New Mexico Statutes

N.M. Stat. § 41-1-1 (2026)

Settlements, releases and statements of injured patients;

✓ current as of May 2026
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acknowledgement required; notice.
    A. No person whose interest is or may become adverse to a person injured who is
either under the care of a person licensed to practice the healing arts, or confined to a
hospital or sanitarium as a patient shall, within fifteen days from the date of the
occurence [occurrence] causing the person's injury:

       (1)    negotiate or attempt to negotiate a settlement with the injured patient; or

       (2)    obtain or attempt to obtain a general release of liability from the injured
patient; or

       (3)    obtain or attempt to obtain any statement, either written or oral[,] from the
injured patient for use in negotiating a settlement or obtaining a release.

    B. Any settlement agreement entered into, any general release of liability or any
written statement made by any person who is under the care of a person licensed to
practice the healing arts or is confined in a hospital or sanitarium after he incurs a
personal injury, which is not obtained in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 [41-
1-2 NMSA 1978] of this act, requiring notice and acknowledgement, may be disavowed
by the injured person within fifteen days after his discharge from the care of the persons
licensed to practice the healing arts or his release from the hospital or sanitarium,
whichever occurs first, and such statement, release or settlement shall not be evidential
in any court action relating to the injury.

    C. Any settlement agreement, any release of liability or any written statement shall
be void unless it is acknowledged by the injured party before a notary public who has no
interest adverse to the injured person.

History: 1953 Comp., § 21-11-1, enacted by Laws 1971, ch. 70, § 1.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

Bracketed material. — The bracketed material was inserted by the compiler and it is
not part of the law.
Adverse or potentially adverse parties. — On its face, the Release Act pertains only
to adverse or potentially adverse parties and prevents those parties from obtaining
statements from injured patients for the purpose of settlement or release. Apodaca v.
AAA Gas Co., 2003-NMCA-085, 134 N.M. 77, 73 P.3d 215, cert. quashed, 2004-
NMCERT-003, 135 N.M. 321, 88 P.3d 263.

An OSHA compliance officer conducting a routine interview in the normal course of
business is not an adverse party within the meaning of the Release Act, despite the
plaintiffs’ contention that OSHA was potentially an "adverse party" in the sense that the
OSHA report blamed the injured plaintiffs and/or their co-employees for the accident
causing the injuries. Apodaca v. AAA Gas Co., 2003-NMCA-085, 134 N.M. 77, 73 P.3d
215, cert. quashed, 2004-NMCERT-003, 135 N.M. 321, 88 P.3d 263.

Restrictions on care of injured person. — While this section does not state that the
care of an injured person by one licensed to practice the healing arts must be actual
and continuous, nor does it limit the time within which the care must be provided, this
section is restrictive in that care must be provided in good faith and must be reasonably
required. Bolles v. Smith, 1979-NMSC-019, 92 N.M. 524, 591 P.2d 278.

Effect of acknowledgment requirement. — The statutory requirement of an
acknowledgment does not impair the obligation of the contract; the acknowledgment is
an integral part of the contract. It is a "restrictive safeguard," but does not prohibit a
defendant from obtaining a valid release, nor does it restrain the freedom of the parties
to contract. Mitschelen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1976-NMCA-093, 89 N.M.
586, 555 P.2d 707, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 9, 558 P.2d 621.

Settlement of lawsuit by attorney with specific authority to settle is binding on the
client. Gonzales v. Atnip, 1984-NMCA-128, 102 N.M. 194, 692 P.2d 1343, cert. denied,
102 N.M. 225, 693 P.2d 591 (1985).

For attorney to bind client to settlement agreement, the attorney must have specific
authority to do so, unless there is an emergency or some overriding reason for
enforcing the settlement despite the attorney's lack of specific authority. Bolles v. Smith,
1979-NMSC-019, 92 N.M. 524, 591 P.2d 278.

Effect of rejection of settlement agreement. — An oral settlement agreement entered
into by an injured person's attorney on the injured person's behalf cannot be enforced
where it was rejected by the injured person prior to its approval by the court or its
dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) or (2), N.M.R. Civ. P., (now Rule 1-041 NMRA). Bolles v.
Smith, 1979-NMSC-019, 92 N.M. 524, 591 P.2d 278.

