Rev. 97
(1982).

For annual survey of commercial law in New Mexico, see 18 N.M.L. Rev. 313 (1988).

For annual survey of New Mexico law of civil procedure, 19 N.M.L. Rev. 627 (1990).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 12 Am. Jur. 2d Bills and Notes §§ 1035
to 1056; 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitations of Actions §§ 92 to 99, 126 to 134.

When statute of limitations begins to run in favor of drawer of check, 4 A.L.R. 881.

Statute of limitations as applied to certificate of deposit, 23 A.L.R. 7, 128 A.L.R. 157.

Availability of statute, and time when it begins to run, where one assumes and agrees to
pay another's debt, 31 A.L.R. 1056.

Acceleration provision in note or mortgage as affecting the running of the statute of
limitations, 34 A.L.R. 897, 161 A.L.R. 1211.

Action by or in behalf of creditors of a corporation on unpaid stock or subscription, 35
A.L.R. 832.

When statute of limitations begins to run against action to recover interest, 36 A.L.R.
1085.

Purchase subject to mortgage as removing or interrupting defense of statute of
limitations as against mortgage, 48 A.L.R. 1320.

Grantee's assumption of mortgage indebtedness by deed as simple contract or
specialty within statute of limitations, 51 A.L.R. 981.

When statute of limitations begins to run against warrant of municipal or quasi-municipal
corporation, 56 A.L.R. 830.

Posting of notice or other steps preliminary to nonjudicial foreclosure of mortgage as
tolling statute of limitations as against grantee of mortgaged premises, 122 A.L.R. 938.
Statute of limitations as affecting suit to enforce mortgage or lien securing debt payable
in installments, 153 A.L.R. 785.

When statute of limitations begins to run against action on written contract which
comtemplates on actual demand, 159 A.L.R. 1021.

Acceleration provision as affecting running of limitations, 161 A.L.R. 1211.

Contract in writing within statute of limitations, what constitutes, 3 A.L.R.2d 809.

What period of limitations governs in an action against a public officer and a surety on
his official bond, 18 A.L.R.2d 1176.

Action by passenger against carrier for personal injuries as based on contract or on tort,
with respect to application of statutes of limitations, 20 A.L.R.2d 331.

Entry or indorsement by creditor on note, bond or other obligation as evidence of part
payment which will toll the statute of limitations, 23 A.L.R.2d 1331.

Estoppel to rely on statute of limitations, 24 A.L.R.2d 1413.

When statute of limitations begins to run against note payable on demand, 71 A.L.R.2d
284.

Validity of contractual time period, shorter than statute of limitations, for bringing action,
6 A.L.R.3d 1197.

When does statute of limitations begin to run upon an action by subrogated insurer
against third-party tort-feasor, 91 A.L.R.3d 844.

Statute of limitations as bar to arbitration under agreement, 94 A.L.R.3d 533.

Limitation of action against insurer for breach of contract to defend, 96 A.L.R.3d 1193.

Debtor's restrictive language accompanying part payment as preventing interruption of
statute of limitations, 10 A.L.R.4th 932.

Statutes of limitation: actions by purchasers or contractees against vendors or
contractors involving defects in houses or other buildings caused by soil instability, 12
A.L.R.4th 866.

When statute of limitations commerces to run on automobile no-fault insurance personal
injury claim, 36 A.L.R.4th 357.

When statute of limitations commences to run on right of partnership accounting, 44
A.L.R.4th 678.
When statute of limitations commences to run as to cause of action for wrongful
discharge, 19 A.L.R.5th 439.

Modern status of the application of "discovery rule" to postpone running of limitations
against actions relating to breach of building and construction contracts, 33 A.L.R.5th 1.

Insurer’s waiver of defense of statute of limitations, 104 A.L.R.5th 331.

Limitations of actions applicable to action by trustees of employee benefit plan to
enforce delinquent employer contributions under ERISA (29 USCS § 1132(a)), 90
A.L.R. Fed. 374.

17A C.J.S. Contracts § 531; 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §§ 56, 59, 63, 149 to 152.