Settlements subject to rescission. — Any settlement procured by the fraud, artifice or
overreaching of the insurer's agent is subject to rescission even if not disavowed in a
timely fashion, pursuant to Subsection B. Ponce v. Butts, 1986-NMCA-042, 104 N.M.
280, 720 P.2d 315.
Notary publics. — Acknowledgment before a notary public is part of the release and
necessary to its validity. Mitschelen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1976-NMCA-093,
89 N.M. 586, 555 P.2d 707, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 9, 558 P.2d 621.

Noncompliance with Subsection C. — Noncompliance with Subsection C renders the
settlement agreement and any release of liability invalid. Catalano v. Lewis, 1977-
NMCA-016, 90 N.M. 215, 561 P.2d 488, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347.

A release cannot be set aside for mistake. Thus, although plaintiff's injury was more
serious than originally believed, the release could not be set aside. Ponce v. Butts,
1986-NMCA-042, 104 N.M. 280, 720 P.2d 315.

Release invalid when not acknowledged by claimant. — A release of liability with
respect to bodily injury claims prepared by an insurer and signed without
acknowledgment by a claimant while under a doctor's care is invalid. Bolles v. Smith,
1979-NMSC-019,92 N.M. 524, 591 P.2d 278.

Oppressive conduct by insured not condoned. — With the Release Act [41-1-1, 41-
1-2 NMSA 1978], the legislature has not expressed condonation of oppressive conduct
on the part of the insured; the insurer is protected by law if it can prove the insured
fabricated a claim. Mitschelen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1976-NMCA-093, 89
N.M. 586, 555 P.2d 707, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 9, 558 P.2d 621.

Conflicts of law. — Where plaintiff, who was a resident of Minnesota, signed a release
of a workers' compensation claim in Minnesota and the workers' compensation claim
arose out of an injury that occurred while plaintiff was a resident of and working in New
Mexico and that was initially treated in New Mexico, the policy underlying 41-1-1 NMSA
1978 and the protections guaranteed by the statute required the application of New
Mexico law. Ratzlaff v. Seven Bar Flying Services, Inc., 1982-NMCA-071, 98 N.M. 159,
646 P.2d 586, cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794.

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law §§ 156,
157; 15A Am. Jur. 2d Compromise §§ 3, 20, 23, 41; 66 Am. Jur. 2d Release §§ 1, 20.

Discretion of court to vacate its approval of release in respect to minor, 8 A.L.R.2d 460.

Avoidance of release of personal injury claims on ground of fraud or mistake as to the
extent or nature of injuries, 71 A.L.R.2d 82, 13 A.L.R.4th 686.

Release of one responsible for injury as affecting liability of physician or surgeon for
negligent treatment of injury, 39 A.L.R.3d 260.

Insurer's tort liability for acts of adjuster seeking to obtain settlement or release, 39
A.L.R.3d 739.
Modern status of rules as to avoidance of release of personal injury claim on ground of
mistake as to nature and extent of injuries, 13 A.L.R.4th 686.

15A C.J.S. Compromise § 34 et seq.; 25 C.J.S. Damages § 81; 37 C.J.S. Fraud §§ 41,
93; 76 C.J.S. Release § 1 et seq.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 23 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1967–2023 · leading case: Gonzales v. Atnip, 692 P.2d 1343 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
Gonzales v. Atnip, 692 P.2d 1343 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 27× “Gonzales contended the settlement could not be enforced because of the Release Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 41-1-1 and -2 (Repl.Pamp. 1982).”
Apodaca v. AAA Gas Co., 73 P.3d 215 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 6× “) {52} Plaintiffs challenge the admission of these statements on three grounds: (1) the statement is prohibited by NMSA 1978, § 41-1-1 (1971); (2) the statement was not properly authenticated; and (3) as a result of medication and post traumatic shock, Velasquez was incompetent…”
State v. Carter, 601 P.2d 733 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979). · cites it 8× “The issues for decision are: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant, pursuant to § 41-1-1 C, N.M.S.A. 1978, to recant and revoke statements made by him to a police officer while he was under the care of a physician; and (2) whether substantial evidence…”
Williams v. Foremost Ins., 102 F. Supp. 3d 1230 (D.N.M. 2015). · cites it 12× “1 Count III seeks to enjoin Defendant from contacting injured New Mexicans in violation of the New Mexico Reléase Act, NMSA 1978, § 41-1-1; and Count IV seeks a declaratory judgment under NMSA 1978, § 44-6-1, the Declaratory Judgment Act.”
Ratzlaff v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 646 P.2d 586 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). · cites it 6× “Plaintiff challenges the court’s findings and conclusions that Minnesota, and not New Mexico law, determines the validity of the release, and argues that the New Mexico Release Act, §§ 41-1-1 to -1-2, N.M.S. A.1978, and Workmen’s Compensation Act, §§ 52-1-1 to -3-59, N.”
Bolles v. Smith, 591 P.2d 278 (N.M. 1979). · cites it 4× “The result of our original opinion is not changed; however, it was deemed necessary to add language to restrict the application of the rule of law announced to cases arising under §§ 41-1-1, et seq., N.M.S.A. 1978 (formerly §§ 21-11-1, et seq.”
State v. Mantelli, 42 P.3d 272 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “§ 1983 (1994) and the State Tort Claims Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 41-1-1 to -27 (1976 as amended through 2001), by the estate of a domestic violence suspect who was shot and killed by a state police officer.”
Herrera v. Herrera, 974 P.2d 675 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 2× “2d at 1345 (holding compliance with Release Act which provides that settlement agreement for personal injury lawsuit “ ‘shall be void unless it is acknowledged before a notary public’ ” not required for settlement of such claim) (quoting NMSA 1978, § 41-1-1(0 (1971)); see also…”
State v. Garcia, 438 P.2d 521 (N.M. Ct. App. 1968). · cites it 4× “" Section 41-1-1, N.M.S.A. 1953. This means with reasonable promptness and dispatch; it does not mean that defendant must be taken before the magistrate "regardless of the time of day or night.”
Sherrill v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2016 NMCA 056 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016). “Specifically, Sherrill argued that ECS and IPC violated the Release Act, NMS A 1978, §§ 41-1-1 to -2 (1971), Section 59A-16-20, and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”
Richey v. Hammond Conservancy Dist., 2015 NMCA 043 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 2× “Defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 1-012(B)(6), arguing that Plaintiffs claims were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act and claiming governmental immunity under the Tort Claims Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 41-1-1 to -30 (1976, as amended through 2013).”
Ponce v. Butts, 720 P.2d 315 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986). “VALIDITY OF THE RELEASE The definition of a valid release relied upon by defendants in this case is contrary to the policy and established judicial construction of the New Mexico Release Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 41-1-1 to -2 (Repl. Pamp.1982). Defendants argue that any…”
— N.M. Stat. § 41-1-1(A) — 1 case
Williams v. Foremost Ins., 102 F. Supp. 3d 1230 (D.N.M. 2015). “1 Count III seeks to enjoin Defendant from contacting injured New Mexicans in violation of the New Mexico Reléase Act, NMSA 1978, § 41-1-1; and Count IV seeks a declaratory judgment under NMSA 1978, § 44-6-1, the Declaratory Judgment Act.”
— N.M. Stat. § 41-1-1(A)(3) — 1 case
Williams v. Foremost Ins., 102 F. Supp. 3d 1230 (D.N.M. 2015). “1 Count III seeks to enjoin Defendant from contacting injured New Mexicans in violation of the New Mexico Reléase Act, NMSA 1978, § 41-1-1; and Count IV seeks a declaratory judgment under NMSA 1978, § 44-6-1, the Declaratory Judgment Act.”
— N.M. Stat. § 41-1-1(B) — 2 cases
Gonzales v. Atnip, 692 P.2d 1343 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984). “Gonzales contended the settlement could not be enforced because of the Release Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 41-1-1 and -2 (Repl.Pamp. 1982).”
Ratzlaff v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 646 P.2d 586 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). “Plaintiff challenges the court’s findings and conclusions that Minnesota, and not New Mexico law, determines the validity of the release, and argues that the New Mexico Release Act, §§ 41-1-1 to -1-2, N.M.S. A.1978, and Workmen’s Compensation Act, §§ 52-1-1 to -3-59, N.”
— N.M. Stat. § 41-1-1(C) — 2 cases
Gonzales v. Atnip, 692 P.2d 1343 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984). “Gonzales contended the settlement could not be enforced because of the Release Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 41-1-1 and -2 (Repl.Pamp. 1982).”
Williams v. Foremost Ins., 102 F. Supp. 3d 1230 (D.N.M. 2015). “1 Count III seeks to enjoin Defendant from contacting injured New Mexicans in violation of the New Mexico Reléase Act, NMSA 1978, § 41-1-1; and Count IV seeks a declaratory judgment under NMSA 1978, § 44-6-1, the Declaratory Judgment Act.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.